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Abstract	
	
This	thesis	deals	with	the	question	of	whether	developing	countries	can	effectively	protect	
themselves	 against	 the	 effects	 of	 international	 cartels	 and	 what	 strategies	 they	 should	
develop	 in	 order	 to	 do	 so.	 	While	 combating	 cartels	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	 pillars	 of	 both	
domestic	and	international	competition	law	policy,	developing	countries	continue	to	suffer	
the	 brunt	 of	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 international	 cartels.	 	 Because	 most	 developing	
countries	have	little	to	no	functioning	competition	law	policy,	they	are	often	the	most	likely	
targets	 of	 international	 cartels	 and	 therefore	 the	most	 in	 need	 of	 assistance.	 	 Developed	
countries	have	the	resources	and	mechanisms	in	place	to	detect,	investigate,	and	prosecute	
international	cartels	targeting	their	domestic	markets;	however,	developing	countries	rarely	
have	such	opportunities.		This	can	be	especially	problematic	in	instances	where	cartels	such	
as	 export	 cartels,	 are	 located	 in	 one	 jurisdiction	 but	 only	 target	 foreign	 jurisdictions.		
Without	 the	 financial	 or	 human	 resources,	 or	 even	 an	 effective	 competition	 law	
enforcement	 mechanism,	 to	 obtain	 the	 evidence	 needed	 to	 challenge	 these	 cartels,	
developing	countries	often	find	themselves	 in	the	hopeless	situation	of	being	subjected	to	
the	whims	of	the	cartel	but	unable	to	do	anything	about	them.	
	
This	 thesis	 will	 discuss	 both	 the	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 effects	 international	 cartels	
have	 on	 developing	 countries	 and	 the	 global	 market.	 	 This	 discussion	 will	 also	 include	
analysis	of	case	studies	conducted	on	the	effects	of	these	cartels.		Another	chapter	will	be	
devoted	 to	 the	 current	 legislation	 and	 strategies	 that	 have	 already	 been	 established	 to	
combat	international	cartels	in	general.		The	final	chapters	will	cover	what	has	already	been	
done	 to	 help	 developing	 countries	 protect	 themselves	 and	what	 the	 appropriate	welfare	
benchmark	should	be	when	considering	reform	options.	 	The	 final	chapter	on	suggestions	
for	 reform	 will	 be	 divided	 into	 two	 sections:	 domestic	 reform,	 and	 global	 reform.	 	 The	
section	on	domestic	reform	will	focus	on	ways	in	which	developing	countries	can	implement	
and	enforce	their	own	competition	law	systems	as	well	as	encourage	the	development	of	a	
competition	 culture	 in	 the	 market.	 	 Global	 reform	 strategies	 discussed	 will	 include	 a	
discussion	on	whether	forming	a	global,	harmonised	competition	law	agreement	would	be	
feasible	and	methods	on	how	to	foster	greater	cooperation	between	jurisdictions.	
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Introduction	
Research	Question	
	
This	 thesis	 is	 primarily	 concerned	with	 establishing	 what	 the	 effects	 international	 cartels	
have	 on	 the	 global	 market	 and	 more	 specifically	 on	 developing	 countries	 and	 what	
strategies	they	can	adopt	to	rectify	this	issue.		This	analysis	will	pave	the	way	to	discussing	
the	desirability	and	shape	of	more	global	reform	strategies.			
The	Gap	in	the	Law	
	
International	cartels,	and	especially	export	cartels	are	particularly	problematic	in	the	global	
market,	 even	 more	 so	 than	 domestic	 cartels.	 	 This	 is	 because,	 as	 stated	 above,	 most	
competition	 law	 systems	are	only	 concerned	with	prosecuting	 anti-competitive	behaviour	
that	 has	 a	 direct	 effect	 on	 their	market.	 	 Indeed,	 as	 Chapter	 Three	will	 elaborate,	many	
jurisdictions	 implicitly	 or	 explicitly	 exempt	 export	 cartels	 from	 enforcement	 of	 their	
competition	 laws.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 United	 States	 has	 enacted	 a	 number	 of	 statutes	
explicitly	exempting	export	cartels	from	antitrust	law	enforcement,	most	notably	the	Webb-
Pomerene	Act	 (1918),	 the	Export	Trading	Company	Act	 (1982),	and	certain	sections	of	the	
Clayton	Act.		The	European	Union	implicitly	exempts	export	cartels	from	EU	competition	law	
enforcement	by	only	prosecuting	those	cases	that	directly	affect	the	Common	Market.		The	
rationale	 behind	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 exempting	 export	 cartels	 is	 that	 these	 cartels,	 if	
created	 with	 the	 right	 intentions,	 can	 facilitate	 access	 to	 foreign	 markets	 for	 small	 and	
medium-sized	firms	who	would	not	otherwise	be	able	to	enter.		However,	this	is	not	always	
the	case	and	the	next	chapter	will	outline	 the	negative	effects	export	cartels	can	have	on	
the	economy.		
	
While	some	may	argue	that	those	countries	that	are	targeted	by	export	cartels	can	simply	
make	 use	 of	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 enforcement	 mechanisms,	 this	 is	 not	 always	 an	
option.	 	These	cartels	often	target	developing	countries	with	 the	knowledge	that	many	of	
these	countries	either	do	not	have	their	own	competition	law	systems	or	cannot	effectively	
implement	 to	 reach	a	 successful	outcome.	 	 These	 issues	are	exacerbated	by	 the	 fact	 that	
export	cartels	are	domiciled	in	a	different	jurisdiction	than	the	targeted	country,	making	it	
especially	difficult	even	 for	 those	countries	 that	have	effective	enforcement	 strategies	 for	
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domestic	 abuses	 but	 may	 not	 have	 any	 in	 place	 for	 those	 that	 occur	 extraterritorially.		
Obtaining	evidence	located	in	a	different	jurisdiction	is	notoriously	difficult,	particularly	for	
developing	 countries	 that	 lack	 the	 necessary	 resources,	 unless	 the	 foreign	 national	
competition	law	authority	agrees	to	cooperate	with	them.		While	international	cooperation	
agreements	exist	 for	 these	purposes,	 they	are	often	 ineffective.	 	The	problems	associated	
with	these	agreements	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	Six.	
	
Although	 export	 cartels	 can	 be	 especially	 damaging	 to	 the	 market,	 particularly	 for	
developing	 countries,	 international	 cartels	 as	 a	 whole	 can	 also	 have	 severe	 detrimental	
effects	 that	 are	 not	 always	 covered	 by	 traditional	 competition	 or	 antitrust	 laws.	 	 Unlike	
export	cartels,	whose	main	function	is	to	export	products	to	another	country,	international	
cartels	can	have	negative	effects	on	both	the	domestic	jurisdictions	in	which	the	members	
reside	 as	 well	 as	 the	 overall	 global	 market.1	 	 International	 cartel	 behaviour	 can	 be	 very	
similar	 to	domestic	 cartel,	only	on	a	much	 larger	 scale.	Politicians	and	scholars	alike	have	
acknowledged	the	effects	international	cartels	have	on	the	market	as	being	detrimental	to	
consumers.2	 	One	of	 the	most	detrimental	effects	an	 international	 cartel	 can	have	on	 the	
global	 market	 is	 excluding	 competitors	 from	 entering	 or	 expanding	 it.	 	 To	 achieve	 this,	
international	cartel	members	may	divide	the	market	amongst	themselves	and	set	predatory	
prices	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 foreign	 competitors	 from	 entering	 or	 employ	 other	 anti-
competitive	behaviours	designed	to	force	other	firms	out	of	the	market.3	 	Once	they	have	
achieved	 a	monopolistic	 hold	 on	 their	 respective	 territories,	 they	 are	 free	 to	 raise	 prices	
above	competitive	levels.		The	next	chapter	will	give	a	more	detailed	discussion	and	analysis	
of	international	cartels	and	the	effects	their	conduct	has	on	the	market.	
	
Chapter	Three	will	discuss	how	domestic	competition	law	authorities	regulate	international	
cartels;	however,	these	laws	are	not	sufficient	to	curb	their	rise.		Developed	countries	may	
apply	 their	 own	 competition	 or	 antitrust	 law	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 against	 any	
international	 cartels	 that	 target	 them;	 whether	 that	 should	 be	 domestically	 or	
extraterritorially.		While	this	may	make	international	cartels	slightly	easier	to	prosecute	than	
                                                
1	Connor,	John	M.	Global	Price	Fixing,	(2007)	Springer	Science	&	Business	Media	at	50.	
2	See	Levenstein,	Margaret	C.;	and	Suslow,	Valerie	Y.,	‘The	Changing	International	Status	of	Export	Cartel	
Exemptions,’	(2004)	American	University	International	Law	Review,	Vol.	20,	No.	3.	
3	Kaplow,	Louis,	Competition	Policy	and	Price	Fixing,	(2013)	Princeton	University	Press	at	24. 
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export	 cartels	 that	 apply	 the	 same	 anti-competitive	 behaviours	 on	 the	 market,	 in	 cases	
where	 international	 cartels	 only	 target	 developing	 countries,	 there	 is	 often	 little	 to	 no	
recourse	available,	beyond	seeking	cooperation	from	the	host	country,	which	as	mentioned	
above,	is	not	always	a	guarantee.		However,	even	if	the	host	country	cooperates	during	the	
investigation,	 international	 cartels	 are	 also	 notoriously	 difficult	 to	 detect.	 	 Notable	
economist,	 John	 Connor	 has	 estimated	 that	 the	 chances	 a	 cartel	 will	 be	 discovered	 if	 it	
operates	in	Europe	or	the	United	States,	are	between	ten	and	twenty	percent.4		Detection	
outside	 of	 these	 jurisdictions,	 especially	 for	 developing	 countries,	 is	 nearly	 impossible.		
Developing	countries	therefore	face	the	same	problems	with	international	cartels	as	they	do	
with	export	cartels.			
Methodology	
	
I	 have	 analysed	 existing	 legislation	 as	well	 as	 case	 studies	 conducted	 by	 other	 academics	
and	economists	 in	order	to	determine	the	effects	 international	cartels	have	on	developing	
countries	 and	whether	 there	 is	 any	 possibility	 for	 reforming	 the	 current	 situation.	 	 I	 also	
conducted	extensive	research	into	the	academic	literature	surrounding	this	topic	along	with	
the	case	law,	most	notably	from	the	EU	and	the	United	States.	
	
Along	with	analysing	the	existing	academic	literature,	I	have	also	looked	at	economic	studies	
conducted	 by	 the	 OECD.	 	 I	 have	 not	 carried	 out	 any	 of	 my	 own	 empirical	 economic	 or	
econometric	 research,	 but	 rather	 I	 used	 the	 findings	 of	 other	 economists.	 	 This	 is	 in	 part	
because	 much	 of	 those	 findings	 remain	 largely	 undisputed.	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 data	
regarding	 cartels,	 particularly	 export	 cartels,	 is	 confidential.	 	 I	 also	 conducted	 interviews	
with	notable	academics	and	economists	discussing	the	issues	surrounding	export	cartels	and	
possible	ways	to	reform	the	current	system.	
	
What	is	Competition	and	Competition	Law?	
	
Competition	can	be	defined	as	the	struggle	between	firms	for	dominance	 in	order	to	gain	
                                                
4	Connor,	John	M.,	‘Global	Cartels	Redux:	The	Lysine	Antitrust	Litigation,’	(1996)	in	Kwoka,	John	E.;	White,	
Lawrence	J.,	The	Antitrust	Revolution:	Economics,	Competition,	and	Policy,	(2014)	Oxford	University	Press.	
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consumers’	approval	and	business.5		Competition	law	is	a	system	or	body	of	rules	designed	
to	 protect	 competition	 within	 the	 market	 and	 generally	 maximise	 consumer	 welfare.		
Perfect	competition	is	however,	merely	a	theoretical	model	in	which	to	model	competition	
policy	on.6	 	 In	practice,	the	conditions	needed	 in	order	to	achieve	perfect	competition	are	
almost	impossible	and	highly	unlikely	to	occur.		These	conditions	include	but	are	not	limited	
to:	an	almost	 infinite	number	of	buyers	and	sellers;	all	products	must	be	 identical;	buyers	
must	 have	 access	 to	 all	 information	 regarding	 market	 conditions;	 there	 cannot	 be	 any	
‘barriers	to	entry’	preventing	new	sellers	from	entering	the	market;	and	there	cannot	be	any	
‘barriers	 to	 exit’	 preventing	 firms	 from	 leaving	 the	market	 should	 they	wish	 to.7	 	 On	 the	
opposite	end	of	 the	spectrum	is	 the	pure	monopoly.	 	Like	the	perfect	competition	model,	
pure	 monopolies	 are	 nearly	 nonexistent.	 	 	 However,	 monopolies	 can	 have	 a	 destructive	
effect	on	the	market.	 	 In	a	pure	monopoly,	one	single	firm	has	a	dominant	position	 in	the	
market.		In	reality,	a	firm	or	several	firms	working	collectively	may	possess	enough	market	
power	to	enjoy	the	same	benefits	as	a	single	monopolist.	 	Simply	put,	the	main	issue	with	
monopolies	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 firms	 to	 increase	 prices	 and/or	 decrease	 production.		
Competition	 law	 therefore	 aims	 to	 bring	 the	 market	 as	 close	 as	 possible	 to	 perfect	
competition	while	curbing	the	rise	of	monopolies.		
	
Apart	from	preventing	the	spread	of	monopolies	that	could	put	firms	in	a	better	position	to	
abuse	 their	 dominant	 position,	 successful	 competition	 law	 systems	 also	 contain	 stringent	
rules	on	preventing	companies	from	colluding	with	one	another,	or	forming	cartels.	
	
Competition	policy	can	be	defined	as	a	set	of	policies	or	laws	that	are	designed	to	encourage	
competition	 along	 with	 allocative	 efficiency	 in	 the	 market.8	 	 Amongst	 its	 other	 goals,	
competition	policy	seeks	to:	prevent	cartels	or	other	anti-competitive	arrangements	such	as	
price-fixing	 and	 market	 allocation;	 prevent	 mergers	 that	 would	 result	 in	 a	 significant	
lessening	of	competition	(or	strengthen	any	dominance	an	undertaking	may	already	have);	
and	 prevent	 sellers	 from	making	 unilateral	 actions	 that	 would	 significantly	 enhance	 their	
                                                
5	Heyne,	Paul	L;	Boettke,	Peter	J.,	Prychitko,	David	L.	The	Economic	Way	of	Thinking,	(2013)	13th	ed,	Pearson	
Higher	Education	at	102.	
6	Li,	Rita	Yi	Man;	Li,	Yi,	‘The	Role	of	Competition	Law:	An	Asian	Perspective,(2014)	Asian	Social	Science,	Vol.	9,	
No.	7	at	47-53. 
7	Whish,	Richard.	Competition	Law,	(2015)	Oxford	University	Press	at	8.	
8	Motta,	Massimo,	Competition	Policy:	Theory	and	Practice,	(2004)	Cambridge	University	Press	at	xviii	
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market	 power.9	 	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 not	 all	 policies	 under	 the	 “competition	 policy”	
umbrella	 are	 entirely	 competition	 and/or	 efficiency	 enhancing.	 	 For	 example,	 studies	 on	
export	 cartel	 exemptions	 have	 shown	 that	 they	 have	 very	 little	 positive	 effect	 on	
competition	 in	 domestic	 markets	 but	 can	 be	 detrimental	 to	 foreign	 markets.	 	 Therefore,	
when	 speaking	 on	 adopting	 competition	 policy	 in	 developing	 countries,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
note	 that	 any	 policy	 that	 is	 to	 be	 implemented	must	 be	 tailored	 to	 fit	 the	 country’s	 own	
competition	 needs.	 	 The	 ways	 in	 which	 competition	 policy	 may	 be	 implemented	 in	
developing	countries	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	Four.	
	
Competition	law	is	an	element	of	competition	policy.		Other	elements	of	competition	policy	
include	deregulation,	trade	liberalisation,	and	privatisation.		Competition	law	is	a	set	of	laws	
designed	to	promote	the	goals	of	a	country’s	competition	policy.		To	that	effect,	competition	
laws	 control	 alleged	 anti-competitive	 conduct	 by	 their	 domestic	 firms,	 for	 instance	 by	
imposing	 sanctions	 on	 cartel	 behaviour,	 regulating	 potential	 mergers	 that	may	 affect	 the	
competitiveness	of	the	relevant	market,	and	limiting	the	potential	for	abuses	of	dominant	or	
monopoly	positions	in	the	market.	
	
The	Relationship	between	International	Competition	Law	and	Trade	Law	
	
International	 cartels	 can	 affect	 both	 competition	 on	 the	 global	 market	 as	 well	 as	
international	trade.		While	these	are	often	considered	to	be	separate	areas	of	law,	it	will	be	
proposed	in	this	thesis	that	there	is	a	tangible	relationship	between	the	two	and	that	both	
international	 competition	 law	 and	 international	 trade	 law	 can	 be	 used	 to	 remedy	 the	
current	situation.	
	
International	 competition	 law	 and	 trade	 law	 share	 similar	 characteristics,	 such	 as	 both	
preside	over	laws	that	govern	behaviour	that	affects	the	global	market.		However,	it	may	be	
argued	 that	 these	 policies	 could	 be	 considered	 to	 be	mutually	 exclusive	 of	 one	 another.		
Competition	 laws,	 both	 domestic	 and	 international,	 controls	 behaviour	 conducted	 by	
private	 individuals	 or	 companies	 that	 negatively	 affect	 competition.	 	 Traditionally,	 cartels	
                                                
9	Ibid.	
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have	been	considered	to	be	predominately	private.		Trade	laws	on	the	other	hand,	preside	
over	public	conduct,	such	as	tariffs	created	by	the	government	in	order	to	grant	preferential	
treatment	 to	domestic	producers	at	 the	expense	of	 foreign	 competitors.	 	Nevertheless,	 it	
will	be	presented	in	this	thesis	that	the	boundaries	between	international	and	trade	law	are	
not	as	clearly	defined.		Indeed,	the	World	Trade	Organisation	has,	on	numerous	occasions,	
considered	 the	 possibility	 of	 introducing	 a	 separate	 competition	 law	 Agreement.	 	 These	
occasions	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	Six.	
	
This	thesis	will	argue	that	some	private	agreements,	such	as	export	cartels,	due	to	the	fact	
that	some	jurisdictions	explicitly	condone	such	practices,	may	fall	under	public	conduct,	and	
thus	may	be	governed	by	international	trade	law.	
	
The	Importance	of	Cartel	Regulation		
	
A	 large	 part	 of	 competition	 law	 enforcement	 has	 to	 do	 with	 cartel	 regulation	 and	
sanctioning	cartel	behaviour.		Chapters	Two	and	Three	will	discuss	the	effects	international	
cartels	have	on	the	domestic	and	global	market	as	well	as	how	these	cartels	are	regulated	
respectively.			
Hard-Core	Cartels	
	
A	 cartel	 is	 an	 agreement	 between	 undertakings	 with	 the	 intent	 to	 restrict	 or	 distort	
competition	within	the	market.	 	Cartel	agreements	often	 involve	anti-competitive	conduct	
such	as	price-fixing,	i.e.	artificially	raising	the	prices	of	a	product	beyond	what	the	consumer	
would	normally	pay,	or	dividing	the	geographic	market	so	each	competitor	essentially	has	a	
monopolistic	hold	on	 their	part	of	 the	market.	 	 Cartels	 are	often	 complex	and	difficult	 to	
trace.	 	Given	that	 these	agreements	occur	 in	secret,	 they	are	very	difficult	 to	 identify	and	
can	therefore	last	many	years	before	they	are	detected.			
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The	International	Competition	Network,	consolidating	the	definitions	of	cartels	contained	in	
eighteen	 members’	 competition	 laws,10	 found	 three	 commonalities	 shared	 by	 these	
jurisdictions.11		The	three	elements	of	a	cartel	that	these	members’	competition	laws	agreed	
upon	were:	
	
1. An	agreement;	
2. Between	competitors;	
3. To	restrict	competition.	
	
In	 an	 effort	 to	 curb	 the	 rise	 of	 cartel	 behaviour,	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	 a	 broad	
interpretation	to	the	meaning	of	 the	term	‘agreement.’	 	While	 legally	binding	agreements	
such	as	contracts	fall	under	this	definition,	the	Commission	has	also	defined	agreements	as	
those	 that	 are	 more	 informal.	 	 Non-legally	 binding	 agreements	 such	 as	 ‘gentlemen’s	
agreements’12	and	simple	understandings13	have	also	fallen	under	the	ambit	of	Article	101.		
In	 addition,	 many	 competition	 and	 antitrust	 laws	 are	 not	 limited	 to	 merely	 prohibiting	
‘agreements.’	 	 For	 instance,	Article	 101	of	 TFEU	also	 refers	 to	 ‘concerted	practices’	while	
Section	1	of	the	Sherman	Act	covers	everything	from	formal	contracts	to	conspiracies.			
	
The	 United	 States	 also	 has	 a	 wide	 definition	 of	 cartel	 ‘agreements.’	 	 Section	 1	 of	 the	
Sherman	 Act	 includes	 ‘contracts,	 combinations	 in	 the	 form	 of	 trusts	 or	 otherwise,	 or	
conspiracies,	in	restraint	of	trade	or	commerce,’	when	considering	the	definition	of	‘cartel.’		
In	 United	 States	 v.	 Container	 Corp.	 of	 America,	 the	 Court	 extended	 the	 meaning	 of	
‘agreements	 in	 restraint	 of	 trade,’	 to	 include	 an	 agreement	 between	 competitors	 to	
exchange	‘the	most	recent	prices	charged	or	quoted,’	despite	there	being	no	agreement	‘to	
                                                
10	These	jurisdictions	were:	Australia,	Brazil,	Canada,	the	European	Union,	Germany,	Hungary,	Ireland,	Japan,	
South	Korea,	Mexico,	New	Zealand,	Russia,	South	Africa,	Spain,	Switzerland,	the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	
States,	and	Venezuela.	
11	See	ICN,	‘Defining	Hard	Core	Cartel	Conduct:	Effective	Institutions,	Effective	Penalties,’	Report	prepared	by	
the	ICN	Working	Group	on	Cartels	for	the	ICN	4th	Annual	Conference,	Bonn,	Germany,	6-8	June	2005.	
12	ACF	 Chemiefarma	 NV	 v.	 Commission	 [1970]	 Case	 41/69,	 ECR	 661,	 CMLR	 43;	 and	 BPB	 plc	 v.	 Commission	
[2008]	Case	T-53/03,	ECR	II-1333,	5	CMLR	1201.	
13	 Re	 Stichting	 Sigarettenindustrie	 Agreements	 OJ	 [1982]	 L	 232/1,	 3	 CMLR	 702	 where	 an	 ‘understanding’	
between	trade	associations	was	held	to	be	an	agreement	under	Article	101	
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adhere	to	a	price	schedule.’14		The	Court’s	justification	was	that	the	agreement	resulted	in	
an	illegal	situation	of	price	stability	and	uniformity.	
	
Most	 antitrust	 and	 competition	 law	authorities	 are	 concerned	with	mainly	 regulating	 and	
sanctioning	 domestic	 cartels.	 	 Domestic	 cartels	 are	 cartels	 that	 are	 domiciled	 in	 the	
competition	authority’s	 territory	and	have	a	direct,	 substantial,	 and	 foreseeable	effect	on	
that	territory’s	market.15	 	One	of	the	first	competition	laws	enacted	was	the	Sherman	Act,	
which	 sought	 to	 curb	 the	 rise	of	 the	 ‘trust’	 –	 oligopolistic	 cartels	 that	 colluded	with	 each	
other	 rather	 than	acting	 independently.	 	 The	Sherman	Act	was	passed	 in	 response	 to	 the	
government’s	 fears	 of	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 trusts’	 growing	 wealth	 and	 capital	 during	 the	
industrial	age;	since	then,	that	fear	has	not	abated.16			
International	Cartels	
	
Domestic	cartels	are	not	the	only	type	of	anticompetitive	agreement	to	plague	competitive	
markets.	 	Undertakings	 from	different	countries	or	 territories	can	also	collude	together	to	
form	 an	 international	 cartel.	 	 International	 cartels	 may	 be	 even	 more	 dangerous	 than	
domestic	cartels	given	the	 fact	 that	 their	effects	can	reach	beyond	one	single	 jurisdiction.		
Early	chapters	in	this	thesis	will	discuss	the	effects	these	cartels	have	on	both	domestic	and	
global	markets,	with	particular	emphasis	on	developing	countries,	as	well	as	ways	in	which	
they	 are	 regulated.	 	 Later	 chapters	will	 examine	 the	difficulties	 developing	 countries	 face	
when	attempting	to	combat	international	cartels	on	their	own	and	what	strategies	they	can	
adopt	 in	 order	 to	 do	 so	more	 effectively.	 	 Because	 international	 cartels	 are	 a	worldwide	
threat	 to	 healthy	 competition,	 discussions	 on	 reforming	 the	 current	 situation	 will	 also	
include	global	suggestions,	such	as	the	adoption	of	harmonised	competition	law	provisions.	
	
The	 most	 famous	 international	 cartel	 is	 the	 Organisation	 of	 the	 Petroleum	 Exporting	
Countries	 (OPEC)	 oil	 cartel,	 created	 on	 14	 September	 1960.	 	 Its	 stated	 objective	 is	 ‘to	
coordinate	 and	 unify	 the	 petroleum	 policies	 of	 its	 member	 countries	 and	 ensure	 the	
                                                
14	393	U.S.	333	(1969).	
15	See	Foreign	Trade	Antitrust	Improvements	Act,	15	U.S.	Code	§	6a;	see	also	General	Court,	Cast	T-102/96	–	
Gencor	v.	Commission	[1999]	ECR	II-759.		
16	Broder,	Douglas	F.,	U.S.	Antitrust	Law	and	Enforcement:	A	Practice	Introduction,	(2012)	Oxford	University	
Press	at	6.	
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stabilization	of	oil	markets,	 in	order	to	secure	an	efficient,	economic	and	regular	supply	of	
petroleum	 to	 consumers,	 a	 steady	 income	 to	 producers,	 and	 a	 fair	 return	 on	 capital	 for	
those	investing	in	the	petroleum	industry.’17		Although,	as	a	permanent	inter-governmental	
organisation,	 it	 contains	 more	 transparency	 than	 illegal	 hard-core	 cartels,	 its	 conduct	
classifies	 it	 as	an	 international	 cartel	 in	 its	own	 right.	 	 The	 fifteen	member	nations	 to	 the	
OPEC	cartel	collectively	hold	78	percent	of	the	world’s	total	crude	oil	reserves	and	together	
produce	 approximately	 60	 percent	 of	 the	 oil	 that	 is	 traded	 on	 the	 global	market.	 	 Thus,	
there	have	been	times	where	OPEC	has	taken	advantage	of	their	dominant	position	in	the	
international	 oil	 trade	 and	 reduced	 oil	 production	 while	 simultaneously	 increasing	 its	
international	market	price.	 	For	 instance,	 in	October	of	1973,	the	Arab	nations	of	OPEC,	 in	
response	 to	 the	United	 States	 throwing	 its	 support	 for	 Israel	 during	 the	 Arab-Israeli	war,	
declared	an	embargo	on	oil	and	intentionally	reduced	the	supply	of	oil	to	the	global	market.		
Within	months	of	this	decision,	global	oil	prices	rose	from	$3	USD	per	barrel	to	nearly	$12;	
prices	in	the	United	States	were	significantly	higher.		This	triggered	an	international	energy	
crisis	that	was	later	dubbed	the	“First	Oil	Shock”	and	led	to	widespread	economic	recessions	
in	many	oil-importing	countries.	
Export	Cartels	
	
Export	cartels	are	a	unique	form	of	international	cartel	that	occupies	a	special	place	in	most	
competition	law	regimes.		Given	that	the	negative	effects	of	export	cartels	are	often	solely	
felt	 in	 the	 foreign	 jurisdiction	 they	 target,	 they	are	often	exempt	 from	 the	host	 country’s	
competition	or	 antitrust	 rules.	 	 An	 export	 cartel	 is	 a	 cartel	 in	which	 the	undertakings	 are	
located	in	one	territory	(or	territories)	while	targeting	another.		In	other	words,	a	cartel	that	
is	 located	in	one	jurisdiction	while	exporting	to	another	and	limiting	their	anti-competitive	
behaviour	solely	to	that	market.		Export	cartels	often	do	not	adopt	the	same	types	of	anti-
competitive	 conduct	 as	 traditional	 hard-core	 cartels.	 	Much	 of	 their	 conduct	 is	 limited	 to	
dividing	export	markets	or	charging	a	specific	export	price.			
What	makes	a	Cartel	Successful?	
	
Cartel	 success	 is	dependent	on	not	only	external	 factors	such	as	 the	market	structure	but	
                                                
17	‘Our	Missions,’	Opec,	available	at	http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm.	
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also	 internal	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 distribution	 of	 power	 within	 the	 cartel	 itself,	 voting	
structure	and	the	effectiveness	of	mechanisms	used	for	detecting	and	deterring	cheating	as	
well	as	the	ability	of	the	cartel	to	create	barriers	to	entry.18	
	
In	order	to	create	a	successful	international	cartel,	certain	market	factors	must	be	in	place.		
For	 instance,	markets	 where	 there	 are	 relatively	 few	 buyers	 encourage	 the	 formation	 of	
more	cartels	than	in	market	where	there	is	a	higher	concentration	of	buyers	since	in	a	low	
concentrated	market,	the	buyers	are	more	likely	to	be	loyal	to	its	suppliers	or	producers.19		
Cartels	are	also	more	likely	to	succeed	in	a	more	transparent	market,	where	members	are	
able	 to	 monitor	 each	 other’s	 behaviour	 from	 available	 information	 such	 as	 product	
catalogues,	pricing	bulletins	and	marketing	campaigns.		This	transparency	makes	it	easier	to	
detect	cheating	and	deal	with	it	 in	a	timely	manner.	 	Finally,	the	market	must	have	higher	
barriers	to	entry	 in	order	to	prevent	new	firms	from	entering	and	saturating	 it	with	 lower	
priced	products.		This	also	means	that	the	elasticity	of	both	supply	outside	of	the	cartel	and	
demand	must	be	 low.	 	A	 low	elasticity	of	supply	means	non-cartel	members	cannot	enter	
the	market	 in	 response	 to	 increased	prices.	 	A	 low	elasticity	of	demand	means	 that	 there	
should	 be	 no	 close	 substitutes,	 otherwise	 consumers	will	merely	 gravitate	 towards	 them	
and	the	volume	of	cartelised	products	sold	will	decrease.			
	
Aside	from	market	factors,	the	cartel	itself	must	also	have	certain	characteristics	in	order	for	
it	 to	succeed.	 	Firstly,	 the	 time	 frame	–	 the	 longer	a	cartel	 remains	operational,	 the	more	
likely	it	is	to	fail.		However,	the	organisational	structure	of	the	cartel	is	also	essential	in	order	
to	ensure	success.		For	instance,	price-fixing	cartels	can	collapse	due	to	the	failure	to	detect	
and	punish	members’	attempts	to	cheat	by	undercutting	the	agreed	price	or	exceeding	the	
allocated	 quota.20	 	 Similarly,	 failing	 to	 discourage	 free	 riding	 on	 these	 services,	 which	
prevents	 the	 cartel	 from	 recovering	 a	 competitive	 profit	 on	 its	 costs,	 also	 undermines	
cartels	 involved	in	cost-sharing	practices	such	as	 joint	market	research	and	advertising.	 	 In	
order	to	discourage	cheating,	cartels	must	not	only	employ	stringent	punishments	but	must	
also	 establish	 effective	monitoring	mechanisms,	 such	 as	 joint	 sales	 agencies	 or	 requiring	
                                                
18	Levenstein,	Margaret	C.;	Suslow,	Valerie	Y.,	‘What	Determines	Cartel	Success?’	(2006)	Journal	of	Economic	
Literature,	Vol.	44,	No.	1.	
19	Stigler,	George	J.,	‘A	Theory	of	Oligopoly,’	(1964)	Journal	of	Political	Economy,	Vol.	72,	at	44-61.	
20	Dick,	Andrew.	‘When	are	Cartels	Stable	Contracts?’	(1996)	Journal	of	Law	and	Economics,	Vol.	39	at	249.	
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regular	reporting	to	one	another	or	third	parties.		Successful	cartels	will	therefore	ordinarily	
adopt	a	hierarchical	system,	separating	high-level	policy	decisions	made	by	the	executives	
from	the	daily	monitoring	and	negotiations	conducted	by	lower-level	managers.21	
	
Previous	studies	on	the	Effects	of	International	Cartels	
	
It	has	been	proven	in	numerous	studies	that	international	cartels	have	a	devastating	effect	
on	 the	 global	 economy	 and	 especially	 the	 economies	 of	 developing	 countries.	 	 More	
controversial	is	the	effect	export	cartels	have	on	competitive	markets.		Until	recently,	export	
cartels	 have	 not	 only	 been	 tolerated	 but	 actively	 encouraged	 by	 many	 governments.		
However,	 studies	 conducted	 as	 early	 as	 the	 1970s	 began	 to	 explore	 the	 negative	
implications	of	these	cartels	as	well.	
	
Studies	on	 the	effects	of	 international	cartels	can	be	 traced	as	 far	back	as	 the	 late	1800s.		
One	 of	 the	 earliest	 identified	 cartels	 was	 the	 Neckar	 Salt	 Association	 in	 the	 salt	 mines	
industry,	 which	 was	 established	 in	 1828	 and	 whose	 members	 originated	 from	 three	
different	 German	 states.22	 	 An	 American	 economist	 by	 the	 name	 of	 Elisha	 Andrews	 is	
credited	 for	 recognising	 the	 world’s	 first	 global	 cartel:	 the	 infamous	 Parisian	 copper	
syndicate,	which	was	 active	 between	 1887	 and	 1889.23	 	 During	 this	 time,	 the	 association	
controlled	 almost	 160,000	 tons	 of	 copper	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 the	world.24	 	 It	 eventually	
collapsed	due	to	the	rise	of	large,	non-syndicate	producers	of	copper,	which	drove	the	price	
downwards.		Unable	to	fulfil	their	contracts,	the	syndicate	was	disbanded.	
	
Charles	Edgerton’s	study	in	1897	on	the	short-lived	but	quite	successful	cartel,	the	U.S.	Wire	
Nail	Association	is	particularly	noteworthy,	mainly	because	it	is	the	first	American	study	on	a	
U.S.	based	international	cartel.25		His	paper	on	the	cartel	was	written	with	the	help	of	insider	
interviews	and	was	published	only	a	year	after	the	cartel	was	dispersed.		In	it,	he	posits	that	
                                                
21	 Levenstein,	Margaret	 and	Suslow,	Valerie.	 ‘What	Determines	Cartel	 Success?’	 (2006)	 Journal	of	 Economic	
Literature	Vol.44	at	44.	
22	Henderson,	W.O.	Genesis	of	the	Common	Market.	(2013)	Routledge	at	87.	
23	Andrews,	Elisha	B.	‘The	Late	Copper	Syndicate,’	(1889)	Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics,	Vol.	3	at	508-516.	
24	Ibid.	
25	Edgerton,	Charles	E.	‘The	Wire-Nail	Association	of	1895-96,’	(1897)	Political	Science	Quarterly,	Vol.	12	at	246-
272.	
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the	cartel	was	a	necessary	 reaction	to	new	technologies	 that	created	a	surplus	 in	 the	nail	
industry.		Manufacturers	claimed	they	would	have	been	forced	out	in	a	normal	competitive	
environment.		Studies	into	the	effects	of	international	cartels	have	continued	right	up	to	the	
2000s,	most	notably	with	Margaret	Levenstein	and	Valerie	Suslow’s	analysis	of	international	
cartels	and	their	effects	on	developing	countries.		Their	findings	will	be	discussed	at	length	
in	the	following	chapter.	
	
International	 cartels	 continued	 to	 prosper	 and	 form	 in	 the	 1900s.	 	 Approximately	 eighty	
such	associations	were	in	force	by	1914,	affecting	various	aspects	of	 international	trade	in	
different	 industries.26	 	 Cartel	 members	 normally	 reserved	 their	 domestic	 markets	 but	
divvied	 up	 foreign	markets	 amongst	 themselves.	 	 The	 nature	 of	 these	 agreements	 varied	
from	 employing	 export	 quotas	 to	 price-fixing	 and	 exploiting	 patents.	 	 The	 United	 States’	
Antitrust	 Division	 has	 been	 prosecuting	 such	 international	 cartels	 since	 the	 early	 1900s,	
beginning	with	the	case	of	United	States	v.	American	Tobacco	against	British	and	American	
firms	 engaged	 in	 a	 market	 division	 agreement.27	 	 The	 Division	 carried	 on	 filing	 civil	 and	
criminal	 cases	 against	 international	 cartels	 throughout	 the	 1940	 and	 early	 1950s.28		
However,	 between	 the	 1950s	 and	 the	 early	 1990s,	 the	 Division	 reduced	 the	 number	 of	
international	cartel	cases	it	chose	to	prosecute	and	prioritised	domestic	cases.		The	Antitrust	
Division	 has	 since	 reversed	 this	 strategy	 and	 since	 the	 mid-1990s	 has	 once	 again	 made	
prosecuting	international	cartel	cases	its	prime	concern.29	
	
The	 study	 of	 export	 cartels	 and	 their	 effects	 on	 the	 global	 economy	has	 been	 a	 bumpier	
road.	 	As	stated	above,	exemptions	for	export	cartels	are	a	mainstay	of	U.S.	antitrust	 law.		
Given	 the	 United	 States’	 continued	 vehement	 defence	 of	 these	 exemptions,	 the	
government	was	 relatively	uninterested	 in	 the	potential	negative	effects	 these	cartels	can	
have.		Nevertheless,	studies	on	the	effects	of	export	cartels	have	been	conducted	since	the	
early	1990s.		Andrew	Dick	and	Spencer	Weber	Waller’s	writings	on	this	topic	are	particularly	
noteworthy.	 	 Waller’s	 papers	 were	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 reactions	 from	 businesses	
                                                
26	Henderson	(2013)	at	87.	
27	221	U.S.	106	(1911).	
28	American	Bar	Association,	Antitrust	Law	Developments,	Volume	2.	(2007)	American	Bar	Association	at	799-
800.	
29	Ibid.	
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following	the	enactment	of	the	ETC	Act.		In	summary,	he	found	that	many	businesses	were	
reluctant	to	obtain	an	exemption	under	the	new	law	due	to	a	fear	of	disclosing	confidential	
business	secrets.30		As	a	result,	the	number	of	exemptions	granted	decreased	from	4,200	in	
the	early	1990s	to	3,000	by	2006.		Dick’s	studies	were	focused	on	the	impact	export	cartels	
had	on	the	competitive	market.		While	he	did	find	that	some	small	and	medium-sized	firms	
took	 advantage	 of	 the	 exemptions	 in	 order	 to	 enter	 the	 market,	 almost	 78%	 of	 all	 ETC	
associations	 could	be	attributed	 to	 the	 four	 largest	 export	 trading	 companies	 and	93%	of	
associations	 could	 be	 attributed	 the	 nine	 largest.31	 	 He	 also	 found	 that	 prices	 in	 some	
industries	 during	which	 export	 cartels	 were	 active	were	 on	 average	 higher	 than	 in	 years	
when	firms	acted	independently.32	
	
This	 thesis	 will	 consolidate	 the	 studies	 that	 have	 been	 conducted	 on	 the	 qualitative	 and	
quantitative	 effects	 international	 and	 export	 cartels	 have	 on	 competitive	 markets,	 with	
particular	emphasis	on	developing	countries.		It	will	also	detail	the	laws	that	have	been	put	
in	place	to	sanction	these	cartels	as	well	as	the	attempts	developing	countries	have	made	to	
protect	 themselves.	 	 In	 a	 broader	 context,	 it	 will	 also	 build	 on	 proposed	 strategies	 for	
reform	 that	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	 previous	 studies.	 	 Finally,	 it	 will	 propose	 additional	
suggestions	for	reform	in	order	to	help	developing	countries	combat	international	cartels	on	
both	a	domestic	and	global	level.	
	
Developing	Countries	and	International	Cartels	
	
This	 thesis	 will	 focus	 primarily	 on	 the	 effects	 international	 cartels	 have	 on	 developing	
countries	and	strategies	that	may	be	employed	in	order	to	better	address	these	effects.		In	
doing	so,	I	will	be	analysing	the	impact	these	cartels	have	on	developing	countries	generally	
as	 well	 as	 highlighting	 case	 studies	 involving	 specific	 developing	 countries,	 such	 as	 the	
potash	 cartel	 that	 targeted	 India	 and	 China.	 	 These	 discussions	 are	 contained	 in	 Chapter	
Two.		In	the	following	chapter,	I	will	also	concentrate	on	certain	developing	countries	such	
                                                
30	 Waller,	 Spencer	 Weber,	 ‘The	 Ambivalence	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Antitrust	 Policy	 Towards	 Single-Country	
Export	Cartels,’	(1990)	Northwestern	Journal	of	International	Law	&	Business,	Vol.	10	No.	1	at	98.	
31	Dick,	Andrew	R.	‘Are	Export	Cartels	Efficiency-Enhancing	or	Monopoly-Promoting?’	(1989)	UCLA	Economics	
Working	Papers	Series,	No.	601.	
32	Ibid.	
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as	Brazil	and	China	in	order	to	compare	and	contrast	the	differing	ways	developing	countries	
have	 implemented	and	enforced	 their	 competition	 laws	 to	varying	degrees	of	 success.	 	 In	
doing	 so,	 I	 intend	 to	 establish	 a	 foundation	 for	 the	 argument	 that,	 in	 general,	 most	
developing	countries	face	nearly	insurmountable	challenges	when	attempting	to	establish	a	
competition	law	system	of	their	own,	thereby	exacerbating	the	negative	effects	they	suffer	
when	targeted	by	an	international	cartel.	
Characteristics	of	Developing	Countries	
	
The	characteristics	of	what	constitutes	a	developing	country	must	 first	be	outlined	before	
any	 sort	 of	 discussion	 can	 take	 place	 regarding	 the	 effects	 international	 cartels	 have	 on	
developing	countries	and	the	struggles	they	experience	in	combating	these	cartels	on	their	
own.	 	At	 face	value,	 the	most	 important	 characteristic	of	 a	developing	 country	 is	 the	 low	
standard	 of	 living,	 in	 relation	 to	 income,	 economy,	 and	 general	 standard	 of	 life	 in	
comparison	to	developed	countries.		A	developing	country	is	most	commonly	categorised	by	
its	 level	 of	 gross	 national	 income	 (GNI)	 per	 capita.	 	 In	 2016,	 the	 World	 Bank	 classified	
countries	 with	 a	 GNI	 below	 $1,045	 USD	 as	 low-income	 economies.33	 	 This	 threshold	
encapsulates	almost	half	of	all	the	jurisdictions	in	the	world	and	approximately	two-thirds	of	
the	 world’s	 population.	 GNI	 measures	 competition	 both	 as	 an	 input	 and	 an	 output.	 	 It	
identifies	 the	 purchasing	 power	 of	 consumers	 that	 impact	 the	 extent	 of	 possible	
competition	in	a	few	markets.		It	also	indicates	the	level	of	competition	within	the	market:	
competition	 incentivises	 market	 players	 into	 improving	 their	 productivity	 and	 efficiency	
through	innovation,	practices	that	 increase	a	country’s	GNI	 levels.	 	Thus,	 low	levels	of	GNI	
indirectly	suggest	there	is	limited	competition	in	the	market.	
	
Relying	on	GNI	as	the	sole	indicator	of	developed	or	developing	status	has	been	the	subject	
of	criticism	in	recent	years.		GNI	is	a	static,	aggregate	indicator,	which	does	not	examine	the	
sources	 and	 factors	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	 low	 productivity	 levels	 characteristic	 of	
developing	 countries.	 	 Some	 have	 therefore	 advocated	 for	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 test	
incorporating	other	factors	in	the	assessment.		For	example,	the	United	Nations	Resolution	
                                                
33	 World	 Bank,	 ‘Country	 and	 Lending	 Groups,’	 available	 at	 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-
lending-groups	(last	accessed	15	August	2016).	
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identifies	 three	criteria	 in	order	 to	determine	whether	a	country	 falls	 into	the	category	of	
least	 developed:	 low	 GNI,	 an	 element	 of	 human	 resource	 weakness,	 and	 an	 element	 of	
economic	vulnerability.34	 	Therefore,	while	GNI	should	be	included	in	the	consideration	on	
whether	 countries	 should	 be	 classified	 as	 developing	 or	 not,	 it	 should	 by	 no	 means	
constitute	the	only	method	of	classification.	
	
Developing	countries	also	typically	have	high	barriers	to	trade,	which	can	impact	the	level	of	
competition	within	the	market.		For	instance,	one	of	the	most	crucial	barriers	to	trade	that	
developing	 countries	 share	 is	 their	 low	 level	 of	 physical	 infrastructure	 including	 utilities	
(energy,	 water,	 and	 sewage	 networks);	 transportation	 (roads,	 rails,	 and	 ports);	 and	
communication	and	 information	 technologies.	 	The	World	Bank	stated,	“infrastructure	 [is]	
crucial	 for	 generating	 economic	 growth,	 alleviating	 poverty,	 and	 increasing	 international	
competitiveness.”35	 	Without	a	proper	 infrastructure,	 firms	have	difficulty	conducting	day-
to-day	business	activities.		For	instance,	poor	transportation	networks	leads	to	increases	in	
logistical	costs,	thus	limiting	a	firm’s	access	to	other	markets.36	
	
Another	 feature	 many	 developing	 countries	 share	 is	 the	 level	 of	 participation	 their	
governments	maintain	through	state	owned	enterprises.37		Until	recently,	many	developing	
countries	 had	 high	 levels	 of	 governmental	 intervention	 in	 their	 economies.	 	 Many	
jurisdictions	 are	 still	 in	 the	 transitional	 phase	 of	 privatisation,	 deregulation,	 endorsing	
foreign	 direct	 investment	 and	 liberalising	 trade.	 	 Converting	 to	 a	 more	 market-oriented	
economy	and	adopting	more	 free	market	principles	 is	 an	 important	 step	 in	 implementing	
and	applying	competition	laws.38	
	
                                                
34	United	Nations	Office	of	the	High	Representative	for	the	Least	Developed	Countries,	‘Landlocked	Developing	
Countries	 and	 Small	 Island	 Developing	 States,’	 available	 at	 www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/164/,	 last	 accessed	 10	
August	2015.	
35	World	Bank,	World	Development	Report,	(2004)	at	xi,	2.	
36	Escribano,	A.;	Guasch,	L.;	and	Pena,	J.,	‘Assessing	the	Impact	of	Infrastructure	Quality	on	Firm	
Productivity	in	Africa:	Cross-Country	Comparisons	Based	on	Investment	Climate	Surveys	from	1999	to	
2005,’	 (2010)	 World	 Policy	 Research	 Working	 Paper	 5191,	 pp.	 36–37	 and	 67,	 available	 at	
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5191.	
37	Dinavo,	Jacques	Vangu,	Privatization	in	Developing	Countries:	Its	Impact	on	Economic	Development	and	
Democracy,	(1995)	Greenwood	Publishing	Group	at	57.	
38	Krause,	Lawrence	B.,	Liberalization	in	the	Process	of	Economic	Development,	(1991)	University	of	California	
Press	at	107.	
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Developing	 countries	 are	 also	 generally	 characterised	 by	 high	 levels	 of	 economic	
vulnerability.	 	 Many	 developing	 countries	 are	 dependent	 on	 the	 agricultural	 industry	 in	
order	 to	 sustain	 their	 economies,	 leaving	 them	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 natural	 disasters	 and	
changes	in	global	prices.39		They	also	tend	to	have	extreme	inequalities	in	the	distribution	of	
wealth	and	opportunities	with	little	to	no	flexibility.40	 	A	small	group	in	society,	which	also	
tends	 to	 control	 both	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 power,	 holds	 much	 of	 the	 wealth	 in	 a	
developing	country.		Depending	on	the	levels	of	corruption	within	the	society	itself,	this	can	
prove	 problematic	 when	 trying	 to	 establish	 a	 competition	 law	 system.	 	 The	 challenges	
developing	countries	face	when	attempting	to	implement	a	competition	law	system	of	their	
own	will	be	addressed	in	Chapter	Four.	
	
Thesis	Outline	
	
Chapter	Two	will	discuss	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	effects	 international	cartels	have	
on	both	 the	domestic	and	global	market.	 	 It	will	 also	analyse	 some	of	 the	case	 studies	of	
international	 cartels	 that	 have	 been	 conducted	 on	 these	 effects,	 particularly	 those	 in	
relation	to	developing	countries.			
	
Chapter	 Three	will	 cover	 how	existing	 competition	 law	 systems	 enforce	 sanctions	 against	
international	cartels.	 	Particular	focus	will	be	made	on	the	EU	competition	law	system	and	
the	U.S.	antitrust	 law	system.	 	This	discussion	will	 include	an	explanation	of	not	only	how	
individual	 jurisdictions	regulate	cartels	operating	within	their	own	territories	but	also	how	
they	extraterritorially	apply	their	laws	against	foreign	cartels.		An	examination	of	the	explicit	
and	 implicit	 exemptions	 the	United	 States	 and	 the	 EU	 respectively	 have	made	 for	 export	
cartels	will	also	be	made.	
	
Chapter	Four	will	analyse	existing	competition	law	systems	of	developing	countries	as	well	
as	 the	challenges	developing	countries	 face	when	attempting	to	 implement	a	competition	
                                                
39	World	Bank,	Global	Economic	Prospects	and	the	Developing	Countries:	Volume	12,	(2002)	World	Bank	
Publications	at	38.	
40	OECD,	Perspectives	on	Global	Development	2012:	Social	Cohesion	in	a	Shifting	World,	(2011)	OECD	
Publishing	at	95.	
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law	system.		It	will	also	discuss	the	goals	that	developing	countries	must	consider	during	this	
process	and	how	they	differ	from	those	of	developed	countries.	
	
Chapter	Five	will	discuss	whether	there	is	a	case	for	reform.		It	will	begin	by	determining	the	
most	appropriate	welfare	standard	that	should	be	adopted	depending	on	whether	reform	
strategies	 should	 take	 place	 domestically	 or	 globally.	 	 It	 will	 then	 set	 out	 the	 current	
regulatory	 framework	 before	 discussing	 the	 calls	 for	 reforming	 the	 current	 situation	
developing	countries	have	made.		The	last	section	will	outline	some	of	the	goals	any	reform	
strategy	that	is	adopted	should	accomplish.	
	
Finally,	 Chapter	 Six	 will	 evaluate	 the	 different	 reform	 options	 that	 can	 take	 place	 and	
determine	which	would	produce	the	best	outcomes.		On	a	domestic	level,	reform	can	take	
the	 form	of	 consolidating	 domestic	 competition	 laws	 and	providing	 adequate	 support	 for	
developing	 countries	 to	 implement	 their	 own	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 against	
international	cartels.		Global	reform	strategies	may	take	the	form	of	negotiating	for	a	global,	
harmonised	competition	law	agreement	specifically	designed	to	tackle	international	cartels;	
or	more	 realistically,	 developing	ways	 in	which	 to	 encourage	 countries	 to	 establish	more	
regional	 agreements	 with	 one	 another,	 ideally	 between	 developed	 and	 developing	
countries,	in	order	to	foster	support.	
	
	
 23 
 
Chapter	Two	
Qualitative	and	Quantitative	Effects	of	International	Cartels	
	
Introduction	
	
An	analysis	of	the	effects	of	private	international	cartels	is	crucial	in	understanding	both	the	
impact	these	cartels	have	on	the	parties	involved	as	well	as	the	implications	on	international	
trade,	particularly	for	developing	countries.	This	analysis	is	also	vitally	important	in	order	to	
establish	whether	the	laws	are	sufficient	to	address	the	specific	issues	developing	countries	
face	when	dealing	with	 international	cartels.	 	 It	 is	 the	position	of	 this	 thesis	 that	 they	are	
not.		This	chapter	will	therefore	reference	key	economic	terminologies	in	order	to	shed	light	
on	the	current	situation.	
	
This	chapter	will	provide	an	in-depth	analysis	of	both	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	effects	
on	both	markets.		Examinations	on	quantitative	effects	will	also	include	a	discussion	on	the	
economic	 effects	 of	 international	 cartels	 in	 both	 the	 domestic	 market	 and	 international	
markets.	 	 Qualitative	 effects	 are	 defined	 as	 effects	 that	 do	 not	 have	 a	 quantifiable	
measurement	 in	 affected	 jurisdictions,	 such	 as	 food	 shortages	 and	 increased	 tensions	
between	 trading	 partners.	 	 Quantitative	 effects	 are	 defined	 as	 effects	 that	 have	 a	
quantifiable	measurement	in	affected	jurisdictions,	such	as	increased	prices.	
	
While	it	is	widely	accepted	that	hard-core	international	cartels	have	a	detrimental	effect	on	
both	 the	domestic	 and	global	markets,	 the	 same	 cannot	be	 said	 regarding	export	 cartels.		
Governments	have	long	recognised	the	destructive	nature	of	hard-core	domestic	cartels	on	
their	 economy	 and	 thus	 the	 laws	 banning	 such	 behaviour	 are	 entrenched	 in	 every	
established	competition	 law	system.	 	Hard-core	 international	 cartels	are	no	different,	and	
most	 of	 them	 are	 formed	with	 the	 sole	 intention	 of	 employing	 anticompetitive	 tactics	 in	
order	to	reap	additional	profits	to	the	detriment	of	consumers.	 	Studies	conducted	on	the	
effects	 hard-core	 international	 cartels	 therefore	 mainly	 serve	 to	 confirm	 the	 rationale	
behind	 laws	 sanctioning	 cartel	 behaviour	 and	 solidify	 the	belief	 that	developing	 countries	
must	 be	 protected	 from	 these	 cartels	 as	 well.	 	 Studies	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 hard-core	
international	cartels	almost	always	result	in	findings	of	losses	suffered	by	the	consumer,	the	
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question	therefore	becomes	a	matter	of	what	type	of	loss	has	been	suffered	and	how	much.	
	
On	 the	other	hand,	 some	governments	are	 less	willing	 to	 recognise	 the	same	detrimental	
effects	 can	 arise	 through	 export	 cartel	 behaviour.	 	 Studies	 conducted	 into	 the	 effects	 of	
export	cartels	can	yield	two	different	results:	either	the	cartel	will	have	similar	detrimental	
effects	on	the	market	as	a	traditional	hard-core	international	cartel,	in	which	case	it	should	
be	treated	no	differently	under	the	law;	or	it	will	be	shown	that	the	cartel’s	membership	is	
predominately	 comprised	of	 small	 and	medium-sized	 firms,	 in	which	 case,	 the	benefits	of	
allowing	these	firms	access	to	a	market	they	otherwise	would	not	be	able	to	may	outweigh	
any	anticompetitive	effects.	 	However,	 this	does	not	necessarily	mean	all	 such	cartels	are	
inherently	 beneficial	 to	 the	 market.	 	 Therefore,	 the	 benefits	 these	 firms	 enjoy	 from	
cooperating	with	one	another	must	be	weighed	against	any	identifiable	harms	it	produces.		
These	effects,	both	the	positive	and	the	negative,	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	
	
It	 is	 because	 of	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 domestic	market	may	 derive	 some	 benefits	 from	
these	 cartels	 that	 governments	 often	 exempt	 export	 cartels	 from	 their	 competition	 laws	
prohibiting	cartel	behaviour.		Until	recently,	the	detrimental	effects	of	export	cartels	on	the	
global	market	were	often	disregarded	in	favour	of	the	possibility	that	some	of	these	cartels	
may	have	a	beneficial	effect	on	the	domestic	market.		Therefore,	studies	into	the	effects	of	
export	cartels	often	emphasise	 that	while	some	of	 these	cartels	may	have	a	 few	benefits,	
these	must	be	weighed	against	any	harms	that	may	result.		The	controversy	here	lies	in	the	
fact	that	the	harms	are	often	only	felt	in	the	foreign	market	while	the	domestic	market	still	
gains	 some	 moderate	 benefits.	 	 Governments	 are	 therefore	 more	 unwilling	 to	 sanction	
export	 cartels	 if	 their	 own	 consumers	 suffer	 no	 losses	 and	 convincing	 them	 to	 do	 so	 has	
been	an	uphill	battle.		
	
Quantitative	Effects	of	International	Cartels	
	
The	OECD	defined	‘hard-core’	cartels	as	anticompetitive	agreements	made	by	competitors	
in	 order	 to	 fix	 prices,	 restrict	 output,	 submit	 collusive	 tender,	 or	 divide	 or	 share	 the	
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market.41		These	are	distinguished	from	more	‘legitimate’	cartels	such	as	joint	ventures.	For	
instance,	 production	 joint	 ventures	 and	 research	 and	 development	 joint	 ventures	 are	
frequently	encouraged	because	they	often	add	to	competition	and	promote	efficiencies	and	
innovation	 gains.	 	 In	 these	 circumstances,	 consumer	 and	 aggregate	 welfare	 as	 well	 as	
producer	welfare	are	more	likely	to	grow.42		The	OECD	in	the	past	has	condemned	hard-core	
cartels	in	the	1998	Recommendation	as	examples	of	some	of	the	most	egregious	violations	
of	 competition	 law,	 emphasising	 that	 behaviours	 such	 as	 raising	 prices	 and	 restricting	
supplies	would	mean	 some	goods	 and	 services	would	be	 completely	 unavailable	 to	 some	
purchasers	and	unnecessarily	expensive	for	others.43		These	effects	can	have	a	much	greater	
significance	 in	 markets	 of	 developing	 countries	 as	 unwarranted	 price	 increases	 can	
drastically	reduce	the	purchasing	power	of	poorer	consumers.		
	
Given	that	developed	countries	are	often	in	the	best	possible	position,	in	terms	of	resources	
and	 established	 competition	 law	 regimes,	 to	 prosecute	 international	 cartels,	much	of	 the	
empirical	 data	 on	 the	 effects	 these	 cartels	 have	 on	 the	market	 has	 been	 compiled	 from	
cases	where	they	were	successfully	prosecuted	by	these	countries,	mainly	the	United	States	
and	the	European	Union.	
	
Levenstein	and	Suslow	conducted	a	case	study	comprising	of	forty-two	private	international	
cartels	 operating	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	 successfully	 prosecuted	 by	 the	 U.S.	 and	 EU,	 primarily	
focusing	on	the	effects	these	cartels	had	on	developing	countries.44		The	average	length	of	
time	these	cartels	were	found	to	be	operating	was	approximately	five	years,	however,	some	
cartels	 in	 the	 study	 ran	 for	 significantly	 longer	 periods	 of	 time,	 such	 as	 the	 Central	West	
African	shipping	cartel,	which	ran	for	twenty	years.		Of	the	forty-two	cartels	Levenstein	and	
Suslow	 analysed,	 twenty-two	 (52	 percent)	 were	 found	 to	 have	 had	 regional	 effects,	 i.e.	
within	 the	United	 States,	 Europe	 or	 particular	 developed	 countries.	 	 Sixteen	 (38	 percent)	
were	discovered	 to	have	had	either	direct	 effects	on	developing	 countries;	 ‘international’	
                                                
41	OECD,	‘Recommendation	of	the	Council	concerning	effective	action	against	hard	core	cartels,’	(1998),	Paris:	
OECD.	
42	Ibid.	
43	Ibid.	
44	 Levenstein,	Margaret	 and	Suslow,	Valerie.	 ‘Contemporary	 International	Cartels	 and	Developing	Countries:	
Economic	Effects	and	Implications	for	Competition	Policy.’	(2003)	Antitrust	Law	Journal,	Vol.	71,	No.	3.	
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effects;	 effects	 in	 ‘the	 U.S.	 and	 elsewhere’;	 or	 in	 ‘Europe	 and	 specific	 third	 markets.’45		
Levenstein	 and	 Suslow	 then	 narrowed	 their	 study	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 effects	 on	 developing	
countries	 by	 calculating	 the	 volume	 of	 goods	 developing	 countries	 imported	 from	
international	cartels.	
	
They	estimated	that	the	total	value	of	‘cartel-affected’	imports	to	developing	countries	was	
approximately	$51.1	billion	USD.		They	compared	this	figure	with	the	total	amount	given	in	
foreign	aid	to	all	developing	countries	in	1997,	which	was	$39.4	billion	USD.		This	figure	of	
$51.1	billion	 formed	3.7	percent	of	all	 imports	 to	developing	 countries	 in	1997	as	well	 as	
0.79	 percent	 of	 their	 combined	 GDP.	 	 When	 compared	 with	 the	 figures	 extracted	 from	
developed	 countries,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 international	 cartels	have	a	 far	more	negative	
effect	 on	 developing	 countries	 than	 they	 do	on	 their	 developed	 counterparts.	 	While	 the	
total	value	of	cartel-affected	imports	to	developed	countries	 is	significantly	higher	($140.8	
billion	USD	as	opposed	 to	$51.1	billion),	 this	 figure	accounts	 for	only	3.4	percent	of	 their	
imports	and	0.6	percent	of	their	GDP.46	
	
In	another	 study	 conducted	by	 the	OECD	 in	2000	on	hard-core	 cartels,	 it	 reported	by	 the	
Competition	 Law	 and	 Policy	 Committee	 (CLP)	 that	 in	 the	 United	 States	 alone,	 ten	
international	cartels	were	discovered	to	have	cost	 individual	consumers	and	businesses	an	
uncalculated	hundreds	of	millions	of	dollars	for	every	year	they	were	operational.47		These	
cartels	 also	 affected	 over	 ten	 billion	 dollars	 in	 American	 commerce	 with	 overcharges	
totalling	over	one	billion	dollars.		The	OECD	noted	that	in	order	to	calculate	the	total	harm	
on	 a	 global	 scale,	 these	 figures	 would	 need	 to	 be	 increased	 by	 the	 harm	 of	 these	 ten	
identifiable	 cartels	 had	 outside	 the	 United	 States	 and	 include	 the	 harm	 of	 any	 other	
successfully	prosecuted	international	cartels	as	well	as	the	successfully	prosecuted	domestic	
cartels,	many	of	which	have	international	effects	as	well	as	domestic	effects.		In	order	to	be	
wholly	 accurate,	 the	 calculation	 must	 also	 include	 undiscovered	 and	 unproven	 cartels,	 a	
much	 larger	 and	 uncertain	 number.	 	 However,	 given	 the	 data	 available	 for	 discovered	
cartels,	 it	 is	clear	that	the	negative	effects	felt	by	the	United	States	can	be	translated	 into	
                                                
45	Ibid	at	806.	
46	Ibid	at	816.	
47	OECD,	‘Hard	Core	Cartels’	(2000),	Paris:	OECD.	
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much	more	devastating	effects	for	developing	countries.	
	
It	 is	 impossible	 to	 calculate	 the	 total	quantitative	effect	 international	 cartels	have	had	on	
the	 global	 market.	 	 This	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 international	 cartels	 are	 almost	
impossible	to	detect.		Therefore,	for	every	cartel	that	has	been	identified	and	whose	effects	
can	be	accurately	measured,	there	may	be	many	more	 lurking	 in	the	shadows.	 	The	OECD	
estimates	that	at	least	one	in	three	international,	or	hard-core,	cartels	remain	undetected.48		
However,	 a	 sample	of	 the	 various	 international	 cartels	 that	have	been	 identified	 can	give	
some	 illustration	 to	 their	 overall	 effect.	 	 In	 the	 vitamins	 cartel,	 which	 involved	members	
from	France,	Germany,	Japan,	Switzerland,	and	the	United	States,	cartel	members	increased	
prices	of	vitamins	required	in	the	manufacturing	of	livestock	feed	and	other	products	such	
as	bread,	 rice,	and	 juice	by	up	 to	35%	for	U.S.	 consumers.	 	The	graphite	electrodes	cartel	
raised	 prices	 by	 45%	 and	 up	 to	 90%	 in	many	 parts	 of	 the	world.	 	 The	 price	 of	 lysine,	 an	
ingredient	 added	 to	 animal	 feed,	 rose	 by	 70%	 during	 the	 first	 six	months	 of	 the	 cartel’s	
formation.49	
	
While	it	could	be	argued	that	producers	in	developing	countries	would	be	able	to	increase	
their	 prices	 in	 response	 to	 the	 rising	 cartel	 prices,	 in	 many	 circumstances,	 this	 is	 not	 a	
feasible	solution.	 	There	may	be	differences	 in	the	quality	of	the	product	or	differences	 in	
manufacturing	or	distribution	 costs	 that	would	prevent	domestic	producers	 in	developing	
countries	from	matching	the	cartel	prices.		On	the	other	hand,	domestic	producers	can	also	
suffer	 harm	 in	 instances	 where	 cartel	 members	 prevent	 imports	 into	 their	 market	 and	
decrease	 the	 price	 to	 below	market	 value.	 	 Graphite	 electrode	 producers	 in	 India	 found	
themselves	 in	 this	 very	 situation.50	 	 Indian	 graphite	 electrode	 producers	 argued	 that	
electrodes	 were	 dumped	 into	 India	 at	 a	 price	 of	 $2200	 per	 tonne	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	
international	price	of	$3200	per	tonne.	 	Unable	to	compete	with	the	low	prices	set	by	the	
cartel;	Indian	producers	were	being	pushed	out	of	the	market.		In	response	to	the	complaint	
filed	by	the	Indian	Graphite	Electrode	Manufacturers	Association,	the	government	imposed	
anti-dumping	duties	on	imports	coming	from	the	United	States,	several	European	countries,	
                                                
48	OECD.	Fighting	Hard-Core	Cartels:	Harm,	Effective	Sanctions	and	Leniency	Programme	(2002)	Paris:	OECD	at	
73.	
49	Sweeney,	Brendan	J.	The	Internationalisation	of	Competition	Rules.	(2009)	Routledge	
50	‘CVD	on	Graphite	Electrodes	Imports	Likely,’	Financial	Express,	20	April	1997	at	2.	
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and	China.51	
	
Qualitative	Effects	of	International	Cartels	
	
The	qualitative	effects	international	cartels	can	have	on	a	market	can	be	separated	into	two	
categories:	 effects	 on	 consumers	 and	 effects	 on	 producers.	 	 The	 main	 effect	 felt	 by	
consumers	 in	 a	 country	 importing	 cartel-affected	 goods	 is	 of	 course	 increases	 in	 price,	
particularly	 if	 the	 cartel	 is	 successful.	 	 Producers	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 even	 those	 that	 are	
excluded	from	the	cartel,	may	reap	some	benefits	such	as	the	ability	to	sell	under	the	cartel-
pricing	 scheme,	without	having	 to	 follow	any	production	quotas	 the	 cartel	may	 impose.52		
However,	 the	 long-term	 negative	 effects	 producers	 may	 suffer,	 which	 will	 be	 detailed	
below,	may	outweigh	these	benefits.	
	
Turning	first	to	the	qualitative	effects	 international	cartels	can	have	on	consumers.	 	 In	the	
short-term,	 consumers	 may	 benefit	 from	 decreases	 in	 price	 due	 to	 local	 price	 wars.53		
However,	 these	 effects	 are	 short	 lived	 and	 the	 overall	 negative	 effects	 vastly	 exceed	 the	
temporary	 benefits.	 	 Once	 a	 cartel	 has	 ‘settled’	 and	 is	 operating	 at	maximum	 efficiency,	
consumers	subjected	 to	higher	prices	choose	either	not	 to	pay	 for	 the	cartelised	product,	
thus	going	without,	or	they	pay	the	cartel	price	and	thereby	unwittingly	transfer	wealth	to	
the	cartel	members.54	
	
The	benefits	for	producers	of	free	riding	under	an	international	cartel’s	price	umbrella	have	
already	 been	mentioned,	 however,	 producers,	 particularly	 those	 in	 developing	 countries,	
can	also	suffer	harmful	effects	as	a	result	of	an	international	cartel’s	activities.		For	instance,	
cartels	 can	 prevent	 producers	 from	 entering	 the	market	 by	 using	 tariff	 barriers	 and	 anti-
dumping	duties	amongst	other	strategies.55		International	cartels	can	also	impose	non-tariff	
barriers	to	limit	entry.		One	such	example	of	a	cartel	imposing	a	non-tariff	barrier	to	entry	
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53	Ibid. 
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can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 price-fixing	 scheme	 in	 the	 EU	 steel	 beam	 market,	 which	 operated	
between	1988	until	1994.		According	to	Karl	Van	Miert,	the	EU	competition	commissioner	at	
the	time,	steel	manufacturers	who	were	engaging	in	price	fixing	in	the	steel	beams	market	
‘restricted	the	flow	of	information	…	in	order	to	freeze	out	any	new	competitors.’56		Exactly	
what	type	of	information	the	steel	makers	were	restricting	is	unknown	from	the	published	
record	of	the	steel	beam	case;	however,	cartels	have	commonly	used	information	regarding	
technology	as	well	as	patent	pools	in	order	to	create	barriers	to	entry.57	
	
Creating	 barriers	 to	 entry	 through	 preventing	 producers	 in	 developing	 countries	 from	
entering	 international	markets	or	obstructing	exports	 from	developing	countries	 results	 in	
harm	 in	 both	markets.	 	 First,	 the	 consumers	 of	 the	 other	markets	 are	 offered	 a	 smaller	
selection	of	products.		Second,	particularly	for	developing	countries,	whose	development	is	
wholly	driven	by	exports,	barriers	to	entry	decelerate	that	growth.	
	
Cartels	have	also	used	anti-dumping	duties	and	tariffs	as	barriers	to	entry.		In	an	especially	
memorable	case,	ferrosilicon	producers	 in	the	United	States	formed	a	price-fixing	cartel	 in	
1989	 and	 began	 using	 the	 anti-dumping	 laws	 in	 U.S.	 and	 Europe	 to	 their	 advantage	 by	
barring	 entry	 to	 non-cartel	 members.58	 	 By	 refusing	 to	 lower	 their	 prices	 in	 response	 to	
increasing	imports,	the	cartel	members	lost	market	share.		They	then	filed	an	anti-dumping	
complaint,	citing	their	loss	of	market	share	as	evidence	of	harm	to	the	American	ferrosilicon	
industry	and	anti-dumping	duties	were	subsequently	imposed	against	five	countries	in	1993.		
The	cartel’s	activities	only	came	to	light	when	the	Department	of	Justice	filed	indictments	in	
1995	and	1996.		The	anti-dumping	duties	were	then	lifted	in	1999.	
	
International	cartels	can	continue	to	haunt	producers	in	developing	countries	even	after	the	
cartel	has	been	dissolved.	 	Barriers,	 like	 those	discussed	above,	created	by	the	cartel	may	
exist	 long	 after	 the	 cartel	 itself	 has	 been	 broken	 up.	 	 These	 barriers	 may	 then	 force	
developing	 country	 producers	 into	 joint	 ventures	 that	 further	 limit	 their	 distribution	 or	
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Journal	Europe,	February	17,	1994	at	3.	
57	Levenstein	and	Suslow	(2003)	at	821.	
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restrict	sales	to	certain	markets.59		These	joint	ventures	could	then	pave	the	way	for	former	
cartel	members	to	 invite	the	producers	 into	a	new	cartel	under	terms	favourable	to	those	
members.		While	these	agreements	allow	developing	country	producers	access	to	the	global	
market,	 this	may	 come	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 level	 of	 competition	 they	may	 otherwise	 have	
obtained	 in	 the	 industry.	 	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 former	 cartel	 members,	 joint	
ventures	may	be	a	way	for	them	to	retain	their	market	dominance	without	having	to	resort	
to	creating	a	formal	cartel.	
	
This	strategy	can	be	seen	in	the	conduct	of	the	firms	following	the	break	up	of	the	citric	acid	
price-fixing	cartel	in	1995.60		Hoffman-LaRoche	subsequently	made	a	number	of	investments	
in	 China	 for	 a	 range	 of	 products	 it	manufactures,	 including	 a	 citric	 acid	 facility	 partnered	
with	Wuxi	Zhongya,	one	of	China’s	three	largest	citric	acid	producers.		Other	former	cartel	
members,	Cargill	and	Tate	&	Lyle,	have	invested	in	Brazil,	where	the	high-quality	and	low-
cost	sugar	supply	is	drawing	in	citric	acid	manufacturers.		These	investments	can	be	seen	as	
either	 a	way	 for	 the	 firms	 to	maintain	 their	 dominance	 in	 the	market	 or	 else	 that	 as	 the	
price	 of	 citric	 acid	 falls	 following	 the	 downfall	 of	 the	 cartel	 and	 the	 Chinese	market	 has	
grown,	 western	 producers	 are	 more	 willing	 to	 allow	 entry	 by	 Chinese	 producers	 by	
exchanging	their	technology	for	access	to	low-cost	production	methods.61	
	
On	the	other	hand,	developing	country	producers	as	well	as	those	who	are	more	established	
could	 also	 have	 other,	 more	 welfare-enhancing,	 motives	 for	 establishing	 a	 joint	 venture	
such	as	sharing	technology,	local	market	expertise	or	gaining	access	to	capital.62		However,	
these	motives	do	not	necessarily	cancel	out	the	more	sinister	reasons	for	entering	into	such	
an	agreement.		Joint	ventures	can	both	enhance	welfare	as	well	as	restrict	competition.		It	is	
therefore	vital	that	such	agreements	are	carefully	monitored,	particularly	those	in	industries	
with	a	history	for	 international	price	fixing,	 in	order	to	allow	consumers	 in	developing	and	
developed	 countries	 to	 experience	 the	 welfare-enhancing	 benefits	 that	 come	 from	
cooperation	while	protecting	them	from	the	harms.	
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60	Ibid.	
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Effects	of	International	Cartels	on	International	Trade	
	
Aside	 from	the	effects	 international	cartels	and	export	cartels	have	on	competition	within	
the	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 markets,	 these	 cartels	 can	 also	 have	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	
international	 trade.	 	 The	effects	export	 cartels	have	on	 trade	have	already	been	explored	
above,	 and	while	 that	 discussion	may	 also	 be	 applied	 to	 international	 cartels,	 a	more	 in	
depth	analysis	is	also	required.	
	
While	national	cartels	are	predominately	the	domain	of	domestic	competition	laws,	by	their	
very	 nature,	 international	 cartels	 must	 be	 analysed	 from	 both	 a	 competition	 and	
international	 trade	 perspective.	 	 The	 conduct	 and	 effects	 of	 domestic	 cartels	 are	 limited	
solely	 to	the	 jurisdiction	 in	which	 it	 is	domiciled.	 	On	the	other	hand,	 international	cartels	
often	have	members	from	many	different	jurisdictions	and	thus	their	effects	are	often	felt	
on	 a	 global	 scale.	 	 International	 cartel	 behaviour	 between	 trading	 partners	 can	 therefore	
affect	 both	 competition	on	 the	 global	market	 as	well	 as	 the	 relationships	 in	 international	
trade.	
	
International	 cartels	 can	 also	 effectively	 create	 monopolies	 in	 the	 countries	 they	 are	
affecting.	 	Cartels	 that	allocate	different	geographical	areas	 to	 their	members	ensure	 that	
not	only	do	 those	 cartel	members	not	 compete	with	each	other	 in	 the	 same	market,	but	
also	 that	 by	 employing	 the	 strategies	 described	 above,	 the	 cartel	 itself	 remains	 the	
dominant	seller	on	the	market.	
	
This	type	of	behaviour	can	be	illustrated	in	the	titanium	dioxide	cartel.63		In	1920,	the	major	
manufacturers	of	titanium	dioxide	colluded	 in	order	to	divide	the	global	markets	between	
themselves	as	well	as	eliminate	free	competition	from	the	industry	itself.		The	participating	
American	firms	were	allocated	the	North	and	Central	American	markets.		The	Germans	were	
assigned	 to	 Middle	 Europe	 and	 one	 French	 manufacturer	 was	 given	 exclusive	 access	 to	
France	 and	 French	 territories.	 	 In	 this	 way,	 international	 trade	 in	 titanium	 dioxide	 was	
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entirely	controlled	by	the	cartel.	
	
By	participating	in	the	cartel,	the	American	firms	were	prohibited	from	exporting	to	Europe,	
a	large	market	that	under	normal	competitive	conditions,	they	would	have	easily	been	able	
to	do.	 	Due	to	the	conditions	of	the	cartel	and	the	market	 itself,	not	only	were	the	export	
activities	of	 the	American	manufacturer	 controlled	by	 the	various	agreements	but	also	 so	
were	 the	 activities	 of	 other	 potential	 manufacturers	 and	 exporters	 of	 the	 product.	 	 The	
same	conditions	applied	to	the	other	international	manufacturers	in	the	cartel.		As	a	result,	
the	 efforts	 of	 the	 cartel	 to	 allocate	 areas	 of	 the	 international	 markets	 to	 its	 respective	
members	 led	 to	 the	effect	of	 creating	domestic	monopolies	 in	 those	markets.	 	 The	 cartel	
was	subsequently	identified	and	successfully	prosecuted	and	the	individual	members	were	
ordered	to	disband	and	enter	the	global	market	as	free	agents.	
	
However,	 international	 cartels	 do	 not	 normally	 come	 under	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	WTO	
given	 that	 they	 usually	 involve	 private	 corporations	 and	 there	 is	 little	 to	 no	 government	
involvement.	 	 This	 can	 be	 contrasted	with	 how	 export	 cartels	 are	 treated	 as	 jurisdictions	
such	as	the	United	States	continue	to	allow	the	formation	of	export	cartels	while	prohibiting	
other	domestic	and	international	cartels.		The	possibility	that	there	may	be	a	case	brought	
before	the	WTO	against	the	U.S.	for	its	explicit	export	cartel	exemptions	will	be	discussed	in	
Chapter	 Six.	 	 Furthermore,	 while	 it	 may	 be	 argued	 that	 international	 cartels	 create	 or	
maintain	barriers	 to	 trade,	 they	do	not	necessarily	 result	 in	 the	 forms	of	 restricting	 trade	
that	the	WTO	ordinarily	regulates.	
	
Export	Cartels	
	
Pure	 export	 cartels,	 or	 cartels	 whose	 sole	 purpose	 is	 exporting	 to	 other	 markets,	 are	
perceived	to	have	little	to	no	effect	on	the	markets	in	which	they	operate.		Therefore,	these	
jurisdictions	are	often	not	as	incentivised	to	pursue	an	export	cartel	operating	in	their	own	
territories	than	they	would	a	hard-core	cartel.	
	
Most	 countries	 that	 explicitly	 allow	 for	 exemptions	 for	 export	 cartels	 allege	 that	 these	
exemptions	promote	cooperation	between	small	and	medium-sized	 firms	so	that	 they	can	
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overcome	the	barriers	to	foreign	trade.64		By	combining	their	market	power,	these	firms	can	
share	market	research	and	advertising.		They	can	also	reduce	the	costs	needed	in	order	to	
fulfil	any	labelling,	packaging	and	quality	requirements	of	importing	countries.65		While	this	
strategy	may	work	 for	 small	 and	medium	 sized	 firms,	 there	 is	 little	 evidence	 that	 export	
cartels	 are	 predominately	 formed	 by	 those	with	 a	 small	 share	 of	 the	market.	 	 Indeed,	 in	
some	cases,	the	opposite	may	be	true.		For	instance,	in	1991,	just	before	Japan	abolished	its	
export	 cartel	 exemptions,	 almost	 a	 quarter	 of	 all	 Japanese	 exports	 were	 conducted	 by	
export	cartels.66			
	
Export	cartels	can	also	have	an	effect	on	the	domestic	market,	i.e.	the	markets	in	which	they	
operate.		For	instance,	Schultz	posits	that	if	the	domestic	and	importing	markets	are	similar,	
or	 if	 there	 are	 constant	 returns	 to	 scale67,	 firms	 tend	 to	 reduce	 production	 in	 both	
markets.68		In	this	situation,	due	to	a	decrease	in	production,	an	export	cartel	can	lead	to	an	
increase	 in	 prices	 in	 both	 the	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 market,	 thereby	 placing	 a	 heavier	
burden	on	consumers	in	both	of	these	markets.	
	
Developing	countries	are	in	the	most	vulnerable	position	of	often	not	having	the	capacity	to	
prosecute	 an	 export	 cartel	 that	 is	 not	 in	 their	 jurisdiction.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 Mexican	
competition	law	authority,	Comisión	Federal	de	Competencia	(CFC)	or	Federal	Competition	
Commission,	 has	 a	 limited	 ability	 to	 sanction	 foreign	 export	 cartel	 that	 create	
anticompetitive	 effects	 on	 the	 market	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 power	 granted	 by	 existing	
legislation.69		Given	these	difficulties	in	prosecuting	export	cartels,	studies	conducted	on	the	
qualitative	effects	of	export	cartels	are	often	concentrated	on	developing	countries.	
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Quantitative	Effects	of	Export	Cartels		
	
Consumers	in	importing	countries	can	be	burdened	by	 increased	import	prices	 imposed	by	
effective	export	cartels.		A	study	conducted	by	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	
and	 Development’s	 (OECD)	 Competition	 Committee	 between	 1996-2000	 found	 that	 16	
larger	cartels	out	of	a	119	case	sample	of	export	cartels	had	a	direct	impact	on	international	
commerce	 that	 exceeded	 $55	 million	 USD.70	 	 While	 such	 an	 amount	 may	 not	 appear	
significant	in	comparison	to	the	larger	global	trading	economy,	such	seemingly	insignificant	
figures	 can	 quickly	 exacerbate	 what	 began	 as	 a	 minor	 issue.	 	 The	 OECD’s	 Committee	 of	
Experts	on	Restrictive	Business	Practices	(CERBP)	noted	that	export	cartels	could	create	or	
maintain	barriers	to	trade.71		Consumers	are	forced	to	pay	higher,	non-competitive	prices	if	
an	export	cartel	operates	to	increase	export	costs	or	limit	the	quantity	of	imports.72		These	
effects	 are	more	 likely	 to	 occur	 in	 situations	where	 export	 cartels	 operate	 in	 oligopolistic	
industries,	producing	homogeneous	products.73	
	
Export	cartels	operating	 in	developed	countries	and	exporting	to	developing	countries	are	
often	more	harmful	than	beneficial.	
	
This	is	because	firms	in	developing	countries	are	usually	‘price	takers,’	in	that	they	have	little	
to	no	control	over	the	prices	set	by	these	cartels	and	are	therefore	forced	to	accept	them	
without	 the	possibility	of	negotiation.74	 	 It	 is	almost	 intuitive	 that	 the	 less	competition	an	
export	cartel	faces	in	a	developing	country’s	market,	the	more	able	it	is	to	exert	its	market	
power.	 	 Therefore,	 countries	 with	 industries	 that	 have	 yet	 to	 develop	 are	more	 likely	 to	
suffer	 harm	 from	 an	 export	 cartel	 than	 countries	 where	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 and	 diverse	
industrial	economy.75		In	a	developing	country,	an	export	cartel	operating	from	a	developed	
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country	 can	be	extremely	detrimental.	 	 Cartel	 practices	 such	as	 the	 refusal	 to	 sell	 certain	
materials	or	equipment	or	setting	minimum	prices	can	affect	the	prices	and	supply	of	such	
goods	used	in	exporting	and	domestic	industries	of	developing	countries.76		There	is	also	the	
possibility	 that	 an	 export	 cartel	 in	 a	 developed	 country	 that	 has	 a	 proportionately	 larger	
market	share	may	engage	in	monopolistic	attacks	against	the	members’	weaker	competitors	
in	the	developing	market.		Because	a	developing	country	is	not	likely	to	have	an	established	
competition	 law	 regime,	 it	 is	 often	 far	 more	 difficult	 for	 it	 to	 successfully	 prosecute	 an	
export	cartel	operating	in	a	developed	country	since	any	evidence	of	collusion	would	likely	
be	contained	in	another	jurisdiction.		
	
Supporters	of	export	cartels	often	assert	that	because	some	export	cartels	have	a	low	world	
market	share,	they	have	very	little	impact	on	the	world	economy.		While	this	may	be	true,	
other	export	cartels	can	possess	a	 low	market	 share	globally	but	at	 the	same	time	hold	a	
high	share	in	certain	countries’	markets.77		Historical	trading	routes	between	developed	and	
developing	 countries	may	 account	 for	 the	 discrepancy	 in	 global	 and	 individual	 countries’	
market	 shares,	 demonstrating	 that	 export	 cartels	may	have	 a	 disproportionately	 negative	
effect	on	developing	countries’	markets.78	
	
Finally,	 export	 cartels	 have	 a	 greater	 chance	 of	 success	 of	 exercising	 market	 power	 in	
developing	countries	where	the	domestic	industries	are	typically	less	competitive.79	
	
The	Potash	Cartel	
	
Canada’s	 potash	 export	 cartel,	 which	 was	 in	 operation	 for	 forty	 years,	 faced	 significant	
criticism	from	the	media	and	academics	alike.		It	was	disbanded	in	2013.	
	
PotashCorp	 used	 its	 jointly	 owned	 subsidiary	 Canpotex	 in	 order	 to	 coordinate	 sales	 with	
American	 companies	 Mosaic	 Co.	 and	 Agrium	 Inc.	 into	 export	 markets	 beyond	 North	
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America.80	 	 Uralkali,	 Russia’s	 largest	 producer	 of	 fertilizer	 quickly	 followed	with	 a	 similar	
strategy	of	price	fixing	and	production	cuts.		These	cartels	accounted	for	approximately	70%	
of	the	global	trade	in	potash.81		Due	to	the	nature	of	potash	itself,	the	geographical	supply	is	
highly	concentrated,	with	Canada	owning	52%	of	the	world’s	known	reserves,	Russia	owning	
21%,	Belarus	owning	9%	and	Germany	owning	8.4%.82	 	 Therefore,	 countries	without	 such	
reserves	would	be	more	heavily	dependant	on	imports	in	order	to	meet	their	needs.	
	
It	 was	 reported	 that	 during	 a	 period	 of	 eighteen	 months,	 between	 January	 2008	 and	
October	2009,	the	price	of	potash	increased	by	more	than	400%.83		In	order	to	maintain	its	
high	prices,	both	Uralkali	and	PotashCorp	announced	temporary	production	cuts	in	January	
2012.84		These	decisions	had	a	devastating	effect	on	developing	countries	such	as	India	and	
China,	who	 rely	 on	 exports	 in	 order	 to	 sustain	 their	 demands	 and	 are	 one	 of	 the	 largest	
consumers	of	potash	in	the	world.	
	
In	 response	 to	 the	potash	export	 cartel,	 India	 temporarily	 ceased	 its	 imports	 in	2009	and	
threatened	to	do	so	again	in	2010.85		However,	the	country	is	entirely	dependent	on	potash	
imports	in	order	to	meet	the	food	needs	of	its	population.		As	a	result,	its	withdrawal	from	
importation	had	little	effect	on	the	potash	producers	given	their	awareness	that	India	could	
not	 sustain	 it	 for	 long	without	 endangering	 its	 own	 crops.	 	 In	 such	 a	 situation,	 imposing	
Indian	competition	law	and	sanctioning	the	potash	cartel	would	likely	create	more	problems	
than	solutions.86	 	 India’s	 competition	 law	system	at	 the	 time	was	not	equipped	 to	handle	
transnational	 anticompetitive	 conduct.	 	 Not	 only	 did	 it	 face	 the	 same	 difficulties	 all	
developing	 countries	 do	with	 regards	 to	 the	 issues	 of	 obtaining	 evidence	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
resources	 needed	 to	 initiate	 an	 investigation	 but	 also	 even	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 successful	
outcome,	it	may	not	be	assured	that	any	imposed	fine	would	be	successfully	enforced	as	the	
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cartel	 remained	outside	of	 its	 jurisdiction.	 	Furthermore,	 it	was	 thought	 that	export	cartel	
members	would	have	reacted	to	such	a	strategy	by	raising	export	prices	to	India	in	order	to	
recover	 any	monetary	 fines	 that	might	 have	 been	 successfully	 enforced	 against	 them.	 	 It	
would	 also	 have	 been	 difficult	 to	 guarantee	 that	 sanctioning	 one	 export	 cartel	 would	
prevent	cartelists	from	employing	similar	anticompetitive	behaviours	in	India	in	the	future.87			
	
The	 effects	 the	 potash	 cartel	 had	 on	 the	 Indian	 market	 could	 have	 been	 cumulative.		
Assuming	India	needs	an	average	yearly	supply	of	6.5	million	tons	of	potash	between	2011	
and	2020,	its	annual	overage	paid	on	imports	would	have	been	approximately	$1.71	billion	
USD.88		Additionally,	should	the	government	have	continued	paying	a	yearly	subsidy	totalling	
$1.5	billion	USD	in	order	to	ensure	potash	fertilizers	was	more	affordable	for	Indian	farmers,	
due	to	the	restrictive	conduct	of	the	potash	producers,	between	80%-100%	of	this	subsidy	
would	have	financed	or	strengthened	the	monopolistic	hold	potash	producers	have	in	India.	
	
In	China,	the	overall	effects	the	potash	cartel	had	on	the	economy	were	not	quite	so	dire.		
Based	on	the	assumption	that	China	will	 import	an	average	of	4	million	tons	of	potash	per	
year	 between	 2011	 and	 2020,	 the	minimum	 yearly	 overcharge	 it	would	 have	 paid	would	
have	been	approximately	$500	million	USD.	
	
In	spring	2011,	Mofcom,	the	Chinese	merger	control	authority	approved	the	merger	of	two	
Russian	 potash	 producers,	 Uralkali	 and	 Silvinit	 on	 three	 conditions.89	 	 Firstly,	 the	merged	
entity	 must	 adhere	 to	 the	 established	 sales	 process	 and	 procedures	 when	 exporting	 to	
China.		Secondly,	the	merged	entity	must	maintain	its	levels	of	sales	and	supplies	in	order	to	
meet	 the	demands	of	China’s	consumers,	both	 in	relation	to	product	volume	and	product	
range.	 	 Thirdly,	 the	merged	 entity	must	 continue	 to	 employ	 traditional	 price	 negotiation	
procedures	with	Chinese	consumers	and	also	account	for	the	historical	and	current	trading	
situation	that	shape	the	unique	features	of	the	Chinese	market.90		Unlike	India,	China	is	not	
wholly	dependent	on	imports	in	order	to	meet	its	needs	for	potash	as	it	has	the	capacity	to	
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produce	a	 limited	quantity.	 	Over	 time,	China	could	potentially	produce	enough	potash	 in	
order	 to	meet	 its	demands	without	 importing	 from	Canada,	 thus	 increasing	 its	bargaining	
power	with	such	export	cartels.	
	
Qualitative	Effects	of	Export	Cartels		
	
Aside	 from	 the	 heavy	 economic	 toll	 on	 developing	 countries’	 markets,	 export	 cartels	
operating	in	the	primary	products	sector	such	as	potash	and	phosphorous,	both	necessary	
for	 the	production	of	 fertiliser,	 can	also	exact	a	heavy	burden	on	 the	basic	necessities	 for	
life.		It	follows	therefore	that	if	Indian	consumers	of	potash	are	forced	to	pay	a	higher	price	
on	potash	imports,	they	may	not	be	able	to	afford	the	quantities	of	potash	needed	in	order	
to	sustain	India’s	food	supply.	
	
In	addition	to	rising	prices	in	potash	fertilizers,	there	is	also	evidence	that	an	export	cartel	
on	 potash	 can	 directly	 contribute	 to	 food	 shortages,	 particularly	 in	 developing	 countries.		
Jenny	has	identified	three	factors	that	are	likely	to	contribute	to	the	increase	in	demand	for	
potash	 in	 the	 next	 few	 years.91	 	 First,	 higher	 incomes	 in	 developing	 economies,	 such	 as	
China	 and	 India,	 necessitate	 increased	 demand	 in	 food	 consumption.	 	 Secondly,	 global	
population	will	increase	from	seven	billion	to	more	than	nine	billion	by	2050.		Thirdly,	due	to	
industrial	 development,	 the	 amount	 of	 land	 available	 for	 agricultural	 purposes	 is	 steadily	
shrinking,	 placing	 a	 greater	 burden	 on	 the	 remaining	 farmland.	 	 This	 is	 especially	
problematic	 for	 developing	 countries	 as	 agricultural	 yields	 are	 typically	much	 lower	 than	
those	 in	developed	countries.	 	The	problem	is	further	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	potash	
has	no	convenient	substitutes	and	therefore,	in	the	long	run,	demand	is	fairly	inelastic.92	
	
In	 an	 article	 published	 in	 2011	 by	 Chinadaily.com	 Feng	 Mingwei,	 the	 deputy	 general	
manager	 of	 Sinofert	 Holdings	 Limited,	 the	 largest	 fertiliser	 importer	 in	 China	 stated,	 ‘our	
dependence	on	 imported	potash	fertiliser	 is	a	 threat	to	our	national	 food	security.’93	 	The	
issue	with	 China’s	 food	 supply	was	 attributed	 to	 the	monopolisation	 of	 the	 international	
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exporters	and	the	resultant	increases	in	the	international	prices	of	potash.	
	
However,	 China	 also	 holds	 a	 significant	 share	 of	 the	 world’s	 remaining	 phosphate	 rock	
reserves.		Together	with	Morocco,	China	owns	approximately	60%	of	the	world’s	supplies	of	
phosphorous	and	controls	between	20%	and	30%	of	the	its	global	trade.94		As	of	2008,	China	
has	 imposed	 a	 100-175%	 export	 tax	 in	 order	 to	 limit	 phosphorous	 exports	 and	 keep	 its	
supply	 within	 its	 own	 borders.	 	 This	 strategy	 strengthens	 the	 control	 of	 the	 three	 most	
dominant	 firms	 in	 the	market:	 Cargill,	which	 holds	 or	 controls	 over	 30%	of	 the	American	
reserves	 of	 phosphates,	 the	 Potash	 Corporation	 of	 Saskatchewan,	which	 possesses	 about	
50%	of	the	U.S.	domestic	supplies	and	Office	Cherifien	des	Phosphates	(OCP),	the	Moroccan	
phosphate	monopoly.		Canpotex,	which	enjoys	an	explicit	exemption	under	section	45(5)	of	
the	Canadian	Competition	Act	1985,	together	with	Cargill	have	colluded	to	form	PhosChem,	
an	American	export	cartel	allowed	under	the	Webb-Pomerene	Act	of	1918	also	controls	a	
large	 portion	 of	 the	 world	 trade	 in	 phosphate,	 indicating	 their	 intention	 to	 access	 and	
perhaps	monopolise	 the	world	market.95	 	 The	 data	 are	 particularly	 problematic	 given	 the	
demand	for	phosphorous	is	predicted	to	increase,	peaking	around	the	year	2033,	while	the	
current	 global	 reserves	may	 be	 exhausted	 in	 between	 fifty	 and	 one-hundred	 years,	 thus	
compounding	the	shortage	of	phosphate	fertilisers.96	
	
As	 already	 noted,	 in	 addition	 to	 effects	 on	 competition,	 export	 cartels	 can	 also	 have	
significant	effects	on	international	trade.		Later	chapters	of	this	thesis	will	elaborate	on	the	
role	competition	law	can	play	in	international	trade	law	as	well	as	the	difficulties	associated	
with	 applying	 a	 policy	 that	 is	 mainly	 used	 to	 govern	 the	 actions	 of	 private	 individuals	
(competition	policy)	 to	 a	policy	used	 to	 regulate	 government	 conduct	 (trade	policy).	 	 The	
WTO	 has,	 in	 some	 cases,	 defined	 government	 conduct	 to	 encompass	 condoning	 the	
behaviour	 of	 private	 individuals.	 	 It	may	 therefore	be	 argued	 that	 explicit	 exemptions	 for	
export	 cartels	 may	 constitute	 governmental	 acceptance	 of	 private	 conduct.	 	 Thus,	 it	 is	
possible	 for	 competition	 policy	 to	 be	 used	 as	 a	 means	 to	 an	 end	 for	 trade	 policy.		
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Competition	policy	is	defined	as	the	regulation	of	competition	law	within	a	jurisdiction.		Its	
main	 aims	 are	 to	 promote	 competition	within	 the	market	 and	 safeguard	 the	 interests	 of	
consumers	by	encouraging	lower	prices	and	increased	choice.		Trade	policy	relates	to	laws	
that	 regulate	 the	 exchange	 of	 goods	 or	 services	 involved	 in	 international	 trade	 including	
(but	not	limited	to)	taxes,	subsidies,	and	import	and	export	regulations.		
	
In	 a	 world	 of	 international	 trade,	 competition	 and	 trade	 policy	 also	
become	the	same	subject.		Trade	policy	at	its	heart	involves	choices	over	
the	 level	 of	 the	 level	 of	 competition	 between	 domestic	 and	 foreign	
producers	a	state	will	permit	or	encourage	…	Absent	a	closed	economy,	
competition	and	trade	policy	are	the	two	sides	of	the	same	coin.97	
	
In	2000	 in	a	submission	to	the	WTO	Working	Group	on	Trade	and	Competition	Policy,	 the	
European	Union	stated	that	export	cartels,	‘had	a	clear	distortionary	effect	on	international	
trade	as	well	as	a	harmful	impact	on	development.’98	
	
An	export	cartel	can	create	or	maintain	barriers	to	trade	by	forcing	consumers	to	pay	higher,	
non-competitive	 prices.	 	 Immenga	 proposed	 three	 possible	 outcomes	 when	 assessing	 an	
export	 cartel’s	 effects	 on	world	 trade.99	 	 	 Firstly,	 that	 the	 importing	 country	may	 benefit	
from	quality	 improved	exports	or	 lower	export	prices.	 	The	possibility	of	such	benefits	has	
been	 reflected	 through	 a	 number	 of	 Japanese	 export	 cartels.100	 	 Secondly,	 the	 importing	
country	may	 suffer	harm	 through	 the	 imposition	of	price	 restrictions	 such	as	quantitative	
restrictions	 and	 increases	 in	 export	 price.	 	 These	 losses	 can	 potentially	 outweigh	 any	
perceived	benefits	the	exporting	country	may	gain	from	allowing	the	formation	of	an	export	
cartel	 in	 the	 short	 term.	 	 However,	 losses	 arising	 in	 this	 situation	 can	 be	 eventually	
recouped.	 	 For	 instance,	 exemptions	 granted	 to	 an	 export	 cartel	 might	 give	 exporting	
producers	 time	to	 invest	 in	 their	product	and	become	 internationally	competitive	through	
the	 imposition	of	export	restrictions,	such	as	raising	prices.	 	Once	this	happens,	 the	cartel	
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would	then	reduce	the	overall	disadvantages	suffered	by	importing	countries	by	lifting	the	
temporary	restrictions	placed	on	exports.		Lastly,	importing	countries’	losses	caused	directly	
by	aggressive	behaviour	from	export	cartels	can	ultimately	outweigh	the	benefits	accrued	in	
the	 exporting	 country	 due	 to	 ‘deadweight	 losses’	 or	 loss	 of	 economic	 efficiency.101	 	 This	
occurs	when	consumers	in	the	foreign	market	are	unable	to	afford	the	rising	price	set	by	an	
export	 cartel	 and	 are	 ultimately	 excluded	 from	 the	 market.	 	 Retaliation	 from	 foreign	
governments	 such	 as	 anti-dumping	 provisions,	 the	 establishment	 of	 import	 cartels,	 or	
subsidies	can	also	be	attributed	to	export	cartels.102		While	only	the	last	of	these	outcomes	
contains	 long-term	negative	effects,	 Immenga	suggested	this	was	 likely	the	most	common	
given	previous	evidence	of	other	trade	restraints	such	as	the	numerous	anti-dumping	cases	
that	have	come	before	the	WTO	panels.103	
	
Economic	theory	can	also	be	used	to	assess	whether	there	are	any	indirect	economic	effects	
on	 international	 trade	 that	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 export	 cartel	 activity.	 	 Through	 the	
application	 of	 game	 theory	 and	 the	 prisoner’s	 dilemma,	 Immenga	 concluded	 that	
exemptions	for	export	cartels,	whether	explicit	or	implicit,	could	encourage	the	formation	of	
more	 cartels	 and	 restrict	 international	 trade	 in	 three	ways.104	 	 Firstly,	 foreign	 exemptions	
granted	 to	 export	 cartels	 create	 incentives	 for	 the	 domestic	 importing	 country	 to	 grant	
similar	 exemptions	 in	 order	 to	 give	 their	 firms	 the	 same	 opportunities	 when	 trading	
internationally.105	 	 Secondly,	export	 cartel	exemptions	can	 increase	 the	 trend	 towards	 the	
creation	 of	 international	 cartels,	 decreasing	 international	 output	 and	 trade	 volume.	 	 The	
formation	of	more	international	cartels	occurs	because	indirect	international	collusion	made	
up	of	member	firms	of	an	export	cartel	operating	in	the	same	country	are	often	more	stable	
in	 the	 sense	 that	 collusion	 is	 likely	 to	 be	more	 convenient	 than	 in	 a	 direct	 international	
cartel	 with	 member	 firms	 coming	 from	 different	 countries.	 	 Lastly,	 mechanisms	 or	
regulations	 that	grant	explicit	 immunities	 for	export	cartels	 in	one	country	can	 incentivise	
more	 active	 control	 of	 export	 cartels	 in	 bordering	 countries	 by	 blurring	 the	 distinction	
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between	‘encouraging’	and	‘compelling’	the	formation	of	export	cartels106	-	which	can	be	a	
crucial	element	for	the	application	of	both	antitrust	and	trade	laws.	
	
If	an	export	cartel	affects	the	imports	of	the	foreign	country	to	which	the	cartel	is	exporting,	
the	importing	country	may	be	tempted	to	take	retaliatory	action.		For	instance,	industries	in	
the	importing	country	may	form	a	buyers’	cartel	in	order	to	offset	the	effects	of	any	export	
association.107	 	 Jurisdictions	with	established	competition	 law	regimes	can	also	apply	their	
laws	extra-territorially	and	prosecute	cartels	exporting	into	their	territories.		These	instances	
of	 litigation	 can	 create	 significant	 trade	 tension	 and	 in	 any	 event,	 cases	where	 an	 export	
cartel	 is	 challenged	 by	 an	 importing	 country	 are	 seldom	 successful.	 	 One	 of	 the	 best	
examples	 of	 a	 case	 in	 which	 a	 country	 challenged	 a	 foreign	 export	 cartel	 led	 to	 an	
international	incident	is	the	Daishowa	case.	
The	Daishowa	Case	
	
In	Daishowa	 International	v.	North	Coast	Export	Co.,	 a	group	of	U.S.	wood	pulp	exporters	
formed	an	export	cartel	as	permitted	by	the	exemptions	in	their	domestic	antitrust	laws.108			
Japanese	wood	pulp	 importers	took	retaliatory	action	through	the	formation	of	an	 import	
cartel	in	order	to	boycott	American	wood	pulp	production.		At	the	same	time,	they	sought	
to	 challenge	 the	 validity	 of	 the	U.S.	 export	 cartel	 under	U.S.	 antitrust	 laws,	 alleging	 price	
fixing	 and	 refusal	 to	 supply.	 	 The	 U.S.	 exporters	 counter-sued	 the	 Japanese	 importers	
through	the	extraterritorial	application	of	their	antitrust	laws.		A	federal	district	court	held	
that	under	U.S.	domestic	laws,	the	American	export	cartel	was	exempted	from	antitrust	law	
but	the	Japanese	import	cartel	was	not.		Damages	were	subsequently	awarded	to	the	U.S.	
exporters.	 	Unsurprisingly,	this	decision	was	perceived	as	decidedly	unfair	by	the	Japanese	
and	triggered	an	international	diplomatic	incident.109	
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The	Export	Trading	Company	Act	
	
While	 the	 effects	 export	 cartels	 have	 on	 developing	 countries	 can	 be	 devastating,	
jurisdictions	such	as	the	United	States	maintain	that	export	cartels	comprised	of	small	and	
medium-sized	 firms	have	negligible	effects	on	both	 the	domestic	and	 foreign	markets.	 	 In	
fact,	despite	the	United	States’	 long	tradition	of	defending	their	export	cartel	exemptions,	
export	 cartels	 operating	 out	 of	 the	 U.S.	 are	 on	 the	 decline.	 	 In	 1982,	 the	 United	 States	
introduced	 the	 Export	 Trading	 Company	 Act	 (ETC	 Act),	 whereby	 all	 export	 cartels	 had	 to	
apply	for	a	certificate	of	review	with	the	Secretary	of	Commerce	in	order	to	be	registered	as	
an	export	trading	company	(ETC).		The	laws	leading	up	to	the	enactment	of	the	ETC	Act	as	
well	as	the	other	regulations	that	govern	export	cartel	exemptions	in	the	United	States	will	
be	discussed	in	the	next	chapter.	
	
Congress	initially	hoped	the	ETC	Act	would	encourage	the	formation	of	more	export	cartels.		
Several	years	after	the	implementation	of	the	ETC	Act,	Spencer	Weber	Waller	examined	the	
limited	public	data	on	ETCs	and	concluded	that	the	Act	made	very	little	difference	given	the	
response	by	the	business	community.110	 	While	Congress	originally	anticipated	over	20,000	
subscriptions	to	the	exemptions	under	the	ETC	Act,	in	1987	only	307	firms	were	members	of	
an	ETC.	 	After	the	Department	of	Congress	allowed	trade	associations	to	form	ETCs,	those	
figures	swelled	to	4,200	in	the	early	1990s.111	 	Levenstein	and	Suslow	added	that	by	2006,	
the	 number	 of	 companies	 who	 were	 members	 of	 the	 78	 active	 ETCs	 had	 decreased	 to	
3,000.112		Waller	attributed	the	initial	lacklustre	response	by	the	business	community	to	the	
ETC	Act	to	a	number	of	factors:	the	abrupt	appreciation	of	the	dollar	in	the	1980s;	a	fear	of	
disclosing	 confidential	 business	 secrets	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 a	 Certificate;	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 an	
established	precedent	in	interpreting	the	immunities	granted	by	the	Act.113		
	
He	 concluded	 that	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 ETC	 Act	 was	 negligible,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	
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encouraging	the	exports	of	small	and	medium-sized	firms	and	in	facilitating	the	exercise	of	
market	power.114	 	Furthermore,	as	roughly	20%	of	the	ETCs	 in	his	study	only	comprised	of	
one	 member,	 he	 concluded	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 ETCs	 did	 not	 function	 as	 horizontal	
agreements	 between	 competitors	 but	 that	 rather	 they	 acted	 as	 ‘export	 facilitators’	 or	
‘export	service	providers’	 in	order	to	broker	exclusive	or	nonexclusive	vertical	agreements	
to	sell	its	customers’	products	in	export	markets.115		
	
In	 2006,	 Levenstein	 and	 Suslow	 compiled	 a	 dataset	 of	 195	 ETCs,	 all	 those	 created	 since	
1983,	when	 the	 first	Certificate	was	granted	and	 through	 to	 the	end	of	2004.116	 	 In	2006,	
there	were	78	active	ETCs.	 	Out	of	the	195	ETCs	in	the	study,	141	were	issued	Certificates	
explicitly	allowing	members	 to	 jointly	set	export	prices.117	 	However,	 in	nearly	every	case,	
the	 right	 to	collude	on	export	prices	was	 issued	 in	conjunction	with	an	explicit	 restrict	on	
sharing	 information	 regarding	 costs	 as	 well	 as	 other	 restrictions	 intended	 to	 prevent	
spillover	anticompetitive	effects	in	the	domestic	market.118	
	
Given	the	vast	majority	of	ETCs	have	the	power	to	fix	export	prices,	Levenstein	and	Suslow’s	
empirical	 research	 focused	 on	 the	 theory	 that	 export	 cartels	 in	 the	 U.S.	 were	 created	 in	
order	to	exercise	their	market	power.		However,	they	found	that	the	majority	of	these	ETCs	
operated	 in	 mostly	 unconcentrated	 or	 moderately	 concentrated	 markets	 and	 thus	 were	
unlikely	to	have	sufficient	individual	market	power	to	maintain	joint	export	price	increases	
and	were	likely	rather	combining	their	market	power	in	order	to	enter	a	new	market.119			
	
They	 also	 calculated	 that	 the	 net	 effect	 of	 all	 ETCs	 was	 on	 average	 minimal	 on	 the	
supposition	that	any	reductions	in	exports	made	by	ETCs	with	the	ability	to	set	export	prices	
is	balanced	by	increases	in	exports	by	the	remaining	ETCs	that	do	not	have	the	authority	to	
set	prices,	approximately	20%.120		If	this	is	the	case,	it	may	indicate	that	any	positive	effects	
gained	by	ETCs	in	some	markets	is	offset	by	the	lessening	of	competition	in	other	moderate	
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to	highly	concentrated	markets	made	up	of	ETCs	with	price-fixing	powers.	 	However,	 they	
noted	 that	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 full	 impact	 of	 all	 ETCs,	 both	 positive,	 such	 as	 increased	
quantities	of	exports	and	better	quality	control	and	negative,	such	as	higher	prices,	would	
require	 access	 to	 information	 Congress	 has	 denied	 public	 access	 to	 as	 this	 information	
would	also	contain	confidential	business	practices	firms	would	be	reluctant	to	divulge.121			
	
Conclusion	
	
While	 it	 is	 widely	 accepted	 that	 international	 cartels	 and	 export	 cartels	 have	 an	 overall	
negative	 effect	 on	 the	market,	 very	 little	 has	 been	 done	 to	 protect	 developing	 countries	
from	being	subjected	to	unnecessarily	cartelised	products.	 	The	next	chapter	will	primarily	
focus	on	the	current	laws	and	sanctions	different	jurisdictions	have	in	place	to	prevent	the	
spread	 of	 international	 cartels	 and	 punish	 those	 found	 guilty.	 	 However,	 these	 sanctions	
normally	govern	only	those	international	cartels	that	affect	that	jurisdiction’s	market	and	do	
little	 to	 help	 developing	 countries,	 which	 may	 not	 have	 as	 sophisticated	 a	 regime	 to	
effectively	prosecute	any	cartel	found	importing	into	their	market.			
	
In	 the	 case	of	export	 cartels,	 these	are	often	encouraged	and	 remain	outside	of	 the	 laws	
that	normally	 sanction	 the	 formation	of	other	 international	 cartels,	 thereby	compounding	
the	problems	experienced	by	developing	countries.	 	Countries	that	still	employ	exceptions	
for	export	cartels,	such	as	the	United	States,	continue	to	defend	the	practice,	arguing	that	
these	 exceptions	 allow	 small	 and	medium	 sized	 firms	 access	 to	 the	 global	market	 (which	
they	otherwise	would	not	have).		However,	as	noted	by	Waller	in	the	1990s	and	Levenstein	
and	Suslow	in	the	2000s,	the	introduction	of	more	laws	encouraging	the	formation	of	export	
cartels	only	had	the	opposite	effect.		Indeed	other	countries	such	as	Australia	that	continue	
to	employ	export	cartel	exemptions	have	also	recorded	a	decline	 in	the	number	of	export	
cartel	agreements	from	a	‘peak’	of	sixty-nine	in	1975	to	only	four	in	2002.122		Japan,	which	
abolished	its	export	cartel	exemptions	in	1997,	also	experienced	declines	in	the	number	of	
export	 cartels	 in	operation,	which	declined	 from	180	 in	1973	 to	 two	 in	1998	and	none	 in	
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1999.123		The	decline	in	the	number	of	export	cartels	over	the	years	is	evidence	that,	despite	
the	well-meaning	intentions	of	export	cartel	exemptions,	very	few	small	and	medium	sized	
firms	are	taking	advantage.		On	the	other	hand,	export	cartels	such	as	the	potash	cartel,	that	
had	 such	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 both	 China	 and	 India,	 are	 allowed	 to	 slip	 through	 the	
cracks.	
                                                
123	Ibid	at	793.	
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Chapter	Three	
How	Are	International	Cartels	Governed	in	Different	Jurisdictions?	
	
Introduction	
	
The	previous	chapter	dealt	with	the	effects	international	cartels,	both	hard-core	and	export	
cartels,	have	on	the	global	market.	 	This	chapter	will	analyse	how	the	law	addresses	these	
effects	 as	well	 as	 how	 hard-core	 international	 cartels	 and	 export	 cartels	 are	 governed	 in	
different	jurisdictions.	
	
Many	 jurisdictions	 with	 effective	 competition	 or	 antitrust	 law	 regimes	 have	 sanctions	 in	
place	 for	 private	 international	 cartels,	 which	 will	 be	 detailed	 in	 this	 chapter.	 	 Both	 the	
United	States	and	the	European	Union	impose	heavy	fines	on	firms	found	guilty	of	forming	
such	a	cartel.		However,	scholars	such	as	Evenett	and	Connor	and	Lande	have	criticised	this	
method	 of	 deterrence,	 arguing	 that	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 prevent	 the	 formation	 of	 private	
international	 cartels.	 	 Evenett	 noted	 that	modern	 competition	 policies	 cannot	 fully	 deter	
such	cartels	because	they	are	‘oriented	towards	addressing	harm	done	in	domestic	markets	
…	[or]	merely	prohibit	cartels	without	[sufficiently	strong	sanctions].”1		While	imposing	strict	
fines	 may	 help	 to	 deter	 the	 formation	 of	 domestic	 cartels,	 international	 cartels	 whose	
operations	 take	 place	 across	multi-continental	markets	may	 take	 advantage	 of	monopoly	
positions	 in	 jurisdictions	with	weak	cartel	enforcement.2	 	 In	this	way,	they	may	be	able	to	
offset	the	losses	of	any	potential	fine	imposed	against	them.	
	
While	 developed	 countries	 have	 both	 the	 experience	 and	 resources	 to	 investigate	 and	
sanction	international	cartels,	many	developing	countries	remain	at	a	distinct	disadvantage.		
Chapter	 Five	 will	 discuss	 various	 strategies	 developing	 countries	 can	 employ	 in	 order	 to	
establish	 an	 effective	 competition	 law	 system	 of	 their	 own	 so	 as	 to	 better	 protect	
themselves	against	international	cartels.	 	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	no	developing	
countries	have	competition	law	systems.		Countries	such	as	Brazil	and	China	have	adopted	
                                                
1	Evenett,	Simon	J.,	Levenstein,	Margaret,	and	Suslow,	Valerie,	‘International	Cartel	Enforcement:	lessons	from	
the	1990s,’	(2001)	The	World	Economy,	Vol.	24	at	1222.	
2	Connor,	John	M.,	‘Global	Antitrust	Prosecutions	of	Modern	International	Cartels,’	(2004)	Journal	of	Industry,	
Competition	and	Trade,	Vol.	4,	No.	3	at	239.	
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their	own	competition	law	systems	and	have	on	occasion,	successfully	imposed	damages	on	
international	cartels	targeting	their	jurisdictions.	
	
As	previously	stated	in	Chapter	Two,	export	cartels	enjoy	a	special	place	in	the	category	of	
international	cartels,	whereby	rather	than	face	sanctions	for	creating	such	a	cartel,	export	
cartel	 associations	 are	 often	 exempt	 from	 competition	 law	 regimes.	 	 The	 way	 in	 which	
export	cartels	affect	the	world,	either	pro	or	anti-competitively,	can	depend	on	the	way	in	
which	these	cartels	are	regulated	in	their	home	jurisdictions.	 	 In	general,	 jurisdictions	with	
explicit	exemptions	 for	export	 cartels	 tend	 to	 regulate	 them	more	closely	with	 regards	 to	
their	effects	on	 the	domestic	market.	 	As	a	 result,	export	cartels	 in	 these	 jurisdictions	are	
more	 likely	 to	 report	 pro-competitive	 effects	 on	 the	 domestic	market	 after	 collusion.	 	 In	
contrast,	in	jurisdictions	with	implicit	exemptions	for	export	cartels,	it	is	far	more	difficult	to	
ascertain	the	effects	an	export	cartel	will	have	on	the	market	since	they	normally	operate	
without	the	knowledge	of	relevant	competition	law	authorities.			
	
Regardless	 of	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 way	 jurisdictions	 regulate	 hard-core	 international	
cartels	and	export	cartels,	developing	countries	still	face	serious	difficulties	when	faced	with	
either.	 	While	 there	 have	 been	 some	 attempts	 at	 addressing	 the	 problems	 these	 cartels	
pose	on	developing	economies	by	some	countries,	international	cartel	enforcement	remains	
largely	separated	into	two	camps,	developed	jurisdictions	and	developing	jurisdictions,	with	
little	effective	cooperation	between	them.	
	
International	Cartel	Enforcement	in	the	United	States	
	
The	formation	of	an	 international	cartel	 in	the	United	States	falls	under	the	 jurisdiction	of	
the	Sherman	Act.3		Cartel	behaviour	such	as	conspiracies	to	fix	prices,	restrict	output,	divide	
markets,	 or	 exclude	 other	 competitors	 are	 prosecuted	 under	 Section	 1,	 which	 governs	
restraints	of	trade,	and	Section	2,	which	deals	with	conspiracies	to	monopolise.	 	However,	
unlike	typical	monopolisation	cases,	the	emphasis	is	not	on	whether	or	not	the	defendants	
have	successfully	monopolised	the	market	but	more	on	their	conduct	and	actions.4		In	other	
                                                
3	Sherman	Act.	26	Stat.	209,	15	U.S.C.	§§1-7.	
4	§1	Sherman	Act,	15	U.S.C.	§1;	§2	Sherman	Act,	15	U.S.C.	§2.	
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words,	it	is	the	motivations	and	intentions	behind	the	defendant’s	conduct	that	is	relevant,	
not	 the	 end	 result.	 	 If	 the	 cartel	 violations	 are	 serious	 enough	 and	 the	 evidence	 of	 the	
intention	 to	 collude	 is	 compelling	 enough,	 the	 corporations	 and	 individuals	 may	 also	 be	
charged	 by	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice	 (DOJ)	 as	 a	 criminal	 case.	 	 The	 DOJ	 can	 employ	 a	
variety	of	sanctions	on	those	found	guilty	of	collusion.	 	For	 instance,	 injunctions	or	cease-
and-desist	 orders	 can	 prohibit	 specific	 conduct,	 however,	 this	 is	 seldom	 used	 for	 cartel	
cases.	 	More	commonly,	government-imposed	sanctions	 take	 the	 form	of	corporate	 fines,	
individual	 fines	 and	 incarceration	 of	 guilty	 managers.5	 	 When	 imposing	 fines	 on	 a	 guilty	
party,	the	DOJ	refers	to	the	Federal	Sentencing	Guidelines.6		At	the	first	instance,	a	base	fine	
is	calculated	by	taking	20%	of	the	company’s	sales	of	the	cartelised	product	during	the	years	
the	cartel	was	active.	 	While	 in	principal,	 this	 figure	can	be	 taken	 from	the	cartel’s	global	
activities,	in	practice,	only	U.S.	sales	are	accounted	for.		Following	this	calculation,	this	figure	
can	 increase	 or	 decrease	 based	 on	 a	 number	 of	 factors.	 	 Factors	 such	 as	 the	 size	 of	 the	
company,	 if	bid	 rigging	was	 involved,	 the	amount	of	participation	 from	the	senior	officers	
and	whether	there	had	been	any	previous	convictions	for	similar	offences	can	all	 increase	
the	 base	 fine.7	 	 Mitigating	 factors	 such	 as	 cooperation	 with	 the	 DOJ’s	 investigations,	
accepting	responsibility	and	the	implementation	of	an	antitrust	training	factor	can	lower	the	
fine	imposed.8	 	The	highest	multiplier	that	can	be	applied	to	the	base	fine	is	4.0	while	the	
lowest	 is	 0.75,	 which	 means	 a	 company	 can	 be	 fined	 by	 as	 much	 as	 80%	 of	 affected	
commerce.9	
	
Companies	 can	 also	 apply	 for	 leniency.	 	 The	DOJ	 awards	 the	 first	 company	 in	 a	 cartel	 to	
come	forward	full	relief	from	their	fine	while	the	second	and	third	companies	to	apply	can	
receive	 smaller,	 but	 still	 substantial	 discounts.10	 	 In	 practice,	 discounts	 for	 cooperation	 in	
international	 cartel	 cases	 range	 from	 40-90%	 of	 the	 maximum	 fine	 allowed	 by	 the	
Guidelines.	
	
                                                
5	See	ICN,	‘Setting	of	Fines	for	Cartels	in	ICN	Jurisdictions,’	Report	to	the	7th	Annual	ICN	Conference,	April	2008.	
6	United	States	Sentencing	Commission,	‘Guidelines	Manual,’	§3E1.1	(November	2015).	
7	Ibid.	
8	Ibid.	
9	Ibid.	
10	See	OECD,	Fighting	Hard-core	Cartels:	Harm,	Effective	Sanctions	and	Leniency	Programmes,	(2002)	OECD	
Publishing.	
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Due	to	its	long	history	of	cartel	enforcement	and	its	stringent	antitrust	policies,	the	United	
States	has	a	proven	record	of	successfully	prosecuting	international	cartels	found	operating	
both	 within	 their	 jurisdiction	 as	 well	 as	 foreign-based	 members,	 beginning	 in	 the	 early	
1900s.		While	the	Antitrust	Division	reduced	its	international	cartel	enforcement	procedures	
between	 the	1950s	and	 the	early	1990s	 in	 favour	of	domestic	 cases,	 since	 the	1990s,	 the	
Division	has	made	the	prosecution	of	international	cartels	its	highest	priority.11		The	number	
of	 international	 cartel	 cases	 brought	 before	 the	 DOJ	 made	 up	 almost	 two-thirds	 of	 its	
criminal	 antitrust	 prosecutions	 in	 1998.12	 	 Over	 90%	 of	 the	 $3	 billion	 in	 criminal	 fines	
collected	 by	 the	 Antitrust	 Division	 between	 1997	 and	 2007	 resulted	 from	 successful	
international	 cartel	 prosecutions.13	 	 During	 this	 period,	 these	 cartels	 affected	 a	 variety	 of	
different	 industries,	 including	 vitamins,	 textiles,	 construction,	 graphite	 electrodes,	 fine	 art	
auctions,	 ocean	 tanker	 shipping,	marine	 construction	 and	 transportation	 services,	 rubber	
chemicals,	synthetic	rubber,	and	dynamic	random	access	memory	chips	and	made	up	more	
than	$10	billion	of	U.S.	commerce.14	
	
The	Antitrust	Division	is	not	limited	to	prosecuting	cartels	solely	within	the	United	States.		In	
2005,	the	Division	obtained	fines	of	$10	million	or	more	from	individual	companies	based	in	
a	number	of	 foreign	 jurisdictions,	 such	as	Sweden,	Germany,	 Japan,	Belgium,	Switzerland,	
the	 United	 Kingdom,	 Luxembourg,	 Norway,	 Korea	 and	 Liechtenstein.15	 	 During	 this	 time,	
approximately	 fifty-six	 grand	 jury	 investigations	 involved	 international	 cartels,	 which	 also	
involved	twenty-five	countries	in	six	continents.16		Additionally,	individual	defendants	from	
nine	 foreign	countries	 served	prison	sentences	 in	 the	U.S.	 for	violating	antitrust	 laws	 that	
year.17	 	 The	 United	 States	 also	 has	 explicit	 treaties	 allowing	 for	 extradition	 for	 antitrust	
violations	 with	 Canada,	 Ireland,	 and	 Japan	 and	 in	 2004,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 a	 Japanese	
                                                
11	 International	 Competition	 Policy	 Advisory	 Committee,	 Final	 Report	 to	 the	Attorney	General	 for	 Antitrust,	
(2000)	available	at	www.usdoj-gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm.	
12	 ICPAC	 Meeting	 Addresses	 Comity,	 Cooperation,	 and	 Antitrust	 Enforcement,	 (1998)	 Antitrust	 &	 Trade	
Regulation	Report	(BNA)	Vol.	75	at	326	
13	Hammond,	Scott	D,	‘An	Update	of	the	Antitrust	Division’s	Criminal	Enforcement	Program,’	Remarks	before	
ABA	Section	of	Antitrust	Law	Cartel	Enforcement	Roundtable	(16	November	2005).	
14	Ibid.	
15	Ibid.	
16	Ibid.	
17	 Barnett,	 Thomas	O.	 ‘Seven	 Steps	 to	 Better	 Cartel	 Enforcement,’	 Presentation	 to	 the	 European	University	
Institute’s	 11th	 Annual	 Competition	 Law	 &	 Policy	 Workshop	 (2	 June	 2006)	 at	 5,	 available	 at	
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/216453.htm.	
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manager	was	extradited	for	a	criminal	cartel	offense.18	
	
The	U.S.	 has	 also	 entered	 into	 bilateral	 agreements	 in	 order	 to	 cooperate	 in	 antitrust	 or	
competition	 law	matters	with	Germany	 (1976)19,	Australia	 (1982	and	again	 in	1999)20,	 the	
European	Community	 (1991	and	1998)21,	Canada	 (1984	and	1995)22,	 Israel	 (1999)23,	 Japan	
(1999)24,	 Brazil	 (1999)25,	 and	 Mexico	 (2000)26.	 	 The	 terms	 of	 these	 agreements	 differ	
however,	 they	 commonly	 allow	 for	 the	 parties	 to	 share	 information,	 coordinate	 parallel	
investigations,	 and	 consult	 one	 other	 in	 periodic	 meetings	 in	 order	 to	 address	 issues	
regarding	enforcement.	
	
International	Cartel	Enforcement	in	the	European	Union	
	
The	 European	 Union	 shares	 many	 characteristics	 with	 the	 United	 States	 in	 regards	 to	
international	 cartel	 enforcement.	 	 For	 instance,	 it	 too	 imposes	 strict	 fines	 on	 cartel	
members	 as	 well	 as	 provides	 scope	 for	 leniency.	 	 However,	 unlike	 the	 United	 States,	
individual	persons	or	managers	responsible	are	not	personally	 liable	for	financial	penalties	
                                                
18	Connor,	John	M.,	‘Global	Antitrust	Prosecutions	of	Modern	International	Cartels,’	(2004)	Journal	of	Industry,	
Competition	and	Trade,	Vol.	4,	No.	3	at	258.	
19	Agreement	Relating	to	Mutual	Cooperation	Regarding	Restrictive	Business	Practices,	23	June	1976,	reprinted	
in	Trade	Reg.	Report	(CCH)	Vol.	4,	No.	13	at	para.	501.	
20	 Agreement	 between	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America	 and	 the	 Government	 of	 Australia	
Relating	to	Cooperation	on	Antitrust	Matters,	20	June	1982,	reprinted	in	Trade	Reg.	Report	(CCH),	Vol.	4,	No.	
13	at	para.	502A.	
21	 Agreement	 between	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America	 and	 the	 European	 Communities	
Regarding	 the	Application	of	 their	Competition	Laws,	November	1991,	 reprinted	 in	Trade	Reg.	Report	 (CCH)	
Vol.	 4,	 No.	 13	 at	 para.	 504;	 Agreement	 between	 the	Government	 of	 the	United	 States	 of	 America	 and	 the	
European	 Communities	 on	 the	 Application	 of	 Positive	 Comity	 Principles	 in	 the	 Enforcement	 of	 Their	
Competition	Laws,	14	June	1998,	reprinted	in	Trade	Reg.	Report,	Vol.	4,	No.	13	at	para.	504A.	
22	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	 as	 to	 Notification,	 Consultation,	 and	 Cooperation	 with	 Respect	 to	 the	
Application	of	National	Antitrust	Laws,	9	March	1984,	reprinted	 in	Trade	Reg.	Report	(CCH)	Vol.	4,	No.	13	at	
para.	503A.	
23	Agreement	between	the	Government	of	the	United	States	of	America	and	the	Government	of	the	State	of	
Israel	 Regarding	 the	Application	of	 Their	 Competition	 Laws,	 15	March	1999,	 reprinted	 in	 Trade	Reg.	 Report	
(CCH),	Vol.	4,	No.	13	at	para.	506.	
24	 Agreement	 between	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America	 and	 the	 Government	 of	 Japan	
Concerning	Cooperation	on	Anticompetitive	Activities,	7	October	1999,	reprinted	in	Trade	Reg.	Report	(CCH),	
Vol.	4,	No.	13	at	para.	507.	
25	Agreement	between	the	Government	of	the	United	States	of	America	and	the	Government	of	the	Federated	
Republic	of	Brazil	Regarding	Cooperation	between	their	Competition	Authorities	 in	the	Enforcement	of	 their	
Competition	Laws,	26	October	1999,	reprinted	in	Trade	Reg.	Report	(CCH),	Vol.	4,	No.	13	at	para.	508.	
26	Agreement	between	the	Government	of	 the	United	States	of	America	and	 the	Government	of	 the	United	
Mexican	 States	 Regarding	 the	 Application	 of	 their	 Competition	 Laws,	 11	 July	 2000,	 reprinted	 in	 Trade	 Reg.	
Report	(CCH),	Vol.	4,	No.	13	at	para.	509.		
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or	prison	sentences	and	there	are	also	no	provisions	for	private	compensatory	suits	within	
the	EU.	 	While	some	EU	Member	States	such	as	the	United	Kingdom,	France,	 Ireland,	and	
Norway	have	criminalised	price	fixing,	cases	that	resulted	in	incarceration	in	the	EU	remain	
rare.	
	
Under	 European	 competition	 law,	 Article	 101	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	
European	Union	governs	anticompetitive	behaviours,	which	have	substantial	negative	effect	
on	 the	 common	 market	 and	 affect	 trade	 between	 Member	 States.	 	 These	 behaviours	
include	 price	 fixing,	 controlling	 output,	 market	 sharing,	 and	 the	 imposition	 of	 dissimilar	
trading	conditions	 in	order	 to	create	a	competitive	disadvantage,	and	tying.	 	 International	
cartels	 would	 fall	 under	 Article	 101	 provided	 their	 conduct	 prevents,	 restricts	 or	 distorts	
competition	in	the	common	market.	
	
Domestic	and	international	cartels	are	sanctioned	mainly	through	the	imposition	of	fines.		In	
the	European	Union,	 fines	 are	 imposed	according	 the	European	Commission’s	 ‘Guidelines	
on	the	method	of	setting	fines’27	published	in	2006.		The	level	of	these	fines	has	increased	
considerably	since	the	1990s,	particularly	after	2006.		This	increase	has	been	attributed	to	a	
combination	of	 the	severity	of	cartel	behaviour,	 the	growing	size	of	 the	affected	markets,	
and	the	Commission’s	tougher	stance	on	competition	law	offences.		Connor	reports	that	the	
average	fines	increased	by	25%	after	the	publication	of	the	2006	Guidelines	when	compared	
with	those	imposed	under	the	1998	Guidelines28,	however,	 it	may	be	argued	that	much	of	
this	difference	could	be	ascribed	to	inflation.29		He	also	highlighted	the	fact	that	the	majority	
of	 the	 ‘starting	 points’	 for	 fines	 imposed	 by	 the	 Commission	 are	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	
scale	outlined	in	the	Guidelines	and	they	tend	to	be	less	severe	than	those	imposed	during	
the	same	period	in	the	United	States	by	the	DOJ.	
	
While	the	Guidelines	sets	the	process	used	to	calculate	a	fine	to	be	imposed	on	a	cartel,	the	
Commission	has	a	great	deal	of	discretion,	making	it	difficult	to	predict	the	amount	of	the	
                                                
27	Commission	Guidelines	on	the	method	of	setting	fines	imposed	pursuant	to	Article	23(2)(a)	of	Regulation	No	
1/2003.	(2006)	OJ	C210/02.	
28	Commission	Guidelines	on	the	method	of	setting	fines	imposed	pursuant	to	Article	15(2)	of	Regulation	No	17	
and	Article	65(5)	of	the	ECSC	Treaty,	(1998)	OJ	C9/3.	
29	 Connor,	 John	 M.	 ‘Cartel	 Fine	 Severity	 and	 the	 European	 Commission:	 2007-2011,’	 (2013)	 European	
Competition	Law	Review,	Vol.	34	at	58.	
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imposed	fine.		In	order	to	calculate	a	fine,	the	Commission	follows	a	two-step	process:	first,	
it	 sets	 a	 basic	 amount;	 and	 second,	 it	 adjusts	 the	 amount	 either	 upward	 or	 downward	
depending	on	several	factors.	
	
In	order	to	establish	the	basic	amount,	the	Commission	accounts	for	the	value	of	the	goods	
or	 services	 that	pertain,	directly	or	 indirectly,	 to	 the	 competition	violation	within	 the	EEA	
within	the	 last	business	year.30	 	 If	 the	cartel	extends	beyond	the	EEA	and	the	EEA	value	 is	
not	representative	of	the	relevant	weight	of	each	undertaking	 in	the	cartel,	the	figure	can	
be	adjusted	accordingly.	 	This	 initial	calculation	 includes	a	proportion	of	 the	total	value	of	
sales	multiplied	by	the	duration	of	the	cartel	 itself.	 	The	proportion	of	the	value	of	sales	is	
maximised	at	30%.		Most	fines	on	average	begin	at	17%	and	only	a	few	ever	go	as	high	as	
25%.31	 	While	these	figures	seem	very	low,	especially	given	the	covert	nature	of	hard-core	
cartels,	 under	 the	 2006	 Guidelines,	 the	 Commission	 still	 retains	 considerable	 amounts	 of	
freedom	to	increase	the	fines	further.		The	duration	of	the	cartel	is	measured	in	years	and	
the	multiplier	 is	calculated	in	six-month	increments.	 	For	 instance,	cartels	that	 last	for	two	
years	would	result	 in	a	multiplier	of	2.	 	A	cartel	that	runs	for	two	years	and	three	months	
would	 result	 in	 a	 multiplier	 of	 2.5.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	 Commission	 also	 imposes	 an	 ‘entry	
penalty’	calculated	between	15%	and	25%	of	 the	value	of	sales	 for	merely	entering	 into	a	
cartel.	
	
Once	the	basic	amount	is	established,	the	Commission	can	choose	to	increase	or	decrease	
the	applicable	fine	according	to	various	factors.		Aggravating	factors	that	may	increase	the	
level	of	the	fine	imposed	include:	where	a	cartel	member	continues	or	repeats	the	same	or	
similar	offence;	refusing	to	cooperate	with	the	authorities;	or	being	a	leader	or	initiator	of	
the	 infringement,	 or	 encouraging	 others	 to	 join.32	 	While	 the	 Guidelines	 allow	 for	 a	 fine	
increase	of	up	to	100%	for	repeat	offenders,	in	practice	the	Commission	normally	applies	a	
                                                
30	Commission	Guidelines	on	the	method	of	setting	fines	imposed	pursuant	to	Article	23(2)(a)	of	Regulation	No	
1/2003.	(2006)	OJ	C210/02,	para	13.	
31	 Connor,	 John	 M.	 ‘Cartel	 Fine	 Severity	 and	 the	 European	 Commission:	 2007-2011,’	 (2013)	 European	
Competition	Law	Review,	Vol.	34	at	58.	
32	Commission	Guidelines	on	the	method	of	setting	fines	imposed	pursuant	to	Article	23(2)(a)	of	Regulation	No	
1/2003.	(2006)	OJ	C210/02,	para	28.	
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30%	 increase,	 with	 a	 further	 30%	 added	 for	 each	 additional	 previous	 offence.33	 	 The	
Commission	may	also	 increase	 the	 fine	 in	order	 to	deter	 future	or	 repeat	offenders.	 	This	
can	 occur	 where	 the	 cartel	 has	 a	 high	 turnover	 outside	 the	 affected	 market.	 	 In	 this	
situation,	the	standard	calculated	fine	might	look	relatively	insignificant	when	compared	to	
its	 overall	 financial	 resources.	 	Mitigating	 factors	 that	may	 decrease	 the	 level	 of	 the	 fine	
include:	 evidence	 of	 limited	 involvement	 in	 the	 conspiracy	 or	 maintaining	 competitive	
behaviour	during	the	conspiracy;	cooperating	with	the	Commission;	or	instances	where	the	
anticompetitive	 behaviour	 has	 been	 authorised	 or	 encouraged	 by	 public	 authorities	 or	
legislation.34	
	
Once	 the	 relevant	 factors	 have	 been	 considered	 and	 the	 initial	 fine	 has	 been	 adjusted	
accordingly,	the	Commission	must	consider	two	final	caveats	before	they	can	issue	the	final	
figure.	 	 Under	 Regulation	 1/2003	 prevents	 the	 Commission	 from	 imposing	 any	 fine	 that	
exceeds	10%	of	an	undertaking’s	total	turnover	in	the	previous	business	year.35		While	this	is	
not	 a	 severe	 limitation	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 cases,	 in	 instances	 where	 a	 single	 product	
undertaking	 is	 involved	 in	 a	 cartel,	 issues	may	 arise	 especially	when	 the	 basic	 amount	 in	
these	cases	tend	to	start	at	20%	of	the	sales	value.		Connor	suggests	that	almost	8%	of	cartel	
members	had	their	 fines	reduced	by	this	cap	between	2007	and	2011.36	 	Additionally,	 the	
Commission	may	also	consider	reducing	the	fine	if	the	undertaking	is	unable	to	pay	due	to	
financial	constraints.37	
The	Vitamins	Cartel	
	
The	Vitamins	 cartel	 is	 a	 good	 example	 of	 the	 EU’s	 approach	 to	 prosecuting	 international	
cartels.		Competition	Commissioner	Mario	Monti	claimed	the	cartel	was:38		
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1/2003.	(2006)	OJ	C210/02,	para	29.	
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The	 most	 damaging	 series	 of	 cartels	 the	 Commission	 has	 ever	
investigated	due	to	the	sheer	range	of	vitamins	covered	which	are	found	
in	 a	 multitude	 of	 products	 from	 cereals,	 biscuits	 and	 drinks	 to	 animal	
feed,	pharmaceuticals	and	cosmetics.			
	
As	one	of	the	largest	international	cartels	of	its	time,	the	Vitamins	cartel	consisted	of	eight	
interdependent	price-fixing	and	market	sharing	cartels	and	 included	thirteen	undertakings	
from	 Switzerland,	 Japan,	 and	 EU	 member	 countries	 of	 Germany,	 France,	 and	 the	
Netherlands.		Each	cartel	had	a	specific	number	of	participants	and	durations,	although	the	
entire	 conspiracy	 took	 place	 between	 September	 1989	 and	 February	 1999.	 	 During	 the	
decade	the	cartels	were	in	operation,	they	had	devastating	effects	on	global	competition	in	
twelve	vitamin	markets,	affecting	consumer	markets	such	as	cereals,	biscuits,	drinks,	animal	
feed,	pharmaceuticals,	cosmetics,	and	many	others.39		Because	the	Swiss	based	company	of	
F.	Hoffmann-La	Roche	Ltd,	the	largest	producer	of	vitamins	in	the	world	with	around	a	50%	
share	of	the	overall	market,	was	the	main	instigator	and	participated	in	all	the	cartels,	it	was	
given	the	highest	cumulative	fine	of	€462	million.	 	The	next	 largest	fine	of	€296.16	million	
was	 imposed	 on	 German	 company	 BASF	 Aktiengesellschaft,	 another	 central	 figure	 in	 the	
cartels.	 	The	other	 six	companies,	who	were	 involved	 in	only	a	 limited	number	of	vitamin	
products,	were	penalised	as	follows:	
	
1. Takeda	Chemical	Industries	Ltd	(Japan):	€37.05	million	
2. Daiichi	Pharmaceutical	Co	Ltd	(Japan):	€23.4	million	
3. Eisai	Co	Ltd	(Japan):	€13.23	million	
4. Merck	KgaA	(Germany):	€9.24	million	
5. Solvay	Pharmaceuticals	BV	(Netherlands):	€9.10	million	
6. Aventis	SA	(France):	€5.04	million	
	
It	 is	worth	noting	here	 that	 the	Commission	 imposed	 fines	on	 F.	Hoffmann-La	Roche	and	
BASF	 in	 2001	 following	 an	 investigation	 conducted	 by	 the	 U.S.	 DOJ	 in	 1999,	 leading	 to	
Hoffmann-La	Roche	and	BASF	pleading	guilty	and	receiving	 fines	 for	a	record	$500	million	
                                                
39	Ibid.	
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and	 $225	 million	 respectively.40	 	 The	 Department	 also	 charged	 a	 Swiss	 executive	 from	
Hoffmann-La	Roche	with	participating	in	the	cartel	and	for	lying	to	its	investigators	in	1997	
while	 attempting	 to	 conceal	 the	 conspiracy.	 	 He	 pleaded	 guilty	 to	 both	 charges	 and	was	
ordered	 to	 serve	 four	months	 in	prison.	 	He	was	also	personally	 liable	 to	pay	a	$100,000	
fine.41	
	
The	 dual	 fines	 imposed	 by	 both	 the	 European	 Commission	 and	 the	 U.S.	 Department	 of	
Justice	 serves	 as	 an	 excellent	 reminder	 that	 in	 international	 cartel	 cases,	 often	 multiple	
jurisdictions	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 punishing	 those	 found	 guilty.	 	 In	 such	 cases,	 these	
jurisdictions	may	 choose	 to	work	 together	 and	 impose	 penalties	 in	 conjunction	with	 one	
another.	
	
Optimal	Deterrence	–	what	is	the	most	effective	way?	
	
Sanctions	 such	 as	 fines	 and	 prison	 sentences	 are	 usually	 imposed	 in	 order	 to	 deter	 the	
formation	 of	 cartels	 and	 discourage	 such	 anti-competitive	 behaviours.	 	 While	 a	 critical	
analysis	of	 the	effectiveness	of	such	strategies	 in	deterring	cartel	 formation	 is	beyond	the	
scope	 of	 this	 thesis,	 this	 section	 will	 briefly	 discuss	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 different	
strategies	 adopted	 by	 the	United	 States	 and	 the	 European	Union	 in	 deterring	 the	 rise	 of	
international	cartels.	
	
As	 stated	 in	 this	 chapter,	 most	 of	 the	 sanctions	 applied	 by	 national	 competition	 law	
authorities	 are	 mainly	 concerned	 with	 cartels	 that	 have	 a	 direct	 effect	 on	 their	 own	
jurisdictions.		As	a	result,	any	sanctions	they	impose	are	more	likely	to	deter	the	formation	
of	 cartels	 within	 their	 own	 jurisdictions	 or	 cartels	 that	 directly	 affect	 their	 own	markets.		
Therefore,	traditional	deterrence	mechanisms	may	not	necessarily	be	effective	in	deterring	
the	formation	of	international	cartels	that	choose	to	target	developing	countries.	
	
However,	national	competition	laws	may	not	be	entirely	effective	in	deterring	the	formation	
                                                
40	The	United	States	Department	of	Justice,	F.	Hoffman-La	Roche	and	BASF	Agree	to	Pay	Record	Criminal	Fines	
for	Participating	in	International	Vitamin	Cartel,	(1999)	Press	Release.	
41	Ibid.	
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of	cartels	even	within	their	own	 jurisdictions.	 	For	 instance,	while	 the	 imposition	of	heavy	
fines	is	the	most	common	way	for	national	competition	law	authorities	to	deter	and	punish	
cartel	behaviour,	some	guidelines	designed	to	control	the	imposition	of	fines	may	have	the	
opposite	 effect.	 	Many	 national	 competition	 laws	 that	 sanction	 cartels	 by	 imposing	 fines	
include	provisions	 limiting	the	maximum	level	of	 the	fine	that	can	be	applied	 in	any	given	
case.	 	 The	EU	guidelines	on	 fines	 set	 an	upper	 limit	of	10	percent	of	 a	 company’s	overall	
annual	 turnover.42	 	 Depending	 on	 a	 particular	 company’s	 annual	 turnover,	 limits	 on	 the	
maximum	 amount	 of	 imposed	 fines	 can	 actually	 reduce	 the	 fine	 that	 is	 ultimately	
enforced.43		Some	scholars,	such	as	Connor,	have	also	suggested	that	any	sort	of	upper	limit	
on	 imposed	 fines,	 save	 for	 those	 that	 correlate	 with	 the	 size	 of	 damages,	 can	 actually	
encourage	 the	 formation	 of	 cartels,	 as	 well	 as	 increase	 their	 stability	 and	 endurance.44		
According	to	Connor,	a	firm	that	is	a	member	of	a	cartel	can	simply	calculate	the	maximum	
fine	it	will	receive	for	participating	in	the	cartel	and	deduce	that	the	company	can	keep	any	
future	gains	above	that	upper	limit.		In	addition,	even	if	a	competition	law	system	contains	
provisions	 increasing	 the	 level	 of	 fines	 for	 repeated	offences,	 once	 a	 firm	has	 passed	 the	
upper	limit,	 it	can	participate	in	as	many	cartel	arrangements	as	it	 likes	without	increasing	
its	liability.45	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Jones	 argues	 that	 corporate	 fines	 alone	 are	 not	 sufficient	 to	 punish	
cartel	 behaviour.	 	 By	 imposing	 a	 fine,	 she	 states,	 the	 individuals	 responsible	 are	not	 held	
accountable	for	their	decision	to	enter	into	a	cartel	agreement	and	the	fine	itself	may	have	
negative	 spillover	 effects,	 which	 would	 punish	 innocent	 shareholders,	 employees,	 and	
creditors.46	 	 Instead,	 she	 argues	 that	 the	 United	 States’	 historical	 approach	 of	 imposing	
criminal	sanctions	on	both	corporations	and	individuals	has	been	one	of	the	most	successful	
systems	at	combating	cartels.	
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Whelan	 argues	 that	 prison	 sentences	 are	 often	more	 stigmatising	 and	 are	more	 likely	 to	
draw	 media	 attention	 than	 fines	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 heeded	 by	
individuals.47		Indeed,	the	OECD	notes	that	individuals	in	the	United	States	have	offered	to	
pay	 increased	fines	 in	order	 to	avoid	prison	sentences	but	 that	 there	has	not	been	a	case	
where	an	individual	preferred	time	in	prison	over	paying	a	fine.48		The	case	of	United	States	
v	McDonough49	provides	an	even	more	extreme	example	whereby	a	defendant	committed	
suicide	 after	 being	 convicted	 of	 price-fixing	 and	 was	 subsequently	 sentenced	 to	 a	 short	
period	of	time	in	prison.50	
	
Despite	evidence	that	criminalising	cartel	behaviour	may	be	the	most	optimal	way	to	deter	
the	formation	of	new	cartels,	there	are	still	some	who	question	the	effectiveness	of	such	a	
strategy.		Some	scholars	have	argued	that	cartel	behaviour	remains	‘morally	ambiguous’,	in	
the	 sense	 that	 it	 does	 not	 hold	 the	 same	 gravitas	 as	 other	 white-collar	 crimes,	 such	 as	
embezzlement.		Therefore,	applying	criminal	law	sanctions	to	anti-competitive	behaviours	is	
not	only	unjust	but	also	undermines	 the	moral	 authority	of	 the	 law.	 	Criminal	 law	 should	
thus	be	used	to	 ‘direct	the	moral	standards	of	society’51	and	this	morality	 is	compromised	
when	 cartel	 offenders	 are	 labelled	 as	 criminals	 alongside	 other	more	 ‘traditional’	 crimes.		
On	 the	other	hand,	 it	 can	 also	be	 argued	 that	 criminal	 law	 should	be	 able	 to	 create	new	
moral	 standards	 in	 society	 and	 that	 as	 cartels	 become	more	 sophisticated	 in	 hiding	 from	
detection,	so	too	must	our	laws	be	in	hunting	them	down.	
	
Nevertheless,	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 criminal	 sanctions	 are	 an	 effective	 mechanism	 in	
deterring	 the	 formation	 of	 new	 cartels	 remains	 inconclusive.52	 	 There	 is	 little	 empirical	
evidence	 as	 to	 whether	 increasing	 the	 use	 of	 criminal	 sanction	 leads	 to	 a	 corresponding	
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decrease	in	cartel	behaviours.		Indeed,	the	main	motivation	behind	criminalisation	appears	
to	be	the	stigma	and	embarrassment	that	comes	with	being	handed	a	prison	sentence,	and	
this	feeling	of	shame	may	fade	over	time.		As	Werden	and	Simon	write,	after	several	months	
into	a	prison	sentence,	‘one	gets	used	to	things,	even	prison.’53	 	Moreover,	one	must	take	
into	account	the	rising	costs	of	imprisoning	individuals	for	the	state	in	question.	
	
There	 is	 a	 vast	 amount	 of	 literature	 that	 has	 been	 written	 regarding	 the	 most	 optimal	
strategies	to	deter	the	spread	of	cartels.		Most	of	these	strategies	are	designed	to	deter	the	
spread	 of	 domestic	 cartels	 and	 assume	 that	 a	 jurisdiction	 already	 has	 an	 effective	
competition	 law	 system	 in	 place.	 	 Given	 that	 many	 developing	 countries	 lack	 proper	
competition	 law	 enforcement	 mechanisms,	 other	 strategies	 may	 be	 more	 suitable	 in	
combating	the	spread	of	international	cartels.		These	strategies	will	be	discussed	throughout	
this	thesis.	
	
International	Cooperation	in	International	Cartel	Enforcement	
	
Countries	 with	 effective	 competition	 or	 antitrust	 regimes	 are	 increasingly	 collaborating	
together	in	the	war	against	international	cartels	in	different	ways,	such	as	the	development	
of	extradition	 treaties,	 and	participating	 in	organisations	 that	 share	 information	 regarding	
effective	 cartel	 enforcement	 tools	 and	 mechanisms.	 	 In	 February	 of	 2003,	 searches	 and	
drop-in	interviews	were	coordinated	for	the	first	time	in	an	international	cartel	investigation	
among	 enforcement	 authorities	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 European	 Union,	 Canada,	 and	
Japan.54		As	mentioned	above,	the	United	States	has	also	formed	bilateral	and	multilateral	
agreements	with	various	countries	regarding	antitrust	cooperation.	 	However,	despite	this	
evidence	 of	 some	 countries’	 willingness	 to	 cooperate	 with	 one	 another	 in	 bilateral	 and	
multilateral	agreements,	 such	cooperation	 is	not	yet	 the	most	effective	 tool	 in	 combating	
the	spread	of	international	cartels.		One	of	the	biggest	obstacles	in	forming	an	operational	
bilateral	or	multilateral	treaty	is	the	reluctance	some	countries	have	of	exchanging	business	
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information.55	 	 Many	 antitrust	 and	 competition	 authorities	 fear	 that	 if	 confidential	
information	 such	 as	 corporate	 secrets	 and	 future	 business	 plans	 are	 made	 public	 or	 is	
shared	 with	 other	 authorities,	 it	 may	 be	 used	 inappropriately	 or	 released	 to	 competing	
firms.56	 	 As	 a	 result,	 many	 agreements	 concerning	 competition	 law	 matters	 restrict	 the	
exchange	 of	 confidential	 business	 information	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	maintaining	 broad	
interpretation	of	what	is	considered	confidential.57	
	
In	2012,	the	OECD	recommended	positive	comity	as	a	solution	when	addressing	the	problem	
of	international	cartels.58		Positive	comity	entails	that	one	country	requests	another	to	begin	
enforcement	or	investigation	methods	in	order	to	rectify	anti-competitive	behaviour	that	is	
substantially	 and	 negatively	 affecting	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 pursuing	 country.	 	 Prior	 to	 this	
Recommendation,	 the	 OECD	 noted	 that	 previous	 Recommendations	 included	 similar	
approaches	 however;	 the	 term	 ‘positive	 comity’	 was	 never	 used.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 1995	
OECD	Recommendation	stated	that	countries	should:	
	
(1) Give	 full	 and	 sympathetic	 consideration	 to	 another	 country’s	 request	
that	 it	 open	 or	 expand	 a	 law	 enforcement	 proceeding	 to	 remedy	
conduct	 in	 its	 territory	 that	 is	 substantially	 and	 adversely	 affecting	
another	 country’s	 interests,	 and	 (2)	 take	whatever	 remedial	 action	 it	
deems	 appropriate	 on	 a	 voluntary	 basis	 in	 considering	 its	 legitimate	
interests.59	
	
The	 OECD	 also	 distinguished	 between	 positive	 comity	 and	 investigatory	 assistance.		
Positive	comity	refers	to	the	active	involvement	by	the	requested	country	in	investigating	
anti-competitive	 conduct	 and	 providing	 remedies	 if	 possible	 in	 order	 to	 satisfy	 the	
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requesting	 country.60	 	On	 the	other	hand,	 investigatory	 assistance	 involves	 a	 request	 for	
assistance	 in	 the	 requesting	 country’s	 own	 enforcement	 methods	 and	 often	 involves	
sharing	or	gathering	information	on	behalf	of	that	country.	
	
The	OECD	outlined	a	number	of	benefits	positive	comity	depending	on	the	extent	to	which	
competition	 and	 antitrust	 authorities	 are	willing	 to	 cooperate	with	 one	 another.	 	 These	
benefits	include:61	
	
1) Improved	 effectiveness:	 Positive	 comity	 can	 allow	 a	 requesting	 country	 to	
invoke	a	 requested	country’s	 laws	and	as	a	 result	provide	a	 remedy	 for	 illegal	
conduct	 the	 requesting	 country	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 rely	 on	 its	 own	 for	
jurisdictional	reasons.	
2) Improved	efficiency:	Positive	comity	involves	the	requested	country	to	conduct	
its	 own	 investigation,	 where	 it	 is	 in	 the	 best	 position	 to	 gather	 necessary	
evidence.	 	 In	 doing	 so,	 efficiency	 is	 improved	 by	 reducing	 the	 costs	 of	
investigations	and	the	risk	of	inconsistencies.		
3) Reducing	the	need	for	sharing	confidential	information:	As	the	proceedings	are	
managed	 by	 whichever	 competition	 authority	 has	 the	 best	 access	 to	 the	
evidence,	there	is	less	chance	or	need	to	share	confidential	information.	
	
Initially,	 competition	 and	 antitrust	 authorities	 reacted	 enthusiastically	 to	 the	 concept	 of	
positive	comity,	 cumulating	 in	 the	signing	of	 the	1998	EC-US	Positive	Comity	Agreement.		
However,	despite	 this	 initial	 enthusiasm	and	 the	associated	benefits,	 positive	 comity	has	
seldom	been	employed.62		Some	reasons	positive	comity	has	not	been	an	entirely	effective	
instrument	 is	 that	 it	 is	 not	 a	 principle	 of	 national	 law	 and	 therefore	 has	 no	 legal	 force.		
Additionally,	despite	the	fact	that	it	is	entirely	voluntary,	some	countries	fear	that	positive	
comity	requests	may	restrict	their	control	over	the	use	of	their	own	often	limited	resources	
and	would	affect	their	discretion	when	prioritising	their	enforcement	mechanisms.	 	Aside	
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from	these	fears,	there	may	be	other	reasons	for	the	lack	of	positive	comity	requests,	or	at	
the	 very	 least,	 formal	 requests.63	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 development	 of	 more	 domestic	
competition	enforcement	systems	and	effective	competition	laws	may	mean	countries	are	
more	 able	 to	 resolve	 competition	 issues	 without	 having	 to	 call	 on	 another	 authority’s	
support.	 	 Alternatively,	 discrepancies	 in	 terms	 of	 size	 or	 power	 between	 different	
authorities	 may	 also	 contribute	 to	 the	 reluctance	 to	 issue	 a	 positive	 comity	 request.		
Smaller	 or	 less	 powerful	 competition	 authorities	may	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 interact	 with	 one	
another	or	have	a	recurring	need	to	compared	to	US	and	EU	authorities	who	interact	and	
assist	each	on	a	regular	basis.		Additionally,	larger	authorities	may	not	be	as	incentivised	to	
respond	 to	 requests	 from	 smaller	 authorities.	 	 Moreover,	 smaller	 jurisdictions	 in	 return	
may	not	have	 the	 resources	necessary	 in	order	 to	 assist	 foreign	authorities	or	 it	may	be	
politically	unappealing	for	them	to	have	to	rely	on	foreign	authorities	to	remedy	behaviour	
that	is	harming	their	own	consumers.	
	
Aside	 from	 the	 OECD,	 the	 International	 Competition	 Network	 (ICN)	 has	 also	 been	
instrumental	in	helping	antitrust	enforcers	coordinate	with	each	other	in	order	to	stop	the	
spread	 of	 international	 cartels.	 	 The	 ICN	 is	 a	 virtual	 organisation	 made	 up	 of	 over	 sixty	
national	and	multinational	antitrust	and	competition	law	enforcement	agencies.		The	Cartel	
Working	Group,	established	by	the	 ICN	 in	May	2004,	 is	aimed	at	addressing	“fundamental	
issues	associated	with	cartel	enforcement.”64	 	The	ICN	and	its	members	formed	the	Cartel	
Working	Group	because	they	acknowledged	“[at	the]	heart	of	antitrust	enforcement	is	the	
battle	 against	 hard-core	 cartels	 directed	 at	 price	 fixing,	 bid	 rigging,	 market	 sharing	 and	
market	allocations.”65		Since	then,	the	Working	Group	has	developed	and	published	an	Anti-
Cartel	 Enforcement	 Manual66	 and	 Template67,	 both	 of	 which	 assess	 the	 best	 of	 the	
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enforcement	techniques	employed	by	different	jurisdictions	against	cartels.		It	also	holds	an	
annual	meeting	of	cartel	enforcement	officials	around	the	world	in	order	to	develop	future	
initiatives	and	ways	competition	and	antitrust	 regimes	may	work	 together	 in	 investigating	
and	prosecuting	cartels.	
	
Export	Cartels	
	
Jurisdictions	 that	 exempt	 export	 cartels	 from	 their	 antitrust	 or	 competition	 law	 regimes	
usually	employ	one	of	two	strategies,	either	through	explicit	or	implicit	exemptions.		Explicit	
exemption	clauses	that	require	notification	or	authorisation	in	order	for	export	cartels	to	be	
registered	as	 valid	are	often	more	 stringently	 regulated	 than	 clauses	 that	do	not	because	
such	requirements	often	stipulate	that	export	cartels	wishing	to	be	exempted	from	ordinary	
antitrust	or	competition	 laws	show	they	meet	certain	criteria.	 	For	 instance,	 in	the	United	
States,	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 a	 certificate	 of	 review	 granting	 such	 an	 exemption,	 an	 export	
cartel	must	show	their	conduct	does	not	have	a	substantial	negative	impact	on	the	domestic	
market,	 among	 other	 criteria	 such	 as	 a	 yearly	 review	of	 their	 conduct.	 	 By	 requiring	 that	
export	 cartels	 register	 themselves	with	 the	 Federal	 Trade	Commission	 (FTC),	 the	U.S.	 has	
ensured	that	antitrust	authorities	are	aware	of	export	cartels	operating	in	their	jurisdiction.			
	
Implicit	 exemptions,	 such	 as	 those	 adopted	 by	 EU	 member	 states,	 contain	 no	 such	
necessities.		EU	competition	law	only	regulates	anti-competitive	behaviour	such	as	cartels	if	
they	 have	 a	 direct	 impact	 on	 the	 domestic	 market.	 	While	 this	 is	 similar	 to	 many	 other	
requirements	imposed	by	explicit	exemption	clauses	with	registration	requirements,	implicit	
exemptions	 such	as	 these	do	not	undertake	 reviews	of	export	 cartel	 conduct	nor	do	 they	
have	 any	 system	 of	 registration.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 is	 often	 very	 difficult	 to	 prove	 an	 export	
cartel’s	existence	let	alone	its	effects	on	the	market,	both	domestically	and	internationally.			
	
While	 implicit	export	cartel	exemptions	contain	problems	with	 identification,	both	explicit	
and	implicit	exemptions	share	similar	goals	and	intentions:	to	allow	small	and	medium	sized	
                                                                                                                                                  
67	International	Competition	Network,	Antitrust	Enforcement	Template,	(2005)	available	at	
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/bonn/Cartels_WG/SG2_Enforcement_Techniques/Anti-
Cartel_Enforcement_Template/pdf.	
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firms	 a	 foothold	 into	 the	export	market	while	 preventing	 larger	 firms	 from	exploiting	 the	
domestic	 market.	 	 However,	 the	 same	 issue	 arises	 with	 both	 types	 of	 exemptions:	 both	
remain	largely	indifferent	to	the	effects	these	cartels	have	on	the	foreign	market.	
	
The	United	States	
	
Export	 cartels	 are	 allowed	 to	 function	 often	 because	 of	 explicit	 exemptions	 granted	 by	 a	
country’s	competition	or	antitrust	 law	regime.	 	The	United	States	first	addressed	the	issue	
when	it	enacted	the	Webb-Pomerene	Export	Trade	Act	(WPA)	in	1918.68	
	
Section	2	of	the	WPA	(contained	in	section	62	of	the	United	States	Code	Title	15)	states	that:	
	
Nothing	contained	in	the	Sherman	Act	…	shall	be	construed	as	declaring	to	be	illegal	
an	 association	 entered	 into	 for	 the	 sole	 purpose	 of	 engaging	 in	 export	 trade	 and	
actually	engaged	solely	 in	such	export	trade,	or	an	agreement	made	or	act	done	in	
the	 course	 of	 export	 trade	 by	 such	 association,	 provided	 such	 association,	
agreement,	or	act	is	not	in	restraint	of	trade	within	the	United	States,	and	is	not	in	
restraint	of	the	export	trade	of	any	domestic	competitor	of	such	association.	
	
WPA	 export	 cartels	 automatically	 received	 immunity	 from	 antitrust	 laws	 upon	 filing	 the	
names	and	addresses	of	their	members	and	a	copy	of	the	cartel’s	articles	of	agreement	with	
the	Federal	Trade	Commission	 (FTC)	within	30	days	of	 formation.	 	 Failure	 to	do	 so	would	
subject	 the	 cartel	 to	 the	 standard	 antitrust	 penalties	 under	 the	 Sherman	 Act.	 	 Once	
registered,	cartels	only	had	to	satisfy	minimal	requirements	related	to	annual	reporting	 in	
order	 to	 remain.	 	 The	 FTC	 sent	 out	 a	 brief	 annual	 questionnaire	 to	 all	 registered	 cartels	
asking	the	value	of	their	exports	and	their	primary	functions.	
	
The	main	purpose	of	 this	Act	was	 to	 increase	overseas	sales	 through	 lowered	distribution	
costs.69	 	The	rationale	behind	this	purpose	was	that	 if	small	and	medium-sized	firms,	who	
                                                
68	Webb-Pomerene	Export	Trade	Act,	15	U.S.C.	§§61-66.	
69	Larson,	David	A.	‘An	Economic	Analysis	of	the	Webb-Pomerene	Act,’	(1970)	Journal	of	Law	and	Economics,	
Vol.	13,	No.	2	at	462.	
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would	otherwise	lack	the	capacity	to	export	outside	the	U.S.,	could	reduce	their	distribution	
costs	through	collusion	and	thus	gain	that	capacity.		It	also	sought	to	prevent	foreign	cartels	
exerting	undue	pressure	on	small	American	firms.70			
	
However,	despite	its	 lofty	goals,	the	WPA	ultimately	did	not	achieve	many	of	them.		At	 its	
peak,	Webb-Pomerene	associations	 accounted	 for	 roughly	 19%	of	U.S.	 exports.	 	 By	 1976,	
this	 figure	had	dropped	to	1.5	percent.71	 	Some	of	 the	criticisms	the	Webb-Pomerene	Act	
faced	included	its	failure	to	include	services,	thereby	limiting	its	coverage.72	
	
Cartels	 established	 under	 the	 Webb-Pomerene	 Act	 relied	 solely	 on	 self-enforcement	 by	
allowing	 export	 cartels	 to	 police	 their	 members’	 own	 behaviour	 as	 neither	 the	 federal	
government	nor	the	courts	dealt	with	enforcement	of	export	cartel	contracts.73		In	order	to	
combat	 cheating,	 Webb-Pomerene	 export	 cartels	 usually	 negotiated	 contracts	 outlining	
dispute	 resolution	procedures,	 including	methods	 for	 investigating	possible	 infringements.		
Export	 cartels	often	 implemented	 these	dispute	 resolution	 tactics	by	 creating	a	governing	
body	with	 powers	 to	 audit	members’	 financial	 statements	 and	 shipping	 records.74	 	 Cartel	
members	 that	 did	 not	 provide	 regular	 reports	 or	 allow	 themselves	 to	 be	 audited	 were	
normally	subjected	to	fines	and,	in	extreme	cases,	expelled	from	the	cartel.		
	
However,	because	cartels	were	self-regulated,	export	cartels	during	the	WPA	regime	often	
dissolved	 for	 one	 of	 two	 reasons,	 failures	 to	 adequately	 implement	 enforcement	
mechanisms	 and	when	 the	 costs	 to	maintain	 the	 cartel	 outweighed	 the	 value	 of	 benefits	
enjoyed	by	its	members.	
	
Price-fixing	 export	 cartels	 often	 collapsed	 because	 of	 their	 failure	 to	 detect	 and	 punish	
members’	 attempts	 to	 cheat	by	undercutting	 the	agreed	price	or	exceeding	 the	allocated	
quota.75	 	 Similarly,	 failing	 to	 discourage	 free	 riding	 on	 these	 services,	which	 prevents	 the	
                                                
70	Larson	at	462.	
71	Victor,	Paul.	‘Export	Cartels:	An	Idea	Whose	Time	Has	Passed’	(1992)	Antitrust	Law	Journal,	Vol.	60	at	573.	
72	Fugate,	Wilbur	L.	‘The	Export	Trade	Exception	to	the	Antitrust	Laws:	The	Old	Webb-Pomerene	Act	and	the	
New	Export	Trading	Company	Act’	(1982)	Vanderbilt	Journal	of	Transnational	Law,	Vol.	15	at	696.	
73	Dick,	Andrew.	‘When	are	Cartels	Stable	Contracts?’	(1996)	Journal	of	Law	and	Economics,	Vol.	39	at	245.	
74	Dick	(1996)	at	245.	
75	Dick	(1996)	at	249.	
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cartel	from	recovering	a	competitive	profit	on	its	costs,	also	undermines	cartels	involved	in	
cost-sharing	practices	such	as	joint	market	research	and	advertising.			
	
In	the	second	scenario,	cartels	that	attempted	to	exercise	their	export	market	power	were	
only	able	to	raise	prices	by	a	minimal	amount	due	to	increased	fringe	competition	and	entry	
barriers	in	their	respective	industries.		For	instance,	WPA	cartels	in	cement,	pine	lumber	and	
wire	 rope	 claimed	 their	dissolutions	were	a	direct	 result	of	 foreign	price	 competition	and	
entry.76			
	
The	 Webb-Pomerene	 Act’s	 effectiveness	 faced	 further	 limitations	 through	 judicial	
interpretation	 in	 subsequent	 cases.	 	 The	 most	 high	 profile	 case	 following	 the	 WPA’s	
enactment	was	the	Alkali	case.		The	Alkali	case	addressed	the	issue	of	whether	the	Attorney	
General	could	bring	an	independent	case	against	Webb-Pomerene	associations	for	antitrust	
violations	 occurring	 in	 foreign	 trade.77	 	 By	 applying	 section	 6(e)	 of	 the	 Federal	 Trade	
Commission	Act78,	which	uses	similar	language	to	that	of	section	5	of	the	Webb-Pomerene	
Act	(contained	in	section	65	of	Title	15),	the	Commission	may,	upon	the	Attorney	General’s	
application,	
	
Investigate	 and	 make	 recommendations	 for	 the	 readjustment	 of	 the	
business	of	any	corporation	alleged	to	be	violating	the	antitrust	Acts	in	order	
to	bring	that	corporation	into	accordance	with	the	law.			
	
Under	 section	 6(i)	 of	 the	 same	 Act,	 the	 Commission	 is	 also	 authorised	 to	 conduct	
investigations	 of	 possible	 violations	 of	 foreign	 antitrust	 laws	 and	 report	 their	
recommendations	to	Congress.	
	
The	 defendants	 of	 the	 Alkali	 case	 included	 two	 export	 associations,	 an	 American	
corporation,	Alkasso	and	a	British	corporation,	Imperial	Chemical	Industries	Ltd.	(ICI).		Along	
with	 other	 foreign	 producers,	 these	 corporations	 concluded	 agreements	 amongst	
                                                
76	Dick	(1996)	at	250.	
77	United	States	v.	United	States	Alkali	Export	Association,	(1945)	325	US.	196	at	198.	
78	Federal	Trade	Commission	Act,	15	U.S.C.	§46(e).	
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themselves	to	allocate	world	markets	in	alkalis.		Alkasso,	as	the	primary	export	association,	
was	 made	 up	 of	 eleven	 of	 the	 most	 important	 alkali-producing	 companies	 in	 the	 U.S.		
Alkasso	and	 ICI	agreed	to	sell	at	 fixed	prices	 in	markets	not	specifically	allocated.	 	Alkasso	
also	 agreed	 not	 to	 export	 to	 Europe,	 including	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 Australia	 and	 New	
Zealand.79		In	1936,	Solvay	S.A.,	a	Belgian	corporation,	became	a	party	to	the	arrangement	
between	Alkasso	and	ICI.		This	arrangement	established	some	exclusive	territories	and	some	
joint	 territories	 and	 created	 percentage	 quotas	 for	 the	 latter.80	 	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	
agreement,	Alkasso	became	the	sole	export	agent	for	effectively	all	alkali	producers	in	the	
United	States	and	therefore,	the	American	foreign	trade	in	alkalis	was	wholly	dependant	on	
the	whims	of	the	international	cartel.	
	
The	 defendants	 in	 the	Alkali	 case	 relied	 completely	 on	 the	 exemptions	 contained	 in	 the	
Webb-Pomerene	Act	in	order	to	justify	their	actions	by	arguing	that	the	antitrust	laws	were	
not	 applicable	 to	 dividing	 territories	 outside	 of	 the	 U.S.,	 establishing	 exclusive	 foreign	
markets	or	fixing	prices	with	foreign	competitors	in	foreign	markets.81		The	Supreme	Court	
decided	 the	 case	 by	 interpreting	 the	 Sherman	 Act	 as	 prohibiting	 such	 conduct	 in	 foreign	
markets,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	the	cartel	agreement	included	the	U.S.	as	one	of	its	
territories.		The	judges	rejected	the	defendants’	arguments	on	the	basis	that	these	activities	
were	a	violation	of	the	Sherman	Act	and	therefore	separate	from	the	immunities	granted	by	
the	 WPA.	 	 The	 defendants’	 conduct	 was	 therefore	 in	 restraint	 of	 the	 export	 trade	 of	
domestic	 competitors	 of	 the	 association	 and	 that	 such	 agreements	 stifled	 potential	
competition	on	the	domestic	market.		The	Supreme	Court’s	conclusion	was	ultimately	that	
the	 practices	 of	 allocating	 exclusive	 markets,	 fixing	 prices	 on	 an	 international	 scale,	 and	
selling	through	joint	agents	with	foreign	competitors	were	not	‘agreements	in	the	course	of	
export	 trade.’82	 	 The	 reasoning	 behind	 this	 decision	 was	 that	 such	 conduct	 gave	 the	
defendants	excessive	control	over	the	worldwide	market	for	alkalis,	which	went	beyond	the	
scope	 of	 the	 WPA	 exception.83	 After	 the	 Alkali	 decision	 was	 passed,	 firms	 became	
increasingly	 uncertain	 over	 what	 conduct	 was	 allowed	 and	 prohibited	 under	 the	 WPA,	
                                                
79	United	States	v.	United	States	Alkali	Export	Association	at	65.	
80	United	States	v.	United	States	Alkali	Export	Association	at	65.	
81	United	States	v.	United	States	Alkali	Export	Association	at	65.	
82	United	States	v.	United	States	Alkali	Export	Association	at	70.	
83	United	States	v.	United	States	Alkali	Export	Association	at	198.	
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which	likely	contributed	to	the	decrease	in	notifications.	
	
Confusion	over	what	was	prohibited	and	what	was	allowed	was	further	exacerbated	under	
the	WPA	due	to	mixed	signals	given	by	 the	government.	 	Congress	and	the	FTC	restricted	
export	cartel	activities	to	three	areas;	however,	they	effectively	nullified	these	restrictions	
by	 either	 adopting	 overly	 narrow	 interpretations	 or	 failing	 to	 adequately	 enforce	 them.84		
For	 instance,	when	the	WPA	was	enacted,	Congress	assured	critics	 that	 the	export	cartels	
would	not	affect	domestic	markets	 ‘adversely	or	 intentionally.’	 	However,	 in	1924,	an	FTC	
advisory	 opinion	 stated	 that	 an	 export	 contract	 that	 ‘incidentally	 or	 indirectly’	 restricted	
domestic	 prices	 would	 not	 violate	 the	 Act	 so	 long	 as	 such	 restrictions	 did	 not	 have	 a	
substantial	effect	on	the	domestic	market.85	 	On	other	occasions,	the	courts	also	explicitly	
rejected	claims	 that	 cartels	 registered	under	 the	WPA	should	be	held	 liable	 for	additional	
superficial	 restraints	 on	 domestic	 trade,	 most	 notably	 in	 the	 Minnesota	 Mining	 and	
Manufacturing	Co.,	 case.86	 	 This	 ruling	 can	be	distinguished	 from	 the	previous	Alkali	 case	
since	the	Alkali	case	showed	evidence	of	market	allocation	 in	the	U.S.	market.	 	There,	the	
U.S.	export	association,	Calkex	was	proven	 to	be	an	active	participant	 in	 the	 international	
alkali	 cartel	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	had	never	 signed	any	of	 the	export	agreements.	 	As	a	
result,	dividing	 the	U.S.	market	and	ensuring	American	producers	had	but	one	agent	with	
which	to	handle	their	exports,	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	Alkasso	had	violated	s.1	of	the	
Sherman	Act.	
	
WPA	 export	 cartels	 are	 free	 to	 negotiate	 exclusive	 dealing	 agreements	 that	 essentially	
prevent	domestic	non-cartel	exporters’	access	to	foreign	markets,	despite	the	fact	that	the	
Act	prohibits	‘restraints	of	export	trade	of	any	domestic	competitor.’87	
	
In	 subsequent	 cases	 regarding	 the	WPA,	 the	 issue	of	what	 constituted	 ‘export	 trade’	was	
also	discussed.		The	Concentrated	Phosphate	case	involved	a	civil	action	claiming	violations	
of	 Section	 1	 of	 the	 Sherman	 Act	 against	 a	 WPA	 association	 and	 its	 members.88	 	 The	
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association	was	bidding	on	an	Agency	for	International	Development	(AID)	contract.89	 	AID	
had	purchased	merchandise	 from	 the	association	 for	 the	South	Korean	government.	 	 The	
Supreme	Court	held	that	the	purchase	was	a	domestic	transaction	and	excluded	it	from	the	
scope	 of	 the	 Webb-Pomerene	 Act’s	 definition	 of	 ‘export	 trade,’	 thereby	 preventing	 the	
defendant	 from	 claiming	 any	 protection	 under	 the	WPA	 and	 allowing	 the	 government	 to	
proceed	with	 its	civil	suit.90	 	The	Court	based	its	 judgment	due	to	the	fact	that	the	money	
never	 left	 the	U.S.;91	 the	Korean	government	did	not	 receive	 the	money	 freely	but	 rather	
there	were	stipulations	that	AID	could	spend	or	have	final	say	over	how	the	funds	were	to	
be	 spent;92	 and	 that	 the	 bidding	 process	 to	 secure	 the	 contract	 granted	 substantial	
competitive	advantages	to	American	companies.93	 	While	the	Court	made	the	ruling	based	
on	the	‘export	trade’	requirement	in	the	WPA,	it	never	clarified	the	exact	definition	of	the	
term,	compounding	the	confusion	surrounding	the	Act.94	
	
After	 the	criticisms	and	subsequent	 limitations	of	 the	WPA,	Congress	enacted	 the	Foreign	
Trade	Antitrust	 Improvements	Act	 (Foreign	Trade	Act)	 and	 the	Export	 Trade	Company	Act	
(ETC	 Act)	 in	 1982	 in	 order	 to	 address	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 Webb-Pomerene	 Act.95	 	 The	
Foreign	Trade	Act	is	contained	in	Title	IV	of	the	ETC	Act.		The	ETC	Act	allows	firms	to	apply	
for	 a	 certificate	 of	 review	 issued	 by	 the	 Secretary	 of	 Commerce	 in	 order	 to	 serve	 as	 an	
exemption	 for	 activities	 conducted	 during	 the	 course	 of	 export	 trade.	 	 The	 certificate	
provides	 immunity	 from	criminal	and	civil	actions	brought	by	the	government	 for	conduct	
covered	in	it.96		In	order	to	obtain	such	a	certificate	an	application	must	be	submitted	to	the	
Secretary	of	Commerce	containing	any	information	that	was	relevant	to	the	overall	market	
in	 which	 the	 export	 cartel	 would	 be	 operating.	 	 The	 Secretary	 of	 Commerce	would	 then	
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publish	a	notice	in	the	Federal	Register	announcing	an	application	for	a	certificate	of	review	
had	been	 submitted	with	 the	 names	 of	 each	 person	 submitting	 the	 applications,	 and	 the	
conduct	 for	 which	 the	 application	 was	 submitted.	 	 This	 was	 intended	 to	 ensure	 greater	
transparency	and	certainty	 for	 firms	seeking	to	obtain	exemptions	from	the	application	of	
antitrust	laws	for	their	export	cartels,	something	the	previous	legislation	was	sorely	lacking	
in.		Despite	the	ambitious	expectations	Congress	had	of	the	ETC	Act,	it	failed	to	generate	the	
results	that	were	initially	predicted	at	its	inception.	
	
The	ETC	Act	
	
Along	with	the	Act’s	purpose	and	definition	of	terms,	Title	I	of	the	ETC	Act	contains	the	ways	
Congress	intends	to	fulfil	the	Act’s	goals:	
	
In	particular	by	establishing	an	office	within	the	Department	of	Commerce	to	
promote	 the	 formation	 of	 export	 trading	 associations	 and	 export	 trading	
companies,	by	permitting	bank	holding	companies,	bankers’	banks	…	to	invest	
in	 export	 trading	 companies,	 by	 reducing	 restrictions	 on	 trade	 financing	
provided	 by	 financial	 institutions	 and	 by	 modifying	 the	 application	 of	 the	
antitrust	laws	to	certain	export	trade.97	
	
In	 response	 to	 the	 critics	 that	 claimed	 the	 WPA	 failed	 to	 adequately	 explain	 how	 the	
Sherman	Act	applied	to	export	trading	companies,98	the	ETC	Act	allows	exporters	to	acquire	
advance	 clearance	 of	 planned	 activities	 with	 the	 Commerce	 Department	 and	 total	
exemption	 from	 criminal	 prosecution	 under	 antitrust	 laws.99	 	 These	 protections	 are	 only	
granted	through	the	certificate	of	review	from	the	Commerce	Department.100	
	
The	 ETC	 Act	 also	 expands	 on	 the	 benefits	 granted	 by	 the	 WPA,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	
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financing.		Title	II	of	the	Act	allows	certain	kinds	of	banks	to	invest	in	ETCs,	breaking	a	well-
established	 Congressional	 ruling	 prohibiting	 banks	 from	 taking	 equity	 interests	 in	
commercial	ventures.101		This	change	was	heralded	as	‘revolutionary’	by	one	commenter.102	
	
Title	 III	 of	 the	ETC	Act	outlines	 the	 requirements	needed	 in	order	 to	 issue	a	 certificate	of	
review	–	applicants	must	show	that	the	practices	will:	
	
1) result	 in	 neither	 a	 substantial	 lessening	 of	 competition	 or	 restraint	 of	 trade	
within	 the	United	 States	 nor	 a	 substantial	 restraint	 of	 the	 export	 trade	 of	 any	
competitor	of	the	applicant;	
2) not	unreasonably	enhance,	stabilise,	or	depress	prices	within	 the	United	States	
of	 the	 goods,	 wares,	 merchandise,	 or	 services	 of	 the	 class	 exported	 by	 the	
applicant;	
3) not	constitute	unfair	methods	of	competition	against	competitors	engaged	in	the	
export	 of	 goods,	wares,	merchandise,	 or	 services	 of	 the	 class	 exported	 by	 the	
applicant;	and	
4) not	 include	 any	 act	 that	may	 reasonably	 be	 expected	 to	 result	 in	 the	 sale	 for	
consumption	 or	 resale	 within	 the	 United	 States	 of	 the	 goods,	 wares,	
merchandise	or	services	exported	by	the	applicant.103	
	
Certain	standards	must	also	be	maintained	in	order	to	keep	the	protections	and	privileges	
granted	by	the	certificate.		The	certificate	is	automatically	voided	if	the	application	contains	
fraudulent	statements.104	 	The	certificate	also	only	protects	against	conduct	sanctioned	by	
the	Act.105	
	
Given	 the	 dearth	 of	 cases	 regarding	 the	 ETC	 Act,	 the	 Commerce	 Department	 issued	
guidelines	 in	 order	 to	 help	 companies	 in	 their	 applications	 for	 certificates	 of	 review.	
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Commentators	 also	 affirmed	 that	 the	 Department	 would	 likely	 use	 the	 WPA	 judicial	
decisions	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 ETC	 Act	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 whether	 an	 applicant	
satisfied	 the	 standards	 needed	 to	 obtain	 a	 certificate.106	 	 However,	 this	 approach	 is	 not	
without	 its	 conflicts.	 	 These	 conflicts	 originate	 from	 the	 almost	 contradictory	 policies	 the	
Webb-Pomerene	Act	puts	forth	and	that	the	ETC	Act	attempts	to	reconcile:	mainly	the	goal	
of	increasing	exports	and	the	requirement	that	the	certificates	not	be	used	to	fraudulently	
protect	domestic	anticompetitive	behaviour.107		A	number	of	these	issues	were	addressed	in	
Horizons	 International,	 Inc.	 v.	 Baldridge	 where	 the	 district	 court	 discussed	 the	 issue	 of	
whether	an	applicant’s	size	affected	its	application	for	a	certificate.108		Here,	the	court	relied	
on	the	ETC	Act’s	legislative	history	and	its	guidelines	and	discussed	the	divide	in	the	ETC	Act	
authorities	 regarding	 applicants	 holding	 large	 market	 shares	 in	 the	 domestic	 market.109		
Minnesota	Mining,	which	was	cited	in	the	ETC	Act	guidelines,	established	the	precedent	that	
an	 export	 trade	 association	 that	 held	 80%	 of	 the	 relevant	 market	 could	 still	 receive	
immunity	under	the	WPA	from	Sherman	Act	liability.110	
	
However,	the	Horizons	court	deviated	from	the	ruling	in	Minnesota	Mining	by	turning	to	the	
ETC	Act	guideline	instructions	detailing	that	the	Justice	Department’s	Merger	Guidelines	be	
applied	to	the	transaction.111		Under	the	Merger	Guidelines,	the	Hirfindal-Hirschman	Index	
(HHI)	is	used	to	assess	the	potential	anticompetitive	effects	of	a	merger.112		In	using	the	HHI	
rather	 than	 Minnesota	 Mining,	 the	 court	 in	 the	 Horizon	 case	 established	 a	 far	 stricter	
standard	 for	 associations	 applying	 for	 a	 certificate	 of	 review.	 	 Other	 commentators	 have	
argued	that	the	HHI	standard	‘prejudices	applicants	that	combine	with	others	to	hold	a	large	
share	of	 the	 relevant	market.’113	 	 By	 applying	 a	 strict	 numerical	 standard,	 applicants	may	
face	 additional	 burdens	 they	would	 not	 otherwise	 be	 subject	 to	 under	 a	more	 subjective	
standard.114	
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The	Foreign	Trade	Act	
	
The	Foreign	Trade	Act,	which	 falls	under	 the	ETC	Act	and	 is	 specifically	 located	 in	Title	 IV	
states:115	
	
Sections	1	to	7	of	this	title	shall	not	apply	to	conduct	 involving	trade	or	commerce	
(other	than	import	trade	or	import	commerce)	with	foreign	nations	unless	–		
	
1) such	conduct	has	a	direct,	substantial,	and	reasonably	foreseeable	effect	–		
a. on	 trade	 or	 commerce	 which	 is	 not	 trade	 or	 commerce	 with	 foreign	
nations,	or	on	import	trade	or	import	commerce	with	foreign	nations;	or	
b. on	 export	 trade	 or	 export	 commerce	with	 foreign	 nations,	 of	 a	 person	
engaged	in	such	trade	or	commerce	in	the	United	States;	and	
2) such	effect	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 claim	under	 the	provisions	of	 sections	1	 to	7	of	 this	
title,	other	than	this	section.	
If	sections	1	to	7	of	this	title	apply	to	such	conduct	only	because	of	the	operation	of	
paragraph	1(b),	then	sections	1	to	7	of	this	title	shall	apply	to	such	conduct	only	for	
injury	to	export	business	in	the	United	States.116		
	
The	Act	also	stipulates	that	the	Sherman	Act	‘shall	not	apply	to	conduct	 involving	trade	or	
commerce…with	 foreign	nations…’117	unless	 it	 is	 ‘import	commerce.’	 	 Import	commerce	 is	
excluded	from	the	Foreign	Trade	Act	unless	it	satisfies	the	‘domestic	injury	exception.’		The	
domestic	 injury	exception	 is	applied	to	alleged	anticompetitive	conduct	normally	excluded	
by	 the	 Foreign	 Trade	 Act	 when:	 1)	 the	 conduct	 has	 a	 direct,	 substantial	 and	 reasonably	
foreseeable	 effect	 on	 United	 States	 commerce	 and	 2)	 that	 effect	 on	 United	 States	
commerce	‘gives	rise’	to	a	claim	under	the	Sherman	Act.118	
	
Therefore,	 under	 the	 Foreign	 Trade	 Act,	 export	 cartels	 are	 exempted	 from	 U.S.	 antitrust	
laws	unless	the	conduct	has	a	direct	impact	on	the	domestic	market.		However,	critics	have	
                                                
115	15	U.S.C.	§6a.	
116	15	U.S.C.	§6a.	
117	15	U.S.C.	§6a.	
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pointed	 out	 some	 problems	 in	 the	 way	 the	 exception	 has	 been	 worded.	 	 	 	 The	 second	
requirement	 of	 the	 domestic	 injury	 exception	 requires	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 defendants’	
conduct	on	the	American	markets	give	rise	to	a	Sherman	Act	claim,	despite	the	general	rule	
that	 conduct	 involving	 trade	 or	 commerce	 with	 foreign	 nations	 is	 excluded	 from	 the	
Sherman	Act	and	thus	may	not	be	subject	to	such	a	claim.119	
	
The	Supreme	Court	has	affirmed	that	the	requirement	that	a	domestic	effect	give	rise	to	a	
Sherman	 Act	 claim	 requires	 that	 the	 conduct	 ‘have	 an	 effect	 of	 a	 kind	 that	 antitrust	 law	
considers	harmful.’120		This	suggests	that	a	foreign	plaintiff’s	antitrust	or	competition	injury	
can	 satisfy	 the	 second	 stage	 of	 the	 domestic	 injury	 exception	 when	 considered	 on	 its	
own.121	
	
Foreign	 plaintiffs	 have	 attempted	 to	 utilise	 this	 interpretation	 in	 cases	 where	 they	 have	
suffered	 injuries	 based	 on	 American	 domestic	 behaviour.	 	 In	 Empagran	 II,	 the	 foreign	
plaintiffs	 relied	 on	 the	 argument	 that	 ‘because	 vitamins	 are	 fungible	 and	 readily	
transportable’,	 suggesting	 there	 was	 one	 global	 market	 for	 vitamins,	 the	 inflated	 prices	
buyers	were	subject	to	abroad	would	not	have	existed	but	for	the	inflation	in	the	domestic	
market.122		The	Court	of	Appeals	held	that	‘but	for’	causation	between	the	domestic	effects	
and	 the	 foreign	 injury	 claim	was	 not	 sufficient	 to	 satisfy	 the	 Foreign	 Trade	Act	 exception	
since	 the	exact	wording	of	 the	exception	 ‘gives	 rise	 to’	 demonstrated	 a	need	 for	 a	direct	
causal	relationship,	that	is	‘proximate	cause’	between	the	two.123	
	
Applying	 the	 proximate	 cause	 standard,	 the	 court	 stated	 that	 the	 foreign	 plaintiffs	 in	
Empagran	 II	 could	 not	 prove	 that	 the	 domestic	 injury	 exception	 had	 been	 satisfied.	 	 The	
analysis	 of	 the	proximate	 cause	 requirement	 included	 a	 discussion	 that	 the	 standard	was	
not	 between	 the	 domestic	 defendants’	 price	 fixing	 and	 the	 foreign	 plaintiffs’	 injury,	 but	
                                                
119	 Taffet,	 Eric.	 ‘The	 Foreign	 Trade	 Antitrust	 Improvements	 Act’s	 Domestic	 Injury	 Exception:	 A	 Nullity	 for	
Private	Foreign	Plaintiffs	Seeking	Access	 to	American	Courts,’	 (2012)	Columbia	 Journal	of	Transnational	Law,	
Vol.	50,	No.	1	at	220.	
120	Empagran	I	at	162.	
121	Taffet	at	220-21.	
122	 Empagran	 S.A.	 v.	 F.	 Hoffman-La	 Roche,	 Ltd.,	 (D.C.	 Circuit	 2005)	 417	 F.3d	 1267	 at	 1269	 [hereinafter	
Empagran	II].	
123	Empagran	II	at	1270-71.	
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rather	between	 the	domestic	effect	of	 the	price	 fixing	and	 the	plaintiffs’	 foreign	 injury.124		
The	court	emphasised	that	this	step	was	crucial	in	establishing	‘only	an	indirect	connection	
between	the	U.S.	prices	and	the	prices	[the	plaintiffs]	paid	…	abroad.’125	
	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 ETC	 Act	 was	 meant	 to	 allow	 companies	 to	 export	 their	 goods	 more	
economically	 by	 forming	 export-trading	 companies,	 which	 act	 as	 ‘international	
intermediaries	between	buyers	and	sellers.’126	 	However,	shortly	after	the	Act	was	passed,	
critics	noted	that	the	ETC	Act	appeared	to	be	following	in	the	footsteps	of	the	WPA	when	it	
came	to	its	shortcomings.127	
	
The	United	States	has	always	been	the	strongest	advocate	for	export	cartel	exemptions.		As	
such,	throughout	the	history	of	antitrust	development,	Congress	has	sought	to	perfect	the	
system.		Unfortunately,	there	is	a	still	a	great	deal	of	work	to	be	done.	
	
Foreign	Export	Cartels	in	U.S.	Antitrust	Law	
	
While	the	U.S.	may	explicitly	exempt	export	cartels	in	their	own	jurisdiction,	they	are	far	less	
lenient	 towards	 foreign	 cartels	 exporting	 into	 their	 markets.	 	 Foreign	 export	 cartels	 that	
harm	the	American	market	may	be	subject	to	prosecution	under	section	1	of	the	Sherman	
Act.		United	States	v.	ALCOA	established	the	effects	doctrine	where	the	Second	Circuit	Court	
held	that	the	Sherman	Act	would	be	applied	 ‘even	upon	persons	not	within	 its	allegiance,	
for	 conduct	 outside	 its	 borders	 that	 has	 consequences	within	 its	 borders	which	 the	 state	
reprehends.’128	
	
Since	almost	every	act	 carried	out	by	parties	 in	 foreign	countries	 that	 trade	with	 the	U.S.	
affects	 U.S.	 trade,	 the	 Sherman	 Act	 is	 only	 applied	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 conduct	 had	 a	
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128	United	States	v.	Aluminium	Co.	of	America.,	148	F.2d	4`6,	443	(2nd	Cir.	1945).	
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substantial	effect	on	the	United	States.129	 	Nevertheless,	 the	extraterritorial	application	of	
U.S.	 antitrust	 laws	 in	 the	 Hartford	 case	 caused	 diplomatic	 tensions	 between	 the	 United	
States	government	and	foreign	governments	who	protested	that	their	interests	where	being	
adversely	 affected.	 	 Due	 to	 the	 broad	 interpretation	 subsequent	 cases	 have	 given	 to	 the	
effects	doctrine,130	several	governments	enacted	blocking	statutes	in	order	to	protect	their	
domestic	firms	against	private	litigants	and	the	American	government	in	antitrust	cases.131		
These	 statutes	prohibit	 the	disclosure,	 inspection	ore	 removal	of	documents	 found	 in	 the	
territory	 of	 the	 enacting	 country	 by	 foreign	 authorities.	 	 The	 U.K.	 Protection	 of	 Trading	
Interests	Act	also	goes	a	step	further	in	its	clawback	provision,	which	allows	for	the	recovery	
of	the	non-compensatory	share	of	treble	damage	awards	given	by	U.S.	courts.132	
	
In	 response	 to	 the	 political	 tension	 caused	 by	 the	 effects	 test,	 U.S.	 courts	 developed	 a	
balancing	 test	 for	 foreign	 conduct	 in	 order	 to	 ascertain	 the	 conflict	 of	 interests	 and	 their	
impact	on	the	parties	involved.		The	balancing	test	was	first	used	in	Timberlane	Lumber	Co.	
v.	Bank	of	America,	where	 it	was	 stated,	 ‘an	effect	on	United	States	 commerce,	 although	
necessary	 to	 the	exercise	of	 jurisdiction	under	 the	antitrust	 laws,	 is	 alone	not	a	 sufficient	
basis	on	which	to	determine	whether	American	authority	should	be	asserted	in	a	given	case	
as	a	matter	of	international	comity	and	fairness.’133		The	Ninth	Circuit	Court	determined	six	
relevant	factors	to	be	considered	when	applying	the	balancing	test:134	
	
1) The	degree	of	conflict	with	foreign	law	or	policy;	
2) The	nationality	or	allegiance	of	the	parties	involved	and	the	locations	of	primary	
places	of	business	of	corporations;	
3) The	extent	 to	which	 law	enforcement	by	either	 jurisdiction	can	be	expected	 to	
achieve	compliance;	
4) The	relative	significance	of	effects	on	the	United	States	as	compared	with	those	
elsewhere;	
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5) The	 extent	 to	 which	 there	 is	 an	 explicit	 purpose	 to	 harm	 or	 affect	 American	
commerce	and	the	foreseeability	of	such	an	effect;	
6) The	relative	 importance	to	 the	violations	charged	of	conduct	within	 the	United	
States	as	compared	with	conduct	abroad.	
	
The	Third	Circuit	Court	expanded	the	‘jurisdictional	rule	of	reason’	in	Mannington	Mills	Inc.	
v.	Congoleum	Corp.	by	considering	additional	factors	such	as	‘possible	effects	upon	foreign	
relations	 if	 the	 court	 exercises	 jurisdiction	 and	 grants	 relief.’135	 	 The	 test	 as	 set	 out	 in	
Timberlane	was	also	 incorporated	 in	1987	 in	 the	Restatement	 (Third)	of	Foreign	Relations	
Law.	
	
While	 the	balancing	 test	 appears	 to	be	more	 suitable	 than	 the	unmodified	effects	 test,	 it	
faced	 criticism	 in	 National	 Bank	 of	 Canada	 v.	 Interbank	 Card	 Association.136	 	 Citing	 the	
Hartford	 judgment,	 the	 Second	 Circuit	 Court	 stated	 that	 it	 failed	 to	 properly	 address	 the	
conflicts	 between	 the	 effects	 test	 and	 the	 balancing	 test.137	 	 Other	 criticisms	 included	 a	
failure	 to	 address	 whether	 or	 not	 a	 court	 must	 exercise	 jurisdiction	 in	 cases	 where	 the	
Foreign	Trade	Act	standard	for	subject	matter	jurisdiction	is	met,	for	instance	if	the	Foreign	
Trade	Act	replaces	 ‘comity	balancing.’138	 	The	problems	associated	with	the	balancing	test	
stem	from	the	uncertainty	in	how	the	various	national	interests	and	other	factors	should	be	
weighed	and	balanced.		Moreover,	there	has	been	some	criticism	over	whether	or	not	the	
courts	are	the	most	appropriate	fora	for	assessing	national	and	foreign	interests	since	these	
conflicts	are	normally	political	rather	than	jurisdictional.139	
The	EU	and	its	Member	States:	the	unspoken	approach?	
	
	
Export	 cartels	 can	also	be	 implicitly	exempted	 from	a	 jurisdiction’s	 competition	 law	 rules.		
As	previously	stated,	 implicit	exemptions,	 like	those	 in	the	EU,	occur	where	a	competition	
law	 or	 antitrust	 statute	 is	 applied	 only	 to	 anticompetitive	 behaviour	 that	 affects	 the	
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domestic	market,	with	no	mention	of	conduct	affecting	foreign	markets.140			
	
Article	 101	of	 the	 Treaty	of	 the	 European	Union	 (TEU)	prohibits	 ‘all	 agreements	 between	
undertakings,	decisions	by	associations	of	undertakings	and	concerted	practices	which	may	
affect	trade	between	member	states	and	which	have	their	object	or	effects	the	prevention,	
restriction,	 or	 distortion	 of	 competition	 within	 the	 common	 market.’	 	 Therefore,	 in	 the	
European	Union,	export	cartels	that	restrict	exports	from	one	member	country	to	another	
are	prohibited.			
	
While	 the	 European	Union	does	not	 explicitly	 exempt	 export	 cartels	 from	 its	 competition	
law	 regime,	 the	nature	of	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 European	Commission	prosecutes	 cartels	
means	 that	 export	 cartels	 are	 often	 indirectly	 or	 implicitly	 exempt.	 	 The	 European	
Commission	will	often	only	pursue	anticompetitive	behaviour	if	it	has	a	significant	effect	on	
the	 Internal	 Market.	 	 This	 is	 known	 as	 the	 effects	 doctrine.141	 	 The	 Commission	 has	
acknowledged	 the	 importance	of	 the	effects	doctrine	 in	EU	 law	 in	both	 the	Wood	Pulp142	
case	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	Dyestuffs143	 case.	 	 Given	 that	 a	 pure	 export	 cartel	will	 only	 have	 a	
substantive	effect	on	a	foreign	market,	it	is	unlikely	that	any	export	cartel	operating	within	
the	EU	would	be	brought	 to	 the	attention	of	 the	Commission	unless	 it	 specifically	 affects	
trade	between	member	 states.	 	 These	 effects	 on	 trade	 can	occur	 if	 traders	 in	 third-party	
countries	are	prevented	from	re-importing	into	the	EU.	
	
Given	 the	 implicit	 nature	 of	 EU	 exemptions,	 there	 are	 no	 notification	 or	 registration	
requirements	 an	 export	 cartel	must	 comply	with	 and	 no	 supervision	 of	 any	 export	 cartel	
operating	in	the	EU	exists.		As	a	result,	there	is	a	dearth	of	empirical	data	on	the	economic	
effects	of	export	cartels	within	the	EU.144			
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Almost	every	EU	member	state	now	grants	implicit	exemptions	for	export	cartels.	Ireland’s	
application	of	its	competition	laws	is	also	a	good	example	of	a	system	where	export	cartels	
are	 implicitly	 exempt.	 	 Section	 4(1)	 of	 the	 Competition	 Act	 of	 2002	 prohibits	 collusion	
between	undertakings	and	their	associations	that	restrict	or	distort	competition	within	the	
State	 of	 Ireland.145	 	 The	 Act	 subsequently	 does	 not	 mention	 agreements	 that	 restrict	 or	
distort	competition	in	other	jurisdictions.	
	
While	pure	export	cartels	are	not	explicitly	mentioned	 in	EU	competition	 law	rules,	mixed	
export	cartels,	that	is	export	cartel	agreements	conducted	between	EU	members	and	non-
EU	members,	must	apply	for	an	exemption	under	Article	101	of	the	TEU	and	are	generally	
supervised	through	the	individual	member	states’	competition	laws. 
Foreign	Export	Cartels	in	the	EU	
	
In	the	Wood	Pulp	case,	an	American	export	cartel	fixed	prices	in	the	EU	and	was	regarded	as	
having	had	an	affect	on	the	Community.		The	Court	applied	Article	101	extraterritorially	and	
held	that	 the	territoriality	principle	also	covered	where	the	effects	of	 the	agreement	took	
place	within	the	Community.	
	
Conversely,	the	Commission	considered	in	cases	where	a	foreign	government	was	involved,	
whether	 it	 would	 prevent	 the	 application	 of	 Article	 101	 during	 their	 investigation	 of	 a	
Franco-Japanese	ball	bearings	agreement.		In	1972,	French	and	Japanese	producers	agreed	
to	 increase	 prices	 for	 Japanese	 exports	 destined	 for	 the	 French	market	 in	 order	 to	 adapt	
them	 to	 French	 prices.	 	While	 the	 Commission	 presumed	 there	was	 a	 violation	 of	 Article	
101,	 it	did	not	 impose	any	 fines.	 	 Instead,	 it	 issued	a	press	release	detailing	 four	different	
kinds	of	export	restraints:146	
	
1) Measures	taken	in	pursuance	of	trade	agreements	between	the	Community	and	
Japan	do	not	fall	under	Article	101;	
2) Measures	that	were	imposed	on	Japanese	firms	by	the	Japanese	authorities	are	
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not	 subject	 to	 Article	 101.	 	 Nevertheless	 the	 prohibition	 applies	 to	 additional	
agreements	and	concerted	practices;	
3) Article	101	is	applicable	to	measures	resulting	solely	from	agreements,	concerted	
practices,	or	decisions	by	associations	of	firms,	entered	into,	or	engaged	in	either	
unilaterally	by	Japanese	firms	or	in	concert	with	European	firms;	
4) Measures	 resulting	 from	agreements	or	 concerted	practices	between	 Japanese	
firms	 that	were	merely	 authorised	by	 the	 Japanese	authorities	under	 Japanese	
law	could	be	subject	to	Article	101	because	the	firms	would	be	free	not	to	enter	
into	the	agreements	or	engage	in	the	concerted	practices.	
	
The	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice	 reiterated	 these	 categories	 in	 the	 Wood	 Pulp	 case	 but	
distinguished	them	from	the	 facts	of	 the	case.147	 	The	Pulp,	Paper	and	Paperboard	Export	
Association	of	the	United	States,	which	was	expressly	exempted	from	antitrust	laws	by	the	
WPA	claimed	the	rule	of	non-intervention	had	been	violated	when	the	Commission	imposed	
fines	 under	Article	 101.148	 	 The	Court	 did	 not	 address	 the	non-intervention	 rule,	 as	 there	
were	no	conflicting	requirements	between	the	United	States	and	EC	authorities.		Rather,	it	
ruled	that	the	statutory	exemption	granted	to	American	export	cartels	did	not	‘require	such	
cartels	to	be	concluded.’149		Therefore,	Article	101	was	applied	and	enforced	in	the	absence	
of	government	intervention	or	coercion.		
	
The	Controversy	Surrounding	Export	Cartel	Exemptions	
	
One	 of	 the	 most	 prevalent	 arguments	 against	 export	 cartel	 exemptions	 is	 that	 such	
exemptions	compromise	 international	 trade	policies	that	would	otherwise	promote	better	
market	integration	and	freer	international	trade.150		In	a	2003	submission	regarding	the	Free	
Trade	Area	of	the	Americas	(FTAA),	the	Canadian	Bar	Association	remarked:151	
	
                                                
147	Ibid.	
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149	Ibid. 
150	Suslow	at	797.	
151	Canadian	Bar	Association	National	Competition	Law,	Submissions	Concerning	the	FTAA	Competition	(Apr.	
2003).	
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With	respect	 to	export	cartels,	 the	CBA	Section	has	difficulty	seeing	
how	 Canada,	 the	 U.S.	 or	 other	 jurisdictions	 could	 seek	 to	 preserve	
export	cartel	exemptions	in	the	context	of	an	FTAA	with	a	meaningful	
competition	policy	component.		The	fact	that	this	was	not	addressed	
in	Chapter	15	of	NAFTA	[the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement]	
is	one	of	the	many	reasons	why	more	vigorous	provisions	on	export	
cartels	need	to	be	explored.	
	
Tensions	 between	 jurisdictions	 that	 support	 export	 cartel	 exemptions	 and	 those	 that	 are	
vehemently	opposed	to	them	are	brought	to	light	when	conflicting	parties	enter	into	trade	
negotiations	with	each	other.		In	the	mid-1990s,	the	United	States	rejected	specific	requests	
from	Mexico	 to	 repeal	 the	WPA	 and	 ETC	Act.	 	 The	 final	 version	 of	NAFTA	 even	 explicitly	
protects	these	aspects	of	U.S.	law:152	
	
No	 changes	 in	 U.S.	 antitrust	 laws,	 including	 the	 Export	 Trading	
Company	Act	 1982	or	 the	Webb-Pomerene	Act,	will	 be	 required	 to	
implement	 U.S.	 obligations	 under	 the	 NAFTA.	 	 These	 laws	 have	
contributed	to	the	export	competitiveness	of	U.S.	industries	and	they	
remain	 appropriate	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 free	 trade	 area.	 	Nothing	 in	
the	Agreement	requires	any	NAFTA	government	to	take	measure	that	
would	adversely	affect	such	associations.	
	
Conflict	 surrounding	 export	 cartel	 exemptions	 have	 also	 reached	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organisation	 (WTO).	 	 Both	 the	 Singapore	 Ministerial	 Conference	 in	 1996	 and	 the	 Doha	
Ministerial	 Conference	 in	 2001	 stressed	 the	 need	 to	 enhance	 the	 contribution	 of	
competition	policy	to	international	trade	and	development.		They	also	stressed	the	need	to	
examine	 issues	 raised	 by	 members	 relating	 to	 the	 interaction	 between	 trade	 and	
competition	policy,	 including	anti-competitive	practices,	such	as	export	cartels,	 in	order	to	
                                                
152	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	 Implementation	Act,	NAFTA	Administrative	Action	Statement,	 ch.	
15(B)	(3	Sept.	1993).	
 82 
 
identify	areas	that	needed	further	consideration	in	the	WTO	framework.153		
	
Another	 major	 concern	 opponents	 of	 these	 exemptions	 have	 is	 that	 the	 intended	
beneficiaries,	that	is	small	and	medium-sized	firms,	are	not	using	the	exemptions	but	rather	
that	large	international	companies	are	benefitting	instead.		As	established	in	the	analysis	on	
the	effects	of	export	cartels	in	Chapter	Two,	export	cartels	with	higher	market	shares,	such	
as	the	case	of	the	potash	cartel,	can	have	devastating	effects	on	developing	countries.		
	
It	has	also	been	argued	that	export	cartel	exemptions	can	have	far-reaching	consequences	
for	developing	countries.		Delegates	from	developing	countries	often	expressed	support	for	
the	eradication	of	export	 cartel	exemptions	 in	 industrialised	or	developed	countries	while	
still	 allowing	developing	 countries	 this	 right.	 	At	 a	 2002	WTO	meeting,	 the	delegate	 from	
Thailand	 maintained	 that	 most	 cartels	 exporting	 to	 developing	 countries	 damage	 their	
economies	 and	 should	 therefore	 be	 illegal;	 however,	 developing	 countries	 themselves	
should	be	able	to	exempt	export	cartels	 in	order	to	 increase	their	bargaining	power.154	 	 In	
2003,	at	a	meeting	of	the	WGTCP,	Thailand	argued	that	exporting	firms:	
	
should	not	benefit	 from	a	blanket	exemption	 from	competition	 laws,	which	would	
exclude	them	from	scrutiny	under	a	case-by-case	approach.155	
	
At	the	same	meeting,	China	stated	that	it	agreed	with	Thailand’s	views	and	that	
	
the	 future	 multilateral	 framework	 on	 competition	 policy	 should	 incorporate	
restrictions	on	the	maintenance	of	export	cartels	by	developed	country	members.156	
	
In	response	to	these	statements,	the	United	States	vehemently	defended	its	right	to	exempt	
                                                
153	Transcripts	of	both	conferences	can	be	found	at	
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm#investment_competition	and	
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154	World	Trade	Organisation.,	Report	on	the	Meeting	of	26-27	Sept.	2002,	WTO	Doc.	WT/WGTCP/M/19	(Nov.	
15,	2002)	at	6.	
155	World	Trade	Organisation.	Report	on	the	Meeting	of	20-21	February,	WTO	Doc.	WT/WGTCP/M/21	(26	May	
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156	Ibid.	
 83 
 
export	 cartels	 from	 antitrust	 persecution.	 	 At	 a	 2003	 WTO	 meeting,	 a	 United	 States	
representative	argued:157	
	
These	 arrangements	 typically	 were	 conceived	 as	 mechanisms	 for	 domestic	
entities	 that	 lacked	 the	 resources	 to	engage	 in	effective	export	activity	acting	
individually.		As	such,	they	often	had	pro-competitive	effects	in	that	they	added	
another	 player	 to	 the	 relevant	markets	 that	might	 bring	 innovation	 or	 lower	
prices.	 	 Moreover,	 they	 were	 not	 secret	 and	 therefore	 did	 not	 bear	 the	
hallmarks	of	what	was	traditionally	considered	to	be	a	hard-core	cartel.	
	
While	the	American	system,	with	its	heavy	emphasis	on	registration	and	regulation,	may	be	
in	 a	 better	 position	 to	 manage	 its	 domestic	 export	 cartels,	 this	 may	 not	 be	 true	 in	
jurisdictions	where	such	exemptions	are	applied	more	freely.		A	globalised	agreement	could	
prevent	 developed	 countries	 from	 using	 export	 cartels	 to	 exploit	 the	 weaknesses	 of	
developing	countries	whilst	allowing	developing	countries	the	freedom	to	support	their	own	
businesses	through	the	use	of	export	cartels.	
	
Furthermore,	under	the	current	WTO	law	system,	business	practices	run	by	purely	private	
firms	unsupported	by	any	government	 that	 restrict	 access	 to	 the	markets	 cannot	be	held	
liable	 under	 the	 GATT	 or	 GATS.	 	 The	 WTO	 is	 also	 currently	 limited	 to	 investigating	
government	 measures	 affecting	 the	 competitive	 market	 in	 their	 jurisdiction.	 	 Thus,	
anticompetitive	 behaviour	 committed	 by	 private	 firms	 on	 foreign	 markets	 as	 well	 as	
government	tolerance	of	anticompetitive	behaviour	affecting	export	markets	by	firms	based	
in	their	territory	do	not	fall	within	the	ambit	of	the	WTO’s	jurisdiction.		There	is	a	potential	
solution	regarding	this	particular	issue.			
	
In	 the	 Japan	–	Film	 case,	 the	Panel	assessed	 the	possibility	of	 ruling	on	private	conduct	 if	
there	 is	 sufficient	 government	 involvement.158	 	 However,	 they	 also	 remarked	 on	 the	
difficulties	 in	 imputing	 private	 conduct	 to	 that	 of	 the	 government	 and	 stressed	 that	 this	
                                                
157	WTO	Feb.	Rep.	at	15.	
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para.	10.56.	
 84 
 
possibility	would	have	to	be	examined	on	a	case-by-case	basis.		The	difficulty	in	making	such	
an	 assessment	 lies	 in	 determining	 whether	 the	 facts	 in	 each	 case	 meet	 the	 level	 of	
government	 involvement	 that	 would	 constitute	 as	 ‘sufficient’,	 thus	 making	 private	 party	
actions	challengeable	measures.159	 	For	 instance,	 the	question	of	whether	a	government’s	
policy	of	exempting	export	cartels	from	their	competition	laws	would	qualify	as	government	
involvement	would	be	difficult	to	answer.	 	 In	the	case	of	implicit	exemptions,	these	would	
clearly	not	meet	the	thresholds	necessary	to	establish	government	involvement.		However,	
in	 the	 case	 of	 explicit	 exemptions,	 such	 as	 those	 applied	 by	 the	United	 States,	 it	may	 be	
argued	 that	 by	 granting	 certificates	 of	 review	 to	 export	 cartels,	 the	 U.S.	 government	 is	
actively	 encouraging	 the	 formation	 of	 export	 cartels.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 can	 also	 be	
argued	that	granting	firms	certificates	of	review	in	order	to	regulate	export	cartels	operating	
in	 the	 country	 may	 not	 constitute	 sufficient	 government	 involvement	 either.	 	 It	 will	 be	
argued	 in	Chapter	Six	 that	a	harmonised	competition	 law	agreement	under	 the	WTO	may	
help	to	resolve	some	of	these	issues.	
	
Private	International	Cartels	and	Developing	Countries	
	
While	jurisdictions	such	as	the	United	States	and	the	European	Union	may	have	the	power	
to	pursue	 international	cartels	affecting	their	own	markets,	countries	without	an	effective	
competition	or	antitrust	system,	particularly	developing	countries,	may	not	necessarily	have	
the	 ability	 to	 do	 so.	 	 International	 cartels	 and	 export	 cartels	 can	 therefore	 often	 target	
developing	countries	to	their	own	advantage.	
Public	Enforcement	
	
The	 previous	 chapter	 has	 already	 covered	 the	 devastating	 effects	 these	 cartels	 have	 on	
developing	 countries.	 	While	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 jurisdictions	with	 established	 antitrust	 and	
competition	 law	 regimes	 often	 can	 and	will	 impose	 their	 own	 sanctions	 extraterritorially,	
these	 penalties	 are	 often	 only	 applied	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 cartel	 has	 had	 a	 substantial	
negative	effect	within	their	domestic	market.		In	instances	where	these	jurisdictions	cannot	
or	 will	 not	 interfere,	 developing	 countries	 need	 to	 find	 their	 own	 solution.	 	 Several	
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 85 
 
developing	 countries	 such	 as	 South	 Korea,	Mexico,	 and	Brazil	 have	 specifically	 developed	
enforcement	 mechanisms	 in	 order	 to	 directly	 prosecute	 international	 cartels	 found	
targeting	their	economies.		Others,	such	as	Chile,	have	taken	steps	to	develop	an	indigenous	
competition	system	but	have	yet	to	successfully	pursue	a	private	international	cartel	case.	
China		
	
While	moving	swiftly	from	developing	country	to	global	powerhouse,	the	People’s	Republic	
of	 China	 still	 retains	 many	 characteristics	 of	 a	 developing	 country,	 one	 of	 which,	 is	 the	
struggle	 to	 enact	 an	 effective	 competition	 law	 agreement.	 	 Instead	 of	 compiling	 its	
competition	 laws	 into	 a	 single	 comprehensive	 piece	 of	 legislation,	 until	 recently,	 China’s	
competition	 laws,	 such	 as	 the	 prohibition	 on	 price-fixing	 agreements,	 were	 scattered	
between	 several	 national	 policy	 announcements	 issued	by	 different	 government	 agencies	
and	provincial	governments.160			
	
The	 Interim	 Provisions	 for	 the	 Promotion	 and	 Protection	 of	 Competition	 in	 the	 Socialist	
Economy,161	issued	by	the	States	Council	1980	was	the	first	attempt	at	passing	legislation	in	
order	 to	 regulate	 monopolies,	 including	 government	 monopolies.162	 	 While	 the	 Interim	
Provisions	 acknowledged	 the	 importance	 of	 competition,	 they	 also	 emphasised	 that,	
‘competition	 between	 socialist	 enterprises	 is	 fundamentally	 different	 from	 that	 under	
capitalism.	 	 Competition	 under	 socialism	 is	 based	 on	 the	 common	 ownership	 of	 product	
resources	and	serves	the	socialist	economy	under	the	guidance	of	the	state	plan.’163		These	
provisions	 were	 therefore	 more	 symbolic	 than	 practical;	 indeed	 many	 of	 the	 provisions	
were	 considered	 to	 be	more	 slogans	 rather	 than	 substantive	 laws	 that	 could	 be	 used	 to	
address	anticompetitive	behaviour.164	
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161	Interim	Provisions	for	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	Competition	in	the	Socialist	Economy,	published	by	
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After	the	Interim	Provisions,	China	subsequently	passed	a	number	of	other	competition	law	
statutes.	 	 The	most	 important	 of	 these	 were	 the	 Law	 Against	 Unfair	 Competition,165	 the	
Pricing	Law,166	the	Provisional	Regulation	on	Curbing	of	Pricing	Monopolies,167	and	the	Rules	
on	Mergers	and	Acquisitions	of	Domestic	Enterprises	by	Foreign	Investors.168		These,	along	
with	 other	 basic	 laws,	 formed	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 a	 basic,	 though	 somewhat	 limited,	
competition	law	framework.	
	
In	 2008,	 China	 finally	 passed	 its	 Anti-Monopoly	 Law	 (AML),	 its	 first	 comprehensive	
competition	law	statute.169		The	AML	prohibits	agreements	that	fix	prices,	impose	limits	on	
production	or	sales,	allocate	markets,	and	set	resale	prices.170	 	Three	Chinese	government	
agencies	 were	 tasked	 with	 implementing	 and	 enforcing	 the	 new	 law:	 the	 National	
Development	 and	 Reform	 Commission;	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Commerce;	 and	 the	 States	
Administration	 for	 Industry	 and	 Commerce	 (SAIC).	 	 The	 SAIC	 was	 also	 responsible	 for	
establishing	 an	 independent	 bureau	 in	 order	 to	 investigate	 and	 punish	 anticompetitive	
behaviour,	commercial	bribery,	cases	involving	smuggling,	and	other	activities	that	violated	
the	provisions	of	the	AML.171	
	
In	 January	 2013,	 China	 joined	 the	 ranks	 in	 the	 war	 against	 international	 cartels,	 when	 it	
successfully	prosecuted	manufacturers	of	liquid	crystal	display.172		While	the	fines	imposed	
(CNY	353,	equivalent	to	$56	million	USD	at	the	time),	were	minimal	when	compared	to	its	
other	developing	country	counterparts,	not	to	mention	those	of	the	United	States	and	the	
EU,	 competition	 law	 experts	 took	 it	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 China’s	 potential	 to	 establish	 itself	 as	 a	
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future	leader	in	global	competition	law.173	
Mexico	
	
Mexico	 introduced	 the	 Federal	 Law	 of	 Economic	 Competition	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Federal	
Competition	Commission	 in	1993	as	part	of	 its	conditions	 in	order	to	enter	 into	the	North	
American	 Free	 Trade	 Agreement	 (NAFTA)	 free-trade	 zone	 in	 1994.	 	 The	 Federal	 Law	 of	
Economic	Competition	(FLEC)	made	conduct	such	as	hard-core	cartel	behaviour	illegal	per	se	
with	 no	 defences	 for	 efficiency	 or	 small-businesses.	 	 There	 were	 initially	 no	 explicit	
guidelines	 when	 imposing	 fines,	 however	 section	 30	 of	 the	 FLEC	 stated	 that	 the	 Federal	
Competition	Commission	must	account	for	the	size	of	the	market	affected,	the	amount	of	
damages,	recidivism,	and	the	ability	of	the	cartel	members	to	pay	the	imposed	fine.174		Since	
then,	FLEC	has	undergone	a	number	of	amendments,	such	as	increasing	sanctions	and	the	
creation	of	leniency	programme.175		In	2011,	Mexico	introduced	amendments	criminalising	
cartels,	increasing	the	fines	imposed,	and	giving	the	Competition	Commission	the	power	to	
conduct	‘dawn	raids.’176	
	
In	June	2013,	Mexico	enacted	the	Comisión	Federal	de	Competencia	Económica	(COFECE),	
an	 independent	 constitutional	body,	 to	 replace	 the	Federal	Competition	Commission.	 	On	
July	 15	 2014,	 the	 new	 Federal	 Law	 on	 Economic	 Competition	 was	 subsequently	 passed,	
which	granted	the	COFECE	as	well	as	the	Instituto	Federal	de	Telecomunicaciones	the	power	
to	 conduct	market	 studies.	 	 The	 COFECE	 is	 responsible	 for	 enforcing	 the	 Federal	 Law	 on	
Economic	Competition	in	all	sectors	except	telecommunications	and	broadcasting,	which	is	
regulated	by	the	Instituto	Federal	de	Telecomunicaciones.	
	
Following	an	 investigation	and	 the	 successful	 prosecution	 in	Canada	 in	1997	of	 the	 lysine	
cartel,	Mexico	fined	American	company	Archer	Daniels	Midland	Co.	(ADM)	$125,000	USD	in	
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1999.	 	 It	 has	 been	 remarked	 upon	 that	 these	 fines	 are	 significantly	 low	 according	 to	
contemporary	international	standards.177		Since	then,	it	has	also	imposed	fines	or	accepted	
plea	agreements	in	cartels	involving	citric	acid	and	vitamins.178	
Brazil	
	
Brazil	has	been	praised	as	having	the	‘largest	and	most	effective	anti-cartel	authority	in	Latin	
America.’179	 	While	competition	 law	in	Brazil	can	be	traced	as	far	back	as	1962,	Law	8884,	
the	 foundation	of	 contemporary	 Brazilian	 competition	 law	was	 passed	 in	 1994.180	 	Under	
Law	8884,	Article	21	prohibited	price	fixing,	market	allocation,	and	other	horizontal	market	
restraints	 that	 have	 a	 substantial	 effect	 on	 the	market.	 	 Two	pieces	 of	 evidence	must	 be	
produced	 in	 order	 to	 prove	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 hard-core	 cartel:	 first,	 confirmation	 of	
collective	market	power	from	a	case-specific	analysis;	and	second,	there	must	be	proof	of	an	
agreement	 to	 collude	 in	 that	 market.181	 	 Furthermore,	 unlike	 many	 other	 jurisdictions,	
Brazil’s	competition	law	system	did	not	exempt	export	cartels,	‘crisis’	cartels,	or	agricultural	
cooperatives.		Like	Mexico,	Brazil	had	also	not	established	any	specific	guidelines	regarding	
the	issuance	of	fines	in	cartel	cases.		Law	8884	did	however	identify	some	general	principles	
such	 as	market	 overcharges	 or	 illegal	 gains	 to	 violators	 as	 aggravating	 factors	 that	would	
increase	 level	 of	 the	 fine	 and	 cooperation	 with	 the	 authorities	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ability	 of	
defendants	to	pay	as	mitigating	factors.182			
	
On	30	November	2011,	Brazil	formally	enacted	Law	12,529/2011,	which	came	into	force	in	
May	2012	and	replaced	law	8884.		Along	with	extensive	changes	to	the	pre-merger	review	
system,	 Law	 12,529	 also	 amended	 the	 previous	 law	 concerning	 the	 administrative	
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proceedings	 regarding	 anticompetitive	 conduct	 such	 as	 cartels	 were	 administered.	 	 It	
introduced	 new	 rules	 related	 to	 Brazil’s	 leniency	 programme	 and	 increased	 penalties	
imposed	on	 cartels.183	 	 The	new	 law	allows	 the	Administrative	Council	 for	Defense	of	 the	
Economy	(CADE)	to	focus	its	priorities	on	domestic	issues	such	as	local	cartels	and	abuse	of	
dominance	claims.	
	
Brazilian	authorities	have	largely	been	concerned	with	domestic	cases,	indeed	CADE	who	is	
responsible	for	 initiating	proceedings	and	administering	penalties	 in	cartel	cases,	has	been	
criticised	for	choosing	cases	that	are	more	likely	to	succeed	and	have	lesser	effects	on	the	
economy.184	 	 Brazil	 has,	 however,	 recently	 concluded	 its	 investigations	 and	 announced	
sanctions	in	the	vitamin	and	lysine	cartels	as	well	as	the	graphite	electrode	cartel.185			
	
Chile	
	
Despite	 having	 one	 of	 the	 oldest	 competition	 law	 systems	 in	 Latin	 America,	 Chile’s	
competition	 law,	which	was	passed	 in	1973,	 remains	 largely	 ineffective	when	 it	 comes	 to	
cartel	 enforcement.	 	 The	 Chilean	 antitrust	 authority,	 the	 National	 Economic	 Prosecutor’s	
Office	 (Fiscalía	 Nacional	 Económica,	 FNE)	 has	 traditionally	 been	 more	 concerned	 with	
merger	control	than	investigating	and	prosecuting	cartels.186	
	
The	 FNE	 averages	 around	 two	 decisions	 in	 relation	 to	 horizontal	 restraint	 cases	 a	 year.		
Before	 the	maximum	 fine	 for	 cartels	was	 raised	 in	2004,	 the	average	 cartel	 fine	 that	was	
imposed	was	 an	 astonishingly	 low	$50,000,	which	was	 largely	 ineffective	 in	 deterring	 the	
typically	 large-scale	 international	 cartels	 that	 targeted	 it.	 	 The	 FNE	 also	 lacks	 the	
sophistication	and	resources	other	jurisdictions	with	experience	in	cartel	investigations	have	
access	to	and	therefore	cannot	 investigate	or	even	prosecute	these	cartels	when	they	are	
                                                
183	Kotona,	Krisztian;	Herrera	Moraes,	‘Reforms	Achieved,	but	Challenges	Ahead:	Brazil’s	New	Competition	
Law,	(2011)	International	Antitrust	Bulletin,	available	at	
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/at311000_bulletin_2011_3.authch
eckdam.pdf.	
184	Grinberg,	Mauro.	Cartels:	The	Brazilian	Experience,	(2006)	Toronto,	paper	at	the	Global	Competition	Forum	
at	2.	
185	Levenstein,	Margaret	and	Suslow,	Valerie,	 ‘Contemporary	 International	Cartels	and	Developing	Countries:	
Economic	Effects	and	Implications	for	Competition	Policy,’	(2004)	Antitrust	Law	Journal,	Vol.	71,	No.	3	at	844.	
186	OECD,	Competition	Law	and	Policy	in	Chile:	A	peer	review,	(2004)	OECD	Publishing	at	63.	
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discovered.	 	Chile	has	managed	to	successfully	fine	one	international	cartel	 in	the	Medical	
Oxygen	 case	 in	2004,	where	 cartel	members	were	 fine	approximately	$300,000.187	 	Apart	
from	 that,	 Chile	 has	 only	 ever	 investigated	 one	 other	 international	 cartel	 case,	Gasoline	
Distribution,	which	was	closed	after	many	years	of	 investigations.188	 	Since	then,	Chile	has	
never	launched	any	other	investigations	or	successfully	prosecuted	any	international	cartels.	
	
Despite	 some	 of	 these	 promising	 examples	 of	 developing	 countries	 exercising	 their	 own	
legislation	 against	 international	 cartels,	 for	 many,	 a	 direct	 approach	 poses	 some	 serious	
problems.		For	instance,	the	difficulties	faced	by	developing	countries	in	export	cartel	cases	
can	 also	be	 applied	 to	hard-core	 international	 cartels.	 	 It	must	 be	 reiterated	 that	 even	 in	
cases	where	 there	 is	 an	 established	 enforcement	mechanism	with	 the	 power	 to	 conduct	
investigations	 and	 prosecute	 cartels,	 developing	 countries	 very	 often	 lack	 the	 necessary	
resources	to	obtain	such	evidence.		More	often	than	not,	in	many	developing	countries,	the	
mere	 question	 of	 how	 to	 obtain	 evidence	 is	 never	 even	 asked	 because	 these	 countries	
rarely	have	 the	 legal,	political,	or	bureaucratic	 resources	 to	even	 investigate	or	prosecute	
international	cartels.	 	The	Consumer	Unity	and	Trust	Society	(CUTS)	report	on	competition	
policy	in	seven	south	Asian	and	African	developing	countries	noted:189		
	
The	 competition	 authorities	 [in	 India,	 Kenya,	 Pakistan,	 South	 Africa,	 Sri	
Lanka,	 Tanzania	 and	 Zambia]	 find	 it	 very	 difficult	 to	 attract	 and	 retain	
competent	and	qualified	 staff	…	Adequacy	of	 legal	provisions	 is	 the	most	
important	 aspect	 of	 a	 competition	 regime	 determining	 its	 effectiveness.		
The	 inadequacy	 or	 lack	 of	 legal	 clarity	 in	 dealing	 with	 cases,	 though	
prevalent	 in	 all	 countries,	was	most	 prominent	 in	 the	 case	of	 India.	 	 The	
lack	of	research	and	investigative	capacity	in	the	seven	countries	makes	it	
very	difficult	for	the	competition	authorities	to	deal	with	cases	judiciously.	
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South	Korea	
	
While	 South	Korea	 can	no	 longer	be	 classified	 as	 a	 developing	 country,	 having	 earned	 its	
developed	 status	 in	 2008,190	 it	 first	 established	 the	 Price	 Stablisation	 Act	 in	 1973,	 as	 a	
developing	country,	in	reaction	to	rising	oil	prices.		This	section	will	therefore	analyse	South	
Korea’s	competition	laws	prior	to	its	establishment	as	a	developed	country.	
	
The	Price	Stablisation	Act	served	to	promote	fair	trade	by	prohibiting	the	practice	of	refusal	
to	sell,	however,	perhaps	conversely,	it	also	placed	price	ceilings	on	all	goods	and	services.		
The	Monopoly	 Regulation	 and	 Fair	 Trade	 Act	 (MRFTA)	 subsequently	 replaced	 it	 in	 1980,	
however,	prior	 to	2002,	 the	Korean	Fair	Trade	Commission	did	not	exercise	 its	powers	 to	
investigate	anticompetitive	behaviour	from	any	international	cartel.191		Surprisingly,	despite	
the	fact	 that	the	MRFTA	was	enacted	after	a	military	coup	 in	1979	that	put	General	Chun	
Doo	Whan	 in	power,	 it	 received	overwhelming	 support	 from	 the	public.	 	 By	 the	 time	 the	
coup	 took	place,	public	perception	of	chaebols	 (large,	 family-owned	businesses	with	deep	
connections	 with	 South	 Korean	 government	 agencies),	 was	 diminishing	 drastically.192		
Scholars,	 consumer	 interest	 groups	 and	 the	 media	 all	 promoted	 the	 view	 that	 these	
conglomerates	were	largely	acting	in	order	to	exploit	the	weaknesses	of	the	common	South	
Korean	worker.	
	
In	May	2002,	South	Korea	became	the	 first	developing	country	 to	 independently	apply	 its	
competition	 law	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 extraterritorially	 and	 fine	 members	 of	 an	
international	cartel	when	it	imposed	$5.7	billion	won	($4.5	million	USD)	in	fines	against	the	
members	 of	 the	 graphite	 electrodes	 cartel.193	 	 In	 April	 2003,	 it	 then	 issued	 fines	 of	 $3.4	
billion	won	 ($2.7	million	USD)	 against	members	of	 the	 vitamin	 cartel.194	 	 Since	 then,	 as	 a	
developed	 country,	 South	 Korea	 has	 levied	 fines	 against	 an	Asian	 cartel	 accused	 of	 fixing	
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Companies,	(23	April	2003),	Press	Release,	available	at	http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/vitaminl.doc.	
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prices	 for	 copy	paper	 in	2008195	as	well	as	more	 recently	 in	April	2015,	 it	 set	a	 combined	
$7.5	billion	won	($6.85	million	USD)	fine	on	a	German	car	bearing	company	and	a	Japanese	
auto	parts	manufacturer	accused	of	illegal	price	rigging.196	
	
Despite	 the	 clear	 benefits	 of	 having	 an	 established	 competition	 or	 antitrust	 legal	 system,	
many	developing	countries	simply	regard	such	an	enterprise	as	too	great	a	financial	burden	
to	bear.		This	is	especially	true	in	instances	where	the	country	is	relatively	small	or	lacks	the	
economic	and	political	power	necessary	to	enforce	potential	fines	or	punishments.		In	these	
situations,	 there	 are	 very	 few	 routes	 aggrieved	 consumers	may	 take	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 a	
satisfactory	outcome.	
Private	Enforcement	of	Competition	Law	
	
In	 cases	 where	 a	 developing	 country	may	 lack	 the	 necessary	 legal	 system	 to	 successfully	
investigate	and	prosecute	an	international	cartel,	consumers	in	these	countries	may	choose	
to	bring	a	domestic	private	action	case	for	damages.		Private	actions	for	damages	in	relation	
to	 competition	 law	 violations	 are	 allowed	 in	 over	 twenty	 countries,	 including	 Argentina,	
Brazil,	Canada,	Russia,	Slovakia,	and	Venezuela.197		However,	private	suits	tend	to	be	a	rare	
occurrence	due	to	a	number	of	reasons.		First,	the	damages	that	can	be	recovered	in	most	
countries	are	minimal,	with	the	exception	of	the	United	States	and	Taiwan,	which	allow	for	
punitive	damages	 in	addition	to	the	actual	damages	suffered	by	the	plaintiff.198	 	Second,	 it	
can	be	more	expensive	and	complicated	to	sue	as	an	individual	since	many	countries	do	not	
allow	 for	 class	 action	 suits	 either	 at	 all	 or	 solely	 for	 competition	 law	 violations.	 	 Finally,	
consumers	 are	 often	 intimidated	 by	 the	 legal	 and	 procedural	 difficulties	 attached	 to	 such	
cases.	
	
The	European	Union	has	recognised	the	importance	of	allowing	private	citizens	the	right	to	
enforce	competition	laws	in	cases	where	they	have	suffered	harm	as	a	direct	result	of	a	firm	
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or	firms’	anticompetitive	behaviour.		In	1984,	the	Commission	emphasised	the	importance	of	
allowing	for	private	damages	for	breaches	of	competition	by	stating	that,	‘Scant	use	has	yet	
been	 made	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 actions	 for	 damages	 for	 breaches	 of	 the	 Community	
competition	rules.		There	is	a	need	to	make	all	concerned	more	aware	of	this	possibility.		The	
Commission	believes	it	desirable	that	the	judicial	enforcement	of	Articles	85	and	86	should	
also	include	the	award	of	damages	to	injured	parties	because	this	would	render	Community	
law	more	effective.’199		[Emphasis	added].	
	
Therefore,	in	the	Commission’s	opinion,	allowing	for	private	action	damages	would	not	only	
allow	 those	who	have	 suffered	harm	some	compensation	but	also	by	 informing	 the	wider	
public	of	 their	 rights	 regarding	competition	 law	enforcement,	allow	 for	more	enforcement	
opportunities.	 	 There	 have	 been	 numerous	 cases	 where	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	
awarded	damages	 in	favour	of	consumers	 in	relation	to	violations	of	competition	 law.	 	For	
instance,	in	the	Manfredi	case,	consumers	filed	for	damages	against	a	number	of	insurance	
companies	 formed	 an	 agreement	 that	 resulted	 in	 increased	 prices	 for	 insurance	
premiums.200	 	 The	 Italian	 national	 competition	 law	 authority	 had	 previously	 ruled	 the	
agreement	as	unlawful.	 	 In	answer	 to	 the	questions	raised	as	 to	whether	Article	101	TFEU	
allowed	third	parties	to	claim	for	damages	for	harm	suffered	as	a	result	of	anticompetitive	
behaviour,	the	ECJ	held:201	
	
any	 individual	 can	 rely	 on	 the	 invalidity	 of	 an	 agreement	 or	 practice	
prohibited	 under	 that	 article	 and,	 where	 there	 is	 a	 causal	 relationship	
between	 the	 latter	 and	 the	harm	suffered,	 claim	compensation	 for	 that	
harm.	
	
Allowing	 for	 private	 action	 damages	 in	 international	 cartel	 cases	 may	 contribute	 to	 the	
objective	 of	 deterring	 the	 formation	 of	 other	 international	 cartels.	 However,	 outside	 the	
United	States	and	the	European	Union,	it	is	notoriously	difficult	for	members	of	the	public	to	
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successfully	bring	an	action	 for	damages	against	 an	 international	 cartel.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	
Japanese	 Anti-Monopoly	 Law	 contains	 limited	 provisions	 on	 private	 enforcement	 and	
effectively	 gives	 the	 Japanese	 Fair	 Trade	 Commission	 veto	 power	 over	 the	 institution	 of	
suit.202		The	Japanese	Fair	Trade	Commission	is	seen	as	having	a	more	involved	and	effective	
role	in	deterring	the	spread	of	cartels	than	its	private	citizens.203	
	
Many	 governments,	 like	 Japan,	 are	 hesitant	 to	 allow	 for	 private	 enforcement	 of	 their	
competition	laws.204		The	rationale	behind	this	reluctance	stems	from	the	fear	that	in	doing	
so	they	will	 relinquish	control	over	enforcing	their	own	 laws	 in	 these	cases.205	 	For	private	
citizens	 in	 developing	 countries	 that	 have	 suffered	harm	 from	an	 international	 cartel,	 this	
daunting	hurdle	is	even	larger	owing	to	the	fact	that	many	developing	countries	often	do	not	
have	competition	law	systems	of	their	own	to	effectively	prosecute	that	cartel.		Consumers	
in	these	countries	may	therefore	need	to	look	elsewhere	if	they	wish	to	claim	any	recourse	
for	the	losses	they	suffer.	
	
Some	jurisdictions,	such	as	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	United	States,	allow	for	consumers	
in	developing	countries	to	bring	a	private	suit	before	their	own	courts,	however,	there	are	
also	problems	associated	with	this	approach.		For	instance,	while	the	United	States	permits	
foreign	 antitrust	 plaintiffs	 under	 the	 Foreign	 Trade	Antitrust	 Improvements	Act	 (FTAIA)206,	
historically,	 U.S.	 courts	 have	 not	 looked	 favourably	 upon	 foreign	 plaintiffs	 whose	 cases	
mostly	pertain	to	conduct	aimed	at	foreign	markets.		The	courts	have,	until	recently,	agreed	
that	 the	 FTAIA	 requires	 foreign	 plaintiffs	 relying	 on	 the	U.S.	 antitrust	 law	 system	 to	 show	
that:	 first,	 the	 alleged	 anticompetitive	 conduct	 had	 “a	 direct	 substantial	 and	 reasonably	
foreseeable	effect”	on	the	U.S.	marketplace;	and	second,	that	the	anticompetitive	effect	on	
the	 U.S.	marketplace	 directly	 harmed	 the	 plaintiff’s	 interests.207	 	 However,	 in	 the	 case	 of	
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Kruman	v	Christie’s	International	PLC208,	the	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	Second	Circuit	deviated	
from	 the	 traditional	 understanding	 and	 stated	 that	 foreign	 plaintiffs	 need	 only	 show	 the	
anticompetitive	 effects	 in	 the	 U.S.	 market	 violate	 the	 Sherman	 Act,	 and	 not	 that	 those	
effects	formed	the	foundation	of	their	harm	in	order	to	bring	an	action	within	the	U.S.209			
	
Nevertheless,	despite	 this	 loosening	of	 standards,	developing	country	consumers	 still	have	
little	to	no	options	in	cases	where	an	international	cartel	has	no	effect	on	the	U.S.	market.	
	
Conclusion	
	
The	effects	of	international	cartels	and	the	law	surrounding	how	these	cartels	are	governed	
have	now	been	covered	extensively.		Although,	developed	countries	have	sophisticated	rules	
in	place	to	pursue	any	international	cartel	found	to	be	targeting	their	own	jurisdiction,	the	
exemptions	 for	 export	 cartels	 can	 have	 a	 serious	 detrimental	 impact	 on	 developing	
countries.	 	 It	 is	 clear	 from	both	 this	 chapter	 and	 the	previous	one	 that,	when	 it	 comes	 to	
international	 cartels,	 developing	 countries	 remain	 at	 a	 significant	 disadvantage.	 	 Many	
developing	countries	do	not	have	their	own	competition	law	systems	and	those	that	do	are	
not	equipped	with	the	necessary	resources	or	expertise	to	effectively	deal	with	international	
cartels.	 	 While	 efforts	 are	 being	 made	 to	 improve	 the	 situation	 by	 encouraging	 more	
cooperation	between	jurisdictions,	there	still	much	more	that	needs	to	be	done.	
	
While	 jurisdictions	 such	as	 the	United	States	and	 the	European	Union	are	quick	 to	punish	
anti-competitive	behaviour	that	is	attributed	to	hard-core	international	cartels,	at	the	same	
time,	 they	 ignore	 or	 even	 encourage	 the	 same	 behaviour	 if	 it	 is	 tied	 to	 an	 export	 cartel.		
Because	 export	 cartels	 tend	 to	 target	 weaker	 economies,	 indeed	 any	 export	 cartel	 that	
adopted	 behaviours	 that	 would	 affect	 either	 of	 these	 jurisdictions	 would	 be	 quickly	
punished,	developing	countries	or	countries	that	lack	an	effective	cartel	enforcement	regime	
are	left	to	bear	the	brunt	of	any	negative	effects	that	may	arise.	
	
Although	 jurisdictions	 such	 as	 the	 U.S	 and	 EU	 are	 often	 very	 effective	 in	 prosecuting	
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international	cartels,	dependency	on	others	to	correct	the	situation	is	not	a	viable	long-term	
solution.		There	are	many	problems	associated	with	simply	allowing	developed	countries	to	
take	 the	 reins	 with	 regards	 to	 international	 cartels.	 	 In	 these	 cases,	 the	 authorities	 are	
normally	 only	 interested	 in	 the	 effects	 these	 cartels	 have	 on	 their	 own	 economies.	 	 For	
instance,	even	 though	U.S.	and	EU	decisions	often	allude	 to	a	cartel	having	effects	 ‘within	
the	U.S.	and	abroad’	or	in	‘specific	third	markets’,	the	exact	nature	of	these	‘other	effects’	is	
never	 elaborated	 upon	 and	 they	 are	 never	 considered	when	 calculating	 the	 final	 penalty.		
Furthermore,	 because	 this	 information	 is	 almost	 always	 confidential,	 the	 details	 of	 the	
effects	of	 international	 cartels	outside	 these	markets	are	 rarely	 released,	undermining	 the	
effectiveness	of	cooperation	between	developed	and	developing	countries	 in	 international	
cartel	 cases.	 	 Current	 competition	 laws	 and	 agreements	 between	 countries	 often	 do	 not	
contain	 provisions	 allowing	 for	 the	 free	 sharing	 of	 such	 information.	 	 In	 these	 situations,	
developing	countries	are	therefore	left	in	the	dark,	with	little	to	no	recourse	to	address	any	
cartel	affecting	their	economies.	
	
Thus,	developing	countries	often	resort	to	establishing	their	own	competition	enforcement	
regimes,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	directly	 confront	 international	 cartels	 themselves.	 	 This	 chapter	
covered	 some	 examples	where	 this	 approach	 has	 been	 successful	 namely	 in	 the	 cases	 of	
South	Korea,	Brazil	and	Mexico.		However,	many	other	developing	countries	face	significant	
issues	when	 trying	 to	build	 a	 competition	 law	 system	 from	 the	 ground	up.	 	 The	 following	
chapter	will	discuss	the	problems	that	arise	when	developing	countries	attempt	to	construct	
an	 effective	 competition	 law	 regime	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 may	 overcome	 them.
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Chapter	Four	
Developing	Countries	and	Competition	Law:	Challenges	and	Obstacles	
	
Introduction	
	
Developing	 countries	 typically	 lack	 effective	 competition	 law	enforcement	 regimes,	which	
makes	 them	 perfect	 targets	 for	 international	 cartels.	 	 Much	 of	 the	 analysis	 thus	 far	 has	
focused	 on	 how	 developed	 countries	 deal	 with	 international	 cartels	 affecting	 their	
economies.		This	is	largely	because	developed	countries	are	in	a	better	position	to	prosecute	
such	 cartels,	with	better	 access	 to	 the	necessary	 resources	 as	well	 as	 the	 knowledge	and	
experience	 in	 trying	 such	 cases.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 there	 is	 more	 documentation	 regarding	
developed	countries’	efforts	in	stopping	international	cartels.		
	
The	 previous	 chapter	 discussed	 the	 possibility	 of	 positive	 comity	 as	 a	way	 for	 developing	
countries	to	challenge	any	foreign	international	cartel	negatively	affecting	their	economies.		
Positive	comity,	while	beneficial	in	that	it	allows	for	developing	countries	to	gain	access	to	
resources	 and	 information	 they	 may	 otherwise	 lack,	 also	 has	 its	 drawbacks.	 	 With	 the	
exception	of	Brazil	and	Mexico,	which	pursued	an	action	against	the	lysine	cartel	and	is	also	
in	the	process	of	investigating	the	vitamins	cartel,	few	developing	countries	take	any	sort	of	
independent	 action	 against	 international	 cartels	 found	 targeting	 their	 markets.	 	 This	
seeming	 reluctance	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 conduct	 of	 private	 individuals	 in	 developing	
countries,	who,	again	with	few	exceptions,	have	evidently	not	pursued	many	civil	remedies	
against	 cartel	members	 to	 the	 same	extent	 that	 their	 counterparts	 in	more	 industrialised	
countries	have.	 	The	underlying	 reason,	at	 least	 from	the	 individual’s	perspective,	may	be	
the	 lack	 of	 a	 cohesive	 competition	 law	 system.	 	Without	 a	 cohesive	 competition	 regime,	
consumers	are	often	unaware	of	their	own	rights	and	in	any	case	can	be	largely	suspicious	
of	pursuing	a	case	even	when	they	have	access	to	a	competition	authority.		By	establishing	
their	 own	 competition	 law	 regime,	 developing	 countries	 may	 be	 able	 to	 combat	 private	
international	cartels	on	their	own.	
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This	chapter	will	discuss	some	of	the	challenges	developing	countries	face	when	introducing	
and	enforcing	competition	laws	into	their	economy.		It	will	begin	with	a	discussion	of	their	
goals,	 both	 economic	 and	 political.	 	 Finally,	 it	 will	 examine	 the	 reasons	 behind	 why	 a	
developing	country	may	wish	to	adopt	a	competition	law	system	as	well	as	some	suggested	
ways	they	may	overcome	the	associated	problems.	
	
Goals	of	Developing	Countries	and	Competition	Law		
	
Given	 that	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 have	 markedly	 different	 economic	
structures,	it	is	clear	they	would	have	different	goals	and	priorities	when	implementing	and	
enforcing	 a	 competition	 law	 regime.	 	 While	 some	 of	 these	 competition	 law	 goals	 may	
overlap,	it	is	not	necessarily	the	case	that	what	is	good	for	a	developed	country	is	good	for	a	
developing	 country.	 	 For	 instance,	 South	 Africa	 has	 included	 additional	 competition	 law	
goals	beyond	the	more	‘traditional’	goals	of	western	countries	in	order	to	account	for	their	
own	 specific	 economic	 and	 social	 needs.	 	 The	 goals	 of	 a	 particular	 country	 are	 therefore	
instrumental	in	shaping	its	competition	laws.	
	
The	 most	 common	 goals	 countries	 account	 for	 when	 introducing	 or	 interpreting	
competition	 law	 are	 economic	 efficiency	 (allocative,	 productive,	 and	 dynamic),	 consumer	
welfare	 (also	 including	 consumer	 choice),	 total	 welfare,	 and	 sometimes	 protecting	 the	
competitive	market	from	the	creation	of	private	artificial	barriers.1		These	concepts	can	be	
categorised	 under	 the	 larger	 goal	 of	 economic	 growth.	 	 Economic	 growth	 can	 mean	
different	things	depending	on	the	country.		For	a	developed	country,	economic	growth	may	
simply	mean	maintaining	 economic	 efficiency	 and	 competitiveness	 in	 the	market.2	 	 For	 a	
developing	country,	economic	growth	often	correlates	with	economic	development,	but	the	
two	 are	 not	 always	 synonymous.3	 	 Economic	 growth	 may	 lead	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 Gross	
Domestic	 Product	 (GDP)	 per	 capita	 but	 simultaneously,	 the	 levels	 of	 poverty	 and	 the	
inequality	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 wealth	may	 also	 increase,	 which	 cannot	 be	 described	 as	
                                                
1	Irma,	Adelman,	Theories	of	Economic	Growth	and	Development,	(1961)	Stanford	University	Press.	
2	Ibid.	
3	Zhong,	Yangsheng;	Wang,	Xiaohui;	He	Guangmin,	The	Economic	Theory	of	Development	Countries’	Rise:	
Explaining	the	Myth	of	Rapid	Economic	Growth	in	China,	(2010)	University	Press	of	America	at	25.	
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development.4	 	For	the	purposes	of	 this	chapter,	however,	economic	development	will	be	
defined	as	 the	method	 through	which	 a	 country	or	 region	 achieves	 sustainable	 economic	
growth	 along	 with	 positive	 structural	 changes	 to	 its	 economy.	 	 Economic	 development	
therefore	describes	the	qualitative,	structural,	and	institutional	changes	required	to	improve	
a	country’s	abilities	to	allocate	its	available	economic	resources.5	
	
Apart	from	economic	priorities,	developing	countries	also	have	different	social	goals,	which	
may	be	taken	into	account	when	implementing	new	competition	laws.		The	United	Nations’	
Millennium	Development	Goals,6	 identify	 a	 number	 of	 such	 goals	 including:	 effective	 and	
inclusive	education;	adequate	supplies	of	clean	water	and	nourishing	food;	health	care	and	
medicines;	 infrastructures	 such	 as	 schools,	 housing,	 roads	 and	 transportation	 systems	 as	
well	 as	 improved	 governance	 to	 ensure	 all	 of	 these	 are	 effectively	 conveyed.	 	 The	
Millennium	Development	Goals	also	contain	a	section	covering	competition	and	markets.			
	
The	first	part	of	this	section	concerns	competition	policy	and	aims	to	empower	consumers	
to	 more	 easily	 participate	 in	 the	 community	 economy.	 	 Freeing	 the	 markets	 of	 artificial	
restraints	and	allowing	buyers	and	consumers	to	obtain	goods	and	services	at	a	price	near	
cost	 can	 liberate	 the	 people	 into	 becoming	 contributing	members	 of	 the	 economy.	 	 The	
second	part	of	 the	section	deals	with	competition	 law	and	 is	concerned	with	encouraging	
the	development	of	 the	markets	and	prohibiting	anti-competitive	practices,	such	as	abuse	
of	power,	 that	 create	 inequality	amongst	 the	people.	 	These	 two	sections,	 covering	 social	
goals	and	competition	and	markets,	are	often	interdependent	for	developing	countries,	as	
competition	 is	 essential	 to	 lowering	 prices	 and	 thereby	 improving	 the	 quality	 of	 services	
such	as	health	care.7	
	
While	the	UN	hoped	to	achieve	all	the	goals	outlined	in	the	Millennium	Development	Goals,	
not	 all	 of	 them	 were	 met	 on	 a	 global	 level.	 	 In	 2015,	 it	 introduced	 the	 Sustainable	
Development	Goals,	many	of	which	overlap	with	the	Millennium	Development	Goals,	which	
                                                
4	Ibid.	
5	Ibid.	
6	See	http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.	Last	accessed	15	August	2015.	
7	Fox,	Eleanor	M.	‘Competition,	Development	and	Regional	Integration:	In	Search	of	a	Competition	Law	Fit	for	
Developing	Countries,’	(2012)	Law	&	Economics	Research	Paper	Series,	Working	Paper	No.	11-04.	
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it	 hopes	 to	 achieve	 by	 2030.	 	 These	 seventeen	 goals	 include:	 making	 improvements	 in	
countries’	 infrastructures;	 encouraging	 economic	 growth;	 and	 reducing	 poverty,	 among	
others.8	
	
One	of	 the	biggest	obstacles	developing	economies	 face	 is	 competition	 from	 imports.	 	As	
most	developing	countries	are	predominately	price	takers	on	the	global	market,	aside	from	
natural	resources	in	particular	geographic	locations,	most	firms	in	developing	countries	have	
little	 to	 no	market	 power.9	 	 Any	 reforms	would	 therefore	 have	 to	 account	 for	 the	 weak	
bargaining	power	many	firms	in	developing	countries	possess.			
	
Why	Should	Developing	Countries	Adopt	Their	Own	Competition	Policy?	
	
Developing	countries	often	have	different	motives	for	wanting	to	implement	a	competition	
law	 system.	 	 However,	 given	 the	 dearth	 of	 resources	 these	 countries	 typically	 have,	 it	 is	
prudent	to	ask	whether	they	even	ought	to	incur	the	expense	of	creating	a	competition	law	
system	of	their	own.	 	The	OECD	has	reiterated	on	numerous	occasions	that	every	country	
can	benefit	from	an	effective	competition	policy	and	legal	system,	so	long	as	the	law	meets	
their	 specific	 needs.10	 	 Aside	 from	 the	 associated	 benefits,	 there	 are	 many	 reasons	 a	
developing	country	chooses	to	 formulate	their	own	competition	 laws,	as	will	be	discussed	
below.	
	
Economic	Development	
	
Most	developing	countries	list	economic	development	amongst	their	many	goals.		The	WTO	
Working	Group	has	encouraged	the	development	of	competition	policy	in	order	to	achieve	
this,	stating:11	
                                                
8	United	Nations.	‘Sustainable	Development	Goals:	17	Goals	to	Transform	Our	World,’	
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/	(last	accessed	10	April	2017).	
9	Mbirimi,	Ivan;	Chilala,	Bridget;	Grynberg,	Roman.	From	Doha	to	Cancun:	Delivering	a	Development	Round,	
(2003)	Commonwealth	Secretariat	at	212. 
10	See	Sengupta	Rijit;	and	Dube	Cornelius,	‘Competition	Policy	Enforcement	Experiences	From	Developing	
Countries	and	Implications	for	Investment,’	OECD	Global	Forum	on	International	Investment,	27-28	March	
2008. 
11	World	Trade	Organisation,	paper	of	18	September	1998;	WT/WGTCP/W/80.	
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	The	 specific	 benefits	 that	 have	 been	 attributed	 to	 such	 policy	 include	
promoting	 an	 efficient	 allocation	 of	 resources,	 preventing/addressing	
excessive	concentration	levels	and	resulting	structural	rigidities,	addressing	
anti-competitive	practices	of	enterprises	…	enhancing	an	economy’s	ability	
to	 attract	 foreign	 investment	 and	 to	 maximise	 the	 benefits	 of	 such	
investment,	reinforcing	the	benefits	of	privatisation	and	regulatory	reform	
initiating	and	establishing	a	focal	point	for	the	advocacy	of	pro-competitive	
reforms	and	competition	culture.	
	
This	view	has	also	been	reiterated	in	a	number	of	OECD	publications,	among	those	asserting	
that	the	evidence	linking	competition	policy	and	economic	development	support	the	theory	
that	more	competition	 leads	to	an	 increase	 in	 ‘economic	growth,	productivity,	 investment,	
and	increased	average	living	standards.’12	
	
Proponents	 of	 adopting	 competition	policy	 as	 a	means	 to	 achieve	 economic	 development	
have	 argued	 that	 competition	 laws	 help	 maintain	 two	 of	 the	 main	 pillars	 of	 economic	
growth:	 a	 competitive	 market	 and	 a	 reliable	 legal	 system.13	 	 In	 an	 efficient,	 competitive	
market,	 firms	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	 practices	 that	 not	 only	 enhance	 their	 own	
efficiency	but	also	 take	 steps	 towards	 investment	and	 research	and	development,	both	of	
which	lead	to	economic	growth.		Competition	policy	also	encourages	other	policies	that	lead	
to	more	openness	 in	 international	 trade,	which	also	 leads	 to	more	efficient	markets.	 	 The	
World	Bank	has	 stated	 that	 competitive	markets	 are	 the	best	way	 to	organise	production	
and	distribute	goods	and	services.14	
	
However,	it	is	important	to	consider	that	the	above	analysis	deals	with	relationship	between	
adopting	 competition	 policies	 and	 economic	 development.	 	 This	 is	 entirely	 different	 from	
analysing	 the	 effect	 that	 enforcing	 competition	 laws	 would	 have	 on	 development.		
                                                
12	Preston,	John,	 ‘Investment	Climate	Reform	Competition	Policy	and	Economic	Development:	Some	Country	
Experiences,’	(2003)	DIFID	Case	Study	for	WDR	at	2.	
13	Owen,	Bruce	M.	‘Competition	Policy	in	Emerging	Economies,’	(2005)	04-10	SIEPR	Discussion	Paper	at	3.	
14	Uchida,	 Yuichiro;	 Cook,	 Paul.	 ‘The	 Effects	 of	 Competition	 on	 Technological	 and	 Trade	 Competitiveness:	 A	
Preliminary	Examination,’	(2004)	Centre	on	Regulation	and	Competition	Working	Paper	Series,	No.	72	at	2.	
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Developing	 countries	 frequently	 face	 challenges	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 enforcing	 their	
competition	legislation,	which	may	negatively	affect	their	development.	
	
Some	scholars	have	criticised	the	view	that	adopting	competition	 laws	necessarily	 leads	to	
economic	 development	 and	 that	 there	 are	more	 effective	methods	 of	 achieving	 this	 goal	
such	as	trade	liberalisation.	Supporters	of	the	argument	that	trade	liberalisation	is	a	better	
alternative	to	competition	law	argue	that	trade	liberalisation	produces	more	prosperity	than	
implementing	laws	that	target	restraints	of	trade.15	 	The	simple	removal	of	trade	obstacles	
such	as	tariffs	and	barriers	to	entry	would	encourage	free	trade,	which	would	stimulate	the	
creation	 of	 wealth	 and	 development,	 especially	 in	 smaller,	 less	 developed	 countries.16		
Bernard	Hoekman	and	Petros	Mavroidis	have	both	supported	this	view,	arguing	that:17		
	
[The]	implication	of	the	empirical	literature	is	that	liberalisation	…	is	likely	
to	 have	 a	 much	 greater	 direct	 impact	 on	 competition	 than	 antitrust	
enforcement,	especially	in	smaller	economies.			
	
Importantly,	 trade	and	 investment	 liberalisation	and	deregulation	of	entry	barriers	are	not	
costly	in	administrative	capacity	and	do	not	require	the	use	of	scarce	technical	expertise.’18		
In	 this	 way,	 trade	 liberalisation	may	 be	more	 effective	 than	 antitrust	 or	 competition	 law	
development	for	less	developed	countries.	
Socio-Economic	Welfare	
	
Along	with	economic	development,	developing	countries	can	also	use	competition	as	a	tool	
for	socio-economic	development.		For	instance,	in	Mexico	and	Costa	Rica,	competition	law	is	
used	 to	 protect	 and	 promote	 access	 to	 basic	 needs.19	 	 Some	 policymakers	 in	 developing	
countries	are	afraid	that,	by	adopting	competition	laws,	they	may	be	unduly	restricting	other	
                                                
15	Cooter,	Robert	D.,	‘Market	Modernization	of	Law,’	(1996)	International	Review	of	Law	and	Economics,	Vol.	
16	at	162.	
16	Godek,	Paul,	‘One	U.S.	Export	Eastern	Europe	Does	Not	Need,’	(1992)	Regulation,	Volume	15,	No.	20.	at	21.	
17	Hoekman	and	Mavroidis,	 ‘Economic	Development,	Competition	Policy	and	the	World	Trade	Organization,’	
(2002)	World	Bank	Policy	Research	Working	Paper	No.	2917	at	8	
18	Ibid.	
19	Stewart,	Taimoon;	Clarke	 Julian;	and	Joekes	Susan,	Competition	 law	 in	action:	Experience	 from	developing	
countries,	(2007)	International	Development	Research	Centre	at	V.	
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policy	concerns.	 	 In	order	to	alleviate	these	fears,	many	countries	 incorporate	a	number	of	
non-economic	factors	in	order	to	strike	a	balance	between	their	competition	law	objectives	
and	their	industrial	or	public	policy	objectives.20		Industrial	policy	goals	are	often	comprised	
of	 a	 selection	 of	 economic	 and	 social	 policy	 goals,	 such	 as	 promoting	 employment,	 and	
correcting	social	injustices.21	
	
The	 possibility	 of	 setting	 public	 policy	 considerations	 as	 a	 standard	 of	 welfare	 will	 be	
discussed	in	the	following	chapter.	
External	Pressures	
	
In	many	 situations,	 pressure	 from	external	 forces	 such	 as	 international	 organisations	 and	
more	powerful	jurisdictions	play	a	role	in	stimulating	a	developing	country’s	motivation	for	
adopting	 competition	 law	 legislation.	 	 This	 external	 pressure	 may	 take	 the	 form	 of	
conditions	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 membership	 into	 a	 particular	 body	 or	 organisation	 or	 during	
negotiations	 in	 order	 to	 better	 facilitate	 trade	 agreements.	 	 Regardless,	 this	 section	 will	
discuss	the	motives	behind	these	sources	of	external	pressure	and	whether	this	approach	is	
effective	in	helping	developing	countries	institute	their	own	competition	law	system.	
	
Members	of	The	World	Trade	Organisation	
	
While	the	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO)	does	not	have	a	separate	agreement	governing	
competition	law,	much	of	the	pressure	on	developing	countries	to	adopt	their	own	form	of	
competition	 legislation	 comes	 from	 this	 organisation.	 	 The	 Working	 Group	 on	 the	
Interaction	 Between	 Trade	 and	 Competition	 Policy	 was	 established	 in	 April	 1997.	 	 Since	
then,	 it	has	played	an	active	 role	 in	encouraging	developing	countries	 to	adopt	 their	own	
competition	policies.		The	WTO’s	interest	in	competition	policy	stems	from	the	relationship	
between	competition	and	the	expansion	of	free	trade.		In	order	to	facilitate	free	trade,	not	
only	must	trade	barriers	such	as	tariffs	be	removed	but	also	those	emanating	from	private	
                                                
20	Lewis,	David,	Chairperson,	Competition	Tribunal	of	South	Africa,	‘Address	at	the	Organisation	for	Economic	
Co-operation	and	Development	Global	Forum	on	Competition:	The	Objectives	of	Competition	Law	and	Policy,’	
(2003).	
21	White,	Lawrence	J.,	‘The	Role	of	Competition	Policy	in	the	Promotion	of	Economic	Growth,’	(2008)	New	York	
University	for	Law	&	Economics,	Working	Paper	No.	08-23	at	9.	
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restraints	 such	 as	 abuse	 of	 dominance,	 monopolisation,	 import	 and	 export	 cartels,	 and	
horizontal	 and	 vertical	 restraints	 –	 all	 of	 which	 can	 be	 governed	 through	 competition	
policy.22		
	
The	influence	the	WTO	has	on	developing	countries	has	resulted	in	a	few	occasions	where	it	
has	 indirectly	 encouraged	 applicants	 to	 adopt	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 system	prior	 to	
their	 accession.	 	 For	 instance,	 although	 the	 WTO	 Agreements	 themselves	 contain	 no	
requirements	 for	 prospective	 members	 to	 adopt	 an	 effective	 competition	 law	 policy	
applicants	to	the	WTO	must	gain	the	approval	of	existing	members	before	they	are	granted	
membership.		Therefore,	any	existing	member,	such	as	the	EU	or	the	United	States,	can	veto	
a	developing	country’s	accession	if	they	don’t	already	have	a	competition	policy	in	place.	
	
While	the	WTO	has	never	explicitly	pressured	a	country	to	adopt	a	competition	law	policy	as	
part	 of	 its	 accession	 protocol,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 some	 prospective	 applicants	 for	
membership	feel	indirect	pressure	to	do	so.		For	instance,	the	timing	of	China’s	decision	to	
begin	 drafting	 the	 Anti-Monopoly	 Law	 in	 the	 1990s	 was	 widely	 questioned,	 particularly	
given	 its	 subsequent	 accession	 in	 2001.23	 	 These	 suspicions	 were	 substantiated	 during	
China’s	WTO	 Accession	Working	 Group	 discussions,	 which	 were	 recorded	 in	 the	 Group’s	
meeting	minutes,	wherein	the	issue	of	competition	law	was	raised:24		
	
	 The	 representative	 of	 China	 noted	 that	 the	 Government	 of	 China	
encouraged	 fair	 competition	 and	 was	 against	 acts	 of	 unfair	
competition	of	all	kinds.		The	Law	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	on	
Combating	Unfair	Competition,	promulgated	on	2	September	1993	and	
implemented	on	1	December	1993,	was	the	basic	law	to	maintain	the	
order	of	competition	in	the	market.		In	addition,	the	Price	Law,	the	Law	
on	 Tendering	 and	 Bidding,	 the	 Criminal	 Law	 and	 other	 relevant	 laws	
also	 contained	 provisions	 on	 anti-monopoly	 and	 unfair	 competition.		
                                                
22	 Geradin,	 Damien,	 ‘Competition	 Law	 and	 Regional	 Economic	 Integration:	 An	 Analysis	 of	 the	 Southern	
Mediterranean	Countries,’	(2004)	World	Bank	Papers	at	21.	
23	Wu,	Qianlan,	‘Harmonisation	of	competition	law	in	multilateral	trade	framework:	China’s	WTO	membership	
and	 its	 Anti-monopoly	 Law,’	 (2011)	 in	 Andenas,	 Mads;	 Andersen,	 Camilla	 Baasch,	 Theory	 and	 Practice	 of	
Harmonisation,	(2012)	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	at	512.	
24	Paragraph	65	of	WTO	Report	of	the	Working	Group	on	the	Accession	of	China,	WT/MIN(01)/3/Add.1.	
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China	 is	 now	 formulating	 the	 Law	 on	 Anti-Monopoly.	 [Emphasis	
added].	
	
While	 its	previous	statement	 in	the	Interim	Provisions	for	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	
Competition	in	the	Socialist	Economy	remarked	on	the	differences	between	competition	law	
in	a	capitalist	economy	and	competition	law	in	a	socialist	economy,	the	Chinese	government	
changed	its	position	entirely	and	announced	it	would	be	adopting	a	competition	policy	based	
on	 fairness.25	 	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 showed	 its	 willingness	 to	 promote	 trade	 liberalisation,	 in	
keeping	with	WTO’s	own	norms,	which	may	have	placed	the	country	in	a	stronger	bargaining	
position	 during	 its	 pre-accession	 negotiations.	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 took	 thirteen	
years	 for	 the	 Anti-Monopoly	 law	 to	 be	 adopted	 is	 also	 evidence	 that	 the	 law	 itself	 likely	
faced	resistance,	either	from	the	public	or	different	industrial	sectors.		It	is	possible	that	the	
Chinese	government	used	 its	obligations	 set	out	 in	 its	 accession	protocol	 into	 the	WTO	 in	
order	to	push	through	political	deadlocks	and	enact	more	domestic	reforms.26		
	
The	emphasis	WTO	members	place	on	developing	countries	to	adopt	policies	similar	to	the	
U.S.	and	EU	is	 likely	to	stem	from	their	previous	desire	to	develop	a	universal	competition	
policy.	 	 It	 can	be	argued	 that	a	more	universal	 approach	 to	 competition	 law	among	WTO	
members	 can	 only	 work	 in	 the	 Organisation’s	 favour.	 	 For	 instance,	 if	 competition	 laws	
between	 developing	 and	 developed	 countries	 were	 fundamentally	 different	 from	 each	
other,	 parties	 involved	 in	 competition	 law	 disputes	 would	 have	 difficulty	 prosecuting	
perceived	 anti-competition	 practices.	 	 This	 disparity	 in	 interests	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 cases	
involving	export	cartels.	 	Developing	countries	may	view	export	cartels	as	directly	harming	
their	 economies,	 however,	 under	American	 antitrust	 law,	 export	 cartels	 are	 exempt	 from	
prosecution.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 there	 is	 very	 little	 recourse	 a	 developing	 country	 may	 have	
regarding	an	export	cartel	found	affecting	their	domestic	market.	
                                                
25 Qin,	Julia	Ya,	‘WTO-Plus	Obligations	and	Their	Implications	for	the	World	Trade	Organization	Legal	System	–	
An	Appraisal	of	the	China	Accession	Protocol,’	(2003)	Journal	of	World	Trade,	Vol.	37	at	483-522 
26	Ibid.	
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The	European	Union	
	
The	WTO	is	not	the	only	body	that	plays	a	part	in	encouraging	developing	countries	to	adopt	
a	 competition	 law	 system.	 	 The	 European	 Union	 has	 had	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	
development	 of	 many	 countries’	 competition	 laws.	 	 Treaties	 such	 as	 the	 Accession	
Agreements	 countries	 must	 sign	 in	 order	 to	 join	 the	 EU	 include	 conditions	 requiring	
signatories	to	implement	a	competition	law	system	modelled	on	Articles	101	and	102	of	the	
TFEU.	 	 The	 EU	 has	 also	 had	 extensive	 involvement	 in	 different	 forums	 regarding	
international	cooperation,	particularly	 in	discussions	on	competition	law	such	as	the	WTO,	
the	 OECD,	 the	 ICN,	 and	 UNCTAD.	 	 Aside	 from	 the	 Accession	 Agreements	 signed	 by	 EU	
Member	 States,	 the	 EU	 has	 also	 signed	 a	 number	 of	 agreements	with	 other	 countries	 or	
regional	 jurisdictions	 that	 include	 competition	 law	 provisions,	 thereby	 compelling	 these	
countries	into	at	least	implementing	national	or	regional	competition	law	provisions	if	they	
do	not	have	a	competition	law	system	of	their	own.		However,	some	critics	have	pointed	out	
that	the	EU	typically	only	concludes	agreements	with	nations	it	has	an	interest	in	partnering	
with	and	seems	generally	reluctant	to	widen	the	net	to	other	jurisdictions.27			
	
Nevertheless,	 despite	 these	 criticisms,	 the	 EU	 has	 entered	 into	 agreements	 with	 many	
countries,	 including	 developing	 countries.	 	 Most	 notably,	 the	 Cotonou	 Agreement,	
concluded	between	the	EU,	and	African,	Caribbean	and	Pacific	countries,	serves	as	the	most	
comprehensive	 partnership	 agreement	 concluded	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 78	 developing	
countries.28		Article	45,	entitled	Competition	Policy	obliges	signatories	to	implement	national	
or	 regional	 rules	 and	 policies	 in	 order	 to	 ‘ensure	 the	 elimination	 of	 distortions	 to	 sound	
competition	 and	 [give]	 due	 consideration	 to	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 development	 and	
economic	 needs	 of	 each	 ACP	 country.’29	 	 Subsection	 3	 of	 the	 Article	 also	 asks	 parties	 to	
‘reinforce	 cooperation	 in	 this	 area	 with	 a	 view	 to	 formulating	 and	 supporting	 effective	
                                                
27	 Gavin,	 Brigid.	 The	 European	 Union	 and	 Globalisation:	 Towards	 Global	 Democratic	 Governance.	 (2001)	
Edward	Elgar	Publishing	at	107.	
28	The	Cotonou	Agreement,	signed	23	June	2000,	available	at	
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/03_01/pdf/mn3012634_en.pdf.	
29	Ibid,	Article	45.1.	
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competition	 policies	 with	 the	 appropriate	 national	 competition	 agencies’	 in	 order	 to	
strengthen	enforcement	of	the	competition	law	rules.30		As	a	result,	a	number	of	signatories	
to	 the	 Cotonou	 Agreement,	 such	 as	 Nigeria,	 have	 since	 taken	 steps	 to	 adopt	 their	 own	
competition	law	agreements.31	
	
The	European	Union	was	also	the	driving	force	behind	the	initiative	to	establish	a	universal	
competition	law	agreement	within	the	WTO	during	the	mid-1990s.32		This	venture	however	
ultimately	failed	as	the	United	States	and	several	developing	countries	vehemently	opposed	
the	adoption	of	 such	an	agreement	and	as	a	 result,	 the	negotiations	 in	Cancun	ultimately	
failed.33	
	
Challenges	Developing	Countries	Face	When	Establishing	a	Competition	Law	System	
	
While	 some	 developing	 countries,	 such	 as	 Brazil	 and	 South	 Korea,	 have	 established	
competition	or	antitrust	systems	with	relative	success,	many	developing	countries,	 for	the	
most	part,	face	almost	insurmountable	challenges	when	attempting	to	instigate	an	effective	
competition	regime.		Developing	and	least	developed	countries	often	lack	the	resources	and	
advanced	 competition	 laws	 required	 to	 successfully	 prosecute	 international	 cartels	
exporting	 to	 their	markets.	 	As	a	 result,	 they	are	often	 flooded	with	 imports	coming	 from	
such	 cartels.	 	 Some	 academics	 have	 argued	 that,	 given	 the	 other	 challenges	 developing	
countries	face	such	as	poverty,	food	shortages	and	rising	food	prices,	lack	of	education,	and,	
in	some	cases,	poor	governance,	developing	a	successful	competition	law	system	should	not	
be	a	 great	priority.	 	 Indeed,	Paul	Godek	expounded	 this	 view	when	he	 stated,	 “exporting	
antitrust	…	 is	 like	giving	a	 silk	 tie	 to	a	 starving	man.	 	 It	 is	 superfluous;	a	 starving	man	has	
much	more	immediate	needs.’34		However,	competition	laws	are	vital	in	the	development	of	
weaker	 economies	 and	 can	 even	 occasionally	 help	 reduce	 some	 the	 concerns	 these	
countries	 may	 have.	 	 An	 effective	 competition	 policy	 can	 help	 reduce	 anti-competitive	
                                                
30	Ibid,	Article	45.3.	
31	See	Briggs,	Mark,	‘Nigeria	edges	closer	to	competition	law,’	Global	Competition	Review,	9	June,	2016,	
available	at	http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article//41227/nigeria-edges-closer-competition-
law/.	
32	Brigid	at	107.	
33	Ibid.	
34	Godek,	Paul,	‘One	U.S.	Export	Eastern	Europe	Does	Not	Need,’	(1992)	Regulation,	Volume	15,	No.	20.		
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barriers	 and	 prevent	 exploitation.	 Competition	 laws	 can	 also	 contribute	 to	 a	 developing	
country’s	economic	growth	and	can	also	reduce	poverty.35	
	
One	 of	 the	 biggest	 obstacles	 a	 developing	 country	 faces	 when	 attempting	 to	 establish	 a	
competition	 law	 system	 is	 its	 own	 government.	 	 In	 some	 developing	 countries,	 the	
government	 controls	many	 different	 sectors	 of	 the	 economy,	which	 can	 create	 problems	
when	 trying	 to	 develop	 an	 effective	 competition	 policy.36	 	 For	 instance,	 in	 some	 sectors	
where	 privatisation	 has	 been	 established,	 the	 government	may	 initiate	 a	 price-fixing	 and	
market	or	customer-sharing	mechanism.37		These	sectors	may	also	be	structured	in	a	way	so	
as	to	give	the	government	complete	control.	 	 In	these	situations,	 free	market	competition	
would	 be	 almost	 impossible	 to	 maintain	 as	 firms	 operating	 within	 the	 sector,	 whether	
public,	political	party-affiliated,	or	private	would	have	 little	 to	no	choice	but	 to	 follow	the	
measures	adopted	by	the	government.38	
	
Governments	 can	 prevent	 the	 development	 of	 competition	 law	 policies	 in	 their	 own	
jurisdictions	by	erecting	barriers	preventing	entrance	or	exit	to	the	market;	establishing	or	
existing	governmental	monopolies	and	different	forms	of	governmental	subsidies	granted	to	
loss-making	undertakings;	and	the	politicisation	of	existing	administrative	authorities	when	
applying	and	enforcing	competition	law	rules.39		With	regards	to	governmental	monopolies,	
many	 developing	 countries	 are	 state-run	 economies.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 in	 many	 of	 these	
economies,	numerous	industries	are	still	comprised	of	state	monopolies.		These	monopolies	
can	result	in	highly	concentrated	markets,	as	described	by	the	Herfindahl-Hirschman	Index	
(HHI).40		The	bigger	the	market	share	a	single	entity	has	in	a	given	market,	the	more	highly	
concentrated	 that	market	 is	 said	 to	 be.	 	 Developing	 countries	 tend	 to	 have	more	 highly	
concentrated	 markets	 than	 developed	 countries.	 	 Besides	 government	 monopolies,	 high	
                                                
35	OECD,	 ‘Implementing	 Competition	 Policy	 in	Developing	 Countries,’	 (2007)	 in	Promoting	 Pro-Poor	Growth:	
Policy	Guidance	for	Donors,	OECD	Publishing	at	88.	
36	Dabbah,	Maher,	International	and	Comparative	Competition	Law,	(2010)	Cambridge	University	Press	at	344.	
37	Ibid.	 	
38	Ibid.	
39	Waked,	Dina	I.	‘Competition	Law	in	the	developing	world:	The	why	and	how	of	adoption	and	its	implications	
for	international	competition	law,’	(2008)	Global	Antitrust	Law	Review,	Vol.	1	at	78.	
40	The	HHI	is	a	way	of	measuring	industry	concentration.		The	values	in	the	index	are	calculated	as	the	sum	of	
the	squared	market	shares	of	individual	undertakings	in	the	market.		Higher	index	numbers	indicate	a	greater	
degree	of	concentration	in	the	market.	
 109 
 
barriers	 to	entry	and	exit	 in	a	market	can	also	contribute	to	a	developing	country’s	highly	
concentrated	market.	 	 Furthermore,	 developing	 countries	 characteristically	 also	 have	 low	
demand	or	purchasing	powers,	which	can	lead	to	a	decrease	in	the	number	of	firms	that	can	
operate	 profitably	 in	 the	 market.41	 	 Markets	 with	 low	 demand	 coupled	 with	 the	
requirement	for	undertakings	to	achieve	minimum	efficient	scale	of	production	in	order	to	
operate	most	efficiently	(at	the	lowest	cost),	such	markets	are	unable	to	sustain	more	than	
a	 few	 firms	 at	 a	 time.42	 	 A	 highly	 concentrated	 market	 can	 pose	 a	 challenge	 when	
considering	the	adoption	and	enforcement	of	more	traditional	competition	policy	models,	
especially	in	the	context	of	laws	regarding	dominant	positions	and	market	power.43		Another	
problem	facing	most	developing	countries	is	the	lack	of	reliable	administrative	enforcement	
mechanisms	 along	 with	 qualified,	 unbiased	 judiciary	 systems	 capable	 of	 upholding	 any	
adopted	competition	law	rule.44			
	
As	 previously	 mentioned,	 corruption	 in	 the	 government	 can	 also	 hinder	 a	 developing	
country’s	 quest	 for	 an	 effective	 competition	 law	 system.	 	 Many	 developing	 countries	
unfortunately	have	high	 levels	of	corruption	throughout	their	administrations.	 	Corruption	
often	 has	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 competition	 within	 the	 market	 by	 raising	 the	 barriers	
some	market	players	are	faced	with	 irrespective	of	any	advantages	they	may	have.	 	There	
are	three	preconditions	that	can	identify	the	presence	of	corruption:	1)	arbitrarily	conferring	
officials	with	discretionary	powers;	2)	the	presence	of	economic	rents,	which	may	either	be	
collected	by	officials	or	created	by	officials	in	exchange	for	a	portion	of	those	rents;	and	3)	
institutional	weakness	with	 a	 lack	 of	mechanisms	 in	 place	 to	 establish	 accountability	 and	
prevent	officials	from	using	their	positions	in	public	office	for	personal	gain.45			
	
These	 conditions	 can	 prevent	 the	 development	 of	 a	 successful	 competition	 policy.	 	 If	
government	 officials	 themselves	 are	 corrupt,	 decisions	made	 by	 those	 officials	 to	 permit,	
prohibit	or	ignore	anti-competitive	behaviour	can	be	linked	with	substantial	rents	for	those	
                                                
41	Gal,	Michal	S.	‘Size	Does	Matter:	The	Effect	of	Market	Size	on	Optimal	Competition	Policy,’	(2001)	Southern	
California	Law	Review,	Vol.	74	at	1445.	
42	Ibid.	
43	Ibid. 
44	Owen,	Bruce	M.	‘Competition	Policy	in	Emerging	Economies,’	(2005)	Stanford	Institute	for	Economic	Policy	
Research;	Discussion	Paper	at	1.	
45	Aidt,	T.S.,	‘Economic	Analysis	of	Corruption:	A	Survey,’	(2003)	113	The	Economic	Journal	F632	
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directly	 involved.	 	There	 is	 therefore	a	strong	 incentive	 for	market	players	 to	collude	with	
officials	and	thus	obtain	a	share	in	the	gains.		It	has	been	suggested	by	some	scholars	such	
as	Henry	Ergas	that	enacting	a	competition	policy	in	a	country	with	high	levels	of	corruption	
can	do	more	harm	than	good.46			
	
Changing	 the	 institutional	 features	 of	 law	 enforcement	 may	 reduce	 corruption	 by	
establishing	new	competition	tribunals,	staffed	with	newly	appointed	officials,	 rather	than	
relying	 on	 existing,	 potentially	 corrupt,	 courts.	 	 However,	 this	 solution	 is	 in	 itself	
problematic.	 	 Not	 only	 must	 a	 developing	 country	 find	 the	 resources	 necessary	 to	
implement	 a	 new	 court,	 but	 also	 there	may	 be	 little	 preventing	 already	 corrupt	 officials	
from	appointing	their	own	cronies	into	the	newly	established	roles.		
Challenges	in	Enforcement	
	
Once	a	 country	has	overcome	 the	 initial	barriers	 to	 creating	or	 introducing	a	 competition	
law	regime,	 it	may	 face	 further	challenges,	particularly	when	 it	comes	 to	enforcement.	 	 It	
has	 been	 previously	 mentioned	 that	 one	 of	 the	 defining	 characteristics	 of	 a	 developing	
country	is	its	lack	of	resources.		This	can	have	a	significant	detrimental	effect	on	competition	
law	enforcement.			
	
Enforcing	 already	 established	 competition	 law	 rules	 is,	 generally	 speaking,	 an	 expensive	
affair.	 	 Financial	 constraints	 can	 therefore	 severely	 limit	 competition	 enforcement,	
especially	in	ex	officio	cases.47	
	
Financial	 resources	 are	 most	 commonly	 discussed	 when	 considering	 resource	 scarcity	 in	
relation	to	developing	countries.		However,	developing	countries	can	also	suffer	from	a	lack	
of	human	resources.48		At	the	enforcement	level,	decision-makers	must	possess	the	relevant	
knowledge	 and	 expertise	 in	 order	 to	 understand,	 analyse	 and	 apply	 the	 laws	 to	 specific	
cases.	 	 Competition	 authorities	 therefore	 typically	 employ	 qualified	 lawyers,	 economists,	
                                                
46	 Ergas,	 Henry,	 ‘Should	 Developed	 Countries	 Require	 Developing	 Countries	 to	 Adopt	 Competition	 Laws?	
Lessons	from	the	Economic	Literature,’	(2009)	European	Competition	Journal,	Vol.	5,	No	3	at	365.	
47	 International	 Competition	 Network,	 Lessons	 to	 be	 Learnt	 from	 the	 Experiences	 of	 Young	 Competition	
Agencies,	(2006)	Competition	Policy	Implementation	Working	Group	at	22.	
48	Gal,	Michal;	Fox,	Eleanor.	‘Drafting	competition	law	for	developing	jurisdictions:	learning	from	experience,’	
(2014)	New	York	University	Law	and	Economics	Working	Papers,	No.	374	at	4.	
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and	 investigators	with	 experience	 in	 applying	 competition	 law.	 	Mistakes	 in	 the	 decision-
making	process	can	have	grave	consequences,	extending	well	beyond	the	immediate	effects	
on	the	conduct	of	the	parties	in	a	particular	case.49		Cases	that	have	been	decided	wrongly	
could	 affect	 the	 incentives	 of	 other	 firms	 to	 act	 pro-competitively	 if	 the	 behaviour	 is	
erroneously	labelled	as	anti-competitive.50		On	the	other	hand,	if	anti-competitive	behaviour	
is	 mistakenly	 found	 to	 be	 legal,	 it	 may	 strengthen	 such	 behaviour	 from	 other	 firms.		
Moreover,	 these	 decisions	 can	 undermine	 the	 credibility	 and	 reputation	 of	 the	 national	
enforcement	authority.	
	
Lack	of	 technical	knowledge	can	also	 lead	 to	 limited	or	 ineffective	enforcement	 such	as	a	
limited	 capacity	 to	 identify	 anti-competitive	 practices	 and	 respond	 within	 a	 reasonable	
period	of	time.		A	study	conducted	by	the	Asia-Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	(APEC)	found	
that	several	developing	countries	were	hesitant	when	it	came	to	applying	competition	law	
due	to	a	 lack	of	experience	 in	dealing	with	such	cases.51	 	This	hesitation	 leads	to	a	vicious	
circle	where	cases	are	never	prosecuted	and	courts	never	gain	the	necessary	experience.52		
Human	 resource	deficiencies	 can	also	 limit	 the	 creation	of	 a	 competition	 culture	within	a	
developing	 economy.	 	 National	 competition	 authorities	 play	 a	 vital	 role	 in	 nurturing	 a	
competitive	 environment	 by	 directly	 influencing	 regulatory	 activities	 that	 discourage	
unnecessarily	anti-competitive	regulatory	measures.		It	has	been	suggested	that	the	role	of	
advocating	for	the	right	provisions	might	be	more	important	for	the	purposes	of	promoting	
competition	 than	 activities	 that	 repress	 anti-competitive	 conduct	 through	 enforcement.53		
However,	 if	 the	 competition	 authority	 is	 under-staffed,	 this	 role	 is	 often	 the	 first	 to	 be	
dropped.54	
	
Another	challenge	a	newly	established	national	competition	authority	can	face	is	not	merely	
its	 lack	 of	 resources	 nor	 the	 control	 the	 government	 exerts	 over	 it	 but	 also	 the	 lack	 of	 a	
                                                
49	 Dabbah,	 Maher	 M.	 ‘Competition	 Law	 and	 Policy	 in	 Developing	 Countries:	 A	 Critical	 Assessment	 of	 the	
Challenges	to	Establishing	an	Effective	Competition	Law	Regime,’	(2010)	World	Competition,	Vol.	33,	No.	3	
50	Gal	(2014)	at	19.	
51	Asia-Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	(APEC),	Study	on	Competition	Laws	for	Developing	Economies,	(1999)	at	
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53	 See	 Clark,	 John,	 ‘Competition	 Advocacy:	 Challenges	 for	 Developing	 Countries,’	 (2005)	 OECD	 Journal:	
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supportive	environment.	 	Market	players	 in	developing	countries	 tend	 to	be	suspicious	of	
what	 they	 see	 as	 competition	 policy	 interfering	 with	 their	 business	 practices.55	 	 Most	
domestic	 industries	 in	 these	 countries	 are	 usually	 highly	 concentrated	 and	 local	 business	
owners	tend	to	be	hostile	towards	the	rules	of	free	competition:	they	do	not	always	accept	
that	prices	are	set	according	to	the	invisible	hands	of	the	market	rather	than	through	their	
own	collusion.56	 	Finally,	 local	politicians	themselves	often	have	misgivings	on	the	benefits	
of	 competition	 law,	 particularly	 instances	 where	 the	 legal	 system	was	 transplanted	 from	
elsewhere	(see	below	section).	
	
Scholars	such	as	Douglas	North	regard	competition	culture	as	an	informal	institution.		North	
argued	 that	 institutions	are	“the	 frameworks	within	which	human	 interaction	 takes	place.		
They	 are	 perfectly	 analogous	 to	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game	 in	 a	 competitive	 team	 sport.”57		
Institutional	 change	 is	 therefore,	 according	 to	North,	 a	 “complicated	 process”	 due	 to	 the	
fact	 that	 “although	 formal	 rules	may	change	overnight	as	 the	 result	of	political	or	 judicial	
decisions,	 informal	 constraints	 embodied	 in	 customs,	 traditions	 and	 codes	of	 conduct	 are	
much	 more	 impervious	 to	 deliberate	 policies.”58	 	 From	 this,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 for	
developing	countries,	the	lack	of	competition	law	and	competition	cultures	can	be	difficult	
to	 change.	 	 The	 absence	 of	 a	 competition	 culture	 can	 thus	 severely	 undermine	 the	
enforcement	of	competition	law	legislation	in	a	developing	economy.	
	
Competition	 culture	 is	 often	 closely	 linked	 with	 a	 country’s	 socio-economic	 ideology.		
Israel’s	attempts	at	developing	an	effective	competition	law	enforcement	regime	is	a	good	
illustration	of	the	challenges	a	country	can	face	due	to	its	lack	of	a	competition	culture.		The	
Israeli	Competition	Act	was	established	 in	1959,	only	eleven	years	after	 the	 country	 itself	
was	 founded.	 	 It	 was	 implemented	 in	 response	 to	 public	 objections	 to	 hard-core	 cartels	
during	 the	 period	 when	 the	 country	 was	 attempting	 to	 create	 a	 working	 economic	
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Press	at	4.	
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infrastructure	that	could	serve	a	small,	developing,	and	 immigrant	country.59	 	 Israel	at	the	
time	 was	 also	 fighting	 severe	 financial	 problems.	 	 In	 order	 to	 address	 these	 issues,	 the	
government	 took	 on	 a	 highly	 interventionist	 and	 arguably	 paternalistic	 approach	 to	
industrial	 policy,	 regulating	 almost	 every	 aspect	 of	 the	market.	 	 Israel’s	 government	 had	
very	 little	faith	 in	the	market’s	own	natural	operations	and	therefore	exerted	control	over	
every	its	every	facet	by	providing	financial	assistance	to	fund	economic	activity	it	perceived	
as	 beneficial,	 granting	 exclusivity	 rights	 to	 favoured	 suppliers	 and	 producers,	 and	 having	
direct	 control	 over	 prices	 and	 trade	 conditions	 of	 many	 goods	 and	 services.60	 	 Free	
competition	was	therefore	virtually	non-existent	in	the	early	years	of	the	Israeli	market	and	
was	actually	discouraged	on	the	basis	that	it	would	hinder	the	development	of	an	efficient	
market.			
	
During	 this	 period,	 the	 Israeli	 Antitrust	 Tribunal	 largely	 followed	 the	 government’s	
controlling	 ideals	 and	 did	 not	 prioritise	 competition	 considerations	 in	 its	 decisions.		
Decisions	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	were	mainly	concerned	with	fulfilling	the	country’s	goals	
such	 as	 encouraging	 more	 exports	 and	 realising	 economies	 of	 scale,	 rather	 than	 an	
emphasis	 on	 individual	 consumer	 welfare	 and	 establishing	 effective	 competition	
conditions.61	 	 As	 a	 result,	 decisions	 such	 as	 the	 Plywood	 decision,62	 where	 the	 Tribunal	
allowed	an	agreement	among	plywood	producers	to	fix	prices	and	designate	quotas	on	the	
basis	 that	 it	 would	 increase	 exports	 as	well	 as	 productive	 efficiency,	 were	 allowed.	 	 This	
decision	and	many	others	often	 resulted	 in	 increased	prices	 for	 consumers	and	 increased	
dominance	of	already	dominant	 firms	 in	 the	 Israeli	market.	 	Due	 to	a	 lack	of	 competition	
culture,	 both	 amongst	 the	 general	 public	 and	 the	 government	 itself,	 pro-competitive	
decisions	were	 discouraged	 –	 as	 exemplified	 by	 the	 reception	 of	 the	 first	 Director	 of	 the	
Antitrust	Authority,	in	which	many	of	his	pro-competitive	recommendations	were	ultimately	
ignored.63	
	
                                                
59	 Gal,	 Michal,	 ‘The	 Ecology	 of	 Antitrust:	 Preconditions	 for	 Competition	 Law	 Enforcement	 in	 Developing	
Countries,’	(2004)	Competition,	Competitiveness	and	Development	at	22.	
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In	the	1980s,	 the	socio-economic	 ideologies	of	 Israel’s	government	began	to	shift	 from	an	
interventionist	regime	to	a	more	pro-market	ideal	and	the	Competition	Act	began	to	have	a	
significant,	positive	effect	on	the	economy.64		This	change	meant	the	government	began	to	
lower	 its	 own	 barriers	 to	 free	 operation	 of	 the	 market	 and	 instituted	 plans	 to	 privatise	
various	sectors	of	the	economy	as	well	as	liberalise	trade	in	order	to	establish	competition	
as	the	main	power	behind	the	functioning	of	the	market.65		In	a	more	competition	friendly	
environment,	 the	 Tribunal	 subsequently	 began	 to	 emphasise	 competition	 considerations	
more	 and	 started	 to	 apply	 long-term,	 dynamic	 economic	 analysis	 to	 its	 decisions.66	 	 In	 a	
short	 period	 of	 time,	 enforcement	 rates	 grew	 exponentially	 and	 free	 competition	 in	 the	
market	was	thoroughly	embraced.	
	
A	national	competition	authority	can	improve	the	level	of	competition	culture	in	its	country	
through	‘competition	advocacy.’		The	ICN	defines	competition	advocacy	as,		
	
activities	 conducted	 by	 the	 competition	 authority	 related	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	 a	
competitive	 environment	 for	 economic	 activities	 by	 means	 of	 non-enforcement	
mechanisms,	mainly	through	its	relationships	with	other	governmental	entities	and	
by	increasing	public	awareness	of	the	benefits	of	competition.67			
	
John	 Clark	 identified	 three	 preconditions	 necessary	 for	 competition	 advocacy	 to	 be	
successful:68	
	
1. First,	the	competition	authority	or	agency	must	be	wholly	independent	
and	 free	 from	political	 influence	 from	both	 inside	and	outside	of	 the	
government.	 	Clark	described	 two	kinds	of	 independence.	 	 Structural	
independence,	which	can	have	ambiguous	effects	on	advocacy.		If	the	
competition	 authority	 is	 entirely	 separate	 from	 other	 sectors	 of	 the	
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government,	 it	 may	 not	 have	 sufficient	 access	 to	 knowledgeable	
decision	makers	 in	 the	 executive	 legislative	 branches.	 	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	 operational	 independence	 gives	 the	 authority	 the	 freedom	 to	
take	a	stance	and	make	opinions	independent	from	those	held	by	the	
public	and	private	sectors.	
	
2. Second,	 the	 agency	 should	 have	 sufficient	 financial	 and	 human	
resources	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 both	 enforcement	 and	 advocacy	
activities.		This	is	highly	problematic	for	developing	countries	because,	
as	 detailed	 above,	 competition	 agencies	 in	 these	 countries	 almost	
always	lack	the	necessary	resources	for	both.	These	agencies	therefore	
often	 find	 themselves	 having	 to	 make	 difficult	 decisions	 on	 how	 to	
balance	 available	 resources	 between	 law	 enforcement	 and	 advocacy	
concerns.	
	
3. Finally,	 in	 order	 to	 be	 respected,	 the	 competition	 agency	must	 gain	
credibility	as	an	effective	and	impartial	advocate	for	competition.		This	
reputation	 must	 extend	 to	 all	 facets	 of	 society	 in	 both	 public	 and	
private	sectors.		Businesses,	workers,	and	consumers	must	appreciate	
how	 competition	 benefits	 the	 economy	 and	 must	 also	 trust	 the	
competition	 authority	 or	 agency	 as	 an	 advocate	 for	 an	 effective	
competition	policy.		The	agency’s	approach	here	must	therefore	cover	
multiple	features	such	as	education	(crucial	 in	dispensing	information	
on	how	competitive	markets	operate	and	the	associated	benefits),	and	
experience	 (consumers	must	 be	 able	 to	 see	 the	 gains	 resulting	 from	
the	agency’s	activities).	
	
Developing	countries	often	find	themselves	in	a	conundrum	of	having	to	allocate	resources	
between	enforcement	and	enriching	the	country’s	competition	culture.		Some	scholars	have	
argued	that	in	the	first	few	years	of	a	national	competition	authority’s	establishment	should	
allocate	more	of	 its	resources	towards	projects	supporting	competition	advocacy	and	only	
once	 a	 competition	 culture	 has	 been	 properly	 instituted	 should	 the	 focus	 turn	 to	
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enforcement.69	 	 According	 to	 David	 Lewis,	 attempting	 to	 enforce	 competition	 legislation	
without	 a	 competition	 culture	 in	 place	 will	 only	 lead	 to	 a	 situation	 where	 almost	 every	
decision	 the	 competition	 authority	makes	 will	 be	 challenged	 by	 the	 companies	 involved,	
often	 in	front	of	national	tribunals	where	the	decision-makers	are	not	equipped	to	handle	
competition	 law	 cases.70	 	 Simultaneously,	 local	 politicians	will	 condemn	 the	 authority	 for	
undermining	the	country’s	industrial	development	by	allowing	local	oligopolies	to	engage	in	
anti-competitive	conduct.	 	Finally,	 the	public	will	 largely	be	reluctant	to	 interfere	due	to	a	
lack	of	general	knowledge	of	its	rights	as	consumers.	
	
Proposals	for	Reform	for	Developing	Countries	
	
In	 addition	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 resources,	 another	 obstacle	 a	 developing	 country	 faces	 when	
building	 its	 own	 competition	 law	 system	 is	 confusion	 over	 which	 model	 to	 adopt.	 	 For	
developing	countries,	merely	emulating	 the	competition	 laws	of	developed	countries	may	
not	be	sufficient	in	meeting	their	own	specific	needs.			On	the	other	hand,	policymakers	in	
developing	countries	are	likely	to	have	little	to	no	background	expertise	in	competition	law	
matters.		Therefore,	it	is	clear	that	the	first	step	in	establishing	an	effective	competition	law	
should	be	to	develop	a	basic	framework,	which	developing	countries	can	refer	to.	
	
Eleanor	Fox	suggests	six	models	in	which	developing	countries	may	implement	and	enforce	
new	competition	laws:71	
	
1. The	U.S.	model:	this	model	begins	with	the	presumption	that	antitrust	law	is	
to	be	used	solely	for	efficiency	purposes	and	that	efficiency	is	produced	by	a	
predominately	 laissez-faire	 approach.	 	 This	 model	 therefore	 only	 contains	
minimal	 antitrust	 laws	 save	 for	 laws	 against	 cartels.	 	 A	 competition	 or	
antitrust	system	based	wholly	on	the	U.S.	model	has	been	criticised	by	some	
policy	 makers	 and	 scholars	 as	 less	 likely	 to	 create	 an	 open	 market.	 	 As	 a	
                                                
69	Clark,	John,	‘Competition	Advocacy:	Challenges	for	Developing	Countries,’	(2005)	OECD	Journal:	Competition	
Law	and	Policy,	Vol.	6,	No.	4	
70	 Lewis,	 David.	 ‘Embedding	 a	 Competition	 Culture,’	 (2013)	 in	 Sokol,	 Daniel	 D	 et	 al.	 Competition	 Law	 and	
Development,	Stanford	University	Press.	
71	Fox,	Eleanor,	 ‘Competition,	Development	and	Regional	 Integration:	 In	Search	of	a	Competition	Law	Fit	 for	
Developing	Countries,’	(2012)	Law	&	Economics	Research	Paper	Series,	Working	Paper	No.	11-04	at	12-17.	
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result,	developing	countries	are	less	likely	to	choose	this	model	without	first	
making	a	few	changes.	
	
It	is	argued	here	that	a	system	based	wholly	on	the	United	States	would	also	
not	address	the	issue	developing	countries	face	with	regards	to	international	
cartels.		In	addition	to	encouraging	the	development	of	an	open	market,	any	
competition	 law	 system	 adopted	 by	 a	 developing	 country	 should	 have	 the	
necessary	 sanctions	 in	place	 in	order	 to	adequately	enforce	 its	 laws	against	
any	 international	cartel	 that	targets	 it.	 	While	this	model	may	be	enough	to	
address	 the	 issue	 of	 domestic	 cartels,	 it	 is	 questionable	 whether	 a	 system	
based	 on	 this	 model	 would	 be	 effective	 when	 dealing	 with	 international	
cartels.	
	
2. The	 second	model	 Fox	describes	 also	begins	with	 the	U.S.	model	but	 alters	
some	 of	 the	 laws	 and	 standards	 in	 order	 to	 accommodate	 the	 market	
situations	 of	 developing	 countries.	 	 This	 assessment	 may	 account	 for	
differences	between	developed	and	developing	countries	 that	a	wholly	U.S.	
model	 would	 not.	 	 For	 instance,	 a	 developing	 country	 may	 choose	 to	
emphasise	 a	 provision	 that	 deters	 dominant	 firms	 from	 exercising	 their	
competitive	powers	in	a	monopolised	market	over	rules	that	allow	dominant	
firms	limitless	freedom	to	engage	in	predatory	prices.		Conversely,	they	may	
also	 choose	 to	maintain	 low	 prices	 for	 consumers,	 however	 temporary	 the	
situation.		Fox	notes	that	developing	countries	are	also	unlikely	to	base	their	
competition	 policy	 on	 this	 model	 as,	 like	 in	 the	 first	 model,	 the	 idea	 that	
competition	 law	 be	 used	 only	 to	 prohibit	 inefficient	 practices	 is	 a	 fairly	
narrow	outlook	on	competition	law.	
	
The	arguments	against	adopting	this	model	are	therefore	very	similar	to	the	
arguments	against	adopting	 the	 first	model.	 	 It	was	discussed	earlier	 in	 this	
chapter	 that	 developing	 countries	 often	 adopt	 competition	 policies	 for	 a	
number	 of	 reasons	 that	 go	 beyond	 protecting	 competition	 in	 the	 market,	
such	 as	 improving	 socio-economic	 welfare	 and	 encouraging	 economic	
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development.		Therefore,	whichever	model	a	developing	country	chooses	to	
base	its	competition	law	system	on	should	reflect	these	objectives.	
	
3. The	third	model	Fox	discusses	is	based	on	EU	competition	law	and	those	of	its	
Member	 States.	 	 This	model	 is	 based	 on	 rules	 allowing	 for	more	 access	 to	
open	 markets	 and	 remains	 sceptical	 of	 state	 involvement	 that	 reduces	 or	
restricts	competition.		Unlike	the	previous	two	models,	which	were	based	on	
U.S.	antitrust	 law,	EU	competition	 law	considers	whether	 the	actions	of	 the	
market	players	are	‘sealing	off	the	market’	and	preventing	open	access.			
	
Developing	countries	are	more	 likely	 to	adopt	 this	model	over	 the	previous	
two.	 	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 between	 the	 U.S.	 and	 the	 EU,	 the	 EU’s	
competition	law	system	is	the	more	favoured	of	the	two.			This	model	would	
also	 address	 the	 issue	many	 developing	 countries	 share	 regarding	 the	 high	
levels	of	state	involvement	in	their	markets.	
	
4. The	 fourth	 model	 combines	 developing	 countries	 that	 have	 already	
established	a	working	competition	law	system	with	the	open	market	strategy	
of	EU	 law.	 	Fox	places	particular	emphasis	on	South	African	case	 law,	which	
serves	 as	 a	 good	 illustration	 of	 the	 challenges	 of	 balancing	 effective	
enforcement	mechanisms	with	 a	 lack	 of	 resources.	 	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	
that	South	African	competition	law	also	contains	special	provisions	designed	
to	 help	 disadvantaged	 classes	 and	 small	 and	 medium	 sized	 enterprises.		
These	provisions	will	be	elaborated	upon	in	the	next	chapter.	
	
However,	 for	 developing	 countries	 that	 have	 not	 yet	 established	 their	 own	
competition	 law	 systems,	 this	model	 would	 not	 be	 feasible.	 	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	laws	limiting	abuses	of	the	state	and	state-owned	firms	may	encourage	
more	privatisation	of	industries	with	a	large	governmental	presence,	thereby	
improving	the	competitiveness	of	the	market	as	a	whole.	
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5. The	fifth	model	introduces	the	concept	of	fairness	amongst	domestic	market	
players.	 	 It	 is	 especially	 suspicious	 of	 large	 multinational	 corporations	 and	
acknowledges	the	fact	that	many	developing	countries	have	been	formed	and	
influenced	 through	 colonialism,	 which	 may	 have	 led	 to	 exploitation	 and	
abuse.		This	model	is	best	suited	for	developing	jurisdictions	that	wish	to	best	
support	 the	 entrepreneurial	 enterprises	 of	 their	 local	market	 players.	 	 This	
model	 is	 specifically	 designed	 to	 support	 local,	 independent	 firms,	 over	 the	
interests	of	larger	firms.		Fox	highlights	the	example	of	the	tourism	industry	in	
the	Caribbean	where	larger	hotel	or	travel	chains	obtain	exclusive	contracts,	
thereby	shutting	out	local	businesses.		At	face	value,	this	may	not	appear	to	
be	 a	 problem	 if	 competition	 between	 those	 chains	 ensures	 consumers	 are	
not	 subject	 to	unfair	prices.	 	However,	 supporting	 local	businesses	 is	 vitally	
important	in	the	development	of	a	developing	country’s	economy.	
	
A	competition	law	system	based	on	this	model	may	therefore	address	some	
of	the	problems	associated	with	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI),	which	will	be	
discussed	in	Chapter	Five.		While	FDI	is	an	excellent	way	of	encouraging	more	
competition	 in	 the	 market,	 it	 may	 lead	 to	 an	 overabundance	 of	 foreign,	
dominant	 firms	 in	 the	 developing	 country’s	 market.	 	 A	 competition	 law	
system	 based	 on	 this	 model	 would	 therefore	 be	 able	 to	 support	 domestic	
firms	while	limiting	the	spread	of	foreign	firms.	
	
6. Finally,	rather	than	adopt	any	of	the	above	models,	developing	countries	may	
choose	to	devise	their	own	system	in	accordance	with	their	individual	needs,	
with	 references	 to	 the	methods	 of	 the	 previous	 five	models,	 especially	 the	
third,	fourth,	and	fifth.		This	model	is	however,	particularly	challenging	as	any	
model	that	deviates	from	the	standard	already	set	by	developed	jurisdictions	
is	unlikely	to	be	recognised	as	a	valid	choice.	
	
In	order	 to	 successfully	 implement	 this	model	 into	an	effective	competition	
law	system,	developing	countries	must	be	certain	their	policymakers	have	the	
necessary	background	in	competition	law	issues.			
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It	is	important	to	note	that	Fox	does	not	consider	any	one	of	her	six	models	to	be	mutually	
exclusive	 and	 that	 developing	 countries	 wishing	 to	 implement	 an	 effective	 competition	
regime	 can	adopt	any	 combination	of	 the	above	models	 into	 their	 system.72	 	 In	 this	way,	
developing	 countries	 can	 ensure	 that	 any	 competition	 law	 system	 it	 adopts	 will	 be	
specifically	tailored	to	fit	in	with	their	economic	and	political	structure.	
	
Legal	Transplantation	
	
Rather	than	build	a	competition	law	system	from	the	ground	up,	many	developing	countries	
find	 it	 easier	 and	 more	 economical	 to	 take	 an	 already	 established	 system	 from	 a	 more	
developed	 jurisdiction	 and	 transplant	 it	 into	 their	 own	 legislation.	 	 By	 modelling	 their	
competition	laws	on	another	jurisdiction’s,	developing	countries	can	often	spare	themselves	
the	 expense	 and	 technical	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 forming	 an	 entirely	 new	 system.		
However,	there	can	also	be	significant	disadvantages	in	adopting	a	ready-made	competition	
regime	or	 even	discrete	 aspects	 of	 it.	 	 It	 is	 therefore	 important	 that	 countries	 seeking	 to	
transplant	 existing	 competition	 laws	 conduct	 a	 thorough	 study	 weighing	 both	 the	
advantages	and	disadvantages	to	such	an	approach.	
	
For	 the	purposes	of	 this	 chapter,	 legal	 transplantation	 is	defined	as	 the	adoption	 into	 the	
national	legal	system	by	one	country	(the	‘adopter’)	of	laws	established	in	a	foreign	country	
(the	‘originator’).		The	process	of	legal	transplantation	has	been	the	subject	of	much	debate	
amongst	legal	scholars.		Watson,	who	first	coined	the	term	‘legal	transplant’	considered	law	
to	be	a	collection	of	codified	rules,	easily	copied	and	applied	elsewhere	since,	“there	is	no	
simple	correlation	between	society	and	its	law.”73		This	view	has	been	roundly	criticised	as	
an	 overly	 simplistic	 stance	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 society	 and	 its	 legal	 system.		
Legrand,	 one	 of	 Watson’s	 most	 vocal	 critics	 stated	 that	 a	 wholly	 transplanted	 system	 is	
unlikely	to	succeed	because	the	process	of	implementing	it	would	involve	transplanting	an	
entire	legal	culture,	including	doctrines,	procedures	and	institutions	developed	for	the	origin	
                                                
72	Ibid.	
73	Watson,	 Alan.	 Legal	 Transplants:	 An	Approach	 to	 Comparative	 Law.	 (1974)	 Edinburgh:	 Scottish	Academic	
Press	at	108.	
 121 
 
country’s	 own	 specific	 needs.74	 	 Proponents	 of	 legal	 transplantation	 therefore	 recognise	
that	transplanted	laws	will	likely	be	interpreted	in	different	ways	in	order	to	best	serve	the	
adopting	country’s	own	interests.	
There	are	several	advantages	to	legal	transplantation,	particularly	for	developing	countries.		
Developing	 countries	 or	 countries	with	 little	 experience	 in	 competition	 law	matters	 often	
face	difficulties	in	the	early	stages	of	development.		It	is	often	a	challenge	to	determine	how	
much	 emphasis	 should	 be	 placed	 on	 a	 particular	 provision	 or	 what	 content	 ought	 to	 be	
included.	 Furthermore,	 if	 the	 transplanted	 laws	 originate	 from	 a	 jurisdiction	 with	 a	 long	
history	 of	 successful	 implementation,	 interpretation	 and	 plenty	 of	 scope	 for	 academic	
discussion,	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 succeed.75	 	 The	 size	 of	 the	 origin	 country	 is	 also	 an	
important	factor	to	consider.		In	general,	larger	jurisdictions,	such	as	the	United	States	and	
the	European	Union,	are	more	likely	to	have	a	greater	turnover	in	the	number	of	decisions	
interpreting	 and	 applying	 its	 laws,	 thus	 providing	 the	 transplanting	 country	 with	 more	
resources	to	consult	when	enforcing	its	own	laws.76		Of	the	two	jurisdictions,	the	EU	is	the	
more	 commonly	 borrowed	 from,	 with	 more	 than	 43	 jurisdictions	 adopting	 the	 EU’s	
prohibition	 on	 monopolisation.77	 	 Moreover,	 the	 more	 developed	 the	 competition	 law	
system,	 the	 greater	 the	 databank	 of	 guidelines	 and	 academic	 articles	 offering	 different	
interpretations	developing	 countries	may	access.	 	 International	 forums	 such	as	OECD	and	
the	 ICN	have	also	published	discussions	 focusing	on	 the	 laws	of	developed	 jurisdictions.78		
Developing	countries	may	also	benefit	from	the	direct	guidance	of	the	origin	country	itself.		
In	 doing	 so,	 both	 the	 transplanting	 country	 and	 the	 transplanted	 country	 can	 work	 to	
mutually	benefit	each	other	by	creating	joint	solutions	to	cross-border	problems.	
	
It	can	also	be	argued	that	many	competition	law	systems	cover	largely	the	same	issues	and	
that	 anticompetitive	 behaviour	 is	 the	 same	 no	 matter	 which	 jurisdiction	 one	 turns	 to.		
Professor	Michal	Gal	put	forth	the	argument	that	all	competition	laws	are	comprise	of	‘fit-
all’	formulas,	that	have	been	developed	to	address	the	specific	competition	law	issue,	be	it	
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merger	regulation,	cartels	and	antitrust,	or	abuse	of	dominant	position,	to	which	they	apply	
in	the	best	possible	way.79		It	can	therefore	be	stated	that	one	should	not	expect	developing	
countries	to	reinvent	the	wheel	and	concoct	their	own	competition	 law	concepts.	 	Broken	
down,	 all	 competition	 law	 systems	 can	 be	 said	 to	 have	 the	 same	 goal:	 prevent	
anticompetitive	 behaviour	 and	 promote	 consumer	 welfare.	 	 The	 idea	 of	 common	 or	
universal	 competition	 law	 goals	 is	 strongly	 encouraged	 by	 the	 ICN.80	 	 Referred	 to	 as	
‘convergence,’	 the	 ICN	 has	 made	 it	 its	 ultimate	 goal	 and	 advocates	 the	 importance	 of	
striving	 to	 achieve	 convergence	 between	 its	 members.	 	 It	 has	 been	 lauded	 as	 the	 ‘new	
universal	 church	 of	 modern	 competition	 law,’81	 and	 many	 have	 stressed	 it	 should	 be	
considered	 as	 the	main	 objective	 of	 competition	 law	 in	 an	 increasingly	 globalised	 world.		
However,	critics	of	the	notion	of	convergence	have	pointed	out	that	the	theory	essentially	
requires	 developing	 countries	 to	 adopt	 the	 standards	 and	 ideals	 of	 the	 western	 world,	
namely	the	U.S.	and	Europe.	
	
An	example	of	legal	transplantation	of	one	jurisdiction’s	competition	laws	into	another	can	
be	 seen	 in	 the	 Singaporean	 competition	 law	 system.	 	 Singapore’s	 Competition	 Act	 was	
enacted	 in	 2004	 and	 revised	 in	 2006.82	 	 It	 is	 almost	 a	 direct	 transplantation	 of	 the	 UK	
Competition	Act	1998,	which	was	itself	modelled	on	Articles	101	and	102	of	the	TFEU.	 	As	
such,	 it	 covers	 the	 standard	 prohibitions	 on	 anticompetitive	 agreements	 and	 abuse	 of	
dominant	 position.	 	 Furthermore,	 Singapore’s	 broad	 definition	 of	 an	 undertaking,	 which	
covers	activities	of	state-owned	companies,	is	taken	solely	from	EU	case	law.83		Section	47	of	
the	Competition	Act	 in	 particular,	which	 refers	 to	 the	 ‘abuse	of	 dominant	position	 in	 any	
market	 in	 Singapore,’	 draws	 heavily	 on	 existing	 European	 jurisprudence.84	 	 The	 principles	
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implemented	by	the	General	Court	and	the	European	Court	of	Justice	can	also	be	found	in	
the	Competition	Commission	of	 Singapore’s	Guidelines	on	 the	Section	47	Prohibition	 (the	
CCS	Guidelines).		For	instance,	in	keeping	with	principles	established	in	EU	case	law,	the	CCS	
Guidelines	 prohibits	 firms	 with	 a	 dominant	 position	 in	 the	 market	 from	 engaging	 in	
commercial	 conduct	 that	would	have	a	detrimental	 effect	on	 competition.	 	 In	 addition,	 it	
also	 refers	 to	 dominant	 firms	 as	 taking	 part	 in	 exclusionary	 behaviour,	 such	 that	 other	
competitors	are	prevented	from	entering	or	competing	in	the	relevant	market.85	
	
Regardless	of	these	similarities,	it	cannot	be	said	that	Singapore’s	competition	law	system	is	
wholly	identical	to	that	of	the	UK	or	EU.		In	recognition	of	its	small	and	open	economy	and	
its	dependence	on	imports	as	well	as	its	vulnerability	to	cartel	behaviour	from	foreign	firms,	
Singapore	 has	 made	 a	 number	 of	 deviations	 from	 EU	 and	 UK	 law.	 	 For	 example,	 the	
definition	of	what	constitutes	a	‘dominant	position’	 is	much	wider	under	section	47	of	the	
Competition	Act	 than	that	of	Article	102	TFEU.86	 	 In	contrast	 to	 the	EU’s	definition,	which	
covers	 only	 undertakings	 that	 have	 a	 dominant	 position	 within	 the	 EU,	 or	 in	 one	 of	 its	
Member	States,	the	Singaporean	definition	of	a	dominant	position	encompasses	firms	that	
hold	 a	 dominant	 position	 in	 another	 jurisdiction	 and	 firms	 that	 may	 belong	 to	 a	
transnational	 market	 in	 Singapore	 with	 a	 largely	 foreign	 customer	 base.87	 	 Rather	 than	
simply	transplanting	the	entirety	of	the	UK	or	EU	competition	law	system,	the	Competition	
Commission	 of	 Singapore	 were	 careful	 to	 make	 the	 necessary	 changes	 in	 order	 to	
implement	 the	 European	 the	 competition	 law	 model	 in	 a	 way	 that	 best	 fit	 their	 own	
economic	needs.	
	
Despite	 the	 benefits	 associated	 with	 legal	 transplantation,	 many	 scholars	 remain	 highly	
critical	of	the	practice.		The	most	common	criticism	expressed	in	regards	to	transplanting	an	
entire	competition	 law	system	is	the	difference	between	the	economies	of	developed	and	
developing	countries.88	 	 If	 a	developing	country	 fails	 to	account	 for	 these	differences,	 the	
transplanted	 laws	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 fail.	 	 The	 competition	 laws	 system	 of	 a	 developed	
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country	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 very	 different	 goals	 and	 priorities	 than	 those	 of	 developing	
countries.	Difficulties	can	arise	when	attempting	to	use	a	legal	system	designed	to	support	
an	 already	 functioning	 competitive	market	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	 competition	 law	 policy	
that	is	meant	to	stimulate	a	weak	economy.	
	
There	 is	 also	 a	 psychological	 element	 in	 legal	 transplantation.	 	 External	 pressure	 on	
domestic	 policy-makers	 may	 affect	 the	 likelihood	 a	 transplanted	 legal	 system	 will	 be	
followed	effectively.	 	Recognition	that	a	particular	set	of	 laws	is	 legitimate	is	an	important	
factor	in	ensuring	compliance,	especially	when	the	laws	originate	from	a	different	country.89		
This	perception	stems	not	only	from	an	assessment	of	a	law’s	properties	but	also	the	source	
and	the	manner	in	which	it	was	instituted.		For	instance,	German	and	Japanese	resentment	
over	 the	 compulsory	 implementation	 of	 a	 competition	 law	 system	 following	 the	 Second	
World	War	may	have	affected	its	success.	
	
Furthermore,	once	a	competition	law	has	been	transplanted,	the	adopter	of	the	new	system	
then	 faces	 the	 daunting	 task	 of	 applying	 the	 new	 laws.	 	 Successful	 implementation	 and	
enforcement	 of	 competition	 laws	 entails	 far	 more	 than	 simply	 ‘cutting	 and	 pasting’	 one	
country’s	legislation	into	another’s.		Understanding	how	that	law	is	meant	to	be	applied	and	
interpreting	the	provisions	in	a	way	that	best	serves	the	new	system’s	objectives	 is	 just	as	
important	 in	 the	 transplantation	process.	 	 Even	with	 guidance	on	 competition	 law	 terms,	
developing	countries	may	struggle	with	deciphering	the	complexities	of	the	system	they	are	
transplanting,	particularly	if	the	laws	need	to	be	translated	into	their	native	language.			
	
For	 instance	Robert	Bork	notes,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	United	States’	 Sherman	Act,	 ‘[the]	bare	
language	 of	 the	 Sherman	 Act	 conveys	 little…’90	 the	 provisions	 in	 the	 Sherman	 Act	 are	
therefore	continuously	being	interpreted	and	reinterpreted	by	the	U.S.	courts.	 	 If	one	only	
looks	 at	 section	 2	 of	 the	 Sherman	 Act91,	 it	 provides	 little	 guidance	 on	 how	 these	 terms	
should	 be	 interpreted.	 	 Even	 in	 the	 EU,	 the	 most	 commonly	 transplanted	 system	 in	
developing	 countries,	 Article	 102	 of	 the	 TFEU	 provides	 few	 details	 on	what	 constitutes	 a	
                                                
89	Gal	(2014)	at	10.	
90	Bork	at	57.	
91	Section	2	of	the	Sherman	Act	states:	“Every	person	who	shall	monopolize,	or	attempt	to	monopolize,	or	
combine	or	conspire	with	any	other	person	or	persons,	to	monopolize	any	part	of	the	trade	or	commerce…”	
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violation	 with	 regards	 to	 provisions	 prohibiting	 excessive	 pricing,	 predatory	 pricing,	 and	
duties	to	deal.		The	difficulties	of	applying	the	law	solely	based	on	the	words	of	the	statute	
with	no	guidance	as	to	their	application	was	acknowledged	by	then-Judge	Breyer	in	the	1st	
Circuit	decision	in	Barry	Wright	Corp	v.	ITT	Grinnell	Corp:	
	
[While]	 technical	 economic	 discussion	 helps	 to	 inform	 the	 antitrust	
laws;	 those	 laws	 cannot	 precisely	 replicate	 the	 economists’	
(sometimes	 conflicting)	 views.	 	 For,	 unlike	 economics,	 law	 is	 an	
administrative	system	the	effects	of	which	depend	upon	the	content	
of	rules	and	precedents	only	as	they	are	applied	by	judges	and	juries	
in	 courts	 and	 by	 lawyers	 advising	 their	 clients.	 	 Rules	 that	 seek	 to	
embody	 every	 economic	 complexity	 and	 qualification	 may	 well,	
through	 the	 vagaries	 of	 administration,	 prove	 counter-productive,	
undercutting	the	very	economic	ends	they	seek	to	serve.92	[Emphasis	
added].	
	
The	 same	 legislation	 applied	 in	 similar	 cases	 can	 sometimes	 lead	 to	 different	methods	 of	
interpretation,	 even	 in	 the	 jurisdiction	 in	 which	 the	 legislation	 originated.	 	 For	 example,	
section	1	of	the	Sherman	Act	was	applied	in	both	the	cases	of	Dr	Miles	Medical	Co	v.	John	D	
Part	&	Sons	Co,93	and	Leegin	Creative	Leather	Prods	v.	PSKS	Ltd.94		Both	cases,	which	albeit	
were	decided	almost	one	hundred	years	between	each	other,	involved	the	same	conduct	of	
vertical	 price	 fixing.	 	Dr	Miles	Medical	 Co	 originally	 applied	 a	per	 se	 prohibition	 on	 resale	
price	maintenance.		Leegin	overturned	this	ruling	and	held	that	such	conduct	must	be	judged	
on	the	basis	of	the	rule	of	reason.		While	this	may	seem	like	a	drastic	shift	between	the	two	
cases,	 in	 the	 interim	years	between	 the	Dr	Miles	Medical	Co	 ruling	and	Leegin,	 the	 courts	
had	already	begun	to	move	away	from	per	se	applications	of	antitrust	laws.		Indeed	this	can	
be	seen	almost	immediately	following	the	Dr	Miles	decision.		Just	a	short	month	after	the	Dr	
Miles	 ruling,	the	case	of	Standard	Oil	Co.	of	New	Jersey	v.	United	States	moved	away	from	
applying	a	per	se	prohibition	on	monopolising	the	petroleum	industry	and	towards	a	rule	of	
                                                
92	724	F	2d	227	(1st	Cir	1983)	234.	
93	220	US	373	(1911).	
94	551	US	877	(2011).	
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reason	approach.95		More	specifically,	the	case	of	United	States	v.	Colgate	&	Co.,	which	dealt	
with	 the	 issue	 of	 vertical	 price	 restraints	 in	 vertical	 agreements,	 also	 favoured	 a	 rule	 of	
reason	approach	over	applying	the	rules	per	se.	
	
It	 is	 questionable	 whether	 developing	 countries	 would	 be	 able	 to	 develop	 and	 evolve	 a	
transplanted	competition	law	system	in	the	same	way	as	if	they	had	designed	one	from	the	
ground	up	to	specifically	target	their	needs.		As	William	Twining	notes,	‘[the]	most	important	
factors	 in	 a	 reception	 are	 the	 underlying	 values,	 principles,	 and	 political	 interests	 that	
motivate	it	rather	than	the	details	of	the	political	rules	or	provisions.’96		Therefore,	it	may	be	
argued	that	without	the	background	knowledge	or	political	and	economic	motivations	that	
were	behind	the	establishment	of	the	originator’s	laws,	the	adopting	country	may	find	itself	
struggling	with	applying	 the	new	 laws	effectively,	 rendering	 the	 transplanted	 system	 itself	
moot.	
	
Developing	 countries	 wishing	 to	 adopt	 transplanted	 competition	 law	 systems	 would	
therefore	do	well	to	benefit	from	some	receiving	some	technical	assistance	from	the	origin	
country.		For	instance,	the	European	Commission	has	provided	the	Chinese	government	with	
extensive	 technical	 assistance	 after	 China	 based	 Article	 45	 AML	 regarding	 rules	 on	
investigation	 suspensions	partly	on	Article	9	of	Regulation	1/2003.	 	 Its	 definitions	of	what	
constitutes	a	‘relevant	market’	under	Article	12	AML	is	also	clearly	taken	from	Western	ideal	
of	 competition	 law.	 	 Thus,	 in	 November	 2003,	 the	 Directorate	 General	 to	 the	 European	
Commission	partnered	with	the	Chinese	Government	to	establish	the	EU-China	‘Competition	
Policy	Dialogue.’97		This	is	a	permanent	instrument,	which	allows	for	continuous,	transparent	
discourse	 between	 the	 two	 parties.	 	 In	 order	 to	 increase	 the	 EU’s	 technical	 and	 capacity	
building	assistance	to	China,	a	number	of	MOFCOM	officials	were	invited	to	Brussels	in	2004	
for	the	purpose	gaining	practical	experience	in	dealing	with	competition	law	cases.	
	
                                                
95	221	US	1	(1911).	
96	Twining,	William,	‘Diffusion	of	Law:	A	Global	Perspective,’	(2004)	Journal	of	Legal	Pluralism,	Vol.	1	at	27.	
97	EU-China	‘Competition	Policy	Dialogue,’	agreed	on	6	May	2004,	available	at	
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/international/bilateral/cn2b_en.pdf.	
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The	ways	in	which	developing	countries	can	seek	technical	assistance	and	its	effectiveness	in	
helping	developing	countries	achieve	an	effective	competition	law	system	will	be	discussed	
in	more	detail	in	the	final	chapter.	
	
Regional	Agreements	and	Competition	Law	
	
As	discussed	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	 jurisdictions	 such	as	 the	EU	commonly	 sign	 regional	
agreements	with	their	partners	in	order	to	better	combat	the	issue	of	international	cartels	
as	well	as	address	any	other	issues	common	between	them.		Regional	agreements	can	also	
be	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	 developing	 countries	 that	may	 not	 have	 the	 resources	 to	 spare	 on	 a	
competition	 law	 system	 of	 their	 own.	 	 There	 are	 many	 different	 types	 of	 regional	
agreements,	however,	they	can	generally	fall	 into	one	of	two	categories:	 loose	 integration	
such	 as	 cooperation	 agreements	 or	 tight	 integration	 such	 as	 customs	 unions	 that	 have	 a	
centralised	 competition	 policy.	 	 According	 to	 Fox,	 regional	 agreements	 can	 address	 six	
challenges	developing	and	smaller	economies	face	with	regards	to	the	effectiveness	of	their	
competition	systems:98	
	
1. Economies	 of	 scale	 in	 competition	 law	 enforcement:	 on	 their	 own,	
developing	jurisdictions	may	lack	the	necessary	resources	to	finance	and	staff	
their	 own	 competition	 authority.	 	 A	 regional	 agreement	with	 a	 centralised	
system	can	help	these	countries	pool	their	resources.	
	
2. Leverage:	 developing	 countries	 acting	 alone	 may	 also	 lack	 the	 bargaining	
power	needed	to	pursue,	resist,	or	enforce	laws	challenging	anticompetitive	
conduct	abroad.		By	acting	together	through	a	regional	agreement,	they	may	
be	 able	 to	 convince	 more	 powerful	 countries	 into	 obtaining	 and	 sharing	
crucial	documents.	 	They	may	also	be	able	 to	prevent	 these	countries	 from	
exploiting	them,	for	example,	by	persuading	them	to	prohibit	their	own	firms’	
export	cartels	from	targeting	developing	countries.	
	
                                                
98	Fox,	Eleanor,	 ‘Competition,	Development	and	Regional	 Integration:	 In	Search	of	a	Competition	Law	Fit	 for	
Developing	Countries,’	(2012)	NYU	Law	and	Economics	Research	Paper	No.	11-04	at	19.	
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3. Influence:	 alone,	 developing	 countries	 may	 lack	 the	 influence	 or	 voice	
required	to	maintain	the	rules	and	standards	set	for	their	specific	needs	for	
development.	
	
4. Information	and	scope:	a	 regional	competition	authority	 is	 likely	 in	a	better	
place	 to	 detect	 international	 conduct	 that	 places	 undue	 restraints	 on	 the	
market.	 	 This	 may	 also	 allow	 the	 authority	 to	 more	 effectively	 address	
regional	trade	barriers.	
	
5. Combating	 parochialism:	 the	 European	 Union,	 for	 example,	 can	 combat	
parochialism	in	its	member	states	by	outlawing	state	measures	that	result	in	
detrimental	 effects	 on	 their	 neighbours	 as	 well	 as	 preventing	 states	 from	
discriminating	in	favour	of	‘their	own.’	
	
6. Remedies:	 as	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 European	Union,	 in	 order	 to	 be	 effective,	
remedies	addressing	 international	cartels	may	need	to	encompass	an	entire	
region	rather	than	simply	one	country	or	territory.	
	
Regional	 agreements	 may	 be	 easier	 for	 developing	 countries	 to	 enter	 into	 rather	 than	
implementing	 a	 competition	 law	 system	 from	 the	 ground	 up,	 however,	 they	 can	 also	
present	a	few	challenges,	particularly	if	a	country’s	priorities	includes	competition	law	issues	
such	as	addressing	the	problem	of	international	cartels.		For	instance,	regional	agreements	
usually	take	the	form	of	trade	agreements,	negotiated	and	enforced	by	the	trade	officials	in	
territories	that	want	to	implement	free	trade	by	abolishing	internal	trade	barriers.		In	these	
types	of	agreements,	competition	 law	 is	normally	merely	an	afterthought	and	may	not	be	
effectively	enforced	even	when	they	are	included.99		This	can	be	seen	in	the	example	of	the	
North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	 (NAFTA).	 	While	NAFTA	does	contain	a	chapter	on	
competition,	 the	 implementation	 of	 it,	 which	 was	 meant	 to	 be	 required	 as	 part	 of	 the	
negotiation	process,	never	took	place.		NAFTA	also	authorised	a	report	on	the	competition	
chapter;	 however,	 this	 report	 was	 also	 never	 submitted.	 	 The	 chapter	 on	 competition	
                                                
99	Gerber,	David.	Global	Competition:	Law,	Markets	and	Globalization.	(2012)	Oxford	University	Press	at	110.	
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therefore	has	largely	been	ineffective,	despite	the	fact	that	the	antitrust	authorities	of	the	
three	 parties	 (Canada,	 the	 United	 States,	 and	 Mexico)	 have	 cooperated	 on	 other,	 less	
prioritised,	 issues.100	 	This	 lack	of	a	Canada-U.S.-Mexico	regional	competition	 law	or	policy	
has	 had	 significant	 effects	 on	 the	 relationships	 between	 these	 countries.	 	When	Mexican	
telecoms	 companies	 imposed	 anticompetitive	 measures	 that	 harmed	 the	 American	
company	AT&T,	 rather	 than	 settle	 the	 dispute	 through	NAFTA,	 the	U.S.	 brought	 the	 case	
before	the	WTO	under	the	WTO	Telecommunications	Annex	in	the	General	Agreement	on	
Trade	in	Services	(GATS),	where	it	subsequently	won.101	
	
Signatories	 to	 a	 regional	 agreement	must	 also	 contend	with	 the	 potential	 for	 conflicts	 of	
jurisdiction	 between	 the	 regional	 authority	 and	 international	 organisations,	 such	 as	 the	
WTO.	 	 Conflict	 may	 also	 have	 been	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 United	 States	 decision	 to	 bring	 their	
dispute	before	the	WTO	rather	than	through	NAFTA.		Conflicts	of	jurisdictions	can	extend	to	
cases	where	a	regional	trade	agreement	(RTA)	shares	similar	provisions	with	the	WTO.		For	
instance,	an	export	cartel	formed	by	one	RTA	member	that	affects	the	other	members	could	
potentially	violate	the	laws	in	both	the	RTA	and	the	WTO.		This	could	create	the	problem	of	
identifying	the	most	appropriate	forum	in	which	to	bring	the	dispute.		Again,	many	scholars	
remain	divided	over	which	one	would	 take	precedence	 in	a	 conflict	of	 jurisdictions.102	 	At	
face	 value,	 the	 Dispute	 Settlement	 Understanding	 (DSU)	 can	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 this	
situation.		The	Appellate	Body	in	EC	–	Bananas	III	highlighted	Article	23	of	the	DSU,	stating	
that	 the	 Dispute	 Settlement	 Body	 (DSB)	 had	 exclusive	 jurisdiction	 in	 any	 case	 regarding	
violations	of	WTO	law.103	 	Once	a	case	has	been	brought	before	the	WTO,	no	other	forum	
has	the	authority	to	adjudicate	on	the	matter.104		Therefore,	in	cases	where	an	export	cartel	
violates	both	an	RTA’s	provisions	and	the	WTO,	it	may	be	simpler	to	merely	bring	the	case	
before	the	DSB.	
	
                                                
100	Lloyd,	Peter	John;	Vautier,	Kerrin	M.,	Promoting	Competition	in	Global	Markets:	A	Multi-national	Approach.	
(1999)	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	at	104.	
101	Mexico	–	Measures	Affecting	Telecommunications	Services,	WT/DS204/R,	adopted	2	April	2004.	
102	See	Yang,	Songling,	‘The	Solution	for	Jurisdictional	Conflicts	Between	the	WTO	and	RTAs:	The	Forum	Choice	
Clause,’	(2014)	Michigan	State	International	Law	Review,	Vol.	23,	No.	1.	
103	European	Communities	–	Regime	for	the	Importation,	Sale	and	Distribution	of	Bananas	(III),	WT/DS27/AB/R,	
adopted	9	September	1997	at	para	136.	
104	European	Communities	–	Regime	for	the	Importation,	Sale	and	Distribution	of	Bananas	(III),	WT/DS27/AB/R,	
adopted	9	September	1997	at	para	136.	
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However,	many	RTAs	contain	their	own	dispute	settlement	procedures.		In	instances	where	
a	case	violates	both	an	RTA	provision	and	the	WTO,	the	outcome	of	the	case	would	differ	
drastically	 in	 each	 forum.105	 	 A	WTO	 panel	would	 only	 discuss	 the	 issues	 relevant	 to	 the	
WTO	while	an	RTA	forum	would	do	likewise	with	the	issues	under	its	own	agreement,	which	
would	 likely	 result	 in	 very	 different	 claims	 and	 remedies.106	 	 A	 member	 of	 an	 RTA	 may	
therefore	 prefer	 to	 have	 the	 RTA	 address	 its	 grievances	 regarding	 an	 export	 cartel	
conducted	 by	 another	member	 states	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	 RTA’s	 forum	would	 be	more	
suited	 to	 consider	 issues	 that	 are	 specific	 to	 that	 region.	 	Nevertheless,	 regardless	of	 any	
jurisdictional	claims	an	RTA	may	have,	the	WTO	remains	reluctant	to	divest	itself	of	its	own	
claims	to	jurisdiction.		In	the	Mexico	–	Soft	Drinks	case,	the	Panel	declined	to	relinquish	its	
jurisdiction	 in	 favour	 of	 NAFTA.107	 	 While	 both	 Mexico	 –	 Soft	 Drinks	 and	 Argentina	 –	
Poultry108	 briefly	 considered	 the	 possibility	 of	 WTO	 panels	 giving	 up	 their	 jurisdiction	 in	
cases	where	there	is	a	‘legal	impediment’	preventing	them	from	exercising	that	jurisdiction,	
the	definition	of	what	a	‘legal	impediment’	would	entail	has	never	been	addressed.		Indeed,	
the	 Appellate	 Body	 in	Mexico	 –	 Soft	 Drinks	went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 refuse	 to	 elaborate	 on	 this	
concept	 by	 declining	 to	 consider	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 a	 legal	 impediment	 could	
exist.109		The	reluctance	of	both	WTO	panels	and	the	Appellate	Body	have	shown	in	defining	
the	 parameters	 in	 which	 their	 jurisdiction	 to	 decide	 cases	 could	 potentially	 be	 limited	
indicates	that	the	WTO	is	unlikely	to	relinquish	any	jurisdiction	they	may	have	in	a	case	in	
favour	of	an	RTA.	
	
While	regional	agreements	can	allow	some	countries	to	pool	their	resources,	the	problems	
associated	 with	 national	 competition	 law	 enforcement	 can	 also	 arise	 in	 regional	
agreements,	 even	 in	 cases	 where	 they	 have	 not	 relinquished	 jurisdiction	 to	 another	
international	body.		The	nature	of	a	regional	agreement	is	a	centralised	system,	with	unified	
enforcement.	 	 Financial	 resources	 may	 still	 be	 inadequate.	 	 Signatories	 must	 be	 able	 to	
cover	their	share	of	the	costs	and	in	some	situations,	members	may	fail	to	pay	or	simply	not	
                                                
105	Kwok,	Tiffany.	‘Conflicts	of	Jurisdiction	between	the	WTO	and	various	Regional	Trade	Agreements,’	(2010)	
LLM	Dissertation,	King’s	College	London.	
106	See	the	arguments	made	by	the	EC	Court	of	Justice	in	European	Economic	Area,	Opinion	1/91,	[1991]	ECR	I-
6084.	
107	Mexico	–	Tax	Measures	on	Soft	Drinks	and	Other	Beverages,	WT/DS308/R,	adopted	7	October	2005.	
108	Argentina	–	Definitive	Anti-Dumping	Duties	on	Poultry	from	Brazil,	WT/DS241/R,	adopted	19	May	2003.	
109	Mexico	–	Soft	Drinks,	AB	Report,	para.	54.	
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consider	 it	a	priority.	 	The	same	 issues	with	 the	requirement	 for	 technical	knowledge	and	
expertise	 during	 the	 enforcement	 process	 such	 as	 advocacy,	 conducting	 investigations,	
prosecution,	 decision-making,	 and	 appeals	 are	 also	 present.	 	 Members	 of	 a	 regional	
agreement	may	be	loath	to	share	their	already	scarce	resources,	preferring	instead	to	keep	
them	for	themselves.			
	
If	countries	already	have	competition	law	enforcement	mechanisms	in	place,	they	may	need	
to	relinquish	these	powers	if	they	have	signed	a	regional	agreement,	even	for	conduct	that	
affects	their	own	domestic	market.		For	instance,	the	West	African	Economic	and	Monetary	
Union	 (WAEMU)	 requires	 members	 to	 defer	 domestic	 judgement	 until	 the	 regional	
authority	 has	 made	 a	 decision.110	 	 For	 countries	 whose	 competition	 law	 enforcement	
mechanisms	are	 ill	equipped	or	 lack	the	experience	to	deal	with	trans-border	competition	
law	issues,	deferring	to	a	regional	authority	may	be	the	ideal	solution.		On	the	other	hand,	
this	can	be	problematic	as	domestic	issues	may	go	unresolved	for	long	periods	of	time.		In	
cases	where	members	 are	only	obliged	 to	 give	up	 the	 right	 to	 cross-border	enforcement,	
gaps	may	still	emerge	if	the	regional	authority	is	not	capable	or	prepared	to	enforce	the	law.		
Studies	 have	 shown	 that	 competition	 law	 enforcement	 against	 transnational	 anti-
competitive	 offences,	 such	 as	 international	 cartels,	 in	 regional	 agreements,	 particularly	
those	 involving	 developing	 countries,	 is	 rarely	 effective.111	 	 There	 is	 also	 the	 risk	 that	
developing	 countries	 will	 become	 utterly	 dependent	 on	 the	 possibility	 of	 regional	
enforcement,	however	effective	enforcement	on	a	regional	level	may	not	become	a	reality	
for	many	years.	
	
Mercosur	
	
Mercosur	 is	comprised	of	six	member	states:	Argentina;	Brazil;	Paraguay;	Uruguay;	Bolivia	
and	Venezuela.	 	Associate	countries	 include	Chile,	Peru,	Colombia,	Ecuador,	and	Suriname	
with	 New	 Zealand	 and	Mexico	 as	 observer	 countries.	 	 Although	 established	 in	 1991	 as	 a	
                                                
110	Bakhoum,	Mor;	Molestina,	Julia.	 ‘Institutional	Coherence	and	Effectivity	of	a	Regional	Competition	Policy:	
The	 Case	 of	 the	 West	 African	 Economic	 and	 Monetary	 Union	 (WAEMU),	 (2011)	 Max	 Planck	 Institute	 for	
Intellectual	Property	and	Competition	Law,	Research	Paper	No.	11-17	at	3.	
111	UNCTAD,	 ‘Review	of	 the	 experience	 gained	 so	 far	 in	 enforcement	 cooperation,	 including	 at	 the	 regional	
level,’	(2011)	TD/B/C.I/CLP/10	at	7.	
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trading	bloc	and	therefore	primarily	concerned	with	promoting	free	trade	and	tearing	down	
barriers	to	entry,	Mercosur	does	contain	some	provisions	governing	competition	law.	 	The	
Fortaleza	 Protocol	 for	 the	 Defence	 of	 Competition,	which	was	 signed	 in	 December	 1996,	
deals	with	competition	related	issues.112		It	borrows	heavily	from	the	EU	model	with	regards	
to	the	substantive	provisions.		For	instance,	Article	4	of	the	Protocol	prohibits	‘agreements	
and	concerted	practices	whose	purpose	or	 final	effect	 is	 to	 restrict,	 limit,	 falsify	or	distort	
competition	 or	 access	 to	 the	 market,	 as	 well	 as	 abuse	 of	 dominance	 that	 affects	
intraregional	trade.’113		For	member	states	such	as	Bolivia,	which	has	been	identified	as	one	
of	the	poorest	countries	 in	South	America	and	has	a	very	 limited	competition	 law	system,	
the	Fortaleza	Protocol	 is	 the	only	 recourse	 it	has	 to	address	any	competition	 law	 issues	 it	
may	have.	
	
At	 the	 moment,	 Mercosur’s	 competition	 policy	 operates	 at	 primarily	 a	 national	 level.		
Member	 states	 are	 required	 to	 enact	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 systems	 in	 line	with	 the	
provisions	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Protocol.	 	 Two	 intergovernmental	 bodies,	 the	 Mercosur	 Trade	
Commission,	and	the	Committee	for	the	Defence	of	Competition	enforce	the	Protocol	itself.		
The	Mercosur	 Trade	 Commission	 carries	 out	 adjudicative	 duties	while	 the	 Committee	 for	
the	 Defence	 of	 Competition,	 which	 is	 made	 up	 of	 representatives	 from	 member	 states’	
national	 competition	 authorities,	 investigates	 cases	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 national	
authorities	 of	 the	 defendant’s	 domestic	 state.	 	 While	 Mercosur	 is	 an	 acceptable	 way	 to	
regulate	competition	law	issues	between	member	states,	 it	may	not	be	the	most	effective	
platform	 for	 addressing	 international	 cartel	 abuses.	 	 This	 is	 because	 Mercosur	 is	
predominately	concerned	with	regulating	competition	law	issues	between	its	own	member	
states.	 	 Under	 the	 Fortaleza	 Protocol,	 competition	 authorities	 of	 member	 states	 initiate	
proceedings	either	ex	officio	or	after	receiving	a	complaint	from	an	interested	party.114		The	
national	 authorities	 must	 first	 determine	 whether	 the	 alleged	 anticompetitive	 behaviour	
has	 any	 implications	 under	 Mercosur.	 	 This	 determination	 must	 include	 evidence	 of	 the	
economic	effects	of	the	behaviour	in	question	as	well	as	a	definition	of	the	relevant	market.			
                                                
112	Common	Market	of	the	Southern	Cone	(Mercosur),	Protocol	on	the	Defence	of	Competition,	the	‘Fortaleza	
Protocol,’	available	at	www.ftaa-alca.org/Wgroups/WGCP/English/cpa/cpa3_e.asp	(last	visited	15	July	2016).	
113	See	also	article	6,	which	defines	the	types	of	practices	(agreements	and	abuses	of	dominance)	that	violate	
the	Protocol	under	article	4.	
114	Article	10,	Fortaleza	Protocol.	
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In	 this	 regard,	Mercosur	 can	 address	 cartels	 domiciled	 in	member	 state	 jurisdictions	 that	
target	other	member	states,	but	it	does	not	have	the	authority	to	protect	its	members	from	
international	cartels	that	are	otherwise	located.	
ECOWAS	
	
Another	example	of	how	competition	law	can	be	integrated	in	a	regional	agreement	can	be	
seen	in	the	Economic	Community	of	West	African	States	(ECOWAS),	which	was	established	
in	1975.		Created	in	order	to	establish	a	single	trading	bloc,	ECOWAS	was	founded	in	order	
to	 help	 its	 member	 states	 achieve	 ‘collective	 self-sufficiency.’	 	 There	 are	 currently	 15	
member	 states:	Benin;	Burkina	Faso;	Cape	Verde;	Gambia;	Ghana;	Guinea;	Guinea-Bissau;	
Ivory	Coast;	Liberia;	Mali;	Niger;	Nigeria;	Senegal;	Sierra	Leone;	and	Togo.	
	
In	 spite	 of	 its	 main	 object	 to	 establish	 a	 common	 market,	 ECOWAS	 was	 not	 initially	
concerned	with	implementing	a	competition	policy,	which	is	generally	necessary	to	ensure	
the	 common	market’s	 success.	 	 It	 wasn’t	 until	 2007	 that	 a	 framework	 for	 a	 competition	
policy	was	published,	which	paved	the	way	for	the	formation	of	a	competitive	market.		As	a	
regional	 competition	 law	 policy,	 the	 document,	 entitled	 ‘ECOWAS:	 Regional	 Competition	
Policy	Framework’	stated,	‘ongoing	efforts	to	facilitate	economic	integration	in	the	ECOWAS	
sub-region	and	to	promote	regional	economic	growth	will	be	meaningfully	enhanced	by	the	
adoption	of	 a	 sound	 regional	 framework	 for	 competition	 law.’115	 	 This	 statement	 strongly	
implies	 that	 the	 objectives	 of	 ECOWAS’	 competition	 law	policy	were	 to	 promote	 regional	
integration	and	facilitate	economic	development.	
	
However,	despite	publishing	what	looked	like	a	promising	competition	law	policy,	ECOWAS	
has	not	yet	formally	enacted	any	substantive	competition	law	provisions.	 	 In	the	‘Regional	
Competition	 Policy	 Framework,’	 it	 identified	 four	measures	 that	 needed	 to	 be	 fulfilled	 in	
order	 to	 implement	 an	 effective	 competition	 law	 regime.116	 First,	 adoption	 detailed	
competition	 laws	should	take	place	as	soon	as	possible.	 	Second,	regulations	pertaining	to	
                                                
115	 ECOWAS,	 ‘ECOWAS:	 Regional	 Competition	 Policy	 Framework,’	 (2007)	 available	 at	
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/actes_add_commerce/1.Regional_Competition_Policy_Framework-
final-P.pdf.	
116	Ibid.	
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how	the	laws	are	to	be	implemented,	including	procedures	for	merger	regulation,	sanctions	
for	violations	of	the	competition	law	rules,	and	steps	needed	in	order	to	file	complaints	or	
initiate	investigations	should	be	defined.	 	Third,	a	regional	competition	law	authority	must	
be	created	 in	order	to	enforce	the	competition	 laws.	 	Finally,	an	advisory	board	with	dual	
competence	 empowered	 to	 assist	 in	 developing	 the	 internal	 procedures	 that	 the	
competition	 authority	must	 follow	 and	 to	 assist	 the	 competition	 authority	 and	 any	 other	
regional	institutions	with	the	task	of	implementing	the	competition	laws.	
	
WAEMU	
	
While	 ECOWAS	 as	 a	 whole	 was	 largely	 unsuccessful	 in	 implementing	 its	 lofty	 goals	 of	 a	
regional	 competition	 law	 system,	 the	 West	 African	 Economic	 and	 Monetary	 Union,	 a	
customs	and	currency	union	comprised	of	members	of	ECOWAS.		In	support	of	its	objectives	
to	 promote	 greater	 economic	 competitiveness	 through	 open	 markets,	 WAEMU	 has	 also	
incorporated	 a	 set	 of	 competition	 law	 rules.	 	 Lauded	 as	 having	 one	 of	 the	 most	
comprehensive	collection	of	competition	laws	contained	in	a	regional	agreement,	it	borrows	
heavily	 from	 the	 EU	 competition	 law	 framework,	 most	 notably	 the	 prohibitions	 on	
anticompetitive	agreements	and	abuse	of	dominance	that	may	affect	intraregional	trade.117			
	
WAEMU’s	 competition	 laws	are	 contained	 in	 three	Regulations	 and	 two	Directives,	which	
regulate	and	sanction	anticompetitive	agreements,	abuses	of	dominant	position,	and	state	
aid.118		It	also	maintains	transparency	in	the	financial	relationships	between	member	states	
and	 public	 enterprises,	 as	 well	 as	 between	 public	 enterprises	 and	 international	
organisations	 in	 addition	 to	 facilitating	 cooperation	 between	 WAEMU’s	 Commission	 and	
member	states’	national	competition	law	authorities.119		WAEMU’s	Commission	has	the	sole	
responsibility	 of	 applying	 the	 regional	 competition	 law	with	 assistance	 from	 the	member	
states.	 	 In	 theory,	 under	 Directive	 02/2002/CM/UEMOA,	 the	 national	 competition	 law	
authorities	of	the	member	states	are	required	to	cooperate	with	the	Commission	and	assist	
                                                
117	Article	88	WAEMU	
118	 Règlement	 02/2002/CM/UEMOA;	 Règlement	 03/2002/CM/UEMOA;	 Règlement	 04/2002/CM/UEMOA;	
Directive	01/2002/CM/UEMOA;	Directive	02/2002/CM/UEMOA.	
119	Ibid.	
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in	the	investigation	of	competition	cases.		In	practice,	member	states	often	lack	the	human	
and	 financial	 resources	necessary	 to	equip	 their	national	competition	 law	authorities	with	
the	tools	needed	to	effectively	collaborate	and	assist	the	Commission.	
	
In	spite	of	these	difficulties,	WAEMU	is	the	only	trading	bloc	(with	the	obvious	exception	of	
the	 European	 Union)	 to	 successfully	 apply	 its	 competition	 laws.	 	 In	 2004	 and	 2005,	 the	
Commission	settled	two	cases	involving	a	dispute	in	the	framework	of	the	West	African	Gas	
Pipeline	 Project	 between	 Benin	 and	 Togo.120	 In	 2005,	 it	 issued	 an	 injunction	 ordering	
Senegal	to	cease	the	sate	aid	it	was	providing	to	a	firm.121		While	these	instances	of	regional	
application	 of	 competition	 laws	 are	 promising,	 they	 remain	 limited	 to	 addressing	 the	
competition	 issues	 between	 member	 states	 only.	 	 With	 regards	 to	 investigating	 and	
prosecuting	international	cartels,	WAEMU	suffers	from	the	same	limitations	that	plague	its	
member	 states.	 	 The	Competition	Commission	 also	 has	 insufficient	 resources	when	 faced	
with	the	threat	of	an	 international	cartel.	 	 It	does	not	have	the	capacity	to	 launch	 its	own	
investigations;	 it	 lacks	 independence	beyond	the	boundaries	of	WAEMU;	and	it	 is	severely	
understaffed.122	
	
While	 regional	 and	 preferential	 trade	 agreements	 may	 be	 ideal	 in	 addressing	
anticompetitive	 behaviour	 between	 member	 states,	 they	 do	 little	 when	 a	 jurisdiction	 is	
faced	with	an	international	cartel	imposed	by	a	non-member	state.		Members	of	a	regional	
agreement,	especially	those	of	developing	economies	can	find	it	difficult	to	apply	their	laws	
extraterritorially.	 	 The	 formation	 of	 such	 an	 agreement	 in	 order	 to	 combat	 international	
cartels	is	therefore	a	bandage	solution	at	best	and	does	little	to	address	the	overall	problem	
faced	by	developing	countries.	
	
Conclusion	
	
                                                
120	UNCTAD,	‘Voluntary	Peer	Review	of	Competition	Policies	of	WAEMU,	Benin	and	Senegal,’	(2008),	UNCTAD,	
at	62-3.	
121	 Bakhoum,	 Mor,	 ‘Delimitation	 and	 Exercise	 of	 Competence	 between	 the	 West	 African	 Economic	 and	
Monetary	Union	(WAEMU)	and	its	Member	States	in	Competition	Policy,’	(2006)	World	Competition,	Vol.	29,	
No.	4	at	665.	
122	 Drexl,	 Josef,	 Competition	 Policy	 and	 Regional	 Integration	 in	 Developing	 Countries,	 (2012)	 Edward	 Elgar	
Publishing	at	106.	
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There	are	many	reasons	why	a	developing	country	may	wish	to	adopt	their	own	competition	
law	 regime,	not	 least	of	which	 is	 the	desire	 to	 combat	 international	 cartels	on	 their	own.		
However,	 the	 associated	 challenges	 with	 first	 implementing	 and	 then	 enforcing	 such	 a	
system	may	render	the	goal	impossible.		A	country’s	competition	laws’	success	is	therefore	
dependent	 on	 its	 development	 as	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 different	 goals	 and	 priorities.		
Developed	 economies	 can	 afford	 to	 expend	 its	 resources	 on	 priorities	 such	 as	 improving	
market	 efficiency	 and	 enhancing	 competition	 amongst	 market	 players.	 	 Developing	
countries	may	not	have	the	resources	to	allocate	to	different	sectors	of	their	society	and	are	
likely	 to	 have	 social	 and	 economic	 goals	 that	 vastly	 differ	 from	 their	 more	 developed	
counterparts.	
	
While	solutions	such	as	legal	transplantation	may	curb	some	of	the	expense	countries	may	
incur,	 a	 legal	 system	 that	 has	 been	 transplanted	 may	 not	 always	 be	 the	 best	 fit.	 	 For	
instance,	 the	 U.S.	 antitrust	 law	 system	 is	 designed	 to	 support	 markets	 that	 can	 operate	
independently	and	do	not	have	a	history	of	excessive	government	involvement.		While	the	
United	States	has	a	reputation	for	its	effective	enforcement	mechanisms	against	hard-core	
cartels,	 given	 that	many	developing	 countries’	 economies	are	or	were	until	 very	 recently,	
largely	state	owned,	transplanting	a	wholly	Americanised	competition	legal	system	may	not	
be	 the	most	appropriate	option.	 	Alternatively,	developing	 countries	may	choose	 to	 solve	
their	 competition	 law	woes	 by	 entering	 into	 regional	 agreements,	 often	with	 each	 other.		
Again,	 this	 recourse	 presents	 its	 own	 challenges.	 	 Developing	 countries	 without	 the	
resources	 to	 allocate	 to	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 systems	may	not	wish	 to	 share	 those	
resources	with	 their	 fellow	members	 to	 a	 regional	 agreement,	 particularly	 if	 an	 effective	
competition	 law	 enforcement	 mechanism	 is	 not	 immediately	 forthcoming.	 	 Given	 these	
obstacles,	 it	 may	 be	 time	 to	 begin	 exploring	 other	 options.	 	 The	 following	 chapter	 will	
therefore	discuss	the	case	for	reform	in	more	detail.	
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Chapter	Five	
Establishing	the	Benchmark	for	Reform	
	
	
Introduction	
	
Chapter	 Two	 established	 that	 developing	 countries	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 suffer	 detrimental	
effects	 from	 international	 cartels,	 including	 export	 cartels.	 	 Chapter	 Three	 discussed	 the	
current	 legislation	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 have	 in	 place	 to	 combat	
international	cartels.	 	While	developed	jurisdictions	often	have	sophisticated	rules	in	place	
and	 the	 resources	 to	enforce	 them	against	both	domestic	 and	 foreign	 cartels,	 developing	
countries	 often	 have	 ineffective	 competition	 law	 systems	 and	 inadequate	 resources	 to	
support	 them.	 	 Chapter	 Four	 then	 moved	 on	 to	 consider	 the	 reasons	 why	 developing	
countries	 struggle	 with	 implementing	 effective	 competition	 law	 systems.	 	 Developing	
countries	face	unique	challenges	such	as	unstable	governments	and	severe	poverty,	which	
can	 hinder	 the	 success	 of	 a	 competition	 law	 system	 or	 even	 disincentivise	 government	
officials	 from	 attempting	 such	 an	 endeavour	 altogether.	 	 However,	 a	 competition	 law	
system	can	do	more	than	work	towards	combating	the	threat	of	international	cartels;	it	can	
also	be	used	as	a	tool	to	remedy	some	of	these	challenges,	especially	if	the	system	has	the	
appropriate	welfare	standard	behind	it.	
	
Having	 established	 that	 developing	 countries	 are	 in	 a	 weaker	 position	 compared	 to	
developed	 countries	 when	 faced	with	 the	 problem	 of	 international	 cartels,	 the	 next	 two	
chapters	will	discuss	how	we	can	remedy	the	current	situation.		A	suitable	welfare	standard	
must	first	be	established	before	determining	the	most	appropriate	method	for	reform.		The	
outcome	 of	 any	 reform	method	 that	 is	 adopted	may	 not	 be	 the	 same	 depending	 on	 the	
welfare	standard	that	is	applied.		Welfare	standards	serve	as	the	benchmark	for	competition	
law	 and	 policy.	 	 Competition	 policy	 and	 laws	 are	 irrevocably	 linked	 to	 the	 goals	 and	
objectives	of	their	 jurisdiction’s	system.		Therefore,	the	goals	of	that	particular	 jurisdiction	
will	have	an	 impact	on	which	welfare	standard	to	apply.	 	Furthermore,	whichever	welfare	
standard	 is	adopted	 into	a	particular	system	will	also	have	an	 impact	on	how	competition	
laws	are	applied	and	how	cases	are	decided	in	the	courts.	
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There	are	several	types	of	welfare	standards	that	can	be	applied	to	a	competition	law	policy	
or	 system	 and	 each	 have	 their	 own	 priorities	 that	 affect	 the	 end	 result.	 	 For	 instance,	
consumer	welfare	is	generally	concerned	with	protecting	the	interests	of	consumers	in	the	
relevant	market.	 	 Therefore,	 competition	 law	 authorities	 in	 a	 system	 that	 has	 adopted	 a	
consumer	welfare	approach	may	not	always	balance	the	interests	of	producers	against	any	
losses	 the	 consumer	 has	 suffered.	 	 Alternatively,	 a	 competition	 law	 system	 that	 has	
established	a	total	welfare	standard	may	be	more	likely	to	weigh	the	interests	of	consumers	
and	producers	alike	 in	making	decisions.	 	 The	 total	welfare	 standard	does	not	necessarily	
consider	transfers	of	wealth	from	the	consumer	to	the	producers	to	be	completely	unlawful	
so	 long	 as	 the	 producer	 is	 operating	 at	 maximum	 efficiency.	 	 When	 considering	 reform	
options	 in	the	case	of	 international	cartels,	as	seen	 in	Chapter	Two,	where	consumers	are	
the	 ones	who	 ultimately	 suffer	 as	 a	 result	 of	 cartel	 behaviour,	 balancing	 the	 interests	 of	
producers	and	consumers	according	to	the	total	welfare	may	not	be	the	most	appropriate	
choice	at	face	value.		On	the	other	hand,	there	are	also	inherent	difficulties	with	applying	a	
wholly	consumer	welfare	standard	when	considering	the	different	options	for	reform.		For	
example,	 a	 total	 welfare	 standard	may	 seem	 disadvantageous	 to	 consumers	 in	 the	 short	
term,	might	also	protect	local	businesses	from	being	forced	out	the	market	due	to	foreign,	
international	cartel	behaviour.	
	
This	 chapter	 will	 outline	 the	 welfare	 standards	 that	 could	 be	 adopted	 when	 considering	
reform	 option	 and	 discuss	 the	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 of	 each	 from	 a	 developing	
country’s	perspective.		It	will	also	set	out	the	goals	for	reform	as	well	as	outline	the	current	
regulatory	 framework	 regarding	 the	 status	of	 international	 competition	policy	 in	 order	 to	
set	the	stage	for	the	final	chapter,	which	will	discuss	the	proposals	available	to	rectify	the	
current	situation.			
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What	is	the	Welfare	Standard?	
The	Importance	of	Goals	
	
The	debate	on	which	welfare	standard	is	the	most	appropriate	remains	a	highly	contentious	
issue	 in	 competition	 law	 to	 this	 day.1	 	 Most	 of	 the	 debate	 centres	 on	 the	 seemingly	
inconsistent	 approach	 some	 jurisdictions	 apply	 when	 adopting	 a	 consumer	 welfare	
standard,	 which	 advocates	 for	 consumer	 interests	 and	 therefore	 forms	 the	 crux	 of	
competition	 law	enforcement.	 	Some	of	 this	 inconsistency	can	be	traced	back	to	a	 lack	of	
consensus	amongst	economists	on	what	the	goals	of	competition	 law	ought	to	be.2	 	Most	
economists	 generally	 assume	 that	 the	 main	 objectives	 of	 competition	 law	 should	 be	 to	
enhance	 economic	 efficiency	 and	 maximise	 consumer	 welfare,	 thereby	 lowering	 prices,	
increasing	choice,	and	improving	the	quality	of	products	in	order	to	benefit	the	consumer.		
Other	 economic	 goals	 competition	 law	 could	 account	 for	 include	 promoting	 trade,	
improving	 economic	 liberalisation	 (including	 privatisation),	 and	 strengthening	 economic	
market	development.3		These	goals	are	especially	pertinent	for	countries	whose	economies	
are	 on	 the	 cusp	 of	 or	 directly	 transitioning	 from	 developing	 status	 to	 developed.		
Competition	 law	 is	often	adapted	 in	 these	situations	 in	order	 to	support	 the	 liberalisation	
process	 occurring	 in	 separate	 sections	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 safeguard	 the	 competitive	
environment.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 economic	 goals,	 some	 countries,	 particularly	 developing	 countries,	 may	
choose	to	 incorporate	social	and	political	goals	 into	their	competition	 law	regimes.	 	These	
goals,	 which	 have	 been	 discussed	 at	 length	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	may	 affect	 how	 the	
different	welfare	standards	are	applied.		Thus,	in	order	to	successfully	implement	any	type	
of	reform,	the	goals	of	the	particular	countries	involved	as	well	as	the	appropriate	welfare	
standard	must	first	be	established.		
                                                
1	See	Blair,	Roger	D.;	Sokol,	Daniel,	D.,	‘Welfare	Standards	in	U.S.	and	E.U.	Antitrust	Enforcement,’	(2013)	
Fordham	Law	Review,	Vol.	81.	
2	See	Blair,	Roger	D.;	Sokol,	Daniel	D.,	‘The	Rule	of	Reason	and	the	Goals	of	Antitrust:	An	Economic	Approach,’	
(2012)	Antitrust	Law	Journal,	Vol.	78,	No.	2. 
3	 Smejkal,	 Vaclav,	 ‘Competition	 law	 and	 the	 social	 market	 economy	 goal	 of	 the	 EU,’	 (2015)	 International	
Comparative	 Jurisprudence,	 Vol.	 1,	 No.	 1;	 see	 also	 Fox,	 Eleanor;	 Sullivan,	 Lawrence	 A.,	 ‘Antitrust	 –	
Retrospective	 and	 Prospective:	 Where	 are	 We	 Coming	 From?	 Where	 are	 We	 Going?’	 (1987)	 New	 York	
University	Law	Review,	Vol.	62	at	936.	
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When	 proposing	 reforms	 regarding	 the	 issue	 of	 international	 cartels	 and	 developing	
countries,	the	geographical	nature	of	the	reform	itself	will	affect	which	welfare	standard	is	
more	applicable.	 	 For	 instance,	 if	 the	proposed	 reform	were	a	globalised	competition	 law	
agreement,	 applicable	 to	many	 jurisdictions	at	once,	 a	welfare	 standard	 that	places	more	
emphasis	on	domestic	consumer	interests	would	not	be	appropriate.	 	The	reasons	for	this	
will	be	explained	later	on	in	this	chapter.		On	the	other	hand,	if	developing	countries	were	
to	simply	create	strategies	on	how	to	establish	or	enforce	an	existing	domestic	competition	
law	system,	then	a	global	welfare	standard	would	be	similarly	 inappropriate.	 	This	chapter	
will	analyse	the	most	common	welfare	standards	that	are	typically	discussed	as	well	as	how	
they	relate	to	developing	countries	in	the	context	of	reform.	
Types	of	Welfare	Standards	
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 there	 are	 two	 dimensions	 when	 analysing	 welfare	 standards:	
geographic	 welfare	 standards	 and	 more	 specific	 welfare	 standards	 such	 as	 consumer	
welfare,	 which	 can	 be	 considered	 under	 domestic	 or	 global	 welfare.4	 	 This	 chapter	 will	
consider	 welfare	 standards	 from	 both	 categories	 before	 discuss	 which	 is	 the	 most	
appropriate	standard	to	adopt	for	the	purposes	of	reform.	
	
Geographic	welfare	standards	can	be	divided	into	two	sub-categories:	domestic	and	global	
welfare.	 	 This	 distinction	 between	 domestic	 and	 global	 welfare	 is	 particularly	 significant	
given	 that	 different	 types	 of	 conduct	 can	 have	 different	 effects	 on	 either.	 	 For	 instance,	
export	 cartels	 may	 increase	 domestic	 welfare	 while	 simultaneously	 decreasing	 global	
welfare.	 	Most	competition	 law	authorities	however	continue	to	base	their	decisions	on	a	
domestic	 welfare	 standard.	 	 National	 competition	 law	 authorities	 often	 only	 consider	
welfare	 standards	 such	 as	 consumer	welfare	 and	 total	welfare	 under	 a	 domestic	welfare	
standard	 but	 they	 should	 also	 apply	 these	 standards	 in	 a	 global	 welfare	 context	 in	
circumstances	that	warrant	it,	such	as	in	the	case	of	international	cartels.	
	
                                                
4	Jain,	Jitendra,	Harmonization	of	International	Competition	Laws:	Pros	and	Cons,	(2013)	Anchor	Academic	
Publishing	at	33.	
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Consumer	Welfare	
	
There	 are	 many	 different	 standards	 and	 interpretations	 of	 the	 term	 ‘consumer	 welfare’.		
While	 the	 phrase	 is	 sometimes	 used	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 theories	 of	 ‘consumer	
protection’	 and	 price,	 service,	 quality	 and	 choice,5	 it	 can	 also	 be	measured	 in	 economics.		
Here,	consumer	welfare	can	be	defined	as	‘consumer	surplus’,	which	broadly	speaking	is	the	
economic	measure	of	consumer	satisfaction	by	weighing	the	price	consumers	are	willing	to	
pay	 for	 a	 given	product	 versus	 its	market	price.6	 	 Consumer	welfare	 should	be	 applied	 in	
order	to	improve	economic	efficiency,	or	maximise	aggregate	social	wealth.7	
	
Some	have	proposed	that	under	the	consumer	welfare	standard,	competition	and	antitrust	
law	 must	 actively	 prevent	 “increases	 in	 consumer	 prices,	 restriction	 of	 output	 or	
deterioration	 of	 quality	 due	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 market	 power	 by	 dominant	 firms.”8		
Competition	and	antitrust	policies	can	therefore	strive	for	consumer	welfare	in	one	of	two	
ways:	1)	by	placing	their	sole	focus	on	immediate	or	short-term	consumer	interests;	and	2)	
emphasising	 consumer	 welfare	 as	 a	 long-term	 goal	 and	 prioritising	 the	 overall	 economic	
welfare	 of	 society	 over	 short-term	 consumer	 interests.9	 	 In	 practice,	 only	 the	 second	
approach	 is	 economically	 feasible.	 	 This	 is	 because	 while	 the	 first	 approach	may	 benefit	
consumers	in	the	short	term,	for	developing	countries,	the	interests	of	both	consumers	and	
producers	 are	 closely	 tied	 with	 one	 another.	 	 As	 stated	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 a	 given	
individual	may	 play	 the	 role	 of	 consumer	 and	 producer	 in	 the	market.	 	 Therefore,	 while	
protecting	consumer	interests	at	the	expense	of	the	overall	economic	welfare	of	the	market	
may	incur	some	benefits	initially,	in	the	long	run,	the	market’s	overall	welfare	may	suffer.	
	
In	the	first	approach,	where	only	the	short-term	interests	of	consumers	are	dealt	with,	the	
dichotomy	 between	 consumer	 interests	 and	 producers’	 desires	 to	 preserve	 productive	
                                                
5	 Buttigieg,	 Eugène.	 Competition	 Law:	 Safeguarding	 the	 Consumer	 Interest:	 A	 Comparative	 Analysis	 of	 US	
Antitrust	Law	and	EC	Competition	Law.	(2009)	Kluwer	Law	International.	
6	 Brodley,	 Joseph	 F.	 ‘The	 Economic	 Goals	 of	 Antitrust:	 Efficiency,	 Consumer	 Welfare,	 and	 Technological	
Progress’	(1987)	New	York	University	Law	Review.	Vol.	62	at	1033.	
7	Brodley	at	1023.	
8	 Cseres,	 Katalin	 Judit.	 ‘The	 Controversies	 of	 the	 Consumer	Welfare	 Standard’	 (2007)	 The	 Competition	 Law	
Review,	Vol.	3,	No.	2	at	124.	
9	 Cseres,	 Katalin	 Judit.	 ‘The	 Controversies	 of	 the	 Consumer	Welfare	 Standard’	 (2007)	 The	 Competition	 Law	
Review,	Vol.	3,	No.	2	at	125.	
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efficiency	 and	 develop	 new	 innovations,	which	may	 in	 fact	 provide	 long-term	 benefits	 to	
consumers,	 is	 overlooked.10	 	 These	 shortcomings	 are	 corrected	 in	 the	 second	 approach	
where	the	welfare	of	society	as	a	whole	supersedes	the	more	immediate	goals	of	the	first	
approach	 so	 long	 as	 consumers	 are	 given	 a	 fair	 proportion	 of	 the	 overall	 economic	
welfare.11	
	
While	 it	 is	accepted	 that	occasionally	 short-term	consumer	 interests	must	be	 sacrificed	 in	
order	to	maximise	the	overall	welfare	of	society,	competition	policy	based	on	this	strategy	
often	only	permit	 such	practices	 if	 they	 fulfil	 three	 conditions.12	 	 First,	 total	welfare	must	
increase	as	a	direct	result	of	considerable	innovations	in	production	and	efficiency.		Second,	
the	 practice	 must	 cause	 as	 little	 harm	 to	 consumers	 as	 possible	 and	 be	 ‘necessary,	
reasonable	and	proportionate’.13	 	 Finally,	 the	practice	must	not	do	any	 lasting	damage	 to	
the	 competitive	market	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 a	 fair	 share	 of	 the	 efficiency	 gains	 is	 handed	
down	to	the	consumers.14	
	
Consumer	welfare	 has	 long	 been	 the	 only	 priority	 of	 the	 American	 antitrust	 law	 system.		
Robert	Bork,	best	known	for	his	book	The	Antitrust	Paradox,	was	a	strong	influence	in	the	
way	courts	interpreted	the	Sherman	Act	from	1978,	the	year	in	which	it	was	published,	to	
present	 day.	 	 His	 book	 has	 been	 cited	 in	well	 over	 a	 hundred	 cases	 concerning	 antitrust	
violations.		Bork	argued	that	the	maximisation	of	consumer	welfare,	in	line	with	the	Chicago	
School,	should	be	antitrust	law’s	sole	objective	and	therefore	the	term	should	be	considered	
synonymous	with	the	economic	wealth	of	a	nation.15		As	a	result,	consumer	welfare	is	at	its	
most	effective	when	society’s	resources	are	allocated	with	the	greatest	efficiency,	thereby	
allowing	 consumers	 to	 satisfy	 their	 wants,	 as	 fully	 as	 current	 technologies	 will	 allow.16		
However,	Bork	also	supported	firms	charging	higher	prices	to	consumers,	so	 long	as	these	
                                                
10	Brodley	at	1036.	
11	 Cseres,	 Katalin	 Judit.	 ‘The	Controversies	 of	 the	Consumer	Welfare	 Standard’	 (2007)	 The	Competition	 Law	
Review,	Vol.	3,	No.	2	at	126.	
12	 Cseres,	 Katalin	 Judit.	 ‘The	Controversies	 of	 the	 Consumer	Welfare	 Standard’	 (2007)	 The	Competition	 Law	
Review,	Vol.	3,	No.	2	at	126.	
13	Ibid.	
14	Brodley	at	1037-1039.	
15	 Bork,	 Robert.	 The	 Antitrust	 Paradox,	 A	 Policy	 at	War	 with	 Itself	 (1978)	 New	 York,	 Basic	 Books;	 see	 also	
Buttigieg,	 Eugène.	 Competition	 Law:	 Safeguarding	 the	 Consumer	 Interest:	 A	 Comparative	 Analysis	 of	 US	
Antitrust	Law	and	EC	Competition	Law.	(2009)	Kluwer	Law	International	at	6.	
16	Bork,	Robert.	The	Antitrust	Paradox,	A	Policy	at	War	with	Itself	(1978)	New	York,	Basic	Books	at	66.	
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firms	operated	at	maximum	efficiency.17		By	following	this	line	of	reasoning,	one	could	argue	
that	 Bork	 sanctioned	 the	 behaviour	 of	monopolists	 and	 cartel	members	 as	 these	 parties	
would	 be	 the	 only	 ones	 to	 benefit	 from	 extorting	 wealth	 from	 consumers.	 	 Consumer	
welfare	according	to	the	Chicago	School	has	since	been	heavily	criticised.	 	According	to	its	
principles,	 while	 they	 put	 forth	 that	 consumer	 welfare	 should	 be	 the	 only	 objective	 of	
antitrust	 law,	 they	 also	 contend	 that	 economic	 efficiency	 should	 be	 the	 only	 aim	 when	
interpreting	 and	 applying	 antitrust	 laws.18	 	 Thus,	 the	 Chicago	 School	 contends	 that	
resources	 should	be	distributed	where	 they	are	 the	most	needed	and	where	 they	 can	be	
most	efficiently	used,	regardless	of	the	interest	group	whether	consumer	or	producer.19		It	
has	 therefore	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 Chicago	 School	 is	 referring	 to	 total	 welfare	when	
discussing	the	merits	of	consumer	welfare.20	
	
Competition	 laws	 that	wish	 to	 follow	a	 consumer	welfare	 standard	 should	 therefore	 take	
care	to	distinguish	between	‘end	consumers’	and	other	consumers.	Traditional	competition	
laws	 are	often	not	 sufficient	 to	 cover	 all	 aspects	 of	 consumer	 interests.	 	While	 consumer	
interests	 such	 as	 lower	 prices,	 and	 more	 choices	 and	 availability	 of	 products	 can	 be	
protected	 with	 a	 working	 competition	 law	 system,	 end	 consumer	 interests	 such	 as	
protecting	 health	 and	 safety	 should	 be	 dealt	with	 through	 legislation	 specifically	 directed	
towards	consumer	protection.21	 	Competition	 law	systems	that	 fail	 to	distinguish	between	
end	 consumers	 and	 other	 consumers	 risk	 falling	 into	 the	 ‘Chicago	 trap.’22	 	 By	 blindly	
following	 a	 consumer	 welfare	 approach,	 without	 making	 such	 distinctions,	 policymakers	
may	inadvertently	support	the	interests	of	businesses	over	those	of	end	consumers.		Thus,	
the	question	that	should	be	asked	when	considering	any	competition	law	provision	is	what	
impact	 will	 this	 provision	 have	 on	 final	 users	 in	 terms	 of	 price,	 choice,	 and	 availability?		
Because	 consumer	 welfare	 and	 consumer	 protection	 have	 overlapping	 concerns	 in	 this	
regard,	it	would	also	be	helpful	to	include	consumer	interest	groups	in	this	narrative.	
	
                                                
17	Ibid.	
18	Cseres,	Katalin	Judit.	Competition	Law	and	Consumer	Protection.	(2005)	Kluwer	Law	International	at	332.	
19	Hovenkamp,	Herbert	J.	Economics	and	Federal	Antitrust	Law,	(1985)	St.	Paul,	MN:	West	Publishing	Co.	
(Hornbook	Series	Lawyer’s	Edition),	at	231-232.		
20	Cseres	at	332.	
21	Ibid	
22	Ibid.	
 144 
 
In	contrast	to	the	singular	consumer	welfare	approach	adopted	by	the	U.S.	antitrust	system,	
European	 competition	 policy	 has	 incorporated	 both	 public	 policy	 considerations,	 such	 as	
social	welfare	 goals,	 and	 the	pursuit	 of	 consumer	welfare	 in	 its	 enforcement	 strategies.23		
The	importance	of	public	policy	considerations	will	be	discussed	further	on	in	this	chapter.		
As	a	result,	‘consumer	welfare’	is	less	easily	defined	in	EU	competition	law.		While	consumer	
welfare	 as	defined	by	 the	United	 States	 can	be	 read	almost	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	 total	
welfare	 standard	 (discussed	 below),	 consumer	 welfare	 in	 EU	 competition	 policy	 can	 be	
interpreted	 as	 referring	 only	 to	 the	 welfare	 of	 consumers.24	 	 Under	 this	 interpretation,	
benefits	 enjoyed	 only	 by	 producers,	 such	 as	 increased	 profits,	 are	 not	 accounted	 for	 in	
European	competition	law	decisions.		European	competition	law	experts	advocating	for	this	
approach	often	cite	Article	101(3)	TFEU,	which	allow	for	anti-competitive	agreements	that	
would,	in	other	circumstances,	trigger	the	application	of	Article	101(1),	as	long	as	they	give	
consumers	a	fair	share	of	any	benefits	resulting	from	the	conduct.25	
	
Economists	are	often	highly	critical	of	this	approach,	arguing	that	such	a	one-sided	focus	on	
consumer	 surplus,	 without	 the	 inclusion	 of	 producer	 surplus	 has	 ‘no	 basis	 in	 welfare	
economics	 and	 can	 be	 justified	 on	 equity	 grounds	 only.’26	 	 Other	 commentators	 have	
responded	with	arguments	that	in	practice,	the	application	of	either	the	total	or	consumer	
welfare	standard	would	make	little	to	no	difference	in	the	decisions	of	most	cases.27			
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 international	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 International	 Competition	
Network	have	advocated	 for	a	more	 consumer-centric	 approach	 to	 competition	 law,	with	
particular	 emphasis	 on	 the	 welfare	 of	 the	 ‘end-consumer.’28	 	 The	 ICN	 argues	 a	 stronger	
focus	on	end-consumers	would	be	more	appropriate	for	developing	countries:	
                                                
23	 Cseres,	 Katalin	 Judit.	 ‘The	Controversies	 of	 the	Consumer	Welfare	 Standard’	 (2007)	 The	Competition	 Law	
Review,	Vol.	3,	No.	2	at	123.	
24	Van	den	Bergh,	R	and	Camesasca,	P.	European	Competition	Law	and	Economics:	A	Comparative	Perspective.	
(2006)	London,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	at	41.	
25	Motta,	M,	Competition	Policy:	Theory	and	Practice.	(2004)	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press	at	19.	
26	Van	den	Bergh	and	Camesasca	at37.	
27	Kingston,	Suzanne.	Greening	EU	Competition	Law	and	Policy.	(2011)	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press	
at	173.	
28	International	Competition	Network,	Unilateral	Conduct	Working	Group,	‘Unilateral	Conduct	Workbook	
Chapter	1:	The	Objectives	and	Principles	of	Unilateral	Conduct	Laws,’	(April	2012)	paper	presented	at	the	11th	
Annual	ICN	Conference,	Rio	de	Janeiro,	available	at	
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc827.pdf.	
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	End-consumers	 tend	 to	 be	 less	well	 off	 than	 firms’	 owners.	 	 This	 argument	 is	 less	
relevant	in	modern	economies	with	effective,	broad	based,	capital	markets	in	which	
ownership	is	becoming	more	and	more	dispersed	via	pension	funds	and	other	forms	
of	collective	investments.29	
	
Nevertheless,	 others	 have	 argued	 that	 for	 developing	 countries,	 adopting	 a	 wholly	
consumer	welfare	 standard	as	 the	 sole	goal	of	 competition	 law	may	be	problematic	 for	a	
number	 of	 reasons.30	 	 Prioritising	 consumer	 interests	 over	 the	 interests	 of	 other	 market	
participants	 does	 not	 account	 for	 the	 economic	 status	 of	 the	 consumers.	 	 Consumers	 in	
developing	 countries	 typically	 make	 their	 living	 in	 the	 agricultural	 industry.31	 	 This	 is	 in	
contrast	 to	developed	countries,	where	most	 citizens	are	 steadily	employed	with	a	 stable	
income.	 	Consumers	 in	developed	countries	are	 therefore	able	 to	spend	 large	amounts	of	
their	 income	on	consuming	goods	and	services.32	Conversely,	 for	consumers	 in	developing	
countries,	 the	 consumption	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 purchased	 within	 the	 market	 forms	 a	
relatively	small	proportion	of	their	daily	life.		The	economic	activity	of	citizens	of	developing	
countries	 is	more	 likely	to	be	dominated	by	their	role	as	 farmers,	 for	 instance,	purchasing	
seeds	or	 fertilisers	as	well	as	selling	any	surplus	crops	they	do	not	consume	themselves.33		
Therefore,	 citizens	 in	 developing	 countries	 often	 play	 the	 roles	 of	 both	 consumer	 and	
producer,	 sometimes	 simultaneously.	 	 Thus,	when	 setting	 the	welfare	 benchmark	 in	 such	
markets,	 it	 often	 makes	 little	 sense	 in	 distinguishing	 the	 welfare	 interests	 between	
producers	or	suppliers	and	direct	consumers.	
	
Protecting	both	consumers	and	suppliers	may	seem	counterintuitive	 in	 the	 face	of	having	
consumer	 welfare	 as	 a	 goal	 of	 competition	 law	 as	 well	 as	 ensuring	 adequate	 safeguards	
                                                
29	Ibid.	Para.	16(i).	
30	Rodriguez,	Juan	D.	Gutierrez,	‘Competition	Law	Goals	in	Agricultural	Markets:	A	Latin	American	Perspective,’	
in	Zimmer,	Daniel	(ed),	The	Goals	of	Competition	Law,	(2012)	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	at	450.	
31	Ibid.	
32	Deaton,	A.,	Muellbauer	J.,	Economics	and	Consumer	Behaviour,	(1986)	Cambridge	University	Press.	
33	Drexl,	Josef,	‘Consumer	Welfare	and	consumer	harm:	adjusting	competition	law	and	policies	to	the	needs	of	
developing	 jurisdictions,’	 in	 The	 Economic	 Characteristics	 of	 Developing	 Jurisdictions,	 (2015)	 Edward	 Elgar,	
edited	by	Gal,	Michal	S.	et	al	at	289.	
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against	 anti-competitive	 behaviour.34	 	 However,	 in	 addition	 to	 accommodating	 the	
consumer	 interests,	 many	 jurisdictions	 with	 established	 competition	 or	 antitrust	 law	
regimes	 also	 include	 provisions	 preventing	 anti-competitive	 behaviour	 on	 the	 part	 of	
consumers,	such	as	predatory	buying	and	the	formation	of	buyers’	cartels.35	
	
The	 Weyerhaeuser	 decision	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 when	 considering	 how	 consumer	
welfare	can	be	applied	to	developing	countries,	especially	since	many	of	these	countries	are	
predominately	exporters	of	 raw	materials	and	agricultural	products	while	maintaining	 the	
need	to	import	the	majority	of	their	manufactured	consumer	products.		Limiting	the	welfare	
standard	to	consumer	welfare	would	potentially	create	the	problem	that	competition	laws	
would	 apply	 to	 only	 benefit	 consumers	 in	 richer	 countries	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 domestic	
suppliers	and	small	farmers.		This	would	exacerbate	the	risk	that	the	domestic	producers	in	
developing	countries	could	be	subject	to	exploitation	through	the	creation	of	buyers’	cartels	
and	abuse	of	dominance	by	large	traders	in	developed	countries.	
	
The	United	States	Supreme	Court	provided	some	clarifications	to	Section	2	of	the	Sherman	
Act	 prohibiting	 ‘predatory	 buying’	 in	 the	 Weyerhaeuser	 case.36	 	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 firms	
involved	operated	hardwood	lumber	sawmills	and	purchased	alder	logs,	the	native	species	
in	 the	 regions,	 as	 inputs,	which	were	 then	processed	 into	hardwood	 finished	 lumber.	 	 By	
2001,	Weyerhaeuser	 established	 itself	 as	 the	dominant	purchaser	of	 alder	 logs,	 obtaining	
approximately	65	percent	of	the	region’s	available	logs.		Due	to	the	fact	that	there	was	no	
separate	 market	 for	 processed	 alder	 lumber,	 with	 a	 three	 percent	 market	 share	 in	 the	
national	 hardwood	 lumber	 market,	 Weyerhaeuser	 had	 no	 market	 power	 in	 the	 output	
market.	 	 In	2001,	Ross-Simons	shut	down	 its	mill,	 citing	 the	 increasing	prices	of	 raw	alder	
logs	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 lower	 prices	 for	 hardwood	 finished	 lumber.	 	 Ross-Simons	
subsequently	sued	Weyerhaeuser	under	Section	2	of	the	Sherman	Act,	arguing	that	the	firm	
had	 participated	 in	 predatory	 buying,	 in	 order	 to	 exclude	 alder	 logs	 from	 the	market	 by	
increasing	the	prices.	
                                                
34	Drexl,	Josef,	‘Consumer	Welfare	and	Consumer	Harm:	Adjusting	Competition	Law	and	Policies	to	the	Needs	
of	Developing	Jurisdictions,’	in	Gal,	Michal	S.	(et	al,	eds.),	The	Economic	Characteristics	of	Developing	
Jurisdictions:	Their	Implications	for	Competition	Law,	(2015)	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	at	290.	
35	Ibid.	
36	 Weyerhaeuser	 Co.	 v	 Ross-Simmons	 Hardwoodlumber	 Co.,	 549	 U.S.	 312	 (2007),	 available	 at	
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-381.pdf.	
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The	 Supreme	 Court	 abstained	 from	 analysing	 or	 discussing	 issues	 regarding	 consumer	
interests.	 	 Instead,	 it	drew	comparisons	between	predatory	buying	and	predatory	pricing,	
noting	 that	 both	 were	 analytically	 similar	 and	 involved	 the	 ‘deliberate	 use	 of	 unilateral	
pricing	measure	 for	 anti-competitive	 purposes,’	 which	 necessitated	 ‘firms	 to	 incur	 short-
term	 losses	on	 the	chance	 that	 they	might	 reap	supra-competitive	profits	 in	 the	 future.’37		
The	Supreme	Court	also	focused	its	judgement	on	the	competitive	process,	arguing,	‘actions	
taken	in	a	predatory	bidding	scheme	are	often	‘the	very	essence	of	competition’	…	Just	as	
sellers	use	output	priced	to	compete	for	purchasers,	buyers	use	bid	prices	to	compete	for	
scarce	inputs.’38	
	
Total	Welfare	
	
The	 American	 standard	 of	 consumer	 welfare	 has	 often	 been	 compared	 with	 the	 total	
welfare	 standard.	 	 Like	consumer	welfare,	 ‘total	welfare’	 can	have	a	variety	of	definitions	
and	 the	 distinction	 between	 consumer	 welfare	 and	 total	 welfare	 remains	 controversial	
when	considering	the	welfare	standards	of	different	jurisdictions.		For	the	purposes	of	this	
thesis,	total	welfare	will	be	defined	as	maximising	welfare	effects	on	the	market	as	a	whole,	
rather	than	focusing	primarily	on	consumers	or	producers	separately.39	
	
Competition	policies	structured	around	maximising	total	welfare	achieve	this	by	distributing	
resources	 along	 the	 price	 system	 to	 those	 who	 value	 them	 most,	 without	 making	 a	
distinction	as	to	whether	they	are	consumers	or	producers.40		The	total	welfare	standard	can	
therefore	account	for	productive	efficiency,	where	production	is	deemed	to	be	at	 its	most	
efficient	 if	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	produce	 the	 same	quality	or	quantity	of	output	at	a	 lower	
cost.41		As	a	result,	enforcement	agencies	operating	under	the	total	welfare	standard	do	not	
require	firms	to	transfer	any	efficiency	benefits	down	to	the	consumers	as	social	welfare	has	
                                                
37	Ibid.	
38	Ibid,	p.	10	
39	See	Harker,	Michael,	‘Antitrust	Law	and	Administrability:	Consumer	versus	Total	Welfare,’	(2011)	World	
Competition,	Vol.	34,	No.	3.	
40	Brodley	at	1023.	
41	Van	den	Bergh	and	Camesacaat	65.	
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been	 increased	 by	 gaining	 those	 efficiencies	 elsewhere.42	 	 In	 practice,	 this	means	 that	 an	
increase	in	consumer	price	may	not	necessarily	result	in	a	decision	deeming	the	conduct	to	
be	anti-competitive,	so	long	as	the	practice	is	justified	by	achieving	productive	efficiency.			
	
Given	the	difficulties	in	applying	a	consumer	welfare	standard,	some	scholars	have	put	forth	
the	 idea	 that	 a	 total	 welfare	 standard	 is	 more	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 dynamic	
competition,	arguing	that	 it	provides	a	more	sophisticated	model	of	what	competition	law	
should	be.	 	A	total	welfare	approach	generally	considers	how	competition	can	benefit	 the	
overall	 market,	 not	 just	 solely	 for	 consumers.	 	 In	 2011,	 the	 ICN	 published	 a	 documents	
entitled,	‘Competition	Enforcement	and	Consumer	Welfare,’43	which	detailed	the	responses	
to	 a	 survey	 it	 conducted	 in	 2010.	 	 A	 number	 of	 respondents	 to	 the	 questionnaire	
acknowledged	 that	 while	 consumer	 welfare	 was	 an	 admirable	 goal,	 economic	 growth	 in	
general	through	the	adoption	of	a	total	welfare	standard	should	be	the	ultimate	objective.		
Indeed,	 countries	 such	 as	 Australia,	 Norway,	 and	 Swaziland	 (a	 developing	 country),	 have	
already	 declared	 total	 welfare	 to	 be	 the	 goal	 of	 their	 competition	 laws	 over	 consumer	
welfare.44	
	
Michal	 Gal	 lists	 several	 reasons	 why	 adopting	 a	 total	 welfare	 approach	 is	 the	 most	
appropriate	 standard	 for	 developing	 countries	 and	 smaller	 economies.45	 	 Developing	
countries’	markets	are	unlikely	to	be	able	to	support	more	than	a	few	firms	at	a	time.		Gal	
therefore	argues	 that	 in	smaller	economies,	due	 to	 the	high	concentration	of	most	of	 the	
markets,	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 consumer	welfare	 approach	would	 likely	 result	 in	 diminished	
productive,	and	likely	even	dynamic,	efficiencies.		She	also	notes	that	the	consumer	welfare	
standard	 would	 potentially	 conflict	 with	 any	 goals	 the	 developing	 country	 may	 have	 of	
enhancing	the	international	competitiveness	of	its	domestic	firms.		A	total	welfare	standard	
would	 therefore	 more	 adequately	 meet	 a	 developing	 country’s	 goals	 of	 maximising	 its	
overall	social	welfare	as	well	as	entering	the	global	market	as	a	competitive	force.	
                                                
42	Roberts,	GL	and	Salop,	SC,	‘Dynamic	Analysis	of	Efficiency	Benefits’	(1996)	World	Competition,	Vol	19,	No.	5.	
43	International	Competition	Network,	‘Competition	Enforcement	and	Consumer	Welfare:	setting	the	Agenda,’	
10th	Annual	ICN	Conference,	The	Hague,	17-20	May	2011,	available	at	
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc857.pdf.	
44	 Jenny,	 Frederic;	 and	 Katsoulacos,	 Yannis.	 Competition	 Law	 Enforcement	 in	 the	 BRICS	 and	 in	 Developing	
Countries:	Legal	and	Economic	Aspects,	(2016)	Springer	at	5.	
45	Gal,	Michal,	Competition	Policy	for	Small	Market	Economies,	(2003)	Harvard	University	Press	at	200-202.	
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While	a	highly	concentrated	market,	with	many	monopolised	industries,	may	be	undesirable	
for	 developed	 economies,	 for	 smaller	 and	 less	 developed	markets,	 they	may	 be	 the	 only	
way	 to	achieve	productive	efficiency.	 	As	 such,	 a	 standard,	 such	as	 the	 consumer	welfare	
standard,	that	considers	high	concentration	to	be	an	unwelcome	part	of	the	economy	and	
should	thus	be	discouraged,	would	not	be	feasible.		The	ICN	has	previously	suggested	that	a	
more	 highly	 concentrated	 market	 would	 allow	 developing	 countries	 to	 gain	 a	 stronger	
foothold	in	the	international	markets	by	making	it	easier	for	them	to	protect	their	‘national	
champions.’46		These	arguments	often	align	with	arguments	that	if	domestic	producers	are	
to	effectively	compete	in	the	global	market,	they	should	be	given	some	freedoms	in	relation	
to	 the	 enforcement	 of	 competition	 laws.	 	 Competition	 laws	 in	 these	 economies	 should	
therefore	contain	provisions	that	allow	for	practices	such	as	export	cartels	or	discriminatory	
enforcement,	 both	 of	 which	 clash	 with	 ideals	 associated	 with	 the	 consumer	 welfare	
standard.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 highly	 concentrated	 market	 can	 also	 lead	 to	 instances	
where	domestic	firms	may	increase	their	prices	to	far	beyond	costs,	which	would	result	in	a	
decrease	in	allocative	efficiency.		The	welfare	standard	any	competition	law	policy	or	type	of	
reform	relies	on	should	therefore	balance	structural	efficiency	with	that	of	the	competitive	
process,	so	firms	may	operate	at	the	highest	efficiency	while	at	the	same	time	passing	some	
of	the	benefits	of	greater	efficiency	onto	their	consumers.47	
	
As	 stated	 above,	 several	 countries,	 including	 Swaziland,	 have	 already	 adopted	 a	 total	
welfare	standard	for	their	competition	law	systems.		In	its	response	to	the	2010	ICN	survey,	
it	 justified	 its	 decision	 by	 stating,	 ‘besides	 consumers,	 there	 are	 other	 equally	 important	
stakeholders,	 such	 as	 competing	 businesses,	 and	 that	 this	 can	 lead	 to	 the	 importance	 of	
ensuring	 welfare	 of	 groups	 other	 than	 consumers.’48	 	 The	 Competition	 Authority	 of	
Swaziland	 therefore	 strives	 to	 promote	 competition	 for	 the	 general	 public’s	 benefit.		
Swaziland’s	 preference	 for	 total	 welfare	 over	 consumer	 welfare	 was	 emulated	 in	 Kenya,	
who	 stated,	 ‘competition	 law	 sometimes	 seeks	 to	 maximise	 producer	 and	 consumer	
                                                
46	ICN,	‘Report	on	the	Objectives	of	Unilateral	Conduct	Laws,	Assessment	of	Dominance/Substantial	Market	
Power,	and	State	Created	Monopolies,’	available	at	
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf;	last	accessed	1	June	2016,	at	
20	
47	Waked,	Dina	I	at	89.	
48	ICN,	‘Competition	Enforcement	and	Consumer	Welfare:	setting	the	Agenda,’	10th	Annual	ICN	Conference,	
The	Hague,	17-20	May,	2011	available	at	
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc857.pdf.	
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surplus,	not	just	consumer	surplus	alone.’49		In	this	vein,	Kenyan	competition	law,	enshrined	
in	 chapter	 504	 of	 its	 1989	 Restrictive	 Trade	 Practices,	Monopolies	 and	 Price	 Control	 Act,	
strives	to	promote	competition	within	the	country’s	economy	by	prohibiting	practices	that	
restrict	trade,	regulating	the	spread	of	monopolies	and	preventing	firms	from	achieving	an	
unjustified	dominant	position	in	the	market,	as	well	as	ensuring	prices	remain	competitive	
for	goods	and	services.	
	
It	should	be	noted	however	that	a	pure	total	welfare	concerns	itself	with	the	reasons	why	
consumers	 choose	 not	 to	 purchase	 a	 product	 that	 has	 experienced	 an	 increase	 in	 price	
(overcharges)	 rather	 than	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 overcharges	 themselves.50	 	 	 A	 system	
focused	 on	 a	 pure	 total	 welfare	 standard	 may	 not	 question	 the	 fact	 that	 prices	 have	
increased	and	may	in	fact	justify	it	as	the	producers’	right	to	increase	prices	due	to	external	
factors	 such	 as	 increases	 in	 production	 costs.	 	 The	 distinction	 between	 the	 reasons	 why	
consumers	 choose	 not	 to	 purchase	 a	 product	 versus	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 increases	 in	
price	 is	 especially	 important	 when	 comparing	 the	 overcharges	 between	 domestic	 and	
international	 cartels.	 	 In	 general,	 international	 cartels	 generate	 higher	 overcharges	 than	
their	domestic	counterparts.		Overcharges	also	tend	to	increase	the	longer	a	cartel	remains	
active.	 	 Therefore,	 a	 competition	 law	 system	 based	 on	 a	 total	 welfare	 standard	may	 not	
question	why	prices	 for	a	particular	product	have	suddenly	 increased	 if	 the	producers	are	
operating	at	maximum	efficiency.		As	such,	a	total	welfare	standard	may	not	necessarily	be	
sufficient	 to	 address	 all	 the	 problems	 developing	 countries	 may	 have	 with	 international	
cartels.	
	
Global	Welfare	
	
Advocates	in	favour	of	adopting	an	international	competition	law	policy	often	adopt	‘global	
welfare’,	when	considering	competition	 law	decisions.	 	National	competition	and	antitrust	
policies	are	often	argued	as	having	a	detrimental	effect	on	global	welfare.		The	UK’s	former	
Office	of	Fair	Trading	has	described	the	current	system	regarding	competition	enforcement	
                                                
49	 ICN,	 ‘Competition	 Enforcement	 and	 Consumer	 Welfare:	 Setting	 the	 Agenda,’	 (2011)	 International	
Competition	Network,	10th	Annual	Conference,	17-20	May.	
50	Neumann	et	al	at	317.	
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as	a	‘patchwork’,	with	each	national	policy	focused	on	a	different	priority.51	 	As	a	result,	 it	
identified	 key	 problems	 consumers	 in	 the	 globalised	 market,	 particularly	 those	 of	
developing	countries,	may	suffer,	resulting	in	a	failure	to	address	the	following:52		
	
1. Private	 anti-competitive	 behaviour,	 including	 cartels,	 abuse	 of	
unilateral	market	power	and	anticompetitive	mergers;	
2. Public	restrictions	on	competition,	such	as	state	restrictions	on	entry	
and	protectionism;	
3. Different	or	inconsistent	substantive	standards	and	policies	that	give	
rise	to	a	risk	of	‘chilling’	conduct	that	could	be	pro-competitive	and;	
4. Duplicative	and	inconsistent	procedures	across	national	competition	
regimes	 that	 create	 additional	 burdens	 for	 businesses,	 which	 are	
ultimately	passed	on	to	consumers.	
	
It	has	been	put	forward	that	the	domestic	effects	of	international	anticompetitive	behaviour	
and	 domestic	 welfare	 are	 inescapably	 tied	 to	 the	 foreign	 effects	 of	 such	 behaviour	 and	
global	welfare.53	 	Mirroring	 the	 consumer	welfare	 priority	 in	many	 domestic	 competition	
law	policies,	 some	commentators	have	put	 forward	 the	 idea	 that	 global	welfare	ought	 to	
incorporate	increasing	consumer	welfare	as	one	of	its	goals.		The	rationale	behind	this	view	
is	that	any	increase	in	consumer	welfare	on	the	global	market	will	benefit	consumers	across	
the	globe,	regardless	of	jurisdictional	boundaries.54			
	
An	emphasis	on	global	welfare	would	also	reduce	the	tendency	towards	self-interest	that	is	
commonly	 demonstrated	 in	 domestic	 competition	 laws.	 	 In	 a	 world	 market	 that	 is	
increasingly	more	open	to	international	trade	and	investment,	some	countries	may	be	more	
tempted	to	enact	protectionist	or	‘beggar-thy-neighbour’	competition	policies.		An	example	
of	 such	 policies	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 attitude	 towards	 export	 cartel	 exemptions.	 	 A	 shift	
                                                
51	Fingleton,	John.	Former	Chief	Executive,	Office	of	Fair	Trading,	‘Competition	Agencies	and	Global	Markets:	
The	Challenges	Ahead,’	(2009)	at	4.	
52	Fingleton,	John.	Former	Chief	Executive,	Office	of	Fair	Trading,	 ‘Competition	Agencies	and	Global	Markets:	
The	Challenges	Ahead,’	(2009)	at	4.	
53	 Klevorick,	 Alvin	 A.	 and	 Sykes,	 Alan	O,	 ‘United	 States	 Courts	 and	 the	Optimal	 Deterrence	 of	 International	
Cartels:	A	Welfarist	Perspective	on	Empagran’	 in	Fox,	Eleanor	M	and	Crane,	Daniel	A.	(eds),	Antitrust	Stories,	
(2007)	Foundation	Press	at	371.	
54	Gerber,	David.	Global	Competition:	Law,	Markets	and	Globalization.	(2010)	Oxford	University	Press	at	307.	
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towards	 a	 global	 welfare	 standard	 may	 curb	 such	 provisions	 in	 the	 future.	 	 National	
competition	laws	are	inevitably	concerned	solely	with	the	welfare	of	the	country’s	residents	
to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 welfare	 of	 all	 non-residents.	 	 In	 some	 respects,	 this	 single-
mindedness	 can	 be	 mitigated	 through	 comity	 with	 other	 nations.	 	 Some	 specialists	 in	
competition	law	have	also	called	for	national	competition	law	authorities	to	adopt	a	global	
welfare	 perspective	 alongside	 their	 own	 national	 welfare	 standard.55	 	 In	 doing	 so,	
governments	may	be	more	willing	to	move	away	from	the	tendency	to	act	in	their	own	self-
interests,	to	the	detriment	of	both	national	and	global	welfare.			
	
The	 struggle	 national	 competition	 authorities	 face	when	 trying	 to	 balance	 global	 welfare	
with	 their	 domestic	 welfare	 concerns	 was	 expounded	 on	 by	 Bacchetta,	 Horn,	 and	
Mavroidis.56		It	is	clear	that	cooperation	between	national	competition	authorities	results	in	
higher	 global	 welfare	 rather	 than	 if	 each	 national	 competition	 authority	 refused	 to	
cooperated	 or	 acted	 independently	 of	 one	 another	 without	 any	 sort	 of	 coordination.		
Bacchetta,	Horn,	and	Mavroidis	use	the	example	of	two	countries,	a	domestic	country	and	a	
foreign	country	where	the	national	competition	law	authority	in	the	domestic	country	must	
choose	between	two	different	outcomes	regarding	welfare	in	a	competition	law	case.		One	
outcome	 (A)	 will	 have	 the	 effect	 of	maximising	 the	 welfare	 of	 residents	 in	 the	 domestic	
country’s	market	and	the	other	(B)	will	have	the	effect	of	maximising	welfare	of	the	global	
market.	 	 This	 illustration,	 where	 national	 competition	 authorities	 must	 weigh	 these	 two	
choices	and	make	a	decision,	is	quite	common	in	cases	involving	international	cartels,	where	
one	 country	 serves	 as	 the	 manufacturer	 of	 a	 good	 while	 the	 consumers	 are	 located	 in	
another.	
	
One	of	the	most	successful	examples	of	an	international	organisation	that	has	adopted	and	
applied	 the	 global	 welfare	 standard	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 balancing	 the	 interests	 of	
individual	member	states	is	the	WTO.		The	WTO	focuses	on	both	national	and	global	welfare	
in	 order	 to	 benefit	 all	 its	members.	 	One	of	 its	 key	 principles,	 the	Most	 Favoured	Nation	
                                                
55	 See	 Fox,	 Eleanor;	 and	Ordover,	 Janus,	 ‘The	 Harmonization	 of	 Competition	 and	 Trade	 Law,’	 (1995)	World	
Competition,	Vol.	15	at	5-34.	
56	Mavroidis,	P.;	Bacchetta,	M.;	Horn,	H.	‘Do	Negative	Spill-Overs	From	Nationally	Pursued	Competition	Policies	
Provide	a	Case	for	Multilateral	Competition	Rules?’	(1998)	in	Ehlermann,	Claus-Dieter;	and	Laudati,	Laraine	
(eds.),	European	Competition	Law	Annual	1997:	Objectives	of	Competition	Policy,	(1998)	Hart	Publishing	at	271.	
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(MFN)	treatment,	which	is	contained	in	the	first	article	of	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	
and	Trade	(GATT),	has	been	praised	as	one	of	the	‘most	efficient	engines	for	creating	global	
welfare.’57	 	 According	 to	 the	MFN	principle,	member	 states	 are	 generally	 forbidden	 from	
discriminating	 between	 their	 trading	 partners.	 	 Therefore,	 any	 benefits	 granted	 to	 one	
country,	such	as	lowering	customs	duty	rates	for	a	particular	product,	must	be	granted	to	all	
other	WTO	members.		It	does	allow	for	some	limited	exceptions,	such	as	the	establishment	
of	free	trade	agreements,	or	giving	preferential	treatment	with	regards	to	special	access	to	
a	 market	 to	 developing	 countries.	 	 By	 requiring	 member	 states	 to	 treat	 every	 country	
equally,	the	MFN	can	reduce	corruption	and	protect	more	vulnerable	economies	from	being	
unfairly	discriminated	against.	
	
The	WTO	has	identified	two	effects	that	can	result,	depending	on	the	decisions	of	a	national	
competition	 law	authority:	negative	 spillover	effects,	 and	distortions.58	 	Negative	 spillover	
effects	occur	when	a	national	competition	authority’s	decision	culminates	in	the	lowering	of	
welfare	 of	 the	 foreign	 country’s	 residents.	 	 These	 are	 common	 in	 situations	 in	 the	 global	
market,	 such	 as	 those	 involving	 international	 cartels,	where	 those	 that	 benefit	 from	 such	
conduct	reside	in	one	country	while	those	that	suffer	losses	reside	in	another.		On	the	other	
hand,	 distortions	 transpire	 when	 the	 national	 authority	 makes	 a	 decision	 that	 while	
maximises	domestic	welfare,	does	so	at	the	expense	of	global	welfare.59		In	this	context,	for	
example,	 it	 may	 be	 the	 decision	 to	 allow	 an	 export	 cartel	 to	 continue	 targeting	 another	
country	or	countries.	 	 It	 is	 important	to	note	that	a	national	authority’s	decision	may	have	
negative	spillover	effects	but	not	create	a	distortion.		In	order	to	eliminate	distortions	in	the	
market,	national	authorities	should	therefore	act	in	the	best	interests	of	the	global	market	
rather	 than	 in	 their	 own	 best	 interests.	 	 While	 this	 may	 have	 the	 short-term	 effect	 of	
decreasing	 domestic	 welfare,	 countries	 would	 eventually	 start	 to	 benefit	 from	 decisions	
taken	by	other	countries	 in	the	long	term.	 	 In	summary,	the	positive	spillover	effects	from	
                                                
57	Matsushita,	Mitsuo;	Schoenbaum,	Thomas;	Mavroidis,	Petros;	Hahn,	Michael,	The	World	Trade	
Organization:	Law,	Practice,	and	Policy,	(2015)	Oxford	University	Press	at	158.	
58	Mavroidis,	P.;	Bacchetta,	M.;	Horn,	H.	‘Do	Negative	Spill-Overs	From	Nationally	Pursued	Competition	Policies	
Provide	a	Case	for	Multilateral	Competition	Rules?’	(1998)	in	Ehlermann,	Claus-Dieter;	and	Laudati,	Laraine	
(eds.),	European	Competition	Law	Annual	1997:	Objectives	of	Competition	Policy,	(1998)	Hart	Publishing	at	271.	
59	Lloyd,	Peter	John;	Vautier,	Kerrin	M.,	Promoting	Competition	in	Global	Markets:	A	Multi-national	Approach.	
(1999)	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	at	22.	
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more	countries	adopting	a	global	welfare	standard	over	a	domestic	welfare	standard	would	
soon	outweigh	any	negative	spillover	effects.	
	
There	 are	 some	 cases,	 such	 as	 those	 involving	 hard-core	 international	 cartels,	where	 the	
interests	 of	 a	 domestic	 competition	 law	 authority	 and	 those	 of	 a	 foreign	 authority	 will	
coincide.	 	 In	 such	 cases,	 any	 decision	 taken	 by	 a	 national	 competition	 law	 authority	 will	
benefit	residents	in	both	countries.		Other	cases,	such	as	those	involving	export	cartels,	the	
interests	of	the	domestic	country	and	the	foreign	country	can	conflict	with	one	another.			
	
There	are	several	problems	that	may	arise	when	adopting	a	global	welfare	standard.	 	The	
first	 and	most	 difficult	 one	 is	 persuading	 countries	 to	 give	more	weight	 to	 global	welfare	
over	domestic	welfare.		Governments	are	usually	very	reluctant	to	adopt	any	sort	of	policy	
that	would	result	 in	decreases	 in	their	own	residents’	welfare,	even	 if	 those	effects	would	
only	be	felt	for	a	short	time.		This	can	be	seen	for	instance	in	the	United	States’	continuous,	
vehement	defence	of	its	export	cartel	exemptions.			
	
Another	 problem	 is	 determining	 how	much	 weight	 a	 national	 competition	 law	 authority	
should	 give	 to	 the	 objective	 of	maximising	 global	welfare	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 its	 country’s	
domestic	welfare.	 	When	faced	with	a	case	that	bisects	 international	borders,	competition	
authorities	must	conduct	studies	regarding	global	and	domestic	market	conditions	as	well	as	
the	potential	consequences	of	their	decisions	on	those	markets	become	increasingly	more	
complex.	 	This	is	especially	difficult	for	developing	countries,	which	may	not	have	as	many	
options	due	to	a	lack	of	resources.		In	term	of	enforcement,	identifying	which	option	would	
be	 the	most	 effective	 in	 terms	 of	 promoting	 competition	 on	 a	 global	 scale	 is	 particularly	
difficult.	 	 These	 options	 often	 encompass	 bilateral,	 regional,	 plurilateral,	 or	 multilateral	
enforcement	 mechanisms.	 	 The	 competition	 law	 authority	 must	 therefore	 assess	 and	
choose	 whether	 or	 not	 coordinate	 its	 actions	 with	 other	 national	 competition	 law	
authorities	or	if	it	will	choose	to	defer	to	a	supranational	authority.60		Factors	that	should	be	
considered	during	 this	decision	making	process	 involves	 calculating	 the	 costs	of	unilateral	
conduct,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 benefits	 of	 coordinating	 with	 other	 national	 competition	 law	
                                                
60	Lloyd,	Peter	John;	Vautier,	Kerrin	M.,	Promoting	Competition	in	Global	Markets:	A	Multi-national	Approach.	
(1999)	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	at	24.	
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authorities.	 	Benefits	such	as	more	opportunities	and	resources	to	gather	evidence	as	well	
as	 investigate	 alleged	 violations	must	 be	 weighed	 against	 concerns	 such	 as	 relinquishing	
control	over	a	particular	case,	if	a	country	chooses	to	defer	to	a	supranational	authority,	as	
well	as	any	credibility	concerns	that	may	be	associated	when	coordinating	with	a	particular	
country’s	competition	law	authority.	
	
Public	Policy	Considerations	
	
Some	scholars	have	argued	 for	 the	 inclusion	of	public	policy	goals	 in	 the	 interpretation	of	
competition	law,	particularly	in	EU	competition	law.61		These	arguments	stem	from	the	view	
that,	unlike	 the	 independent	antitrust	 laws	 in	 the	United	States,	 EU	competition	 laws	are	
part	of	a	larger	set	of	inter-connected	provisions.		Under	this	model,	there	are	seven	policy-
linking	clauses	contained	 in	the	Treaty	 for	the	European	Union:	environmental	protection,	
employment,	 culture,	 public	 health,	 consumer	 protection,	 economic	 and	 social	 cohesion	
and	development	policy.62		As	competition	policy	is	a	European	policy	in	the	TFEU,	it	may	be	
argued	 that	 each	 of	 these	 policies	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	 competition	 policy	
decisions	 are	 made,	 even	 where	 those	 policy	 objectives	 conflict	 with	 competition	 law	
objectives.63	 	Article	7	of	the	Treaty	expands	on	policy-linking	causes	by	adding	a	new,	all-
inclusive,	 clause:	 ‘The	 Union	 shall	 ensure	 consistency	 between	 its	 policies	 and	 activities,	
taking	all	of	its	objectives	into	account.’		It	also	includes	additional	clauses	for	employment,	
social	 protection,	 social	 exclusion,	 education,	 training,	 the	 protection	 of	 human	 health,	
environmental	protection,	consumer	protection	and	the	welfare	of	animals.64	
	
In	the	event	of	conflict	between	competition	and	the	other	public	policy	goals,	resolution	is	
achieved	in	the	form	of	balancing	them	in	accordance	with	Article	26(1)	of	the	Treaty,	which	
states	that:	
	
                                                
61	Townley,	Christopher,	‘Is	Anything	more	Important	than	Consumer	Welfare	(in	Article	81	EC)?:	Reflections	of	
a	Community	Lawyer’	(2008)	The	Cambridge	Yearbook	of	European	Legal	Studies,	Vol.	10	at	352.	
62	Articles	11,	9,	167,	168,	169,	174	and	212	TFEU	respectively.	
63	Townley	at	352.	
64	TFEU	Treaty	Arts	9-13.	
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The	 Union	 shall	 adopt	 measures	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 establishing	 or	 ensuring	 the	
functioning	of	the	internal	market	[which	includes	competition],	in	accordance	with	
the	relevant	provisions	of	the	Treaties.65	
	
By	 enacting	 such	 a	 provision,	 the	 Treaty	 emphasises	 that	 all	 the	 provisions	 outlined	 in	 it,	
including	 those	 on	 competition	 law,	 are	 to	 be	 read	 in	 conjunction	 with	 one	 another.66		
Therefore,	public	policy	considerations	covered	in	the	Treaty	can	conceivably	be	taken	into	
account	when	deciding	on	competition	law	issues.			
	
The	 inclusion	of	public	policy	 considerations	 into	 competition	 law	 remains	a	 controversial	
topic,	particularly	with	those	who	feel	 the	emphasis	should	be	placed	on	efficiency	rather	
than	social	concerns.	 	While	this	approach	may	work	for	more	advanced	jurisdictions	such	
as	the	EU	and	the	United	States,	 it	can	be	argued	that	competition	law	can	and	should	be	
used	 as	 more	 than	 simply	 an	 economic	 tool	 to	 regulate	 markets.	 	 The	 reasons	 why	 a	
developing	country	should	include	competition	law	as	one	of	its	priorities	in	legislation	have	
been	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	
	
Public	 policy	 considerations	 are	 also	 particularly	 pertinent	 for	 developing	 countries	when	
defining	the	welfare	standard.		For	instance,	developing	countries	such	as	Kenya	and	Algeria	
have	 embraced	 a	 broader	 set	 of	 considerations,	 albeit	 mainly	 in	 their	 merger	 regulation	
laws.	 	 These	 considerations	 include,	 among	 others,	 ‘financial	 stability,	 the	 protection	 of	
national	 champions,	 industrial	 policies,	 the	promotion	of	 employment,	 and	 increasing	 the	
ownership	 status	 of	 historically	 disadvantaged	 persons.’67	 	 While	 some	 of	 these	
considerations	may	not	be	directly	related	to	international	cartel	regulation,	for	developing	
countries,	 in	 order	 to	 optimise	 competition	 in	 the	 market,	 governments	 must	 take	 into	
account	a	wider	range	of	factors	based	on	their	other	socio-economic	needs.	
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South	Africa	has	also	employed	a	broader	range	of	goals	beyond	merely	economic	goals	into	
its	 competition	 policy.	 	 The	 non-economic	 goals	 that	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	 the	
system	 are	 mainly	 geared	 towards	 rectifying	 the	 social	 iniquities	 the	 country	 has	
experienced	throughout	its	history,	particularly	during	the	period	of	apartheid.		To	that	end,	
along	with	promoting	efficiency	and	consumer	welfare,	South	African	competition	law	also	
seeks	 to	 encourage	 employment,	 advance	 social	 and	 economic	 welfare,	 grant	 small	 and	
medium	 sized	 firms	more	 opportunities	 to	 access	 their	 relevant	 markets,	 and	 give	more	
economic	 opportunities	 to	 individuals	 that	 have	 been	 historically	 disadvantaged.68	 	 In	
practice,	 this	 may	 entail	 the	 Competition	 Tribunal	 granting	 an	 exemption	 for	
anticompetitive	 behaviour	 if	 it	 contributes	 to	 the	 ‘promotion	 of	 the	 ability	 of	 small	
businesses	or	 firms	controlled	or	owned	by	historically	disadvantaged	persons,	 to	become	
competitive.’69			
	
An	 excellent	 example	 of	 the	ways	 in	 which	 a	 competition	 law	 agency	 can	 employ	 public	
policy	considerations	in	its	decisions	is	South	African	Competition	Tribunal’s	approval	of	the	
acquisition	of	domestic	retailer	Massmart	by	Wal-Mart.		In	response	to	the	concerns	raised	
with	 regards	 to	 the	 acquisition	 of	 a	 local	 business	 by	 a	 retailer	 giant,	 the	 Competition	
Tribunal	 imposed	 several	 conditions	on	 the	merged	entity,	mainly	 that	 it	was	 required	 to	
carry	out	a	study	specifically	designed	to	determine	how	domestic	suppliers,	including	small	
and	medium	 sized	 firms,	 could	benefit	 from	 the	merger.	 	 It	was	 also	 asked	 to	 rehire	 503	
distribution	workers	 that	Massmart	 had	 laid	off	 in	 the	months	preceding	 the	merger	 and	
prohibited	from	cutting	jobs	for	another	two	years.70	
	
Public	policy	considerations	can	be	considered	in	cases	such	as	the	Canadian	potash	cartel,	
where	 increases	 in	 price	 could	 have	 resulted	 in	 food	 shortages,	 as	 farmers	 in	 developing	
countries	 such	 as	 India	were	 unable	 to	 pay	 such	 exorbitant	 prices	 for	 fertiliser.	 	 In	 other	
instances,	proponents	of	export	cartels	often	state	that	export	cartel	exemptions	are	usually	
enacted	 for	 public	 policy	 reasons.	 	 These	 arguments	 are	 supported	 by	 the	 notion	 that	
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increased	trade	between	trading	partners	and	increases	in	production	efficiency	of	domestic	
producers	 can	 offset	 any	 detriments	 or	 efficiency	 losses	 suffered	 by	 domestic	markets.71		
However,	these	arguments	often	disregard	or	ignore	the	negative	spill	over	effects	inflicted	
on	 foreign	 markets	 or	 the	 wider	 implications	 export	 cartels	 can	 have	 on	 international	
competition.72	
	
Despite	 the	 reasoning	 put	 forth	 from	 developing	 countries	 that	 have	 supported	 the	
inclusion	 of	 public	 policy	 considerations	 in	 competition	 law,	 there	 remains	 an	 equally	
vehement	 camp	who	 argue	 that	 such	 considerations	 have	 no	 place	 in	 competition	 law.73		
For	instance,	Professor	Donald	Turner	argued,	‘it	is	questionable	whether	populist	goals	are	
appropriate	 factors	 to	 consider	 when	 formulating	 antitrust	 rules.’74	 	 By	 granting	 special	
privileges	 such	 as	 protecting	 small	 and	 medium	 sized	 firms	 and	 giving	 dispensations	 in	
merger	 applications	 that	 promote	 certain	 goals,	 these	 actions	 ultimately	 undermine	 the	
main	 function	 of	 competition	 law.	 	 Supporters	 of	 this	 view	 often	 argue	 that	 competition	
law’s	 predominant	 objective	 is	 to	 protect	 and	 facilitate	 the	 competitive	 process,	 and	
therefore	competition	agencies	should	not	prioritise	the	interests	of	individual	competitors	
over	 this	 goal.75	 	 Others	 argue	 that	 small	 businesses	 should	 not	 have	 to	 be	 given	 special	
treatment	given	that	in	theory,	an	effective	competition	law	system’s	enforcement	agency	
should	 be	 able	 to	 protect	 them	 from	 any	 unfair	 or	 anticompetitive	 schemes	 not	 directly	
related	 to	 superior	 skills	 or	 efficiencies,	 used	 by	 larger	 companies	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 an	
advantage	in	the	market.76	
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Review,	Vol.	75	at	798.	
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Other	 scholars	 have	 responded	 to	 the	 argument	 that	 competition	 law	 can	 and	 should	 be	
used	in	furtherance	of	other	socio-economic	goals	with	the	opinion	that	competition	law	is	
not	the	most	appropriate	area	in	which	to	do	so:	
	
	There	 is	widespread	(albeit	not	universal)	acceptance	that	competition	
laws	should	 focus	on	 the	maximization	of	economic	welfare,	 that	 they	
are	 not	 well	 suited	 for	 achieving	 employment	 or	 other	 economic	 or	
social	policy	objectives,	and	that	attempts	to	 infuse	amorphous	 ‘public	
interest’	 considerations	 into	 competition	 law	 standards	 create	 serious	
uncertainty,	 which	 may	 chill	 investment	 and	 pro-competitive	
initiatives.77	
	
In	addition	to	these	arguments,	critics	of	the	public	policy	debate	also	stress	that	that	these	
wider	goals	can	be	better	achieved	by	pursuing	other	avenues	such	as	sector	 regulation.78		
Sector	regulation	has	the	capacity	to	 include	a	wider	range	of	goals	and	 is	thus	 in	a	better	
position	to	reconcile	the	potential	conflicts	between	law	and	policy.		In	this	regard,	a	more	
suitable	approach	may	be	to	address	each	concern	in	separate	pieces	of	legislation	instead	
of	one	where	none	of	them	are	adequately	dealt	with.	
	
Developing	 countries	 may	 still	 argue	 that	 incorporating	 public	 policy	 considerations	 as	 a	
standard	of	welfare	 in	 their	 competition	 law	 systems	 is	more	efficient	 than	 spreading	out	
their	economic	and	socio-economic	concerns	over	multiple	platforms,	at	 least	 in	 the	short	
term.	 	 Many	 countries	 that	 defend	 such	 inclusion	 have	 also	 rejected	 traditional	Western	
competition	 or	 antitrust	 law	 goals;	 especially	 those	 that	 promote	 aggregate	 welfare	 or	
efficiency	goals.79	 	They	argue	 that	 such	goals	do	not	meet	 their	 specific	needs	and	 fail	 to	
address	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 distribution	 of	 power	 and	 opportunity.	 	 By	 designing	 and	
implementing	 their	 own	 competition	 laws	 based	 on	 their	 own	 standards	 of	 welfare,	
developing	 countries	 can	 have	 a	 competition	 law	 system	 that	 is	 tailor	made	 to	 suit	 their	
individual	economic	and	socio-economic	conditions.	
                                                
77	Campbell	&	Rowley	(2008)	at	44.	
78	Blair	&	Sokol	(2013)	at	2505.	
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Which	Welfare	Standard	to	Adopt	Then?	
	
The	 next	 chapter	 will	 discuss	 proposals	 for	 reforming	 the	 current	 situation	 regarding	
developing	countries	and	international	cartels	along	with	their	pros	and	cons,	however	it	is	
necessary	 to	 note	 that	 there	 is	 no	 one	 all	 encompassing	 welfare	 standard	 that	 will	 be	
applicable.	 	 Depending	 on	 the	 type	 (or	 types	 as	multiple	 forms	 of	 reform	 can	 take	 place	
simultaneously)	of	reform	that	is	to	be	implemented,	the	welfare	standard	will	need	to	shift	
accordingly.	
	
For	 instance,	 proposals	 that	 concern	 reform	 on	 a	 global	 scale,	 such	 as	 the	 possibility	 of	
establishing	 a	 harmonised	 competition	 law	 agreement	 designed	 to	 combat	 international	
cartels	 and	 other	 such	 anti-competitive	 behaviours	 globally,	 should	 be	 developed	 with	 a	
global	welfare	standard	in	place.	
	
Much	 of	 this	 thesis	 has	 also	 been	 focused	 on	 developing	 countries	 and	 the	 effects	
international	cartels	have	on	them.		Chapter	Six	will	have	a	similar	focus,	in	which	one	of	the	
options	 proposed	 is	 to	 develop	 strategies	 in	 order	 to	 aid	 them	 in	 implementing	 and	
enforcing	their	own	competition	law	systems.		For	such	methods	of	reform	that	are	applied	
on	a	domestic	level	a	domestic	welfare	standard	would	be	more	suitable.		This	is	because	it	
is	the	position	of	this	thesis	that	developing	countries	should	first	focus	on	improving	their	
own	domestic	situation	first	before	concentrating	on	wider	global	reforms.		Therefore,	they	
should	 first	 apply	 a	 domestic	 welfare	 standard,	 at	 least	 initially,	 in	 order	 to	 bolster	 or	
implement	their	own	competition	law	systems,	before	they	can	consider	the	application	of	a	
global	welfare	standard	to	other	methods	of	reform,	such	as	the	development	of	a	global,	
harmonised	competition	law	agreement.	
	
Should	 reform	 strategies	 include	 an	 element	 of	 helping	 developing	 countries	 create	 and	
enforce	 their	own	 competition	 law	 regimes,	public	policy	 considerations	 along	with	other	
welfare	 standards	 such	 as	 consumer	 or	 total	 welfare	 would	 be	 useful	 in	 establishing	 a	
baseline.		Some	developing	countries	have	already	begun	to	take	wider	considerations	into	
account	 when	 deciding	 on	 other	 competition	 law	 issues,	 such	 as	 merger	 control.	 	 For	
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instance,	 some	 countries,	 such	 as	 Swaziland,	 allow	 for	 mergers	 based	 on	 other	 public	
policies	such	as	advancing	employment	opportunities.			
	
It	may	be	argued	that	countries	should	adopt	a	global	welfare	perspective	regardless	of	the	
scope	of	reform	that	is	considered,	be	it	on	a	domestic	or	a	global	scale.		Because	of	the	very	
nature	 of	 international	 cartels,	 even	 reform	 on	 a	 domestic	 level	 could	 have	 international	
implications.	 	Furthermore,	while	domestic	reform	options	such	as	implementing	strategies	
to	help	developing	countries	establish	their	own	effective	competition	law	systems	would	go	
a	 long	way	 in	helping	 them	 fight	 these	 cartels	 on	 their	 own,	 they	would	 still	 benefit	 from	
some	intervention	from	more	developed	countries.		As	Eleanor	Fox	stated	in	her	testimony	
to	the	Antitrust	Modernization	Commission:80	
	
We	must	 contemplate	maximizing	world	welfare	…	 The	 national	 law	
governing	 jurisdiction	and	remedies	should	be	broadened	so	that,	 for	
example,	 national	 authorities	 in	 a	 jurisdiction	 with	 the	 greatest	
contacts	or	the	largest	consumer	market	can	provide	a	forum	in	which	
smaller	 affected	 nations	 can	 be	 heard,	 can	 take	 account	 of	 outside	
harms,	and	can	afford	relief	that	covers	those	harms.	
	
While	this	does	not	mean	developed	countries	with	the	most	sophisticated	competition	law	
systems,	 such	as	 the	United	States	and	 the	European	Union,	 should	be	obligated	 to	adopt	
the	role	of	‘global	competition	law	enforcers.’		To	do	so	would	not	only	be	a	massive	burden	
on	the	courts,	but	would	also	serve	as	a	deterrence	and	disincentivise	developing	countries	
from	working	 towards	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 enforcement	mechanisms.	 	 Having	 said	
that,	 perhaps	 national	 competition	 law	 authorities	 would	 do	 well	 to	 consider	 the	 impact	
their	 decisions	 have	 on	 the	 international	 community,	 as	 was	 suggested	 by	 the	 Munich	
Group.81		In	this	regard,	choosing	not	to	act	can	often	have	more	devastating	consequences	
than	if	the	national	authority	had	made	the	decision	to	enforce	their	domestic	competition	
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laws.	 	 For	 instance,	 given	 that	many	 competition	 law	 systems	operate	on	 the	basis	of	 the	
effects	 doctrine,	 or	 something	 similar,	 they	 often	 decide	 not	 to	 prosecute	 cartels	 such	 as	
export	cartels	if	they	do	not	have	a	substantially	negative	effect	on	their	domestic	markets,	
ignoring	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 cartels	 can	 often	 detrimentally	 affect	 the	 markets	 of	 other	
countries.	 	 By	 choosing	 not	 to	 enforce	 domestic	 cartel	 laws,	 a	 country	 can	 create	 a	 ‘safe	
haven’	 for	 international	 cartels,	 thereby	 creating	 a	 toxic	 environment	 for	 that	 country’s	
trading	 partners.82	 	 So	 long	 as	 that	 international	 cartel	 ensures	 their	 behaviour	 does	 not	
directly	 affect	 the	 market	 in	 which	 they	 are	 domiciled,	 they	 can	 effectively	 cartelise	 the	
market	of	a	foreign	nation	with	very	few	consequences.	
	
In	addition	to	global	welfare	and	other	considerations	such	as	public	policy,	 it	 is	 important	
that	developing	countries	do	not	outright	dismiss	the	value	of	adopting	a	consumer	welfare	
standard.		In	addition	to	the	questions	covered	above	regarding	the	2010	ICN	survey,	the	ICN	
also	 asked	 respondents	 whether	 they	 referred,	 either	 directly	 or	 indirectly,	 to	 consumer	
welfare	in	any	of	their	competition	law	mission	statements	or	legislation	of	authorities.		This	
was	 in	order	 to	determine	whether	or	not	authorities	 that	 claimed	consumer	welfare	was	
not	a	primary	goal	of	 their	 competition	 law	systems,	 regardless	 still	promoted	 it.	 	The	 ICN	
noted	 that	out	of	 the	57	authorities	 that	answered	 the	survey,	only	 seven	 responded	 that	
neither	their	mission	statements	nor	legislation	contain	any	direct	or	 indirect	references	to	
consumer	welfare.83		Of	these	seven	respondents,	the	ICN	pointed	out	that	four	of	these	in	
fact	 had	 identified	 consumer	 welfare	 as	 one	 of	 several	 goals	 of	 their	 competition	 law	
authority.	 Two	 of	 these	 stated	 consumer	 welfare	 was	 a	 primary	 goal	 of	 their	 authority,	
despite	 not	 including	 it	 in	 either	 their	 legislation	 or	 mission	 statement.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 ICN	
pointed	 out	 that	 out	 of	 all	 57	 respondents	 surveyed,	 only	 one	 country	 did	 not	make	 any	
references	 to	 consumer	 welfare	 in	 its	 mission	 statement,	 legislation,	 or	 goal	 of	 its	
competition	law	authority.		Therefore,	it	cannot	be	emphasised	enough	that	while	consumer	
welfare	can	be	difficult	to	define	and	subsequently	apply,	 it	would	be	almost	impossible	to	
consider	enacting	any	of	 the	options	 for	 reform	 that	will	 be	discussed	 in	 the	next	 chapter	
without	 it.	 	 Consequently,	 while	 some	 developing	 countries	 may	 choose	 other	 welfare	
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standards	such	as	total	welfare,	 in	order	to	best	suit	their	own	individual	needs,	consumer	
welfare	should	also	be	applied.		
	
The	Current	Regulatory	Framework	
	
There	 is	yet	no	global	 regulatory	 framework	solely	devoted	to	governing	competition	 law.		
Therefore,	 in	 most	 cases	 involving	 international	 cartels,	 unless	 a	 developing	 country	 has	
partnerships	in	bilateral	or	regional	trade	agreements,	they	are	arguably	left	on	their	own.		
The	previous	chapter	detailed	the	difficulties	developing	countries	face	when	attempting	to	
not	only	establish	but	also	effectively	implement	and	enforce	a	competition	law	regime.	
	
This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 there	 have	 been	 no	 attempts	 or	 efforts	 made	 by	 international	
organisations	to	curb	international	cartels.		Previous	chapters	discussed	efforts	made	by	the	
ICN,	OECD	and	UNCTAD;	however,	none	of	them	are	binding	on	a	global	scale.	
Calls	for	Reform	
	
One	of	the	most	important	elements	required	in	order	to	implement	any	method	of	reform	
is	consistent	and	confident	political	support	–	most	notably,	at	the	highest	level.		Reform	of	
the	current	system,	depending	on	the	form	it	may	take,	will	require	active	involvement	from	
both	 the	public	and	private	sectors.	 	Any	reform	activity	must	also	begin	with	a	clear	and	
discernible	objective,	whether	it	is	to	establish	a	global,	harmonised	agreement	with	a	focus	
on	 international	 cartels	 or	 develop	a	 strategy	 in	order	 to	 support	 developing	 countries	 in	
forming	their	own	competition	law	systems.			
	
In	1998,	the	Council	of	OECD	adopted	the	“Recommendation	of	the	Council	concerning	the	
Effective	Action	Against	Hard	Core	Cartels.”84		In	it,	it	asked	for	member	states	to	fulfil	two	
requirements	 in	 order	 to	 combat	 the	 scourge	 of	 international	 cartels:	 1)	 member	 states	
must	 enact	 anti-cartel	 legislation	 in	 order	 to	 punish	 and	deter	 cartelisation;	 2)	 they	must	
also	 outline	 common	 principles	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 guidance	 and	 establish	 cooperation	
between	other	antitrust	and	competition	authorities.		The	Recommendation	makes	it	clear	
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Publishing.	
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that	 such	 cooperation	 would	 be	 in	 the	 members’	 best	 interests.	 	 Following	 this	
Recommendation,	the	OECD	issued	a	report	in	2000	that	gave	an	account	of	what	steps	had	
been	 taken	 in	 the	 time	since	 the	 report	was	adopted.	 	 It	noted	 that	while	a	 few	member	
states	had	eliminated	or	restricted	some	of	their	exemptions	to	their	cartel	 laws,	very	few	
developments	had	been	made	on	encouraging	bilateral	cooperation	 in	 international	cartel	
investigations.	 	 Despite	 the	 lack	 of	 progress,	 these	 two	 publications	 contributed	 to	 the	
growing	consensus	that	international	cartels	could	not	be	solely	regulated	through	domestic	
legislation	and	that	greater	reforms	must	take	place.	
	
If	reform	is	to	take	the	form	of	establishing	a	new	competition	law	system,	special	attention	
must	 be	 paid	 to	 its	 structure.	 	 According	 to	 the	 OECD	 in	 its	 Council	 Recommendation	
Concerning	Structural	Separation	in	Regulated	Industries85,	any	reform	that	takes	place	must	
ensure	 that	 competitive	 and	 non-competitive	 activities	 are	 separated.	 	 This	 separation	 is	
essential	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 discrimination	 and	 abuse	 between	 the	 competitive	 and	 non-
competitive	 activities.	 	 For	 instance,	 regulated	 firms	 (i.e.	 those	 bound	 by	 regulations	
restraining	the	firm’s	exercise	of	its	market	power),	particularly	those	in	network	industries,	
often	 engage	 in	 complementary	 competitive	 and	 non-competitive	 activities.	 	 As	 a	 result,	
regulated	 firms	 may	 be	 tempted	 to	 restrict	 competition	 in	 the	 non-competitive	 activity.		
Establishing	 independent	 subsidiaries	 specifically	 designed	 to	 operate	 these	 activities	 as	
well	as	enacting	complementary	provisions	can	ensure	structural	separation.86	
	
Another	way	 to	ensure	any	 reform	measures	 that	are	adopted	are	successful	 is	 to	ensure	
that	 any	 rules	 established	 can	 adequately	meet	 the	 established	 goal	 or	 objective.	 	 Some	
scholars	argue	 that	 the	 first	 step	 to	 successful	 reform,	 for	developing	countries,	 is	 to	 first	
establish	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 systems.	 	 According	 to	 Bernard	 Phillips,	 developing	
countries	 benefit	 little	 from	 waiting	 until	 they	 are	 sufficiently	 economically	 developed	
before	creating	or	implementing	a	new	competition	law	system.87		By	delaying	this	process,	
Phillips	 argues,	 previously	 established	 state	monopolies	 and	 private	 firms	 with	 dominant	
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positions	in	the	market	have	more	time	to	continue	practising	anti-competitive	behaviours	
that	 would	 severely	 dampen	 the	 development	 process.88	 	 He	 therefore	 advocates	 for	
countries	 to	 implement	domestic	 competition	 laws	 as	 soon	as	possible	 in	order	 to	better	
facilitate	 the	 market	 opening	 process.	 	 However,	 developing	 countries	 must	 also	 ensure	
they	are	not	only	in	a	position	to	establish	an	entirely	new	competition	law	system	but	also	
that	they	have	the	necessary	resources	to	enforce	it	as	well.	
	
As	 cross-border	 transactions	 become	 increasingly	 more	 common	 due	 to	 strengthened	
efforts	 in	 trade	 liberalisation	 and	 the	 removal	 of	 trade	 barriers,	 more	 countries	 are	
acknowledging	 the	need	 to	 solidify	 their	own	competition	 law	enforcement	 systems.	 	 For	
developing	 and	 least-developed	 countries,	 this	 translates	 to	 a	 need	 to	 implement	 an	
entirely	new	system,	particularly	as	 their	economies	develop	more	market-based	reforms,	
such	as	deregulating	certain	market	areas,	privatising	select	public	sectors,	and	liberalising	
trade.		For	example,	Zambia	established	its	own	competition	law	authority	after	selling	241	
of	 its	 281	 state	 owned	 enterprises	 to	 the	 private	 sector.89	 	 Conversely,	 Ghana	 has	 faced	
numerous	 difficulties	 after	 privatising	 its	 telecoms	 sector	 –	 without	 an	 effective	
independent	 regulator	 or	 competition	 law	 in	 place,	 the	 sector	 has	 been	 subjected	 to	
practises	akin	to	commercial	bullying	and	political	interference.90	
	
For	 many	 countries,	 such	 as	 Zambia,	 the	 underlying	 motivation	 for	 developing	 and	
instituting	a	new	competition	 law	system	 is	 to	create	merger	controls	 in	order	 to	prevent	
dominant	firms	from	gaining	too	strong	a	foothold	 in	the	market.91	 	 	Privatisation	leads	to	
more	players	 in	the	market,	and	developing	countries	are	subsequently	realising	the	need	
for	competition	laws	and	policy	in	order	to	better	facilitate	healthy	competition	and	restrict	
unfair	 business	 practices.	 	 However,	 international	 cartels	 can	 also	 serve	 as	 the	 main	
motivation	for	implementing	a	competition	law	system.		While	Chapter	Three	discussed	the	
cases	 where	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 alike	 addressed	 the	 problem	 of	
international	 cartels,	by	and	 large,	 these	cartels	are	 still	 a	 serious	problem	 for	developing	
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countries.	 	 In	 some	 instances,	 when	 cartels,	 such	 as	 the	 vitamins	 cartel,	 have	 been	
successfully	prosecuted	by	the	United	States	and	the	European	Union,	they	simply	shift	to	
countries	 where	 they	 may	 practice	 their	 behaviours	 without	 fear	 of	 punishment.	 	 As	 a	
result,	 it	 is	more	important	than	ever	that	developing	countries	implement	an	enforceable	
competition	law	system	as	soon	as	they	can.	
	
On	the	other	hand,	special	attention	must	also	be	given	to	the	size	of	a	country’s	economy	
as	well	as	its	capabilities.		For	example,	Tanzania,	like	many	African	nations,	has	a	relatively	
small	market	that	is	incapable	of	supporting	more	than	a	few	firms	at	a	time.92		It	also	does	
not	 have	 a	 history	 of	 competition	 advocacy,	 a	 trait	 shared	 by	 many	 other	 developing	
countries.			
	
Goals	for	Reform	
	
Before	any	discussion	of	possible	methods	of	reform	can	take	place,	an	exploration	of	the	
goals	any	proposed	type	of	reform	should	address	must	be	made.		As	stated	before,	it	is	not	
necessary	to	adopt	merely	one	of	the	proposed	reform	solutions;	reform	can	take	place	on	
multiple	platforms	and	in	multiple	ways.		Therefore,	this	section	will	give	a	broad	overview	
of	the	general	goals	any	method	that	is	adopted	should	strive	to	achieve.	
	
While	total	eradication	of	international	cartels	and	other	such	anti-competitive	behaviours	
is	the	most	desirable	outcome,	it	is	also	wildly	ambitious	and	clearly	impractical.		It	has	been	
reiterated	in	this	thesis	that	international	cartels	are	notoriously	difficult	to	detect	and	the	
temptation	to	cartelise	the	market	is	sometimes	too	great	to	resist.		As	such,	in	order	to	gain	
some	insight	into	suitable,	achievable	goals,	it	would	be	helpful	to	first	discuss	some	general	
goals	of	competition	law	for	developing	countries.	
	
One	of	the	main	reasons	developing	countries	implement	a	competition	law	system	of	their	
own	 is	 in	order	 to	gain	economic	 freedom.	 	Economic	 freedom	rests	on	the	principle	 that	
free	 participation	 in	 the	 market	 forms	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 free	 market	 economy.93	 	 While	
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economic	 freedom	 and	 free	 competition	 are	 wholly	 intertwined	 as	 goals	 in	 every	
competition	law	system,	for	developing	countries	in	particular,	achieving	economic	freedom	
is	of	 the	utmost	 importance.	 	 Because	of	 the	 institutional	 challenges	 faced	by	developing	
countries,	 which	 have	 been	 previously	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Three,	 developing	 countries	
often	 face	 difficulties	 when	 incorporating	 economic	 freedom	 into	 their	 goals	 for	
competition	law.		Economic	freedom,	if	it	is	constitutionally	protected,	gives	individuals	the	
right	to	freely	participate	in	the	economy.		These	individual	interests	can	often	conflict	with	
one	another,	especially	if	one	accounts	for	the	fact	that	economic	market	power	is	normally	
unequal	 between	 participants,	 which	 can	 lead	 to	 imbalance.	 	 For	 instance,	 individual	
freedoms	can	come	into	conflict	in	situations	where	dominant	firms	attempt	to	push	smaller	
firms	out	of	the	market.			Firms	with	monopoly	power	in	the	market	can	also	prevent	new	
entrants	 from	gaining	access.	 	 It	 can	 therefore	be	difficult	 to	balance	out	 the	 interests	of	
different	participants,	particularly	for	developing	countries.	
	
Other	 scholars	 argue	 for	 a	 more	 economics	 based	 approach	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 setting	
competition	 law	goals	 for	developing	countries,	which	can	be	difficult	 to	 implement	when	
combined	with	a	 free-competition	approach.	 	For	 instance,	Professor	Michal	Gal,	who	has	
done	 extensive	 research	 into	 competition	 policy	 issues	 for	 small	 market	 economies,	
advocates	 for	 a	 system	 centred	 more	 on	 efficiency	 concerns	 rather	 than	 individual	
freedoms.		Gal	writes,	‘in	a	small	economy,	it	is	vital	that	the	goals	of	competition	policy	be	
clearly,	 consciously,	 and	 unambiguously	 defined,	 and	 that	 economic	 efficiency	 be	 given	
primacy	over	 other	 goals.’94	 	While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 small	market	 economies	 can	 also	 come	
from	developed	countries,	developing	countries	are	more	likely	to	fall	under	this	category.	
	
Gal	 identifies	 three	main	economic	characteristics	every	 small	market	economy	shares:	1)	
high	industrial	concentration	levels,	2)	high	entry	barriers,	and	3)	below	minimum	efficient	
scales	(MES)	 levels	of	production.95	 	According	to	the	argument	that	 ‘competition	policy	 is	
designed	to	protect,	promote,	and	encourage	the	competitive	process,’	inefficient	firms,	or	
firms	 that	are	not	operating	at	maximum	efficiency,	 should	be	pushed	out	of	 the	market.		
Countries	with	smaller	markets	should	not	be	overly	burdened	with	more	companies	than	it	
                                                
94	Gal,	Michal,	Competition	Policy	for	Small	Market	Economics,	(2003)	Harvard	University	Press	at	47.	
95	Ibid.	
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needs	in	order	to	obtain	economies	of	scale.		Social	goals	would	also	not	be	protected	under	
this	 system	 of	 competition	 law.	 	 Because	 developing	 countries	 are	 often	 concerned	with	
issues	that	are	beyond	those	that	are	purely	economics	based,	this	approach	to	competition	
law	can	be	particularly	difficult	to	implement.		
	
However,	 according	 to	 Gal,	 employing	 a	 strict	 efficiency	 approach	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	
promoting	 economic	 freedom	 appears	 to	 challenge	 Professor	 Josef	 Drexl’s	 theory	 that,	
‘there	 is	 no	 inherent	 conflict	 between	 the	 more	 economic	 approach	 and	 the	 freedom	
paradigm.’96	 	 Once	 again,	 though,	 this	 argument	 is	 unworkable	 in	 light	 of	 developing	
countries.	 	 Because	 developing	 countries’	 markets	 tend	 to	 be	 highly	 concentrated,	 a	
rigorous	 application	 of	 economic	 efficiency	 principles	 may	 result	 in	 more	 concentrated	
economic	power,	 thereby	conflicting	with	the	freedom	paradigm.97	 	Free	competition	also	
decreases,	 particularly	 in	 instances	where	 concentrated	 industries	 are	 held	 by	 political	 or	
well-connected	 individuals	 or	 are	 subsidiaries	 of	 foreign	 companies.	 	 Drexl’s	 theory	 is	
therefore	 only	 applicable	 to	 developed	 countries,	 where	 the	 entry	 barriers	 are	 relatively	
low.	
	
Economic	 freedom	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 economic	 efficiency	 may	 be	 a	 feasible	 goal	 for	
developing	 countries,	 however	 if	 reform	 methods	 are	 to	 be	 universally	 applicable,	
developed	countries	may	chafe	at	the	idea	of	sacrificing	efficiency	for	a	goal	they	have	more	
or	 less	already	achieved.	 	This	 is	the	fear	many	countries,	both	developed	and	developing,	
have	 when	 discussing	 universally	 applicable	 reform	 methods	 for	 competition	 law	 issues	
such	 as	merger	 regulation	 and	 international	 cartels.	 	 The	 general	 fear	 is	 that	 some	goals,	
particularly	 those	advanced	by	 countries	with	more	political	power,	 are	more	 likely	 to	be	
adopted	than	other	goals.98		For	example,	in	developed	countries,	the	goals	of	competition	
law	 are	 heavily	 based	 on	 traditional	 economic	 theories,	 namely	 to	 improve	 the	 efficient	
allocation	of	resources	and	maximise	consumer	welfare.		On	the	other	hand,	as	previously	
established,	 developing	 countries	 focus	 on	 broader	 objectives	 when	 considering	
                                                
96	 Drexl,	 Josef,	 ‘Competition	 Law	 as	 Part	 of	 the	 European	 Constitution’	 in	 Bogdandy,	 A	 von	 and	 Bast,	 J.,	
Principles	of	European	Constitutional	Law,	(2009)	Hart	Publishing	at	695.	
97	Gal	(2003)	at	47.	
98	Guzman,	Andrew,	 	 ‘Is	 International	Antitrust	Possible?’	 (1998)	New	York	University	Law	Review,	Vol.	73	at	
1501.	
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competition	 law	goals	such	as	building	up	their	market	economies	as	well	as	ensuring	any	
changes	or	provisions	that	are	implemented	are	done	so	with	the	approval	of	the	public.			
	
As	 over	 120	 countries	 have	 already	 adopted	 some	 form	of	 competition	 policy,	 each	with	
provisions	 specially	 tailored	 to	 fit	 their	 own	 economies	 and	 market	 structures;	 it	 would	
therefore	be	unrealistic	to	expect	any	single	goal	to	satisfy	both	developed	and	developing	
countries.	
	
Conclusion	
	
Regardless	of	the	method	of	reform	that	is	ultimately	adopted,	its	outcome	and	impact	on	
developing	countries	and	the	global	market	as	a	whole	will	be	dependant	on	which	welfare	
standard	is	chosen	to	serve	as	its	benchmark.		While	there	have	been	some	discrepancies	in	
how	 various	 standards	 of	 welfare	 are	 defined,	 such	 as	 the	 confusion	 in	 the	 precise	
difference	 between	 consumer	 and	 total	 welfare,	 different	 jurisdictions	 choose	 different	
welfare	 standards	 as	 the	 foundation	 to	 their	 competition	 law	 systems	 according	 to	 their	
individual	needs.		Competition	law	goals	of	individual	countries	can	range	from	maximising	
economic	 and	 social	 welfare	 in	 the	 domestic	 market	 to	 achieving	 economic	 freedom.		
Therefore,	 it	may	be	argued	that	adopting	a	welfare	standard	 for	all	developing	countries	
may	not	be	entirely	appropriate	as	 it	would	be	difficult	 to	presume	one	welfare	 standard	
would	suit	the	needs	of	all	countries.			
	
When	 considering	 which	 welfare	 standard	 should	 be	 adopted	 when	 implementing	 the	
proposed	 reform	measures	 that	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 due	 consideration	
must	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 intended	 beneficiaries	 of	 that	 reform	 measure.	 	 For	 instance,	 a	
domestic	welfare	standard	with	a	focus	on	consumer	or	total	welfare	would	be	appropriate	
for	 reform	 measures	 designed	 to	 specifically	 help	 developing	 countries,	 such	 as	 helping	
them	establish	their	own	competition	law	systems.		This	is	because	while	it	has	been	argued	
that	national	competition	law	authorities	should	consider	how	their	decisions	would	affect	
global	welfare,	 developing	 countries	 are	 still	 in	 a	 position	where	 they	must	 tend	 to	 their	
own	 needs	 first	 before	 worrying	 about	 global	 problems.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 reform	
strategies	that	are	designed	to	address	the	 issue	of	 international	cartels	on	a	global	scale,	
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such	 as	 establishing	 a	 global	 harmonised	 competition	 law	 agreement,	 a	 global	 welfare	
standard	 would	 be	 required	 in	 order	 to	 address	 the	 worldwide	 issues	 regarding	
international	cartels.			
	
Developing	 countries	 wishing	 to	 implement	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 systems	 may	 be	
tempted	 to	emulate	 the	 systems	of	more	developed	 jurisdictions,	even	going	 so	 far	as	 to	
copy	 their	 welfare	 standards,	 for	 instance	 by	 adopting	 the	 same	 approach	 to	 consumer	
welfare	as	the	United	States	or	the	EU.		However,	doing	so	would	not	address	the	specific	
challenges	 that	 are	unique	 to	developing	 countries.	 	 Therefore,	 developing	 countries	 that	
choose	to	base	their	competition	law	systems	on	a	specific	model,	they	should	bear	in	mind	
how	that	system	would	meet	their	own	individual	needs	and	make	the	necessary	changes.	
	
The	following	chapter	will	discuss	some	proposals	for	reform,	both	on	a	domestic	level	and	
on	a	global	level,	specifically	designed	for	developing	countries.	
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Chapter	Six	
Proposals	for	Reform	
	
Introduction	
	
As	 established	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 before	 a	 global	 solution	 can	 be	 sought,	 the	
difficulties	facing	developing	countries	must	first	be	corrected.		The	best	way	to	do	this	is	to	
enact	 strategies	 designed	 to	 help	 them	 establish	 and	 enforce	 their	 own	 competition	 law	
systems.		These	strategies	can	include	fostering	better	relationships	between	developed	and	
developing	 countries	as	well	 as	establishing	guidelines	 that	 can	help	developing	 countries	
implement	a	competition	law	system	designed	to	address	their	own	specific	needs.			
	
Developing	 countries	 rarely	 prioritise	 forming	 any	 kind	 of	 competition	 law	 policy	 or	
enforcement	mechanism	when	they	are	battling	more	pressing	issues	such	as	poverty,	social	
instability,	 and	political	upheaval.	 	However,	as	was	discussed	 in	 the	previous	 chapter,	an	
effective	competition	law	system	can	go	a	long	way	towards	resolving	these	issues.	
	
This	 chapter	 will	 discuss	 the	 next	 steps	 in	 reforming	 the	 current	 situation	 regarding	
international	cartels	and	developing	countries.		It	was	proposed	in	the	previous	chapter	that	
the	most	appropriate	 solution	would	be	 to	execute	 reform	strategies	on	a	domestic	 level	
first	before	moving	onto	global	reform	strategies.		This	will	solve	two	issues:	first,	by	helping	
developing	 countries	 implement	 and	 enforce	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 systems,	 it	 will	
ensure	these	countries	are	in	a	position	to	better	defend	themselves	against	both	domestic	
and	 international	cartels;	second,	with	a	competition	 law	system	of	 their	own,	developing	
countries	will	 be	 in	 a	much	 stronger	 position	when	 entering	 into	 negotiations	with	 other	
nations.	
	
Because	developing	countries	often	lack	the	resources	or	the	knowledge	to	enact	or	enforce	
a	competition	 law	system	on	their	own,	many	strategies	designed	to	help	them	do	so	are	
predicated	on	seeking	support	from	outside	sources.		Much	of	this	support	can	be	obtained	
from	 international	organisations	such	as	 the	OECD,	UNCTAD,	and	the	 ICN.	 	The	OECD	and	
UNCTAD	in	particular	have	developed	specific	policies	and	programmes	designed	to	educate	
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policymakers	 in	developing	countries	on	the	importance	of	effective	competition	laws	and	
ways	 they	 can	develop	or	 amend	 their	 own.	 	Developing	 countries	 can	 also	 seek	 support	
from	 other	 developing	 countries	 as	 well	 as	 developed	 countries,	 through	 the	 signing	 of	
bilateral	or	regional	cooperation	agreements.		Nevertheless,	while	many	of	these	strategies	
may	 give	 developing	 countries	 the	 aid	 and	 encouragement	 they	 need	 to	 enact	 their	 own	
competition	law	policies,	they	are	not	without	their	own	difficulties	and	consequences.		It	is	
therefore	still	up	to	them	to	tread	carefully	and	choose	the	right	strategy	that	will	best	fit	
their	needs.	
	
However,	 in	 order	 to	 fully	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 international	 cartels,	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	
simply	 help	 developing	 countries	 implement	 and	 enforce	 their	 own	 competition	 law	
systems.	 	 In	order	 to	attack	 this	problem	 from	all	 sides,	both	domestic	and	global	 reform	
strategies	must	 be	 put	 forth.	 	 Even	with	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 systems,	 developing	
countries	will	still	be	at	a	severe	disadvantage	in	comparison	with	developed	countries	and	
will	 likely	 still	be	 targeted	by	 international	 cartels.	 	 In	a	world	where	cartel	members	and	
cartel	behaviours	are	no	longer	limited	to	one	or	two	jurisdictions,	it	is	more	important	than	
ever	 to	 revisit	 the	 idea	 of	 global	 reform	 in	 the	 area	 of	 competition	 law.	 	 While	 some	
attempts	have	been	made	in	the	past	to	adopt	more	globalised	competition	law	policies,	it	
is	this	thesis’	proposal	that	the	world	may	be	ready	for	another.			
	
Domestic	Reform	
	
Helping	Developing	Countries	Implement	an	Effective	Competition	Law	Regime	
	
Chapter	Four	discussed	the	ways	 in	which	developing	countries	themselves	can	help	build	
an	effective	competition	 law	regime	as	well	as	 the	 factors,	 such	as	competition	advocacy,	
necessary	to	enforce	it.		This	section	will	therefore	detail	the	ways	in	which	foreign	nations,	
notably	developed	countries,	may	better	support	developing	countries.	
Free	Riding	
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There	 are	 number	 of	 ways	 developing	 countries	 may	 obtain	 support	 from	 developed	
countries	in	cases	involving	international	cartels.		The	simplest	of	these	is	by	free	riding	on	
cases	already	tried	by	competition	authorities	in	developed	countries.	 	An	example	of	free	
riding	 was	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Two	 regarding	 Mexico’s	 successful	 case	 against	 the	
American	company	Archer	Daniels	Midland	Co.	following	the	successful	prosecution	of	the	
company	by	Canada.	 	 Free	 riding	 is	an	attractive	option	 for	 competition	 law	enforcement	
agencies	 in	 developing	 countries	 for	 two	 reasons:	 first,	 developing	 countries	 are	 often	
fearful	of	making	decisions	that	would	conflict	with	or	simply	differ	from	decisions	a	foreign,	
more	powerful	competition	 law	authority,	especially	one	from	a	developed	country	would	
make;	 and	 second,	 developing	 countries,	 especially	 those	 with	 weak	 enforcement	
mechanisms,	would	rather	‘assist’	or	‘support’	a	more	developed	or	advanced	authority	by	
taking	on	 less	 intense	duties	 such	as	conducting	specific	 investigatory	activities	or	passing	
on	information	it	may	already	possess	to	the	foreign	competition	authority	rather	than	face	
the	pressure	of	prosecuting	 the	 case	 itself.1	 	 Free	 riding	would	also	 alleviate	 some	of	 the	
difficulties	developing	countries	when	attempting	to	gain	access	to	evidence	on	their	own.	
	
It	is	not	just	developing	countries	that	can	benefit	from	free	riding	on	previous	international	
cartel	investigations.		Chapter	Three	alluded	to	Mexico’s	successful	prosecution	of	the	lysine	
cartel	 following	 Canada’s	 decision	 regarding	 the	 international	 cartel.	 	 Canada’s	 case	 was	
previously	built	upon	the	United	States’.	 	According	to	John	Connor,	the	Lysine	Cartel	case	
represents	one	of	the	most	significant	cases	 involving	an	 international	cartel	 in	history	for	
several	 reasons:	 first,	 it	 ‘represented	 the	 U.S.	 government’s	 first	 completely	 successful	
conviction	 of	 a	 global	 cartel	 in	more	 than	 four	 decades’;2	 second,	 it	 ‘was	 the	 first	 public	
manifestation	 of	 a	 sea	 change	 in	 enforcement	 priorities’;3	 third,	 it	 ‘demonstrated	 the	
government’s	 intention	 to	 employ	 tough	 ‘blue-collar’	 criminal	 investigative	 techniques	 to	
what	 had	 formerly	 been	 treated	 as	 gentle	 ‘white-collar’	 misdemeanours’;4;	 and	 finally,	
although	it	proved	that	fines	had	‘escalated	enormously’	in	the	years	leading	up	to	the	case,	
                                                
1	Dabbah,	Maher,	International	and	Comparative	Competition	Law,	(2010)	Cambridge	University	Press.	
2	Connor,	John	M.,	‘Global	Cartels	Redux:	The	Lysine	Antitrust	Litigation,’	(1996)	in	Kwoka,	John	E.;	White,	
Lawrence	J.,	The	Antitrust	Revolution:	Economics,	Competition,	and	Policy,	(2014)	Oxford	University	Press	at	
301.	
3	Ibid	at	302.	
4	Ibid.	
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‘they	may	still	be	 inadequate	to	suppress	recidivism.’5	 	The	 lysine	cartel	case	was	the	first	
case	in	which	the	United	States	went	beyond	the	Sherman	Act’s	stated	maximum	penalty	of	
$10	million.		By	applying	the	penalty	provisions	allowing	for	the	recovery	of	up	to	twice	the	
cartels	 profits,	 or	 twice	 the	 value	 of	 consumers’	 losses,	 as	 laid	 out	 in	 18	U.S.C.	 §3571,	 in	
1997,	the	Department	of	Justice	was	able	to	charge	a	fine	of	$70	million	on	Archer	Daniels	
Midland	for	its	participation	in	the	lysine	cartel	and	a	further	$30	million	for	its	participation	
in	the	citric	acid	cartel.				
	
Working	closely	with	U.S.	antitrust	investigators,	Canada	launched	its	own	investigation	into	
the	 lysine	 cartel	 in	1995.	 	 In	1998,	Canada	 successfully	 imposed	a	 fine	of	 about	Canadian	
$11.4	million	 (approximately	$7.9	million	USD	at	 the	 time)	on	Archer	Daniels	Midland,	 six	
times	more	 than	 the	 previous	 Canadian	 recorded	 fine	 in	 competition	 law.6	 	 Following	 on	
from	 the	 U.S.	 and	 Canada’s	 investigations	 and	 successful	 prosecution,	 Mexico	 began	 its	
investigation	into	the	lysine	cartel	in	February	1997.		Two	years	later,	Mexico’s	Competition	
Commission	successfully	fined	Archer	Daniels	Midland	approximately	$125,000.7	
	
While	 free	 riding	 can	 alleviate	 some	 of	 the	 pressure	 felt	 by	 developing	 countries	 when	
confronted	with	the	prospect	of	bringing	an	action	against	an	 international	cartel	on	their	
own,	it	is	not	without	its	difficulties,	particularly	in	abuse	of	dominance	cases.8		In	instances	
where	the	foreign	authority	has	taken	over	an	abuse	of	dominance	case,	whether	the	final	
result	be	eradicate	the	anticompetitive	behaviour	or	cause	 it	 to	become	 ineffective	 in	 the	
global	market,	 the	 foreign	 competition	 law	 authority	may	 neglect	 to	 address	 the	 specific	
harms	 felt	 by	 the	 developing	 country	 that	 directly	 affected	 its	 domestic	 market.		
Furthermore,	there	are	some	who	argue	that	allowing	developing	countries	to	free	ride	on	
foreign	 international	 cartel	 cases	 is	 a	 poor	 use	 of	 the	 already	 limited	 resources	 these	
                                                
5	Ibid	at	303.	
6	Reuters.	‘Canada	Fines	Archer	Daniels	in	Price	Fixing,’	The	New	York	Times,	28	May	1998.	
7	OECD,	‘Promoting	Compliance	with	Competition	Law,’	(2012)	OECD	Directorate	for	Financial	and	Enterprise	
Affairs,	Competition	Committee,	DAF/COMP(2011)20.	
8	Dabbah.	
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countries	have	access	to	and	would	only	result	in	a	minimal	gain	with	regards	to	deterring	
future	cartel	activity.9			
	
Increasing	 the	number	of	domestic	 competition	 law	authorities	 that	 initiate	 investigations	
and	enforcement	procedures	against	the	same	international	cartel	can	also	carry	the	danger	
of	undermining	existing	leniency	programmes.		Multiple	jurisdictions	prosecuting	the	same	
cartel	also	means	having	 to	deal	with	multiple	 leniency	programmes	associated	with	each	
individual	competition	law	system.		Juggling	numerous	leniency	applications	is	no	easy	feat	
and	cartel	members	can	suddenly	find	themselves	dropping	a	ball	or	two.		A	company	may	
successfully	 apply	 to	 one	 leniency	 programme,	 granting	 it	 immunity	 in	 one	 jurisdiction,	
while	at	the	same	time	finding	that	another	cartel	member	has	beaten	them	to	the	punch	in	
another.	 	 These	 difficulties	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 EU,	where	 there	 is	 no	 ‘one-stop	 shop’	 for	
leniency	applications.	 	 Firms	must	 therefore	apply	 to	multiple	 jurisdictions	at	 the	national	
level	in	order	to	be	granted	immunity.		Even	then,	their	case	may	still	not	be	heard	by	the	
European	Commission.10	
Peer	Review	
	
OECD	 established	 a	 Competition	 Committee	 responsible	 for	 conducting	 peer	 reviews	 of	
countries’	 competition	 law	systems.	 	Participation	 in	 the	programme	 is	entirely	voluntary,	
however	once	the	review	is	conducted,	the	country	under	review	has	no	right	of	veto	over	
the	final	report.			
	
The	OECD	describes	 several	 stages	 that	occur	during	 the	peer	 review	process.11	 	 The	 first	
stage	 is	 the	 investigation	where	 one	 or	more	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	 peer	 review	 groups	
collect	information	relevant	to	the	activity	or	policy	that	is	under	review.		The	investigators	
then	 compile	 a	 report	 based	 on	 the	 acquired	 information	 and	 according	 to	 the	 review	
criteria	 that	 has	 been	 previously	 established.	 	 The	 second	 stage	 is	 the	 examination	 stage	
where	the	committee	discusses	the	contents	of	 the	report	with	the	party	being	reviewed.		
                                                
9	 Sokol,	 Daniel	 D.;	 and	 Stephan,	 Andreas,	 ‘Prioritizing	 Cartel	 Enforcement	 in	Developing	World	 Competition	
Agencies,’	 in	 Sokol	 Daniel;	 Cheng,	 Thomas;	 and	 Lianos,	 Ioannis	 (eds),	 Competition	 Law	 and	 Development,	
(2013)	Stanford	University	Press	at	140.	
10	Ibid.	
11	Ibid.	
 176 
 
The	third	stage	involves	the	preparation	of	the	final	report,	which	is	then	submitted	to	the	
party	 under	 review.	 	 The	 party	 will	 then	 be	 allowed	 to	 submit	 its	 own	 comments	 and	
corrections	and	the	modified	final	report	is	then	published.	
	
Peer	 reviews	 are	 especially	 helpful	 when	 conducted	 in	 a	 public	 policy	 context,	 most	
importantly	 the	 role	 they	 play	 in	 developing	 and	 improving	 policy	making.	 	 Peer	 reviews	
often	culminate	 in	a	 final	 report	containing	specific	conclusions	and	recommendations	 for	
improvement,	 which	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 catalyst	 for	 internal	 reform.	 	 Peer	 reviews	 can	 also	
instruct	 the	 party	 under	 review	 as	 well	 as	 the	 country’s	 general	 population	 on	 the	 best	
practices	 in	 the	 international	 field.	 	 For	 developing	 countries,	 peer	 review	 can	 be	 an	
especially	useful	tool	for	obtaining	technical	assistance	and	building	a	proper	foundation	for	
an	effective	competition	law	regime.	
	
The	final	report	is	divided	into	six	sections:12	
	
1. Competition	 policy	 foundations:	 this	 section	 details	 the	 history	 of	 the	
competition	policy	of	 the	 country	 in	question	and	 includes	any	policy	 goals	
that	have	been	implemented	into	its	competition	laws.	
2. Substantive	issues,	including	the	content	of	the	competition	law:	this	section	
describes	 the	competition	 law	enforcement	mechanisms	already	 in	place	 in	
the	country’s	competition	law	system	and	usually	also	includes	summaries	of	
actual	cases	investigated	by	the	competition	law	authorities.	
3. Institutional	 issues,	 enforcement	 structures	 and	 practices:	 this	 section	
outlines	 the	 structure	 and	 practices	 of	 the	 competition	 law	 agency	 and	
includes	descriptions	of	its	investigative	and	enforcement	powers,	its	average	
case	load,	and	any	practices	that	have	an	international	scope.	
4. Limits	of	competition	policy,	exemptions	and	special	regulatory	regimes:	this	
section	outlines	any	exemptions	or	provisions	that	give	special	or	differential	
treatment	under	the	country’s	competition	laws.	
                                                
12	OECD.	Trade	and	Competition	from	Doha	to	Cancun:	From	Doha	to	Cancun,	(2003)	OECD	Publishing.	
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5. Competition	advocacy	and	policy	studies:	this	section	describes	any	activities	
related	to	competition	advocacy	conducted	by	the	competition	agency.	
6. Assessment	and	policy	options:	the	final	section	summarises	the	conclusions	
of	 the	 committee	 based	 on	 the	 information	 contained	 in	 the	 previous	
sections.		It	also	lists	seven	to	ten	recommendations	for	improvement.	
	
Countries	that	have	agreed	to	submit	themselves	for	review	reported	to	the	OECD	that	they	
found	 the	 reports	 to	 be	 valuable	 resources	 in	 identifying	 the	 areas	 that	 needed	 to	 be	
reformed.13	
	
Several	countries	have	already	 taken	advantage	of	 the	peer	 review	system	offered	by	 the	
OECD,	many	of	whom	come	from	Latin	America.		For	instance,	between	2003	and	2006,	the	
OECD,	 in	 collaboration	 with	 the	 Inter-American	 Development	 Bank,	 reviewed	 the	
competition	 policies	 of	 five	 countries:	 Chile	 (2003);	 Peru	 (2004);	 Mexico	 (2004);	 Brazil	
(2005);	 and	 Argentina	 (2006).	 	 It	 subsequently	 followed	 up	with	 these	 countries	 in	 2007	
during	 the	 Latin	 American	 Forum	 in	 order	 to	 ascertain	 the	 impact	 the	 peer	 review	
recommendations	had	on	each	country’s	competition	policies	and	the	effectiveness	of	their	
competition	law	authorities.14	
	
The	OECD	noted	that	in	general,	all	five	respondents	to	the	follow-up	commended	the	peer	
review	process	and	the	reports	they	generated,	which	were	then	used	in	a	number	of	ways:	
as	a	reference	to	best	practice	for	internal	competition	agencies;	as	evidence	for	advocating	
for	 much	 needed	 reforms	 that	 required	 measures	 outside	 the	 agencies,	 for	 instance	
expanding	 budgets	 or	 enacting	 new	 legislation;	 and	 finally	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 competition	
advocacy	 through	 its	 inclusion	 in	 communications	with	 the	 press	 or	 reports	 on	 agencies’	
websites.15		The	recommendations	of	the	reports	were	separated	into	two	categories:	those	
that	 necessitated	 the	 enactment	 of	 new	 legislation;	 and	 those	 that	 national	 competition	
                                                
13	Ibid.	
14	OECD,	‘Peer	Reviews	of	Competition	Law	and	Policy	in	Latin	America,	a	Follow-up:	Argentina,	Brazil,	Mexico,	
and	Peru,’	(2008)	OECD,	Inter-American	Development	Bank.	
15	Ibid.	
 178 
 
agencies	could	put	into	effect	on	their	own.		For	the	most	part,	the	OECD	reported	that	the	
latter	were	more	easily	carried	out.16	
	
Each	 respondent	 country	 to	 the	 peer	 review	 scheme	 was	 asked	 to	 fill	 out	 a	 generic	
questionnaire,	 which	 only	 differed	 slightly	 from	 participant	 to	 participant	 depending	 on	
their	specific	recommendations.		Each	questionnaire	asked	the	respondents	to	comment	on	
whether	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 recommendations	 in	 their	 peer	 reviews	 had	 been	
implemented,	and	to	also	detail	if	further	implementations	were	planned,	what	steps	those	
would	entail.	 	Recommendations	 in	the	peer	reviews,	particularly	those	that	required	new	
legislation,	were	met	with	mixed	results.		While	Argentina	and	Brazil	struggled	with	pushing	
through	the	new	legislation,	Mexico	and	Chile	found	the	peer	reviews	to	be	a	highly	useful	
instrument,	with	Mexico	making	 broad	 amendments	 to	 their	 competition	 laws	 two	 years	
after	their	review	and	Chile	using	the	report	as	an	aide	to	applying	existing	legislation	that	
had	 been	 passed	 almost	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 the	 peer	 review	 itself.	 	 Peru’s	 attempts	 to	
follow	through	the	providing	for	merger	control	as	recommended	by	its	peer	review	report	
failed	at	the	time.		The	debate	has	since	been	revitalised	and	new	legislation	is	now	being	
discussed.17	
	
Along	 with	 budget	 concerns,	 which	 every	 respondent	 had	 difficulties	 with,	 the	 topic	 of	
cartels	and	cartel	regulation	was	raised	in	all	five	peer	review	reports.		The	OECD	has	been	
emphasising	the	importance	of	prosecuting	hard-core	cartels	and	how	competition	agencies	
should	be	making	this	their	highest	priority	for	several	years.	
	
While	 the	 OECD	 recognised	 the	 difficulties	 in	 enacting	 and	 enforcing	 an	 anti-cartel	
mechanism,	the	OECD	reviewers	found	each	respondents’	efforts	to	be	lacking	in	some	way.		
In	general,	all	 the	peer	 review	reports	pointed	out	 the	dearth	of	cartel	 investigations	 that	
had	 been	 conducted	 in	 each	 respondent	 country	 and	 even	 fewer	 cases	 that	 had	 been	
successfully	 prosecuted.18	 	 Other	 criticisms	 included	 a	 lack	 of	 leniency	 programmes,	 or	
                                                
16	Ibid.	
17	Egge,	Michael;	Motta,	Rita,	‘Merger	Control	2016	–	Introduction,’	(2016)	Latin	Lawyer,	available	at	
http://www.latinlawyer.com/reference/article/49103/introduction/.	
18	OECD,	‘Peer	Reviews	of	Competition	Law	and	Policy	in	Latin	America,	a	Follow-up:	Argentina,	Brazil,	Mexico,	
and	Peru,’	(2008)	OECD,	Inter-American	Development	Bank 
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ineffective	leniency	programmes;	and	that	fines	and	sanctions	 imposed	in	successful	cases	
were	not	high	enough	to	have	any	impact	on	deterring	future	cartel	activity.	
	
The	 reports	 all	 contained	 the	 same	 general	 and	 specific	 recommendations.	 	 General	
recommendations	given	to	respondents	included	prioritising	the	prosecution	of	cartels,	and	
imposing	 stricter	 penalties	 in	 successful	 cases.	 	 Specific	 recommendations	 included	
incorporating	more	 investigative	 tools,	 setting	 or	 specifying	 the	 legal	 standard	 for	 cartels	
(preferably	by	establishing	a	per	se	 rule	or	 its	equivalent),	and	suggesting	amendments	 to	
leniency	programmes	in	order	to	improve	their	effectiveness.19	
	
In	 general,	 the	 OECD	 reported	 that	 most	 of	 the	 recommendations,	 particularly	 those	
designed	 to	 combat	 cartels,	made	 to	 the	 respondents	were	 carried	 out.20	 	More	 difficult	
recommendations,	 such	as	 those	 requiring	new	 legislation,	 such	as	 setting	new	 standards	
for	 cartels,	 had	 yet	 to	be	 implemented	at	 the	 time	of	 the	 follow-up	 report	 but	 had	been	
proposed.	 	Although	the	OECD	noted	that	at	the	time	of	 its	report,	 it	was	still	too	soon	to	
see	whether	any	of	the	changes	made	had	any	positive	effects	on	combating	cartels,	several	
respondents	recorded	an	increase	in	the	number	of	cartel	investigations	they	had	begun.21	
	
Not	only	 are	 the	 recommendations	 in	 the	peer	 review	 reports	 a	useful	 instrument	 to	 the	
country	 that	 is	being	 reviews,	but	 they	can	also	act	as	a	helpful	 reference	point	 for	other	
countries.		For	instance,	Chile	and	Mexico	both	reported	using	the	recommendations	in	the	
peer	 review	 reports	 for	 Argentina	 and	 Brazil	 during	 the	 implementation	 process	 of	 their	
own	recommendations.22		It	is	clear	from	reports	such	as	this,	that	the	OECD’s	peer	review	
scheme	is	one	of	the	most	indispensable	tools	when	identifying	and	fixing	the	problems	in	
the	competition	law	systems	of	developing	countries.		While	success	with	implementing	the	
recommendations	made	in	peer	reviews	can	be	mixed,	they	serve	as	a	good	stepping-stone	
for	developing	countries	wishing	to	improve	the	infrastructure	of	their	competition	laws.			
	
                                                
19	Ibid.	
20	Ibid.	
21	Ibid.	
22	Ibid. 
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There	are,	however,	a	few	disadvantages	associated	with	peer	reviews.23		For	instance,	peer	
review	 recommendations	 are	 not	 binding,	 nor	 are	 there	 any	 enforcement	 or	 compliance	
mechanisms	attached	 to	 the	 final	outcome.	 	 There	 is	no	 requirement	 for	 the	party	under	
review	to	follow	or	accept	the	final	review	or	to	implement	any	of	the	recommendations.		In	
some	 respects,	 however,	 a	 more	 voluntary	 implementation	 system	 may	 produce	 more	
favourable	 results	 than	 if	 the	 final	 recommendations	 were	 compulsory.	 	 Parties	 under	
review	are	more	likely	to	cooperate	with	the	review	committee	and	the	process	as	a	whole	
is	 likely	 to	be	 confrontational	 if	 the	process	 is	more	 informal.24	 	On	 the	other	hand,	peer	
reviews	require	a	great	deal	of	investment.		The	process	itself	is	lengthy	and	requires	a	great	
deal	of	time	to	complete.	 	Therefore,	peer	review	committees	are	restricted	to	how	many	
reviews	 they	may	be	able	 to	undertake	and	as	a	 result,	 individual	 countries	 likely	are	not	
reviewed	very	often,	giving	very	little	opportunities	for	follow-up	checks.25	
	
Technical	Cooperation	
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 peer	 review	 system	 established	 by	 the	 OECD,	 the	 UNCTAD	 has	 also	
developed	 a	 programme	 that	 offers	 assistance	 to	 developing	 countries	 in	 relation	 to	
capacity	building	and	technical	cooperation.26	 	There	are	five	elements	to	the	programme:	
legislation,	 where	 UNCTAD	 helps	 developing	 countries	 adopt	 or	 amend	 their	 domestic	
competition	 laws	 in	 order	 to	 best	 meet	 their	 particular	 needs;	 the	 peer	 review	 process,	
which	 has	 been	 previously	 discussed;	 institutional,	 which	 provides	 support	 to	 developing	
countries	 creating	 or	 improving	 domestic	 institutions;	 capacity	 building,	 which	 helps	
developing	countries	come	up	with	effective	enforcement	strategies;	and	finally,	advocacy,	
which	 promotes	 competition	 culture	 in	 developing	 countries.27	 	 According	 to	UNCTAD,	 in	
2015,	they	ran	almost	thirty	programmes,	which	comprised	of	229	projects	in	145	countries.		
One	 of	 the	 programmes	 it	 designed	 is	 COMPAL,	 which	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 Swiss	
government	 and	 is	 concerned	 with	 helping	 Latin	 American	 countries	 with	 regards	 to	
                                                
23	Ibid	
24	Ibid	
25	Ibid	
26	UNCTAD,	‘A	Guide	to	UNCTAD	Technical	Cooperation,’	(2012)	UNCTAD,	UNCTAD/DOM/2009/2/Rev.1.	
27	Ibid.	
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competition	 law	 and	 consumer	 protection	 matters.	 	 The	 programme	 currently	 involves	
twelve	countries	and	aims	to	help	them	 implement	competition	 law	and	policies	 in	a	way	
that	will	result	in	lower	prices,	higher	quality	and	variety	of	products.28			
	
In	response	to	the	Accra	Accord,	which	was	adopted	by	the	12th	Ministerial	Conference	of	
UNCTAD,	the	Africa	Competition	Programme	(AFRICOMP)	was	launched	in	2008.		AFRICOMP	
works	to	advance	competition	law	in	developing	countries	on	a	national	as	well	as	a	regional	
level.29		The	programme	is	funded	by	Norway,	Sweden,	Switzerland,	France,	the	EU,	and	the	
UN	Development	Programme.		It	is	also	run	by	UNCTAD	alongside	the	national	coordinators	
of	the	beneficiary	countries	as	well	as	the	secretariats	of	WAEMU	and	CEMAC.		By	May	of	
2010,	 21	 countries	 and	 six	 regions	 put	 in	 requests	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	 programme.30		
Beneficiaries	 to	 the	 programme	 include	 countries	 such	 as	 Ghana,	 Lesotho,	 Malawi,	
Swaziland,	and	Zambia	along	with	the	regional	groups,	WAEMU	(West	African	Economic	and	
Monetary	Union)	and	CEMAC	(Economic	Community	of	Central	African	States).		WAEMU	has	
eight	member	states	and	CEMAC	has	eleven.31		The	programme	is	intended	to	help	African	
states	to	‘develop	appropriate	administrative,	institutional	and	legal	structures	for	effective	
enforcement	of	competition	and	consumer	laws	and	policies.’32	
	
UNCTAD	is	also	the	depository	of	the	Model	Law	on	Competition,	which	is	used	as	guidance	
for	developing	countries	when	drafting	and	amending	their	competition	laws.33		The	Model	
Law	 is	 comprised	 of	 two	 parts:	 the	 first	 part,	 which	 contains	 thirteen	 chapters,	 sets	 out	
potential	 substantive	 provisions	 for	 a	 basic	 competition	 law	 system;	 the	 second	 part	
                                                
28	Maher,	 Imelda,	and	Papadopoulos,	Anestis,	 ‘Competition	Agency	Networks	around	 the	World,’	 in	Ezrachi,	
Ariel	(ed.),	Research	Handbook	on	International	Competition	Law,	(2012)	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	at	71.	
29	UNCTAD,	‘Accra	Accord	and	the	Accra	Declration,’	UNCTAD/IAOS/2008/2	at	para.	104.	
30	Qaqaya,	H.	(Head	of	Competition	and	Consumer	Policies	Branch	of	UNCTAD),	‘The	AFRICOMP	Programme,’	
(High	Level	Meeting	on	Trade	Capacity	Building	and	Competition	Policy	from	African	LDCs,	Zambia,	May	2010),	
available	at	http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditc_ccpb/docs/ditc_ccpb_AFRICOMP_en.pdf,	last	accessed	18	
July	2016.	
31	WAEMU	member	 states:	Benin,	Burkina	 Faso,	 Ivory	Coast,	Guinea-Bissau,	Mali,	Niger,	 Senegal,	 and	Togo;	
CEMAC	member	 states:	Angola,	 Burundi,	 Cameroon,	 Central	African	Republic,	 Chad,	 Republic	 of	 the	Congo,	
Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo,	Equatorial	Guinea,	Gabon,	São	Tomé	and	Príncipe,	and	Rwanda.	
32	UNCTAD,	‘The	Africa	Competition	Programme	(AFRICOMP),’	May	2009	Briefing,	available	at	
http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditc_ccpb/docsditc_ccpb0027_en.pdf.			
33	UNCTAD,	Model	Law	on	Competition,	TD/RBP/CONF.7/8,	available	at	
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/tdrbpconf7d8_en.pdf,	last	accessed	17	July	2016.	
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contains	commentaries	and	explanation	of	the	chapters	discussed	in	the	previous	part	and	
describes	alternative	to	existing	legislation.34	
	
In	addition	 to	developing	 technical	 assistance	programmes	and	guidelines	on	 competition	
law,	 UNCTAD	 also	 carries	 out	 training	 activities	 to	 different	 audiences	 in	 developing	
countries.35	 	 These	 training	 activities	 are	 mostly	 geared	 towards	 judges,	 policymakers,	
competition	 and	 consumer	 officials	 and	 those	 in	 private	 sector	 with	 competition	 law	
experience.	 	 Training	 activities	 are	 held	 either	 in	 UNCTAD’s	 offices	 in	 Geneva,	 or	 in	 the	
relevant	country	itself.		Many	of	these	activities	are	conducted	in	a	way	that	is	reminiscent	
of	 university	 style	 ‘teaching’	 or	 ‘seminars.’36	 	 Because	 many	 audience	 members	 are	
unfamiliar	with	competition	law	issues,	these	sessions	tend	to	focus	on	the	foundations	on	
competition	policy.37	 	However,	others	are	much	more	advanced	and	are	designed	to	help	
policymakers	with	the	skills	 they	need	to	 implement	 legislative	reform	or	enact	a	working	
competition	law	system.		In	addition	to	these	training	sessions,	UNCTAD	also	offers	judges	
from	developing	countries	the	opportunity	to	meet	with	competition	law	specialists	in	order	
to	discuss	pending	cases.	
	
Unlike	 other	 international	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 ICN	 and	 the	OECD,	 the	UNCTAD	 has	
retained	a	strong	focus	on	providing	support	to	developing	countries.		Through	the	running	
of	 technical	 assistance	 programmes,	 which	 all	 draw	 heavily	 on	 the	 Model	 Law,	 it	 has	
established	 itself	 as	 an	 invaluable	 aide	 to	 other	 competition	 law	 networks	 and	 regional	
institutions.	
	
Foreign	Direct	Investment	
	
Another	 way	 developed	 countries	 can	 support	 developing	 countries	 in	 their	 attempts	 to	
strengthen	 their	 competition	 law	systems	 is	 through	 foreign	direct	 investment	 (FDI).38	 	As	
                                                
34	 Lee,	 Cassey,	 ‘Model	 Competition	 Laws,’	 in	 Cook,	 Paul;	 Fabella,	 Raul;	 and	 Lee,	 Cassey	 (eds),	 Competitive	
Advantage	and	Competition	Policy	in	Developing	Countries	(2007)	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	at	29-53.	
35	Dabbah	(2010)	at	147.	
36	Ibid.	
37	Ibid.	
38	Hawk,	Barry	E.,	International	Antitrust	Law	&	Policy:	Fordham	Competition	Law	(2010)	at	316.	
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stated	 above,	 FDI	 can	 be	 an	 excellent	 way	 to	 encourage	 competition	 in	 the	 market.		
Furthermore,	 it	 has	 been	 put	 forward	 that	 the	 development	 of	 investment	 policies	 that	
encourage	 foreign	 investment	 can	 also	 support	 the	 development	 of	 stronger	 competition	
policies.39		Indeed,	more	countries	are	recognising	the	need	to	maintain	strong	competition	
laws	and	policies	in	order	to	encourage	and	facilitate	FDI	into	their	economies.		Because	of	
this	 view,	 developing	 countries	 that	 are	 reluctant	 to	 adopt	 their	 own	 competition	 law	
systems	 can	 be	 persuaded	 to	 do	 so	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 it	 may	 encourage	 more	 foreign	
investment.	
	
Many	 developing	 countries	 acknowledge	 that	 FDI	 is	 crucial	 in	 the	 development	 of	 their	
economies	as	well	as	technological	advances,	which	can	not	only	 increase	the	competitive	
conditions	 of	 their	 domestic	 economies	 but	 also	 benefit	 local	 consumers.40	 	 However,	 as	
with	 the	 issue	 of	 free	 riding,	 FDI	 also	 comes	with	 some	 inherent	 risks.	 	 If	 the	 developing	
country	 relies	 too	heavily	 on	 FDI,	 it	may	 find	 themselves	 subject	 to	 the	whims	of	 foreign	
nations	 and	 multinational	 firms.	 	 This	 loss	 of	 control	 may	 then	 translate	 to	 the	 loss	 of	
control	the	domestic	government	can	exert	in	its	ability	to	make	independent	decisions	with	
regards	to	economic,	political,	and	social	issues.41		Developing	countries	are	also	in	danger	
of	being	manipulated	 if	 it	 lobbies	 too	hard	 for	 FDI.	 	 In	 some	countries,	 governments	may	
institute	well-meaning	measures	 in	 order	 to	 attract	more	 FDI.	 	 In	 doing	 so,	 governments	
may	be	 so	 singularly	 focused	on	attracting	 FDI	 and	accommodate	 the	 interests	of	 foreign	
investors	that	they	may	forget	or	neglect	their	own	interests	in	relation	to	competition	and	
competition	 policy.42	 	 This	 oversight	 may	 result	 in	 situations	 where	 the	 domestic	
competition	 law	 system	 may	 develop	 into	 a	 regime	 it	 may	 otherwise	 not	 have,	 thus	
undermining	 the	 potential	 for	 effective	 and	 impartial	 enforcement.43	 	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	
these	circumstances,	domestic	governments	should	adopt	a	more	circumspect	approach	to	
FDI	by	 recognising	 that	allowing	 foreign	 investors	 free	 rein	 in	 their	 local	markets	 is	not	 in	
their	country’s	best	interests	nor	in	the	interests	of	its	local	consumers.		Governments	from	
                                                
39	World	Trade	Organisation,	‘The	relation	between	investment	and	competition	policy,’	(1998)	
Communication	from	the	European	Community	and	its	Member	States,	Working	Group	on	the	Relationship	
between	Trade	and	Investment,	WT/WGTI/W/63.	
40	Dabbah,	M,	‘Competition	Law	and	Policy	in	Developing	Countries:	A	Critical	Assessment	of	the	Challenges	to	
Establishing	an	Effective	Competition	Law	Regime,’	(2010)		
41		Hawk	at	317.	
42	Ibid.	
43	Ibid.	
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developing	countries	should	therefore	be	instructed	to	clarify	to	foreign	governments	that	
participating	in	their	markets	would	be	granted	on	the	condition	that	such	investment	will	
not	unduly	infringe	on	the	domestic	firms’	rights	to	participate	in	the	market.	
	
China	is	the	largest	recipient	of	FDI	among	developing	countries	and	plays	a	massive	role	in	
promoting	trade,	investment,	and	tax	revenue	generation.		It	relies	heavily	on	FDI	to	sustain	
its	 economy	 and	 therefore	 the	 government	 extensively	 regulates	 it.	 	 FDI	 is	 regulated	 by	
several	pieces	of	legislation	in	China.		The	‘Regulations	on	Guiding	the	Direction	of	Foreign	
Investment,’	 (FDI	Regulations)	first	enacted	by	the	State	Council	 in	1995	and	subsequently	
amended	 in	 2002,	 outlines	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 for	 FDIs.44	 	 The	 FDI	 Regulations	
separates	 foreign	 investment	 projects	 into	 four	 headings:	 encouraged,	 permitted,	
restricted,	and	prohibited.45		Foreign	investments	that	introduce	new	technologies	can	fulfil	
the	 demands	 of	 the	 market,	 develop	 the	 market,	 increase	 China’s	 competitiveness	
internationally,	or	contribute	to	the	development	of	the	middle	and	western	regions	of	the	
countries	are	encouraged.46		On	the	contrary,	projects	that	endanger	state	security,	damage	
public	interest,	pollute	the	environment,	hinder	the	protection	and	development	of	natural	
resources,	or	utilise	techniques	or	technologies	that	are	exclusive	to	China	are	prohibited.47	
Any	 industry	not	 specifically	mentioned	 in	any	of	 these	 four	 categories	 is	permitted.	 	 The	
‘Foreign	 Investment	 Industrial	 Guidance	 Catalogue,’	 issued	 by	 the	 National	 Development	
and	Reform	Commission	(NDRC)	in	1995	and	later	revised	by	the	NDRC	and	the	Ministry	of	
Commerce	 (MOFCOM)	 in	 2011,	 defines	 and	 catalogues	 the	 industries	 in	which	 foreigners	
may	invest.		FDI	transactions	in	China	can	take	several	forms:	first,	through	the	creation	of	a	
foreign	 investment	 enterprise	 (FIE)	 in	 China;	 or	 second,	 by	 way	 of	 an	 M&A	 operation,	
specifically	designed	to	acquire	existing	local	businesses.		The	latter	of	these	options	is	the	
most	important	method	of	obtaining	FDI	in	China	and	the	acquisition	of	a	number	of	well-
known	Chinese	firms	has	had	a	notable	impact	on	the	development	of	competition	in	China.	
	
Following	its	accession	to	the	WTO,	China	has	had	to	relax	some	its	policies	and	restrictions	
on	foreign	 investment	 in	order	to	stay	true	 its	commitments.	 	As	a	result,	more	 industries	
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45	See	Article	4.	
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have	been	 added	 to	 the	permitted	or	 encouraged	 categories	 and	 the	 restrictions	 such	 as	
capping	foreign	ownership	and	the	mandatory	export	requirements	placed	on	joint	ventures	
have	 been	 removed.	 	 These	 changes	 have	 allowed	 China	 to	 develop	 and	 refine	 it	
competition	 policies,	 industrial	 policies,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 intellectual	 property	 rights	
protections.48		By	creating	a	more	competitive	environment	for	foreign	investors,	China	has	
created	a	more	open	market	and	allowed	both	 foreign	and	domestic	 firms	to	 trade	 freely	
with	regards	to	imports.	
	
Nevertheless,	 while	 some	 scholars	 have	 lauded	 the	 expansion	 of	 FDI	 in	 China,	 there	 are	
others	who	have	cautioned	an	overly	dependent	approach	to	foreign	investment.		Professor	
Ping	 Lin	 has	 discussed	 two	ways	 in	 which	 FDI	 can	 negatively	 affect	 industries	 in	 China.49		
First,	while	 FDI	 firms	 can	 open	 up	 competition	 in	 the	market,	 they	 can	 also	 place	 undue	
burdens	on	 local	 enterprises.50	 	 Foreign	 firms	often	have	 access	 to	 greater	 resources	 and	
more	 advanced	 technology	 and	 management.	 	 Unable	 to	 compete,	 domestic	 firms	 are	
driven	out	of	the	market,	leading	to	a	higher	concentration	of	foreign	enterprises.		Second,	
the	most	 desirable	 local	 enterprises	 for	 FDI	 are	 often	 the	 dominant	 ones	 in	 the	market,	
making	them	more	attractive	to	foreign	firms	who	wish	to	merge	or	acquire	them.51		Many	
of	these	transactions	involve	either	state-owned	enterprises	or	other	top	companies.		As	a	
result,	 foreign	 enterprises	 can	 quickly	 gain	 a	 dominant	 position	 in	 the	 market.	 	 Indeed,	
industries	such	as	automobile	production,	mobile	phone	production,	and	soft	drinks,	are	all	
largely	dominated	by	foreign	enterprises	in	China.	
	
Fearful	 of	 relinquishing	 all	 its	 markets	 to	 foreign	 influences,	 China’s	 competition	 law	
authority,	MOFCOM,	has	begun	to	push	back	against	foreign	investments.		On	3	September	
2008,	 industry	giant	Coca	Cola	announced	 its	plans	 to	acquire	China	Huiyuan	 Juice	Group	
Ltd,	 the	 largest	 domestic	 juice	 manufacturer	 in	 the	 country.52	 	 This	 acquisition	 would	
increase	Coca	Cola’s	market	share	in	China’s	juice	industry	from	12.7	percent	(calculated	in	
                                                
48	Song,	Ligang,	Rising	China:	Global	Challenges	and	Opportunites,	(2011)	Australian	National	University	Press	
at	85.	
49	 Lin,	 Ping;	 Zhao,	 J.,	 ‘Merger	 Control	 Policy	 under	 China’s	 Anti-Monopoly	 Law,’	 (2012)	 Review	 of	 Industrial	
Organization,	Vol.	41.	
50	Ibid.	
51	Ibid. 
52	Madden,	Normandy,	‘Coca-Cola	Bids	$2.4	Billion	for	Huiyuan	Juice	Group,’	AdvertisingAge,	3	September	
2008.	
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2008)	to	20.2	percent.		It	would	also	give	it	an	advantage	over	its	rival	PepsiCo	in	relation	to	
accessing	 the	 beverage	market	 in	 China.	 	 The	 reaction	 to	 this	 announcement	was	 almost	
immediate.	 	 Local	 juice	manufacturers	 claimed	 they	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 compete	 with	
Coca	 Cola’s	 increased	 market	 power.53	 	 Citizens	 protested	 the	 acquisition	 of	 a	 beloved,	
home-grown,	Chinese	brand.	 	Due	to	the	overwhelmingly	negative	response,	on	18	March	
2009,	MOFCOM	subsequently	released	Notice	[2009]	No.	22,	prohibiting	the	acquisition.	
	
Notice	 No.	 22	 outlined	 three	 potentially	 negative	 consequences	 of	 the	 acquisition	 on	
competition.54	 	 First,	 following	 its	 acquisition,	 Coca	 Cola	 would	 have	 had	 the	 power	 to	
transfer	its	dominant	position	in	the	carbonated	soft	drink	market	to	the	fruit	juice	market,	
driving	 out	 local	 fruit	 juice	 manufacturers	 and	 therefore	 injuring	 consumer	 interests.		
Second,	by	obtaining	control	over	two	of	the	largest	fruit	juice	brands	in	China,	Huiyuan	and	
Coca	Cola’s	existing	subsidiary	Meizhiyuan,	the	dominant	position	it	would	gain	would	have	
raised	barriers	to	entry,	preventing	new	competitors	from	entering	the	market.	 	Third,	the	
acquisition	would	have	forced	small	and	medium-sized	local	fruit	juice	manufacturers	out	of	
the	market	and	hinder	their	ability	to	innovate	and	develop	new	products.	
	
MOFCOM’s	decision	was	roundly	criticised	as	motivated	by	protectionist	values,	with	many	
believing	 it	 was	 ‘fuelled	 by	 popular	 resentment	 against	 a	 foreign	 company	 acquiring	 a	
popular	Chinese	brand.’55	 	Conversely,	or	perhaps	 in	 response	to	 the	criticisms	 it	 received	
regarding	its	previous	decision,	 in	August	2012,	MOFCOM	issued	a	conditional	approval	to	
Wal-Mart	regarding	its	plans	to	acquire	Niuhai	Holdings	Ltd,	an	indirect	parent	company	of	
Niuhai	 Information	 Technology	 (Shanghai)	 Ltd,	 which	 controlled	 Yihaodian.56	 	 Wal-Mart	
specifically	targeted	Yihaodian,	which	translates	to	Store	No.	1	in	Chinese,	in	its	transaction.		
Yihaodian	 is	one	of	 the	 largest	and	fastest	growing	online	retailers	 in	China.	 	The	decision	
was	once	again	met	with	criticism,	however	MOFCOM	imposed	a	number	of	limitations	on	
Wal-Mart,	which	confined	its	business	to	the	Yihaodian	website	alone.	
                                                
53	Fairclough,	Gordon;	Tejada,	Carlos;	and	Bauerlein,	Valerie,	‘Beijing	rejects	Coke	takeover,’	Wall	Street	
Journal	Asia,	19	March	2009.	
54	 Notice	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Commerce	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China,	 Notice	 22	 (2009),	 available	 at	
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.html,	last	accessed	15	July	2016.	
55	 Fairclough,	 Gordon;	 Tejada,	 Carlos;	 and	 Bauerlein,	 Valerie,	 ‘Beijing	 rejects	 Coke	 takeover,’	 Wall	 Street	
Journal	Asia,	19	March	2009.	
56	‘Wal-Mart	gets	restricted	approval	to	raise	stake	in	China	e-commerce	firm,’	14	August	2012,	Reuters.	
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As	can	be	seen	from	these	examples,	while	FDI	can	be	a	useful	way	to	persuade	developing	
countries	 to	 implement	 their	 own	 competition	 law	 systems	 on	 the	 condition	 that	 it	may	
encourage	more	foreign	investment,	the	use	of	FDI	must	be	exercised	with	extreme	caution.		
Many	 countries	 are	 loath	 to	 relinquish	 control	 of	 well-established	 domestic	 enterprises,	
however,	 these	 enterprises	 are	 usually	 the	 most	 likely	 targets	 of	 foreign	 investors.	 	 A	
balance	must	therefore	be	maintained,	between	allowing	more	foreign	influences	to	enter	
the	 market	 and	 ensuring	 the	 relevant	 market	 is	 not	 completely	 dominated	 by	 outside	
investors.		
	
Global	Reform	
Establishing	a	Global	Harmonised	Competition	Law	Agreement	
Reasons	for	Supporting	a	Globalised	Competition	Agreement	
	
For	developing	countries	struggling	to	establish	their	own	competition	law	systems,	a	global,	
harmonised	 competition	 law	 agreement,	 specifically	 designed	 to	 combat	 international	
cartels,	can	ease	the	burdens	they	experience	when	faced	with	prosecuting	these	cartels	on	
their	own.		There	are	many	reasons	why	a	harmonised,	global	competition	law	agreement	
may	be	the	most	ideal	way	to	address	international	cartels.	
	
A	global	harmonised	competition	law	agreement	could	help	alleviate	the	conflict	regarding	
export	cartels.		As	previously	discussed	in	Chapter	Two,	developing	countries	are	more	likely	
to	suffer	negative	effects	due	to	the	exemptions	granted	to	export	cartels	by	other,	mainly	
developed,	countries.		As	a	result,	many	attempts	have	been	made	in	curbing	or	abolishing	
these	exemptions	entirely,	as	was	discussed	in	Chapter	Three.	
	
Apart	 from	 resolving	 the	 controversy	 regarding	 export	 cartel	 exemptions,	 a	 harmonised	
agreement	can	also	be	an	effective	tool	in	the	fight	against	hard-core	international	cartels,	
and	 not	 solely	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 developing	 countries.	 	 Given	 that	 the	 large	majority	 of	
international	 cartels	 are	 formed	 of	 producers	 from	 a	 multitude	 of	 predominately	
industrialised	 states,	 investigating,	 let	 alone	 prosecuting,	 an	 international	 cartel	 as	 an	
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individual	 competition	 authority,	 especially	 from	 a	 developing	 country,	 is	 particularly	
difficult.	 	Scholars	who	argue	that	there	is	 little	to	no	need	for	governments	to	curb	cartel	
behaviour	often	rely	on	the	argument	that	cartels	in	themselves	are	inherently	unstable	due	
to	the	propensity	for	cartel	members	to	‘cheat.’57		These	arguments	often	go	hand	in	hand	
with	others	that	argue	that	governments	may	potentially	do	more	harm	than	good	if	they	
wrongfully	condemn	a	welfare-enhancing	cartel.58			
	
Given	that	all	developing	countries	suffer	from	a	dearth	of	resources,	many	are	unwilling	or	
unable	to	allocate	the	funds	necessary	to	effectively	maintain	a	competition	law	regime.		A	
global,	harmonised	competition	law	agreement	can	help	to	ease	this	burden.		Chapter	Four	
discussed	 the	 difficulties	 developing	 countries	 face	 when	 attempting	 to	 confront	 an	
international	cartel	operating	in	their	economy	alone.		Many	of	these	problems	stem	from	
the	lack	of	resources	developing	countries	are	able	to	expend	on	investigating	such	cartels,	
made	 especially	 more	 difficult	 given	 that	 many	 international	 cartels	 these	 days	 are	
increasingly	more	adept	at	structuring	their	cartels	in	order	to	make	domestic	enforcement	
nearly	impossible.		A	globalised	competition	law	agreement	can	not	only	alleviate	some	of	
the	 expenses	 in	 such	 cases	 as	 well	 as	 facilitating	 the	 transfer	 of	 information	 between	
countries	on	a	global	scale,	thereby	making	the	task	of	gathering	sufficient	evidence	easier,	
particularly	 for	countries	who	may	not	have	convenient	access	 to	such	 information	across	
their	borders.	
	
In	addition	to	alleviating	some	of	the	burdens	competition	law	authorities	from	developing	
countries	face	when	prosecuting	 international	cartels,	a	global	harmonised	agreement	can	
also	be	a	driving	 force	 in	 increasing,	or	even	maximising,	global	welfare	 (see	 the	previous	
chapter	for	a	discussion	on	the	definition	of	global	welfare	and	how	it	can	be	applied).		This	
can	be	seen	most	clearly	 in	cases	 involving	cross	border	mergers	of	 large,	dominant	 firms	
from	various	parts	of	the	world.		While	domestic	welfare	may	increase	as	a	result	of	such	a	
merger,	due	to	an	increase	in	productive	efficiency	and	an	increase	in	the	market	power	of	
the	merged	entity,	at	the	same	time,	foreign	welfare	and	subsequently	global	welfare	may	
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decrease.59	 	 It	 is	 a	well-known	 fact	 that	 national	 or	 domestic	 competition	 law	 authorities	
only	account	 for	national	or	domestic	welfare,	and	seldom	even	consider	 the	 implications	
their	 choices	 may	 have	 on	 the	 global	 economy.60	 	 An	 international	 competition	 law	
agreement,	if	negotiated	effectively,	may	thus	ensure	that	global	welfare	is	accounted	for	in	
every	decision-making	process.	
	
Proposed	Content	of	a	Global	Harmonised	Competition	Law	Agreement	
	
For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	only	provisions	dealing	specifically	with	international	cartels	
will	be	discussed	with	regards	to	potential	inclusion	in	a	global	harmonised	competition	law	
agreement.	 	 Should	 such	 an	 agreement	 ever	 be	 successfully	 negotiated,	 it	 will	 of	 course	
cover	a	wider	spectrum	of	competition	 law	 issues;	however,	an	analysis	of	 the	content	of	
these	rules	would	go	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.		It	is	also	important	to	note	that	any	
international	competition	law	agreement	should	not	override	already	established	domestic	
competition	laws.		It	is	highly	unlikely	that	countries	would	agree	to	an	agreement	in	which	
they	would	lose	control	of	their	own	competition	law	regimes.			
	
The	specific	provisions	governing	a	global	harmonised	competition	law	agreement	would	of	
course	depend	on	the	forum	in	which	such	an	agreement	would	take	place.		It	is	argued	that	
it	would	be	much	less	complicated	if	the	agreement	were	to	be	concluded	in	an	established	
international	organisation,	such	as	the	WTO.		In	this	regard,	not	only	would	negotiations	be	
more	readily	initiated	but	also	the	agreement	would	be	able	to	draw	on	some	of	the	already	
established	principles	of	the	organisation	itself.	
	
With	regards	to	prohibiting	hard-core	international	cartels,	it	is	proposed	that	the	provisions	
adopted	under	 an	 international	 competition	 law	agreement	 can	be	drawn	 from	domestic	
competition	 laws	 with	 a	 few	 modifications.	 	 However,	 in	 addition	 to	 prohibiting	 the	
formation	 of	 international	 cartels,	 the	 international	 agreement	 must	 also	 provide	
mechanisms	for	detecting	and	punishing	any	cartel	that	is	formed.		Provisions	on	detecting	
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60	Ibid.	
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and	punishing	 international	 cartels	 can	be	 separated	 into	 three	 categories:	 investigations,	
leniency	programmes,	and	fines.		
	
One	 of	 the	 biggest	 problems	 with	 research	 into	 international	 cartels	 is	 the	 issue	 of	
detection.	 	 While	 this	 thesis	 deals	 with	 the	 question	 of	 how	 developing	 countries	 can	
effectively	combat	these	cartels,	either	on	their	own	or	in	conjunction	with	the	international	
community,	 these	 strategies	 can	only	be	employed	 in	 cases	where	an	 international	 cartel	
has	been	 successfully	 identified.	 	As	 stated	earlier	 in	 this	 thesis,	 the	 rate	of	 detection	 for	
cartels	operating	in	the	United	States	and	Europe	is	about	ten	to	twenty	percent.		Without	
the	 resources	 to	prosecute	or	even	 investigate	 suspected	 cartels,	 it	would	 fair	 to	 surmise	
that	 detecting	 a	 cartel	 that	 is	 either	 operating	 in	 a	 developing	 country’s	 jurisdiction	 or	
targeting	it	is	nigh	impossible.	
	
National	competition	law	authorities	should	therefore	be	encouraged	to	cooperate	with	one	
another	 as	 much	 as	 feasibly	 possible	 during	 the	 investigation	 process.	 	 Cooperation	
agreements	related	to	the	sharing	of	evidence	in	cases	involving	international	competition	
law	issues	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	chapter;	however,	it	is	proposed	here	that	a	similar	
approach	may	be	adopted	in	an	international	agreement.			
	
The	 second	 aspect	 that	 should	 be	 included	 in	 a	 provision	 dealing	 with	 hard-core	
international	cartels	is	the	issue	of	leniency	programmes.		An	effective	leniency	programme	
can	facilitate	the	detection	of	international	cartels	by	encouraging	cartel	members	to	report	
on	their	fellow	cartel	participants	in	exchange	for	immunity	or	other	benefits.		As	previously	
stated,	at	the	moment,	there	is	no	global	leniency	programme	in	place	to	address	the	issue	
of	international	cartels.		However,	the	EU’s	Directive	2014/104/EU,	more	commonly	known	
as	the	Damages	Directive,	serves	as	a	good	example.		The	Damages	Directive,	which	is	to	be	
implemented	 by	 all	member	 states	 by	 17	 December	 2016	 at	 the	 very	 latest,	 coordinates	
many	aspects	of	national	 competition	 laws	 related	 to	private	enforcement	of	Articles	101	
and	102	TFEU.61			
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The	 European	 Commission’s	 leniency	 programme	 has	 traditionally	 been	 operated	 on	 the	
basis	of	combating	and	deterring	the	formation	of	cartels.		The	Commission	will	often	grant	
immunity	or	reduce	imposed	fines	to	cartel	members	who	inform	their	fellow	members	or	
cooperate	 with	 their	 investigation.	 	 The	 Damages	 Directive	 subsequently	 grants	 absolute	
protection	 to	 statements	made	 for	 leniency	or	 in	 the	 course	of	 settlement	 applications.62		
Parties	 wishing	 to	 bring	 follow-on	 actions	 for	 damages	 would	 therefore	 no	 longer	 have	
access	to	this	information.		Because	the	Damages	Directive	has	not	yet	been	implemented	
across	all	EU	member	states,	it	is	still	too	early	to	determine	what	effect	this	rule	will	have	
with	 regard	 to	 cartel	 informants	 or	 private	 enforcement	 cases.	 	 It	 may	 be	 that	 cartel	
members	may	 be	more	 likely	 to	 report	 on	 their	 fellow	 cartel	 participants	 if	 they	 can	 be	
assured	that	any	information	they	provide	in	the	course	of	that	reporting	will	not	be	used	
against	them	at	a	later	time.		On	the	other	hand,	the	Directive	may	have	a	deterring	effect	
on	those	who	wish	to	bring	private	actions	for	damages.		If	claimants	no	longer	have	access	
to	 the	 necessary	 documents	 in	 order	 successfully	 bring	 a	 claim	 in	 the	 EU,	 they	may	 turn	
elsewhere	to	another	jurisdiction	in	order	to	seek	proper	compensation.			
	
The	final	issue	a	global	harmonised	agreement	must	address	is	optimal	deterrence.		As	was	
discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Three,	 deterring	 the	 formation	 of	 cartels,	 both	 domestic	 and	
international,	 is	 usually	 achieved	 through	 the	 imposition	 of	 fines	 or	 criminalising	 such	
behaviours.	 	With	regards	to	the	issue	of	fines	and	other	sanctions,	there	are	a	number	of	
approaches	that	can	be	taken	here.		National	competition	law	authorities	should	of	course	
be	able	to	retain	their	independence	and	be	free	to	apply	their	own	domestic	laws	in	cases	
involving	 international	 competition	 issues.	 	 However,	 an	 international	 competition	 law	
agreement	 can	 serve	 to	 establish	 a	 standard	 according	 to	 which	 all	 countries	 should	
maintain.		At	the	moment,	sanctions	for	international	cartels	vary	widely	between	different	
competition	law	systems.		For	instance,	on	one	side	of	the	spectrum	sits	the	United	States,	
whose	 treble	damages	actions,	criminal	charges	and	 imprisonment	of	cartel	members	has	
rendered	it	one	of	the	most	severe	systems	in	the	world.		On	the	other	side	of	the	spectrum	
sits	developing	countries	that	may	or	may	not	have	a	competition	law	system	of	their	own.		
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Those	that	do	are	usually	ineffectively	enforced	and	may	be	missing	significant	competition	
law	elements.		Those	that	do	not	are	clearly	in	no	position	to	combat	international	cartels.	
	
It	 is	 doubtful	 that	many	 nations	would	wish	 to	 apply	 the	 strict	 penalties	 adopted	 by	 the	
United	 States.	 	 However,	 if	 left	 to	 their	 own	 devices,	 it	 is	 doubtful	 that	 an	 international	
competition	 law	 agreement	 designed	 to	 punish	 international	 cartels	 would	 be	 able	 to	
effectively	 do	 so.	 	 Therefore,	 it	 may	 be	 necessary	 to	 impose	 a	 minimum	 standard	 for	
sanctions	regarding	international	cartels	in	order	to	establish	a	middle	ground	between	the	
harsh	punishments	on	the	United	States	and	the	weaker	ones	of	other	countries.	
	
The	 idea	 of	 setting	minimum	 standards	 in	 relation	 to	 cartel	 enforcement	 in	 international	
competition	law	was	raised	in	the	Munich	Code.		The	Munich	Code	was	drafted	as	part	of	a	
study	 conducted	 by	 the	 Max	 Planck	 Institute	 for	 Foreign	 and	 Patent	 Copyright	 and	
Competition	 Law	 of	 Munich,	 which	 seriously	 considered	 the	 development	 of	 an	
international	competition	law	agreement.63		As	part	of	its	initiative	to	consolidate	different	
domestic	 competition	 laws	 into	 a	 single	 international	 competition	 law	 agreement,	 the	
Munich	 Code	 proposed	 setting	 a	 minimum	 standard	 of	 enforcement	 procedures	 for	 all	
ratifying	 countries.	 	 These	 minimum	 standards	 were	 based	 on	 the	 three	 main	 ideals	 of	
contemporary	 competition	 law:	 regulation	of	 concerted	 conduct,	 prohibition	of	 abuses	of	
dominant	position,	and	regulation	of	business	concentration.64	
	
However,	 while	 setting	 minimum	 standards	 in	 a	 competition	 law	 agreement	 may	 help	
developing	 countries	 form	 a	 foundation,	 concerns	 have	 been	 raised	 regarding	 their	
effectiveness	 and	 desirability.	 	When	minimum	 standards	 were	 suggested	 in	 the	Munich	
Code,	 it	 was	met	with	 resistance	 from	 a	 number	 of	 countries.	 	 By	 requiring	 all	 potential	
ratifying	 countries	 to	 harmonise	 their	 competition	 laws	 and	 adopt	 a	 minimum	 standard,	
many	 competition	 law	 authorities	 voiced	 the	 concern	 that	 the	 requirement	 would	
undermine	their	political	preferences	and	economic	policies	on	which	their	own	laws	were	
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based.65	 	 In	addition,	they	argued	that	harmonising	all	competition	laws	could	prevent	the	
natural	 progression	 of	 their	 domestic	 competition	 laws	 and	 also	 prevent	 them	 from	
designing	 and	 applying	 them	 in	 a	way	 that	 suited	 their	 individual	 needs.66	 	 Furthermore,	
while	 introducing	 a	minimum	 standard	 of	 competition	 law	may	 be	 useful	 for	 developing	
countries	 who	 either	 lack	 a	 competition	 law	 system	 of	 their	 own	 or	 have	 a	 weak	 or	
ineffective	system,	stronger	economies	with	already	established	competition	laws	may	balk	
at	the	notion	of	being	prevailed	upon	to	amend	or	abolish	their	existing	laws.	
	
In	 keeping	with	 the	 concerns	 raised	by	China	and	Thailand,	any	 international	 competition	
agreement	 should	 also	 contain	 provisions	 to	 more	 effectively	 regulate	 the	 exemptions	
granted	 to	 export	 cartels.	 	 It	 is	 tempting	 to	 argue	 for	 a	 complete	 blanket	 prohibition	 on	
export	 cartel	 exemptions;	 however,	 this	 approach	 ignores	 the	 associated	 benefits	 export	
cartels	 can	 have	 in	 some	 situations.	 	 Therefore,	 any	 provisions	 in	 an	 international	
competition	 law	agreement	dealing	with	export	cartels	should	continue	to	allow	for	these	
exemptions,	albeit	on	a	much	more	limited	scale.			
	
In	 addition	 to	 simply	 examining	 the	 effects	 an	 export	 cartel	may	 have	 on	 their	 domestic	
market,	 governments	 could	 also	be	 required	 to	 consider	 any	 ramifications	 the	 cartel	may	
have	on	international	competition	and	foreign	markets.		Governments	seeking	to	apply	any	
kind	of	exemption	to	an	export	cartel	should	be	required	to	assess	the	effects	of	that	cartel	
on	the	overall	global	market.	 	 In	the	event	that	an	export	cartel	has	a	negative	 impact	on	
international	competitive	market,	the	exemption	should	be	refused.		Exemptions	granted	to	
export	 cartels	 should	 also	 contain	 strict	 limitations	 such	 as	 the	 restricting	 the	 size	 of	 the	
cartel	 that	 is	 allowed	 and	 the	 types	 of	 conduct	 the	 cartel	 is	 allowed	 to	 engage	 in.		
Furthermore,	export	cartels	that	are	granted	an	exemption	should	be	subjected	to	regular	
reviews	in	order	to	monitor	any	potential	anticompetitive	effects.			
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While	some	of	these	provisions	may	go	a	long	way	in	helping	developing	countries	combat	
international	 cartels,	 negotiating	 a	 new	 international	 law	 agreement	 is	 never	 a	 simple	
endeavour.		There	are	many	challenges	that	can	arise	when	attempting	to	implement	such	
an	agreement.		These	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section	of	this	chapter.	
	
Challenges	in	Implementing	and	Enforcing	a	Global	Harmonised	Competition	Law	
Agreement	
	
Despite	 the	 many	 benefits	 associated	 with	 supporting	 a	 harmonised	 competition	 law	
agreement,	there	are	also	many	challenges.		For	instance,	while	many	academics	agree	that	
the	WTO	would	be	the	best	possible	forum	for	such	an	agreement,	the	WTO	has	unilaterally	
declared	there	are	no	plans	to	implement	a	separate	competition	law	agreement.	
	
One	of	the	major	challenges	associated	with	implementing	a	global	harmonised	competition	
law	agreement	is	the	level	of	difficulty	associated	with	negotiating	such	an	agreement.		The	
previous	 chapter	 highlighted	 some	 of	 the	 problems	 developing	 countries	 can	 face	 when	
entering	into	negotiations	in	bilateral	or	regional	trade	agreements.		On	a	global	scale,	these	
challenges	are	likely	to	be	magnified	to	an	extent	where	successfully	concluding	the	terms	
of	such	an	agreement	is	a	near	impossible	dream.		For	instance,	the	issue	of	export	cartels	is	
a	 particularly	 contentious	 issue	 in	 the	 political	 economy.	 	 Countries	 that	 continue	 to	
maintain	exemptions	for	export	cartels	have	been	extremely	vocal	in	their	support	for	them,	
the	United	States	being	amongst	the	most	vehement.		Therefore,	a	global	competition	law	
agreement	 that	 would	 allow	 foreign	 states	 to	 regulate	 export	 or	 import	 cartels	 located	
beyond	their	own	borders	is	likely	to	face	a	great	deal	of	opposition.	
	
Countries	 are	 also	 likely	 to	 disagree	 on	 the	 exact	 definition	 of	 what	 an	 ‘ideal’	 global	
competition	law	regime	should	be.67	 	Each	jurisdiction	will	have	its	own	specific	economic,	
cultural,	 and	 societal	 needs	 that	may	 conflict	with	 those	of	 others.	 	 There	 are	 some	who	
argue	that	competition	 laws,	when	put	 into	practice,	should	not	be	wholly	uniform	–	that	
                                                
67	 Sweeney,	Brendan,	 ‘Globalisation	of	Competition	Law	and	Policy:	 Some	Aspects	of	 the	 Interface	Between	
Trade	and	Competition,’	(2004)	
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depending	 on	 their	 individual	 economic	 structures	 and	 levels	 of	 development,	 states	 are	
likely	to	have	different	policy	needs	and	therefore	have	developed	their	own	laws	to	reflect	
that.68	 	 In	 order	 to	 properly	 establish	 a	 harmonised	 agreement,	 countries	would	 need	 to	
agree	on	a	number	of	provisions	governing	a	range	of	competition	law	issues.		Countries	are	
less	likely	to	make	allowances	or	compromise	on	such	issues,	particularly	in	cases	where	the	
differences	 between	 the	 signing	 parties	 is	 significant.69	 	 Given	 that	 an	 international	
competition	 law	agreement	would	be	most	effective	 if	 the	signatories	 included	developed	
and	developing	countries,	it	is	unlikely	that	harmonisation	would	be	successful.	
	
The	idea	of	a	WTO	agreement	on	competition	law	has	been	rejected	by	several	developing	
countries	 based	 on	 the	 argument	 that	 it	 would	 need	 to	 encompass	 more	 than	 simply	
competition	 law	 issues	 and	 should	 therefore	 include	 broader	 industrial	 policy	 exceptions.		
During	 the	discussions	 in	 the	working	 group	on	 trade	and	 competition,	 India	 submitted	a	
communication	stating	that:70	
	
Developing	 countries	 do	 not	 yet	 have	 the	 kind	 of	 well-developed	
safety	 nets	 that	 exist	 in	 industrial	 countries	 to	 provide	 for	 those	
displaced	 by	 import	 competition.	 	 There	 is	 thus	 a	 greater	 need	 to	
cushion	 its	 impact	 by	 suitable	 industrial	 restructuring	 measures	 …	
which	 would	 also	 enable	 developing	 countries	 to	 embrace	 greater	
trade	liberalization.	
	
This	concern	is	also	reflected	in	the	ways	several	developing	countries	have	already	included	
other	 social	 and	political	objectives	 in	 their	 competition	 law	systems	 rather	 than	 focusing	
wholly	on	competition	 issues.	 	To	 that	end,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 some	developing	countries	 still	
have	not	reconciled	themselves	to	the	idea	of	a	pure	competition	law	system.	 	During	the	
Cancun	Ministerial	Conference,	Kenya	provided	an	explanation	for	this	reticence:71	
	
                                                
68	Ibid.	
69	Taylor,	Martyn	D.	at	343.	
70	Communication	from	India	of	26	September	2002,	WT/WGTCP/W/216.	
71	Comments	by	Kenya	on	Second	Revision	of	the	Draft	Cancun	Ministerial	Text	of	14	September	2003,	
WT/Min(03)/W/21.	
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[We]	believe	that	this	Ministerial	Conference	should	…	focus	on	how	
to	 expand	 the	 space	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	 Singapore	 Issues	 and	
launch	 a	 process	 of	 improving	 that	 understanding.	 	 Kenya	 cannot	
accept	the	launching	of	negotiations	on	issues	that	we	do	not	clearly	
understand	and	whose	implications	for	our	economies	have	not	been	
assessed.		Moreover,	although	Kenya	attaches	a	lot	of	importance	to	
technical	assistance	and	capacity	building,	we	are	fully	convinced	this	
should	 be	 provided	 to	 enhance	 understanding	 of	 issues	 involved	
before	negotiations	are	launched.	
	
This	 statement	 from	 the	 Kenyan	 representative	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	 worry	 a	 number	 of	
developing	countries	share	regarding	the	costs	that	are	involved	with	developing	a	new	WTO	
agreement.		The	issue	of	costs	has	been	raised	with	regards	to	a	number	of	agreements	that	
were	adopted	in	the	course	of	the	Uruguay,	such	as	the	agreements	on	customs	valuation,72	
technical	 regulations,73	 sanitary	 and	 phytosanitary	 measures,74	 and	 intellectual	 property	
rights.75		In	order	to	implement	the	norms	in	each	of	these	agreements,	developing	countries	
were	required	to	purchase	new	equipment,	hire	and	train	enforcers,	and	establish	a	system	
of	checks	and	balances.76			
	
Kenya’s	 concerns	 about	 technical	 assistance	 in	 the	 event	 of	 WTO	 competition	 law	
agreement	are	also	well	founded.		Each	of	the	above	agreements	mentioned	have	technical	
assistance	 provisions,	 requesting	 that	 industrialised	 countries	 should	 provide	 guidance	 to	
developing	countries	related	to	the	necessary	procedures	 in	order	to	 implement	and	apply	
the	rules	set	out	in	the	agreements.77		However,	none	of	these	provisions	are	binding	on	the	
members,	an	issue	that	 is	the	source	of	great	contention	among	developing	countries	who	
                                                
72	Agreement	on	the	Implementation	of	Article	VII	(Customs	Valuation)	
73	Agreement	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade.	
74	Agreement	on	the	Application	of	Sanitary	and	Phytosanitary	Measures	(SPS	Agreement).	
75	Agreement	on	Trade-Related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights	(TRIPS	Agreement).	
76	Finger,	Joseph,	Schuler	Philip,	‘Implementation	of	Uruguay	Round	Commitments:	The	Development	
Challenge,’	(1999)	Policy	Research	Working	Paper	Series	1264,	The	World	Bank.	
77	See	Article	9	of	the	SPS	Agreement;	Article	67	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement;	and	Article	20(3)	of	the	Customs	
Valuation.	
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claim	 that	 industrialised	 countries	have	done	 little	 to	help	 them.78	 	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 area	of	
competition	law,	developing	countries	have	already	reported	receiving	inadequate	technical	
assistance	 from	 developed	 countries,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 many	 of	 them	 are	 unable	 to	
establish	the	institutions	and	agencies	necessary	to	efficiently	enforce	competition	rules.79		It	
is	therefore	understandable	that	developing	countries	are	reluctant	to	expend	their	already	
scarce	 resource	 on	 a	 venture	 that	 would	 bind	 them	 to	 more	 obligations	 without	 first	
obtaining	assurances	that	they	would	receive	the	necessary	help	in	order	to	do	so.	
Attempts	to	Establish	a	Global	Competition	Law	Agreement	
	
There	 have	 been	 several	 attempts	 throughout	 history	 to	 establish	 an	 international	
competition	 law	 agreement.	 	 Unsurprisingly,	 these	 attempts	 have	 all	 failed	 at	 the	
negotiation	stage.		The	first	attempt	came	following	the	First	World	War	when	the	League	
of	 Nations	 called	 for	 a	 global	 conference	 in	 1925	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 and	 abolish	 the	
obstacles	 to	 the	 development	 of	 international	 trade.	 	 This	 led	 to	 the	 World	 Economic	
Conference	 in	 1927,	 whose	 primary	 objective	 was	 develop	 policies	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	
barriers	to	international	trade	as	well	as	government	barriers	such	as	tariffs.80		Additionally,	
many	of	the	participants	also	discussed	the	issue	of	private	barriers,	such	as	domestic	and	
international	cartels,	as	they	considered	these	to	be	of	equal	importance.		It	was	during	this	
conference	that	the	idea	of	using	a	universal	law	to	govern	and	protect	global	competition	
was	first	deemed	a	potential	international	issue.81	
	
The	official	objective	of	the	1927	Conference	was	to	convince	governments	of	the	necessity	
of	 cooperation	 with	 foreign	 governments	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 economic	 collapse	 and	 the	
subsequent	 political	 consequences.82	 	 194	 participants	 from	 fifty	 nations	 were	 in	
attendance,	including	the	members	of	the	League	of	Nations,	the	United	States,	the	Soviet	
Union,	 and	 Turkey.83	 	 Conference	 organisers	 hoped	 that	 government	 participants	 would	
                                                
78	Finger,	M.;	Winters	A.,	‘Reciprocity	in	the	WTO,’	(2002)	in	Hoekman,	Bernard;	Mattoo,	Aasitya;	English,	
Edward	Philip,	Development,	Trade	and	the	WTO:	A	Handbook,	(2002)	World	Bank	at	51-2.	
79	Papadopoulos,	Anestis	S.	The	International	Dimension	of	EU	Competition	and	Policy,	(2010)	Cambridge	
University	Press	at	268.	
80	Gerber,	David.	Global	Competition:	Law,	Market,	and	Globalization	at	24.	
81	Ibid.	
82	Gerber	at	25.	
83	Ibid.	
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realise	the	 importance	of	 fostering	relationships	with	one	another	on	their	own.	 	As	such,	
the	 agenda	 did	 not	 contain	 plans	 to	 create	 any	 sort	 of	 binding	 agreement	 and	 the	
participants	 were	 not	 required	 to	 represent	 their	 government	 in	 an	 official	 capacity.		
Instead,	 conference	 leaders	 intended	 on	 developing	 a	 set	 of	 internationally	 accepted	
responses	 to	various	global	economic	problems,	which	would	 then	convince	 the	public	as	
well	 as	world	 leaders	 of	 the	 need	 to	 implement	 further	 cooperative	 economic	 policies.84		
Through	the	conference’s	 initiative,	a	number	of	studies	were	conducted	on	the	effects	of	
international	cartels,	which	would	go	on	to	have	a	major	impact	on	the	way	the	issue	was	
subsequently	discussed.85	 	Ultimately	however,	 its	 final	 recommendations	did	not	warrant	
the	establishment	of	a	binding	 international	competition	law	system	nor	did	 it	call	 for	any	
sort	 of	 enforcement	 agency	 or	 office	 to	 oversee	 international	 cartels,	 much	 to	 the	
disappointment	of	some	participants.86		Instead,	the	Conference	recommendations	included	
instructions	 for	 League	members	 to	 document	 information	 related	 to	 international	 cartel	
behaviour,	monitor	 their	 activities,	 and	 investigate	 and	publish	 information	 regarding	 any	
negative	 effects	 they	 produced.	 	 Despite	 these	 hopeful	 first	 steps	 in	 implementing	 an	
international	competition	law	agreement,	the	start	of	the	Great	Depression	followed	by	the	
Second	 World	 War	 forestalled	 any	 attempts	 states	 might	 have	 made	 to	 follow	 the	
recommendations	set	by	the	Conference.			
	
The	 Havana	 Charter	 project	 began	 in	 1948	 and	 from	 the	 beginning,	 it	 included	 plans	 to	
create	 an	 international	 institution	 in	 order	 to	 stabilise	 and	 improve	 commercial	
relationships.		While	competition	law	was	only	one	small	part	of	the	Havana	Charter,	it	was	
considered	by	many	to	be	an	integral	part	of	the	entire	project.		The	Havana	Charter’s	main	
objective	was	 therefore	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 International	 Trade	Organisation	 (ITO),	which	
would	contain	restrictive	practices	codes	governing	global	competition.87	
                                                
84	Ibid.		
85	 League	of	Nations,	 ‘Report	and	Proceedings	of	 the	World	Economic	Conference,’	 (paper	presented	at	 the	
World	Economic	Conference	held	in	Geneva	4-23	May	1927)	146-8;	CEL	46	II;	League	of	Nations	Publication	at	
49.	
86	The	Official	Report	stated,	“So	far	as	regards	international	[cartel]	agreements,	it	is	generally	recognised	that	
the	 establishment	of	 an	 international	 juridical	 regime	 is	 impossible	 in	 view	of	 the	divergences	between	 the	
measure	which	various	countries	have	considered	 it	necessary	 to	 take	 in	 the	matter,	and	on	account	of	 the	
objections	of	principle	which	a	number	of	states	would	feel	on	national	and	constitutional	grounds	to	any	such	
system.”	
87	Brown,	William	A.	The	United	States	and	the	Restoration	of	World	Trade:	an	analysis	and	appraisal	of	the	ITO	
charter	and	the	General	agreement	on	tariffs	and	trade,	(1950)	Brookings	Institution	at	47.	
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The	negotiations	were	predominately	 led	by	 the	United	States,	whose	proposal	contained	
two	 elements.	 	 One	 of	 these	 was	 a	 set	 of	 substantive	 principles	 that	 would	 apply	 to	 all	
states.		These	principles	embodied	a	code	of	conduct	that	mainly	governed	trade,	focusing	
on	four	main	areas:	government	 interference	with	trade	(tariffs	and	quotas);	private	party	
restrictive	agreements	(cartels);	commodity	agreements	among	governments;	and	national	
treatment	of	foreign	investment.		The	hope	was	to	create	a	set	of	principles	that	would	be	
‘fair’	 and	 impartial	 for	 all	 parties	 and	 could	 therefore	 be	 used	 as	 the	 foundation	 for	
international	economic	relations.		The	second	element	of	the	United	States’	proposal	called	
for	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 international	 organisation	 –	 the	 International	 Trade	Organization	 -	
that	would	enforce	these	principles.	
	
The	Charter	also	built	on	the	idea	of	a	global	competition	law	agreement	as	discussed	in	the	
1927	Conference.	 	 Early	on	 in	 the	discussions	with	officials	 from	 the	United	Kingdom	and	
Canada,	 the	 United	 States	 argued	 for	 strong	 competition	 laws	 that	 would	 include	
prohibitions	on	anti-competitive	conduct,	such	as	cartels,	and	enforcement	mechanisms	to	
police	 these	 provisions.88	 	 The	 UK	 officials	 considered	 these	 proposals	 too	 onerous	 and	
convinced	 the	 U.S.	 State	 Department	 to	 relax	 these	 provisions,	 as	 at	 the	 time,	 UK	
competition	 law	 did	 not	 contain	 any	 prohibitions	 on	 cartels	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 anti-
competitive	 behaviour.89	 	 The	United	 States’	 final	 proposal	 therefore	 did	 not	 contain	 any	
prohibitions	 on	 anti-competitive	 conduct.	 	 Instead,	 it	 determined	 which	 conduct	 was	
unlawful	and	asked	for	states	to	action	against	it.	
	
The	response	from	the	57	countries	was	largely	underwhelming.		Negotiations	for	the	final	
agreement	 were	 fraught	 with	 tension	 –	 the	 most	 vehement	 came	 from	 less	 developed	
countries,	 mainly	 participants	 from	 Latin	 American	 countries.	 	 In	 order	 to	 facilitate	 the	
agreement,	the	U.S.	made	a	number	of	concessions	to	developing	countries,	such	as	giving	
special	treatment	to	such	countries	and	assisting	them	in	developing	their	own	economies.90		
                                                
88	 U.S.	 Department	 of	 State,	 Proposal	 for	 consideration	 by	 an	 international	 conference	 on	 trade	 and	
employment.	(1945)	1-2.	
89	Gerber	at	49.	
90	 Toye,	 Richard,	 ‘Developing	Multilateralism:	 The	Havana	Charter	 and	 the	 Fight	 for	 the	 International	 Trade	
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53	countries	thus	signed	the	agreement	in	March	of	1948.		The	Charter	ultimately	failed	to	
come	into	force,	due	in	large	part	to	the	United	States	refusal	to	present	the	agreement	to	
the	Senate	for	ratification.91	
	
As	mentioned	above,	the	Munich	Code	was	one	of	the	most	serious	undertakings	as	well	as	
the	 most	 comprehensive	 to	 date	 that	 endeavoured	 to	 establish	 an	 international	
competition	 law	agreement.	 	 It	was	drafted	between	1991	and	1993	 in	 the	 final	stages	of	
the	WTO	Uruguay	Round	by	a	private	group	of	 twelve	 leading	competition	and	 trade	 law	
academics	 and	 practitioners	 who	 called	 themselves	 the	 International	 Antitrust	 Code	
Working	Group	(Munich	Group).	 	The	Group	consisted	of	nine	German,	one	Japanese,	and	
two	 American	 academics,	 who	 were	 additionally	 all	 qualified	 lawyers	 in	 their	 respective	
countries.	 	 Recognising	 that	 many	 GATT	 members	 were	 considering	 incorporating	
competition	law	into	the	proposed	World	Trade	Organisation,	the	Munich	Group	sought	to	
provide	guidance	on	how	to	reconcile	the	inconsistencies	between	international	trade	and	
competition	 law.92	 	 They	 proposed	 that	 the	 Munich	 Code	 could	 be	 enacted	 as	 a	 new	
plurilateral	trade	agreement	under	Annexe	4	of	the	WTO	Agreement.	
	
As	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 difficulties	 political	 powers	 are	 often	 faced	 with	 when	 negotiating	
international	 law	agreements,	the	Munich	Group	 itself	could	not	agree	on	the	substantive	
content	of	the	Munich	Code.	 	The	majority	of	the	Group	proposed	adopting	an	elaborate,	
interventionist	 code	 comprised	 of	 twenty	 articles	 separated	 into	 eight	 parts	 governing	
different	aspects	of	 competition	 law.	 	These	 included	provisions	 regulating	horizontal	and	
vertical	 restraints,	 market	 concentration,	 abuses	 of	 dominant	 position,	 and	 a	 regime	 for	
public	undertakings	and	state	authorisation.93	 	On	the	other	hand,	the	minority	advocated	
for	a	 less	detailed	intrusive	model,	which	encouraged	the	adoption	of	fifteen	fundamental	
principles	designed	to	provide	support	in	the	development	of	international	competition	law	
policies.	 	The	different	approaches	proposed	by	the	majority	and	the	minority	will	now	be	
discussed	in	more	detail.	
                                                
91	Gerber	at	45.	
92	Petersmann,	E.U.,	‘International	Competition	Rules	for	Governments	and	for	Private	Business:	The	Case	for	
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93	‘The	Draft	International	Antitrust	Code,’	(1993)	Antitrust	&	Trade	Regulation	Report,	Vol.	64,	No.	1628.	
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Along	 with	 setting	 minimum	 domestic	 standards	 of	 competition	 law,	 which	 has	 been	
discussed	earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	majority	 of	 the	Munich	Group’s	 draft	 of	 the	Munich	
Code	set	out	five	core	principles:94	
	
1. Domestic	minimum	standards	of	competition	law	(outlined	above)	
2. A	principle	of	national	 treatment:	all	 signatories	were	to	abide	by	 the	principles	of	
equality	and	non-discrimination	according	to	the	tenets	of	the	WTO.	
3. Substantive	 international	 standards:	 all	 signatories	were	 to	 apply	 and	 enforce	 the	
suggested	 international	 standards	 in	 relation	 to	 trans-border	 anticompetitive	
behaviour	when	applying	their	domestic	competition	laws	
4. A	 principle	 of	 international	 procedural	 initiatives:	 all	 signatories	 were	 to	 establish	
appropriate	institutions	and	mechanisms	in	order	to	effectively	enforce	the	domestic	
and	international	standards	of	competition	law.	
5. A	 principle	 of	 exclusivity:	 The	 Munich	 Code	 would	 only	 apply	 to	 international	
anticompetitive	 behaviour	 rather	 than	 anticompetitive	 behaviour	 confined	 solely	
within	one	jurisdiction.	
	
In	 order	 to	 enforce	 the	 principles	 and	 provisions	 detailed	 above,	 the	 Munich	 Group	
proposed	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 International	 Antitrust	Authority	 (IAA)	 under	 the	WTO,	
which	would	be	led	by	a	president,	appointed	for	terms	lasting	no	more	than	six	years,	and	
supported	 by	 an	 International	 Antitrust	 Council	 of	 twenty	 members.	 	 The	 IAA	 would	 be	
granted	extensive	powers,	similar	to	existing	international	enforcement	institutions,	such	as	
the	WTO	Dispute	Settlement	Body.		 It	was	here	that	the	lofty	ambitions	of	the	majority	of	
the	 Munich	 Group	 hit	 a	 snag.	 	 Most	 of	 the	 representatives	 at	 the	 Uruguay	 round	 were	
concerned	by	the	idea	of	a	supra-national	enforcement	agency	and	panel	with	the	power	to	
override	their	national	courts.95	
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Recognising	 the	value	of	 the	differences	between	national	 competition	 laws,	 the	minority	
proposed	adopting	a	more	minimalist	 system	of	 international	competition	 law,	which	was	
comprised	of	a	general	statement	of	fifteen	principles.		These	fifteen	principles	would	serve	
as	guidance	for	national	competition	law	authorities	rather	than	setting	out	a	framework	of	
binding	provisions.		The	only	substantive	provisions	the	minority	felt	should	be	harmonised	
were	 for	 the	worst	competition	 law	offences,	 such	hard-core	cartel	behaviour.	 	While	 the	
minority	still	advocated	for	the	establishment	of	the	 IAA,	 it	was	suggested	that	 its	powers	
should	be	limited	to	providing	advice	and	assistance	and	acting	as	an	arbiter	of	international	
jurisdictional	disputes.	
	
While	 imposing	very	few	actually	binding	provisions	on	ratifying	countries,	the	minority	of	
the	Munich	Group	did	suggest	that	countries	should	be	required	to	consider	the	effects	its	
enforcement	 decisions	 would	 have	 on	 the	 international	 community.	 	 They	 also	
recommended	 limiting	 the	 exemptions	 granted	 under	 domestic	 competition	 laws	 and	
reducing	the	number	of	defences.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 concerns	 related	 to	 the	 IAA,	 some	 countries	 were	 also	 critical	 of	 the	
Munich	 Code’s	 approach	 to	 international	 treaty	 obligations.	 	 Rather	 than	 wait	 for	
international	 obligations	 to	 become	 binding	 when	 they	 ratified	 into	 domestic	 law,	 the	
majority	 of	 the	 Munich	 Group	 proposed	 compelling	 all	 potential	 signatories	 to	 adopt	
domestic	 laws	 that	 complied	with	 at	 least	 the	 same	 standard	 and	 content	 as	 the	Munich	
Code,	thereby	establishing	it	as	the	benchmark	for	all	domestic	competition	laws.			Some	of	
the	provisions	that	potential	signatories	would	have	been	asked	to	amend	include:96	
	
1. How	horizontal	restraints,	such	as	cartel	behaviour	and	market	division,	and	vertical	
restraints	were	 to	be	governed	 in	each	 jurisdiction:	 these	were	classified	as	per	se	
illegal	 in	 the	 Munich	 Code,	 however,	 many	 jurisdictions	 do	 not	 identify	 them	 as	
such;97	
2. The	 thresholds	 that	 applied	 in	 certain	 provisions:	 the	 Munich	 Code	 imposed	 far	
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97	Comanor,	William	S.;	Rey,	Patrick,	‘Competition	Policy	Toward	Vertical	Restraints	in	Europe	and	the	United	
States,’	(1996)	Paper	Presented	at	Conference	‘Global	Issues	on	Competition	Policy,’	Vienna,	20	June	1996.	
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higher	 thresholds	 than	 those	of	 a	 number	of	 jurisdictions,	 notably	with	 regards	 to	
assessing	business	concentration;	
3. The	 level	 of	 importance	 that	 is	 associated	 with	 violations	 of	 certain	 competition	
laws:	 for	 instance,	 the	 United	 States	 has	 a	 more	 moderate	 approach	 to	 vertical	
restraints	that	those	contained	in	the	Munich	Code;	
4. Some	 exemptions,	 such	 as	 those	 for	 export	 cartels	 and	 those	 granted	 to	 specific	
industries,	 like	 exemptions	 the	 U.S.	 grants	 to	 defence	 related	 industries,	 that	 are	
contained	in	many	jurisdictions’	competition	laws	would	not	be	consistent	with	the	
provisions	outlined	in	the	Munich	Code;	
5. A	 number	 of	 national	 competition	 law	 authorities,	 such	 as	 Kenya,	 are	 required	 to	
account	 for	 non-competition	 considerations,	 such	 as	 national	 interest,	 when	
deciding	 on	 a	 case.	 	 These	 considerations	 would	 not	 necessarily	 align	 with	 the	
interests	of	those	contained	in	the	Munich	Code;	and	
6. Many	 jurisdictions	 completely	 exempt	 certain	 acts	 of	 state	 from	 their	 competition	
laws.		These	exemptions	would	be	wholly	inconsistent	with	the	Munich	Code.	
	
Given	 these	 concerns	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 suggested	 minimum	 standards,	 which	 were	
drafted	by	mostly	EU	academics	and	practitioners	and	thus	were	perceived	to	be	excessively	
influenced	by	 the	EU,	 it	 is	not	surprising	 the	Munich	Code	was	widely	 rejected	during	 the	
Uruguay	 round,	 with	 the	 delegation	 from	 the	 U.S.	 being	 its	 strongest	 critic.98	 	 Sir	 Leon	
Brittan,	then	the	EU	Commissioner	even	recognised	that	it	would	be	unreasonable	to	expect	
countries	 to	 agree	 on	 an	 international	 harmonisation	 principle	 based	 solely	 on	 EU	
competition	policies.99	 	Developing	countries	 in	particular,	who	 lack	the	economic	stability	
and	integration	necessary	to	effectively	incorporate	these	principles	into	their	competition	
law	system	would	have	an	especially	difficult	time	conforming	to	these	standards.	
	
The	main	criticisms	of	both	the	majority	and	the	minority’s	proposals,	voiced	by	the	United	
States	 delegates	 and	 the	 international	 community	 at	 large,	 can	 be	 classified	 into	 two	
                                                
98	See	Klein,	J.,	‘Anticipating	the	Millennium:	International	Antitrust	Enforcement	at	the	End	of	the	Twentieth	
Century,’	Address	Before	the	Fordham	Corporate	Law	Institution,	16	October	1997.;	see	also	Klein,	J,	‘A	Note	
of	Caution	with	Respect	to	a	WTO	Agenda	on	Competition	Policy,’	Address	Presented	at	the	Royal	Institute	of	
International	Affairs,	18	November	1996.	
99	See	UNCTAD,	‘United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development:	Competition	and	Trade,’	16	
September	1994,	UNCTAD/ITD/9.	
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categories,	 institutional	 concerns	 and	 substantive	 concerns.100	 	 The	 institutional	 concerns	
were	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 IAA	 and	 its	 associated	 supra-national	 procedures	 placed	
unnecessary	 restrictions	 on	 national	 sovereignty.101	 	 Secondly,	 the	 substantive	 concerns	
dealt	with	the	overly	detailed	provisions	of	 the	Munich	Code	 itself,	which	did	not	address	
the	legitimate	differences	between	different	nations’	domestic	competition	laws.	
	
In	addition	to	the	concerns	raised	that	the	IAA’s	authority	would	supersede	the	authority	of	
a	national	competition	law	authority,	countries	were	also	troubled	with	the	notion	that	the	
IAA	 would	 also	 have	 the	 power	 to	 investigate	 alleged	 instances	 of	 anticompetitive	
behaviour	 and	 initiate	 enforcement	 actions	 before	 domestic	 authorities	 and	 courts.		
Furthermore,	 these	 powers	 extended	 to	 the	 ability	 to	 bring	 actions	 against	 any	 national	
competition	law	authority,	in	their	own	national	courts,	if	they	refused	to	take	enforcement	
actions	of	their	own.	
	
While	 the	 Munich	 Code	 strengthened	 the	 United	 States	 opposition	 to	 the	 idea	 of	
incorporating	binding	international	competition	law	policies	into	international	trade	law,	it	
also	gave	the	EU	the	fuel	it	needed	to	lobby	for	inclusion	of	these	principles	into	the	WTO.		
The	 concerns	 that	 arose	 during	 the	 Munich	 Code’s	 discussions	 highlighted	 the	 need	 for	
compromise	 and	 flexibility	 when	 considering	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 harmonised	 international	
competition	law	agreement.	
	
As	 previously	 reiterated,	 the	WTO	 has	 ultimately	 rejected	 the	 notion	 of	 implementing	 a	
harmonised	competition	law	agreement,	however,	it	did	toy	with	the	idea	at	various	times.		
The	 WTO	 first	 commissioned	 a	 group	 headed	 by	 Karel	 van	 Miert,	 the	 then	 European	
Commissioner	for	competition	law,	to	draft	recommendations	on	the	relationship	between	
competition	 law	and	the	WTO.102	 	The	report,	which	was	 issued	 in	1995,	emphasised	that	
the	WTO’s	 ‘new’	 free	 trade	 institution	 required	 the	 further	 development	 of	 competition	
                                                
100	Waller,	Spencer	Weber,	‘An	International	Common	Law	of	Antitrust,’	(1999)	New	England	Law	Review,	Vol.	
34,	No.	1.	
101	Gifford,	Daniel,	J.,	‘Antitrust	and	Trade	Issues:	Similarities,	Differences	and	Relationships,’	(1995)	Depaul	
Law	Review,	Vol.	44,	No.	1049.	
102	European	Commission,	Directorate-General	IV,	‘Competition	Policy	in	the	New	Trade	Order:	Strengthening	
International	Cooperation	and	Roles:	Report	of	the	Group	of	Experts,’	[COM	(95)	359	final]	(July	1995).	
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law.103	 	 Interestingly,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 two	of	 the	academics	of	 the	Munich	Group,	
Professors	Petersmann	and	Immenga,	were	also	part	of	the	group	of	experts	appointed	to	
draft	the	report	by	Commissioner	van	Miert.	
	
Building	on	the	principles	and	methods	proposed	by	the	Munich	Group	two	years	previous,	
the	 report	 also	 advocated	 for	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 plurilateral	 competition	 law	 agreement	
under	Annex	 IV	of	 the	WTO	that	would	 include	signatories	 from	all	 the	member	states	of	
the	OECD,	 along	with	 the	Central	 and	Eastern	 European	 countries,	 as	well	 as	Hong	Kong,	
Korea,	Singapore,	and	Taiwan.104		Rather	than	foist	the	principles	of	competition	law	onto	all	
ratifying	 countries,	 as	 was	 the	 approach	 suggested	 by	 the	 Munich	 Code,	 the	 report	
suggested	 that	 should	 such	 an	 agreement	 be	 adopted,	 it	 would	 initially	 only	 be	
implemented	by	countries	that	already	had	established	competition	law	systems.105		It	drew	
on	provisions	already	established	in	bilateral	enforcement	cooperation	agreements	such	as	
notification	procedures,	cooperation,	positive	and	negative	comity	obligations,	as	well	as	a	
few	 minimum	 standards	 for	 cross-border	 competition	 transgressions,	 for	 instance	
prohibiting	international	cartels,	including	export	cartels,	vertical	restraints	(for	which	a	rule	
of	reason	test	was	proposed),	abuse	of	market	power,	including	national	monopolies.106		In	
addition,	the	report	dialled	back	the	Munich	Group’s	proposals	demanding	countries	adopt	
the	 same	 standards	 and	 provisions	 contained	 in	 the	 Code	 and	 suggested	 that	 while	 the	
principles	 in	 the	new	agreement	would	have	to	be	 implemented	 into	 the	national	 laws	of	
the	member	countries,	that	requirement	would	share	similarities	with	the	way	EU	Directives	
themselves	 are	 incorporated.107	 	 Member	 countries	 with	 competition	 law	 systems	 that	
already	 contained	 the	 same	principles	or	 similar	 interpretations	of	 those	principles	would	
not	be	required	to	amend	them.	
	
Again,	 departing	 from	 the	 Munich	 Code’s	 suggestion	 of	 establishing	 a	 separate	 body	 to	
enforce	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 new	 agreement,	 the	 EU	 report	 proposed	 using	 the	WTO’s	
                                                
103	Van	Miert	stated,	“[Regarding]	competition	policy,	how	can	we	 imagine	that	this	new	‘trade	order’	could	
produce	 its	 full,	 positive	 effects	 when,	 throughout	 the	 world,	 companies	 are	 subject	 to	 different	 rules	 on	
competition	and,	of	even	more	concern,	certain	national	authorities	(or	regional	authorities	in	the	case	of	the	
EU)	rigorously	apply	their	antitrust	legislation	while	others	have	a	more	lax	approach?”		
104	Report	of	EU	Experts	at	16-17.	
105	Ibid.	
106	Ibid	at	17.	
107	Ibid.	
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existing	 dispute	 settlement	 system,	 which	 would	 have	 the	 power	 to	 review	 disputes	
involving	competition	issues.		There	are	four	types	of	disputes	the	report	foresaw	that	could	
come	 before	 the	 WTO	 dispute	 settlement	 body:	 disputes	 over	 international	 procedural	
obligations;	disputes	related	to	per	se	violations	of	competition	law;	disputes	related	to	rule	
of	 reason	 violations	 of	 competition	 law;	 and	 disputes	 involving	 restrictions	 to	 market	
access.108	 	 By	 allowing	 the	 agreement	 to	 germinate	 and	 evolve	 through	 the	 slow	
introduction	of	 its	provisions,	the	EU	group	hoped	the	agreement	would	be	more	likely	to	
be	accepted	by	more	countries	and	thereby	expanding	 its	geographic	scope	and	 influence	
over	time.109	
	
While	the	proposals	in	the	EU	report	were	considered	to	be	far	more	reasonable	than	those	
put	forth	in	the	Munich	Code,	the	idea	of	establishing	a	separate	international	competition	
law	 agreement	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 WTO	 once	 again	 faced	 criticism.	 	 One	 of	 the	
biggest	 criticisms	 raised	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 no	 business	 representatives	 were	 involved	 in	
drafting	the	report.		The	Union	des	Industries	de	le	Communauté	Européenne	(UNICE),	now	
known	as	Business	Europe	repeatedly	voiced	its	concerns	regarding	this	issue:110	
	
UNICE	 is	 concerned	 about	 a	 binding	 multilateral	 agreement	 on	 specific	
competition	 rules	 concluded	 in	 the	WTO	as	opposed	 to	 clear	objectives	or	
guidance	for	a	voluntary	set	of	rules.		[The]	WTO	is	not	intended	or	equipped	
to	 operate	 at	 the	 private-to-private	 level.	 	 UNICE	 fears	 that	 a	 binding	
agreement	 cannot	 but	 result	 in	 [a]	 binding	 review	 of	 specific	 essentially	
private	cases	by	bodies	that	are	inappropriate	and	ill	equipped	for	that	task.		
This	 will	 greatly	 slow	 down	 commerce	 and	 escalate	 private	 disputes	 to	
international	problems.	
	
Despite	 these	 criticisms,	 the	 report	 succeeded	 in	 triggering	 further	 calls	 to	 discuss	 the	
incorporation	 of	 competition	 policy	 into	 international	 trade	 law.	 At	 the	 WTO’s	 1996	
                                                
108	Ibid.	
109	Ibid.	
110	UNICE,	‘Preliminary	UNICE	Comments	on	the	Commission	Discussion	Paper:	Trade	and	Competition:	WTO	
Framework	on	Competition	Rules,	(1999)	UNICE	Paper	No.	1/30/1,	available	at	
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Singapore	Conference,	EU	officials	called	for	the	establishment	of	a	working	group	devoted	
to	competition	policy.111	
The	Efforts	of	the	WTO	
	
The	formation	of	the	working	group	on	trade	and	competition	law	in	the	WTO	was	met	with	
enthusiasm	 from	 a	 large	 number	 of	member	 states.	 	 Hundreds	 of	 communications	 were	
submitted	 from	 these	member	 states	debating	 the	merits	 of	 introducing	 competition	 law	
and	policy	into	the	international	trade	law	system.112			Between	1998	and	2001,	the	working	
group	 published	 several	 reports,	 based	 on	 the	 papers	 submitted	 by	 WTO	 members,	
outlining	the	 issues	the	group	was	concentrating	on	as	well	as	discussing	the	possibility	of	
establishing	 a	 WTO	 competition	 law	 framework.	 	 Under	 the	 proposed	 framework,	 all	
members	 to	 the	 WTO	 would	 implement	 and	 apply	 their	 domestic	 competition	 laws	
alongside	the	agreed	international	principles.		The	framework	would	develop	progressively,	
beginning	with	all	member	 states	adopting	a	common	structure	 for	 their	 competition	 law	
systems	 before	 moving	 on	 to	 consolidating	 the	 more	 common	 elements	 of	 competition	
policy,	 such	 as	 the	prohibition	on	hard-core	 cartels.	 	 Finally,	 these	 components	would	be	
consolidated	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 which	 of	 them	 could	 be	 incorporated	 into	 the	WTO	
dispute	settlement	mechanisms.113			
	
The	 group’s	 efforts	were	 bolstered	 in	 2001	 at	 the	Doha	ministerial	 conference	when	 the	
WTO	issued	a	declaration	in	support	of	its	work.114		It	was	decided	that	competition	law	and	
policy	 would	 be	 included	 in	 the	 next	 round	 of	 negotiations.	 	 Despite	 this	 promising	
affirmation,	 the	United	States	and	a	number	of	developing	countries	 rejected	 requests	 to	
put	 competition	 law	 on	 the	 agenda	 for	 the	 Cancun	 ministerial	 conference.	 	 One	 of	 the	
reasons	 given	 for	 this	 refusal	 was	 the	 issue	 that	 developing	 countries	 still	 lacked	 the	
necessary	 experience	 to	 properly	 negotiate	 on	 issues	 concerning	 competition	 law	 and	
                                                
111	WTO,	1996	Singapore	Ministerial	Conference	of	the	Parties	to	the	WTO,	Singapore	Ministerial	Declaration	
WT/MIN(96)/Dec.	
112	See	for	instance	the	paper	submitted	by	Japan:	‘Non-Paper	on	Trade	and	Competition	by	the	Japanese	
Delegation	to	the	WTO,’	reprinted	in	(1996)	International	Business	Law,	Vol.	26,	No.	11	at	463.	
113	Van	Miert,	Karl,	‘The	WTO	and	Competition	Policy:	the	Need	to	Consider	Negotiations,’	Address	before	
Ambassadors	to	the	WTO,	Geneva,	21	April	1998.	
114	WTO,	Doha	WTO	Ministerial	2001:	Ministerial	Declaration,	(2001)	WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1.	
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policy.115		The	Cancun	ministerial	conference	in	2003	therefore	failed	to	produce	any	sort	of	
agreement	on	the	matter.		This	was	in	large	part	due	to	a	group	of	twenty-nine	developing	
countries,	 including	 India	 and	 China,	 combining	 their	 bargaining	 power	 and	 refusing	 to	
accept	the	inclusion	of	the	Singapore	Issues	regarding	competition	law	should	not	proceed	
to	negotiation.116		In	July	2004,	the	working	group	was	officially	disbanded	and	competition	
law	was	subsequently	removed	from	formal	discussions	in	the	WTO.117	
	
Since	the	failure	of	the	WTO	to	establish	a	separate	competition	law	agreement,	there	have	
been	no	subsequent	attempts	to	form	a	global,	harmonised	competition	law	agreement.	
	
Establishing	a	Global	Framework 
	
Developing	 a	 working	 global	 competition	 law	 framework	 would	 likely	 be	 far	 easier	 than	
achieving	 total	 cooperation	 and	 approval	 from	 many	 different	 jurisdictions	 during	
negotiations	for	a	harmonised	global	competition	law.			
	
In	contrast	to	an	established	international	agreement,	a	globalised	framework	would	consist	
of	 a	 serious	 of	 networks	 between	 existing	 competition	 law	 authorities.	 	 Chapter	 Two	
outlined	 the	 different	ways	 in	which	 international	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 International	
Competition	 Network	 and	 the	 OECD	 have	 fostered	 greater	 cooperation	 amongst	 its	
members	 in	combating	 international	 cartels.	 	This	 section	will	propose	developing	a	more	
cohesive	and	structured	framework	in	which	developing	countries	can	gain	the	support	they	
need.	
	
While	 bilateral	 and	 regional	 cooperation	with	 regards	 to	 competition	 law	 exists	 between	
trading	partners,	these	agreements	are	usually	concluded	between	developed	countries	or	
developing	countries	with	 larger	economies.	 	By	and	 large,	most	competition	 law	systems	
are	 built	 around	 an	 ‘effects’	 doctrine	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 competition	 law	 authority	 will	 only	
become	involved	in	a	case	if	the	anti-competitive	behaviour	has	a	direct	effect	on	their	own	
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economy.		In	theory,	this	approach	works	quite	well.		It	would	be	ludicrous	to	suggest	that	
competition	 law	authorities	 should	be	 responsible	 for	 policing	 anti-competitive	behaviour	
that	not	only	 affects	 another	 jurisdiction	 altogether	but	 that	 also	has	no	effect	 on	 theirs.		
However,	 the	waters	have	become	 increasingly	murkier	as	competitive	practices	between	
businesses	 have	 shifted	 from	 a	 largely	 national	 context	 to	 an	 ever	more	 global	 one.	 	 For	
instance,	some	international	cartels	such	as	export	cartels	are	domiciled	in	one	jurisdiction	
but	only	have	effects	abroad.	 	Eleanor	Fox	has	also	described	the	gaps	 in	which	a	country	
that	has	suffered	harm	can	seek	reparation	when	relying	solely	on	a	national	competition	
law	framework.	 	Fox	identifies	four	existing	possible	gaps	where	a	global	framework	could	
potentially	correct:118	
	
The	 first	 gap	 Fox	 identifies	 relates	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 developing	 countries	 lack	 an	
effective	 competition	 or	 antitrust	 law	 system,	 which	 makes	 them	 easy	 victims	 when	
targeted	by	 international	cartels.119	 	The	second	gap	described	by	Fox	 is	more	evidentiary	
and	 affects	 both	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries.120	 	 In	 cases	 such	 as	 international	
cartels,	 where	 cartel	 members	 may	 be	 abroad,	 the	 evidence	 needed	 to	 successfully	
prosecute	them	would	also	be	abroad.	 	Therefore,	even	if	the	competition	authority	has	a	
reasonably	good	case,	 it	may	fail	due	to	 its	 inability	to	gather	the	required	evidence.	 	The	
third	gap	relates	to	the	way	industrial	policy	is	affected.121		Industrial	policy	in	an	exporting	
country	can	conflict	with	the	competition	policy	in	the	importing	country.		Fox	argues	that	in	
some	instances,	the	exporting	country	may	attempt	to	adopt	restraints	such	as	price-fixing	
in	order	to	protect	its	domestic	firms	from	the	importing	country’s	own	competition	laws,	as	
seen	in	China’s	arguments	in	the	case	concerning	the	vitamin	C	cartel.		The	fourth	and	final	
gap	Fox	describes	outlines	 the	problem	of	 input	cartels.122	 	National	competition	 laws	are	
normally	subject	to	an	effects	doctrine	where	a	national	competition	law	authority	will	only	
become	involved	in	cases	that	cause	direct,	substantial,	and	reasonably	foreseeable	effects	
within	the	domestic	market.		In	addition	to	export	cartels,	this	can	cause	problems	in	global	
business	transactions.		For	instance,	if	a	cartel	fixes	prices	on	a	component	manufactured	in	
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one	country	that	is	then	shipped	to	another	in	order	to	be	assembled	and	the	final	product	
is	then	shipped	to	a	third	country,	where	then	does	the	liability	lie?		It	is	important	to	note	
that	none	of	these	gaps	can	be	corrected	through	the	application	of	national	laws	alone.	
	
A	 global	 competition	 law	 framework	 could	 remedy	 several	 of	 these	 problems	 that	 are	
otherwise	difficult	 to	 solve	on	a	national	 level,	namely	 the	 fact	 that	developing	countries,	
even	 those	 with	 a	 competition	 law	 system	 of	 their	 own,	 are	 incapable	 of	 protecting	
themselves	 from	 international	 cartels	 and	 the	 difficulties	 both	 developing	 and	 developed	
countries	 have	 in	 obtaining	 the	 necessary	 information	 for	 successful	 prosecution.	 	 Fox	
proposes	developing	an	international	competition	law	framework	built	on	the	foundations	
already	 established	 by	 international	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 ICN.123	 	 The	 framework	
directive	 could	 therefore	 include	prohibitions	on	hard-core	 international	 cartels,	 including	
import	 and	 export	 cartels,	 market	 blocking,	 and	 unjustified	 monopolistic	 practices.	 	 By	
providing	 a	 basic	 structure,	 different	 jurisdictions	would	 have	 the	 option	 of	 following	 the	
framework’s	directive	by	inputting	it	into	their	competition	laws	on	their	own	terms,	rather	
than	having	a	 separate	binding	agreement	 foisted	upon	 them.	 	The	 framework	could	also	
work	closely	with	organisations	such	as	the	International	Competition	Network	in	order	to	
foster	 cooperation	 between	 national	 competition	 law	 authorities	 with	 regards	 to	
information	exchanges	and	positive	comity.		With	regards	to	information	sharing,	however,	
special	 attention	 would	 need	 to	 be	 given	 when	 considering	 the	 issue	 of	 confidentiality.	
Many	leniency	programmes	are	dependent	upon	the	promise	of	confidentiality	in	order	to	
remain	 successful.124	 	 	 Without	 the	 agreement	 to	 keep	 information	 confidential,	 cartel	
members	would	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 cooperate	with	 competition	 law	 authorities.	 	 Therefore,	
countries	with	leniency	programmes	that	rely	on	confidentiality	agreements	would	be	less	
able	to	cooperate	with	others.	
	
The	 European	 Union	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	most	 vocal	 supporters	 of	 establishing	 a	 global	
competition	law	framework,	and	has	been	lobbying	for	the	inclusion	of	competition	law	into	
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the	WTO	since	the	1990s.125		Following	the	WTO’s	decision	not	to	address	competition	law	
issues	 in	2004,	the	EU	has	scaled	back	on	their	original	proposals	 for	a	global	competition	
law	 agreement	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 more	 relaxed	 ‘framework.’	 	 Nevertheless,	 the	 current	
European	proposals	are	still	 largely	problematic	for	many	developing	countries.	 	There	are	
three	main	 elements	 in	 the	 EU	proposals:	 1)	 domestic	 competition	 law	 legislation	 should	
contain	prohibitions	on	hard-core	cartels;	2)	domestic	competition	laws	should	also	adhere	
to	 the	 core	WTO	 principles	 of	 non-discrimination,	 transparency,	 and	 procedural	 fairness;	
and	 3)	 the	 multilateral	 framework	 will	 also	 be	 subject	 to	 the	WTO’s	 dispute	 settlement	
system.126			
	
Developing	countries	are	most	likely	to	take	issue	with	the	second	aspect	of	this	proposal	–	
that	 the	principles	of	non-discrimination,	 transparency,	and	procedural	 fairness	 should	be	
made	 binding	 on	 all	 members	 and	 must	 be	 adopted	 into	 their	 competition	 laws.127		
Developing	countries	have	long	argued	that	these	principles	are	not	universally	applicable	to	
all	 issues	 as	 they	 were	 first	 developed	 in	 by	 the	 GATT	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 barriers	 to	
international	 trade.128	 	 Therefore,	 to	 apply	 them	 now	 to	 competition	 policy	 may	 not	 be	
appropriate	 and	 would	 likely	 not	 achieve	 the	 desired	 results.	 	 With	 regards	 to	 the	
procedural	fairness	requirement,	a	key	concern	developing	countries	may	have	is	that	their	
legal	systems	may	differ	too	greatly	with	those	developed	countries	and	they	may	not	have	
the	financial	resources	to	meet	the	standard	set	by	the	notion	of	‘fairness.’		The	concept	of	
fairness	has	different	meanings	according	to	different	legal	systems	as	well	as	political	and	
legal	cultures.129		As	such,	there	is	no	global	consensus	on	the	exact	definition	of	procedural	
fairness	when	applied	to	the	context	of	competition	law	enforcement.	
	
Developing	 countries,	 particularly	 those	 from	 Asia,	 are	 also	 likely	 to	 take	 issue	 with	 the	
outright	ban	on	hard-core	cartels	in	the	European	proposal.		The	main	problem	with	such	a	
ban	 is	 there	 has	 been	 no	 consensus	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 what	 constitutes	 a	 ‘hard-core’	
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Journal	of	Private	International	Law,	Vol.	12,	No.	1	at	77-105.	
126	Sarkar,	A.	N.	Enhancing	Global	Competitiveness:	Advantage	India,	(2009)	I.K.	International	Pvt	Ltd	at	225.	
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cartel.130	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 proposal	 apparently	 assumes	 that	 all	 ‘hard-core’	 cartels	 have	
negative	effects	in	every	market	in	every	country,	regardless	of	their	level	of	development,	
which	is	contentious.	 	Historically,	for	Asian	developing	countries,	cartelisation	formed	the	
foundation	of	many	of	their	industrial	policies.131		It	would	therefore	be	difficult	separating	
which	cartels	ought	to	be	prohibited	and	how	to	change	their	laws	accordingly.		The	issue	of	
which	 laws	 to	 change	 can	 also	 be	 applied	 to	 developed	 countries.	 	 Most	 developed	
countries	have	either	had	exemptions	or	continue	to	maintain	such	exemptions	allowing	for	
small	and	medium-sized	firms	to	cooperate	in	order	to	counteract	the	effects	of	a	dominant	
firm	 in	 the	market.	 	 Therefore,	 a	 universal	 prohibition	 on	 hard-core	 cartels	 in	 the	 global	
framework	would	 arguably	 unduly	 limit	 the	 freedom	 countries	 have	 in	 determining	 their	
own	policies.			
	
Any	 proposed	 globalised	 framework	 should	 therefore	 contain	 concessions	 for	 developing	
countries.	 	 Developing	 countries	 have	 often	 benefited	 from	 special	 and	 differential	
treatment	 in	various	contexts.	 	For	 instance,	 the	agreements	within	 the	WTO	contain	145	
special	 provisions	 geared	 towards	 helping	 developing	 countries.	 	 These	 provisions	 are	
classified	under	five	main	headings:132	
	
1. Provisions	 intended	 to	 enhance	 market	 access	 by	 increasing	 trade	
opportunities.	
2. Provisions	 that	 require	WTO	members	 from	more	developed	economies	 to	
protect	 the	 interests	 of	 developing	 countries.	 	 These	 are	 usually	 phrased	
broadly	 and	 generally	 and	 use	 language	 such	 as	 ‘best	 endeavours,’	 and	
encourage	members	to	‘give	particular	attention	to,’	or	take	‘special	regard’	
of	the	needs	of	developing	countries	when	implementing	new	measures.	
3. Provisions	 that	 allow	 for	 more	 flexibility.	 	 Developing	 countries	 are	 given	
more	 flexibility	 in	 implementing	 rules	 that	 relate	 to	 market	 access,	
exemptions,	 or	 subsidies.	 	 This	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 examples	 of	
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131	Ibid.	
132	 WTO	 Committee	 on	 Trade	 and	 Development,	 ‘Implementation	 of	 Special	 and	 Differential	 Treatment	
Provisions	in	WTO	Agreements	and	Decisions,’	(2000)	WT/COMTD/W/77.	
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special	and	differential	treatment	and	forms	the	basis	of	48	of	the	145	special	
provisions	within	the	WTO.	
4. Provisions	granting	developing	countries	longer	transitional	time	periods.		For	
instance	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 Related	 Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	
Rights	 (TRIPS)	 allows	 developing	 countries	 to	 take	 an	 additional	 five	 years	
while	least	developed	countries	are	granted	a	delay	of	up	to	eleven	years	in	
order	to	bring	their	legislation	in	conformity	with	the	Agreement,	subject	to	a	
few	 exceptions.	 	 The	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 Related	 Investment	 Measures	
(TRIMs)	 also	 gives	 least	 developed	 countries,	 developing	 countries	 and	
developed	 countries	 seven,	 five,	 and	 two	 years	 respectively	 to	 rectify	 any	
inconsistent	trade-related	investment	measure.	
5. Provisions	 giving	 technical	 assistance	 when	 needed.	 	 These	 provisions	
acknowledge	 that	 in	 order	 to	 implement	 the	WTO	 agreements,	 developing	
countries	need	an	adequate	legal	and	institutional	framework	and	therefore	
needed	additional	assistance	in	this	regard.	
	
In	a	global	competition	law	framework,	special	and	differential	provisions	should	allow	for	
flexibility	 as	well	 as	 providing	developing	 countries	with	 adequate	 support,	 particularly	 in	
relation	 to	 international	 cartels.	 	 In	 terms	 of	 flexibility,	 developing	 countries	 ought	 to	 be	
allowed	 to	 incorporate	 provisions	 that	 may	 violate	 core	 principles	 of	 non-discrimination	
such	as	creating	exclusions	or	exemptions	that	would	discriminate	against	foreign	firms.133		
For	 instance,	 as	 stated	 in	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 several	 developing	 countries	 have	
advocated	 for	 the	 abolishment	 of	 allowing	 countries	 to	 exempt	 export	 cartels	 from	 their	
competition	 laws,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 developing	 countries	 themselves.	 	 By	 restricting	
developed	 countries’	 abilities	 to	 exempt	 export	 cartels	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 allowing	
developing	countries	to	do	so,	competition	in	the	global	market	can	expand	to	include	more	
players.	 	However,	 these	provisions	would	also	need	to	be	transparent	 in	order	to	remain	
accountable.		Transparency	can	take	the	form	of	regulations	designed	to	limit	the	scope	of	
such	provisions.		For	example,	returning	to	the	example	of	export	cartel	exemptions,	while	
developing	countries	should	be	allowed	to	employ	them,	limitations	should	be	set	in	order	
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to	ensure	the	exemptions	are	not	abused.	 	For	 instance,	these	limitations	can	include,	but	
by	no	means	should	be	limited	to,	assessing	the	combined	market	power	of	any	proposed	
export	cartel	in	order	to	ensure	it	does	not	ultimately	dominate	the	market.			
	
Additionally,	 developing	 countries	 typically	 lack	 the	 resources	 and	 institutions	 needed	 to	
meet	procedural	 fairness	 requirements	 in	 competition	 law	enforcement.	 	 For	 instance,	 as	
discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Four,	 a	 lack	of	 human	 resources	 and	expertise	 is	 one	of	 the	biggest	
problems	 developing	 countries	 face	 when	 attempting	 to	 enforce	 their	 competition	 laws.		
Limited	 financial	 resources	 can	 also	 have	 a	 grave	 effect	 on	 enforcement.	 	 Special	 and	
differential	provisions	should	therefore	give	more	time	and	resources	to	them	as	opposed	
to	 developed	 countries.	 	 These	 provisions	 can	 include	 encouraging	 cooperation	 between	
jurisdictions	involved	in	international	cartel	cases	to	share	evidence	and	expertise	with	one	
another	as	well	as	giving	developing	countries	more	time	to	conduct	their	investigations.	
	
The	 OECD	 has	 proposed	 establishing	 a	 Competition	 Policy	 Review	Mechanism	 (CPRM)	 in	
addition	to	its	existing	peer	review	programme	that	would	outline	a	peer	review	system	to	
be	implemented	in	a	multilateral	framework	on	competition.134	 	 In	a	public	policy	context,	
peer	 review	 constitutes	 an	 examination	 of	 a	 particular	 governmental	 activity	 by	 a	 peer	
group	 made	 up	 of	 experts	 from	 other	 countries	 or	 independent	 organisations.	 	 All	 peer	
review	programmes	share	a	general	framework.		Peer	review	groups	organise	meetings	and	
provide	continuity	between	individual	reviews.135		The	members	of	the	peer	group	are	also	
responsible	 for	 setting	 the	 review	 criteria	 or	 the	 standards	 to	 be	 used	when	 judging	 the	
subject’s	performance.		Criteria	can	include	policy	recommendations	and	guidelines,	specific	
indicators	 and	benchmarks	 as	well	 as	 legal	 norms.	 	 The	peer	 group	would	 also	 appoint	 a	
secretariat	whose	role	and	responsibilities	typically	vary	depending	on	the	review	process.	
	
Bilateral	or	Regional	Cooperation	
	
To	date,	the	only	bilateral	or	regional	agreements	that	contain	competition	 law	provisions	
are	predominately	concerned	with	free	trade.		Generally	speaking,	only	countries	that	wish	
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to	 join	 the	 European	 Union	 or	 signing	 free	 trade	 agreements	 have	 provisions	 regarding	
cooperating	 in	 competition	 law	 issues.	 	 Bilateral	 or	 regional	 cooperation	 agreements	
specifically	 targeting	 competition	 policy	 have	 not	 yet	 been	 established	 between	 any	
jurisdictions.			
	
Chapter	 Four	 discussed	 the	 difficulties	 developing	 countries	 face	 when	 attempting	 to	
address	 competition	 law	 issues	 through	 regional	 or	 preferential	 trade	 agreements,	
particularly	 when	 attempting	 to	 enter	 into	 these	 agreements	 with	 developed	 countries.		
Developing	countries	are	likely	to	face	similar	challenges	if	they	wish	to	establish	a	bilateral	
or	 regional	 agreement	 devoted	 to	 competition	 policy.	 	 For	 instance,	 while	 such	 an	
agreement	may	be	feasible	between	developed	jurisdictions	such	as	the	EU	and	the	United	
States	 as	well	 as	 developing	 countries	with	 larger	markets	 like	 China,	 India,	 and	Brazil.136		
However,	 bilateral	 cooperation	 between	 developed	 trading	 partners	 and	 developing	
partners	from	smaller	economies	is	difficult	to	facilitate	due	to	an	imbalance	in	powers.		For	
developing	 countries,	 one	 of	 their	 main	 concerns	 is	 that	 their	 domestic	 competition	 law	
authority	 may	 become	 overwhelmed	 with	 requests	 to	 cooperate	 through	 requests	 from	
their	foreign	counterparts	for	specific	information	related	to	the	opening	of	their	domestic	
markets.137	 	 Depending	 on	 the	 volume	 of	 the	 requests,	 competition	 law	 authorities	 in	
developing	jurisdictions	may	be	unable	to	conduct	their	own	investigations	or	research	into	
practices	 or	 behaviours	 affecting	 competition	 in	 their	 own	 markets.138	 	 In	 addition	 to	
potentially	 overburdening	 competition	 law	 authorities	 in	 developing	 countries,	 a	 sudden	
increase	 in	 different	 bilateral	 and	 regional	 agreements	 would	 create	 difficulties	 in	 cross-
implementation	where	provisions	in	one	agreement	may	clash	with	those	of	another.	
	
This	increase	is	one	of	the	biggest	obstacles	in	using	bilateral	or	multilateral	agreements	to	
combat	international	cartels.	If	an	international	cartel	from	one	jurisdiction	targets	another	
and	there	is	no	agreement	between	the	two	nations,	there	is	very	little	the	targeted	nation	
can	do	protect	 itself,	particularly	 if	 it	 is	 a	developing	 country.	 	Developing	 countries	must	
therefore	enter	into	cooperation	agreements	with	both	developing	and	developed	countries	
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in	 order	 to	 solve	 this	 issue.	 	 However,	 the	 sheer	 number	 of	 cooperation	 agreements	 a	
developing	 country	 would	 have	 to	 enter	 into	 in	 order	 to	 make	 international	 cartel	
enforcement	 effective	 makes	 this	 strategy	 nigh	 impossible.	 	 At	 the	 moment,	 there	 are	
approximately	over	one	hundred	countries	with	domestic	competition	laws	and	competition	
law	 authorities.	 	 Therefore,	 any	 developing	 country	 wishing	 to	 enter	 into	 bilateral	
cooperation	agreements	in	order	to	combat	the	spread	of	international	cartels	would	need	
to	sign	agreements	with	over	one	hundred	countries.	
	
One	of	the	other	difficulties	with	bilateral	cooperation	between	competition	law	authorities	
is	 determining	 the	 extent	 of	 what	 exactly	 cooperation	 entails.	 	 Competition	 law	 officials	
tend	to	refer	to	‘reporting’	when	referring	to	specific	cases	where	cooperation	took	place,	
without	elaborating	on	the	particulars	of	that	‘cooperation’	and	exactly	was	‘reported.’		An	
example	of	this	can	been	in	the	way	the	Vitamins	cartel	was	handled.	 	After	U.S.	antitrust	
authorities	announced	they	would	be	investigating	into	the	cartel	activities	of	Hoffmann-La	
Roche,	 Basf	 Aktiengesellschaft	 and	 Aventis	 (now	 known	 as	 Rhône-Poulenc),	 other	
competition	 authorities	 initiated	 their	 own	 investigations.	 	 Among	 these	 competition	
authorities	 was	 Brazil’s	 national	 competition	 authority,	 the	 Secretariat	 of	 Economic	 Law	
(SDE).		The	SDE	was	quick	to	publicise	its	cooperation	with	the	U.S.	antitrust	authorities	but	
did	 not	 provide	 any	 more	 details	 beyond	 that.139	 	 Additionally,	 during	 the	 Lysine	 cartel	
investigations,	the	SDE	again	reported	that	it	had	procured	a	‘great	deal’	of	documents	with	
cooperation	from	the	U.S.	Department	of	Justice	but	again	failed	to	provide	any	details	on	
the	nature	of	these	documents	and	their	importance	in	the	case.140	
	
There	 is	 considerable	 uncertainty	 where	 bilateral	 cooperation	 entails	 the	 exchange	 of	
information,	namely	whether	 it	 includes	all	 information	kept	by	the	competition	authority	
or	authorities	 in	question,	 including	confidential	 information.	 	 Indeed,	with	 regards	 to	 the	
exchange	of	 information,	this	uncertainty	appears	to	be	the	greatest	weakness	of	bilateral	
cooperation.		Under	most	bilateral	agreements,	competition	law	authorities	are	prohibited	
from	sharing	confidential	information	with	other	authorities	without	the	express	consent	of	
the	parties	involved.		Therefore,	in	situations	where	companies	have	refused	to	give	consent	
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and	the	competition	authorities	are	thus	unable	to	share	confidential	information,	it	can	be	
almost	impossible	for	these	authorities	to	successfully	conduct	their	investigations.			
	
Several	countries	have	already	recognised	the	inherent	frustrations	in	these	circumstances	
and	 have	 taken	 it	 upon	 themselves	 to	 devise	 some	 exceptions.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	United	
States	 enacted	 the	 International	 Antitrust	 Enforcement	 Assistance	 Act	 (IAEAA)141,	 which	
allowed	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice	 and	 the	 Federal	 Trade	 Commission	 to	 exchange	
confidential	information	with	other	countries,	provided	they	have	established	an	agreement	
with	each	other.	 	This	 led	 to	 the	 first,	and	only,	 IAEAA	agreement,	which	was	signed	with	
Australia	in	1999.		The	United	States-Australia	Mutual	Antitrust	Enforcement	Treaty	allows	
the	parties	to	cooperate	with	each	other	when	obtaining	or	distributing	evidence	related	to	
antitrust	or	competition	law	issues,	even	if	providing	such	evidence	would	violate	the	laws	
of	the	distributing	country.142		It	is	important	to	note	that	this	agreement	solely	pertains	to	
antitrust	law	enforcement	and	only	relates	to	the	exchange	of	information.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 cost	 and	 difficulties	 associated	with	 entering	 into	 bilateral	 cooperation	
agreements,	as	noted	above,	these	agreements	are	still	predominately	concerned	with	free	
trade.	 	 Therefore,	 any	 competition	 law	 chapter	 contained	 therein	 may	 not	 be	 wholly	
effective	 in	 combating	 international	 cartels.	 	 Indeed,	 Jane	 Rennie	 noted,	 after	 examining	
various	competition	law	provisions	in	various	FTAs,	these	provisions	tended	to	be	‘ritualistic	
rather	 than	 responsive,’	 and	 lacked	 ‘functional	 definition.’143	 	 However,	 encouraging	
bilateral	 or	 multilateral	 cooperation	 and	 including	 competition	 law	 provisions	 in	 such	
agreements	can	be	a	step	towards	harmonising	competition	law	between	more	countries	or	
establishing	a	global	framework	for	competition	law.	
	
Extraterritorial	Application	of	Competition	Laws	
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While	many	countries’	competition	and	antitrust	laws	contain	effects	doctrines	limiting	their	
ability	 to	 pursue	 anti-competitive	 behaviour	 solely	 to	 conduct	 affecting	 their	 own	
jurisdictions,	 in	 cases	 involving	 international	 cartels	 and	 developing	 countries,	 it	 may	 be	
possible	 to	 apply	 the	 competition	 or	 antitrust	 laws	 of	 another	 country	 extraterritorially.		
Extraterritorial	 application	 of	 laws	 is	 when	 a	 country	 imposes	 or	 applies	 their	 laws	 in	
another’s	territory.	
	
There	are	several	advantages	 to	applying	competition	 laws	extraterritorially;	 these	can	be	
divided	 into	 three	 categories:	 first,	 advantages	 to	 the	 state	 itself;	 second,	 advantages	 to	
other	 states;	 and	 third,	 protecting	 weaker	 economies	 from	 the	 spread	 of	 international	
cartels.144		Turning	first	to	the	advantages	a	state	enjoys	when	it	applies	its	competition	laws	
extraterritorially,	in	cases	where	a	jurisdiction	is	able	to	do	so,	it	retains	control	over	how	its	
domestic	laws	are	applied.		For	instance,	one	of	the	most	prevailing	arguments	the	United	
States	 has	 made	 on	 the	 numerous	 occasions	 in	 which	 the	 possibility	 of	 enacting	 an	
international	competition	 law	agreement	was	debated	 is	 the	 fear	 that	such	an	agreement	
would	 detract	 from	 their	 own	 sovereignty,	 and	 thus	 detract	 from	 its	 effectiveness.145	 	 By	
applying	its	laws	extraterritorially,	a	country	can	ensure	there	will	be	no	confusion	as	to	its	
interpretation	 or	 application.	 	 This	 is	 important	 because	 different	 countries	 often	 have	
differing	 opinions	 on	 how	 to	 regulate	 anticompetitive	 behaviour.	 	 Even	 in	 cases	 where	
competition	 laws	 are	 markedly	 similar,	 the	 way	 in	 which	 they	 are	 applied	 may	 be	 very	
different.	 	 Competition	 law	 terms	 such	 as	 the	 relevant	 ‘market’	 and	 what	 constitutes	 a	
‘substantial	 lessening	 of	 competition’	 are	 notoriously	 difficult	 to	 define.	 	 By	 applying	
domestic	 competition	 laws	 extraterritorially,	 a	 national	 competition	 law	 authority	 can	
therefore	reduce	some	of	the	uncertainty	with	regards	to	the	outcome	of	the	case.	
	
Other	countries	can	also	benefit	from	a	state	applying	its	laws	extraterritorially.		These	are	
called	 spillover	 effects.	 	 While	 the	 state	 applying	 its	 laws	 will	 mainly	 target	 the	
anticompetitive	 behaviour	 that	 specifically	 affects	 their	 own	market,	 other	 countries	 can	
derive	 numerous	 benefits	 if	 the	 case	 is	 successful.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 case	 of	 free	 riding,	
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where	developing	countries	essentially	piggyback	onto	previously	successful	cases	decided	
by	 developing	 countries	 in	 order	 to	 launch	 their	 own	 investigations,	 has	 been	 discussed	
earlier	 in	 the	 preceding	 chapter.	 	 Furthermore,	 if	 a	 country	 successfully	 applies	 its	 laws	
extraterritorially	against	an	international	cartel,	there	is	a	chance	that	cartel	will	terminate	
its	operations	completely,	and	not	solely	in	the	relevant	country’s	own	market.	
	
Finally,	countries	that	apply	their	laws	extraterritorially	can	protect	those	countries	that	do	
not	have	effective	competition	law	systems,	most	notably	developing	countries.		It	has	been	
repeatedly	stated	in	this	thesis	that	international	cartels	are	more	likely	to	target	developing	
countries	because	of	 their	 inability	 to	detect	and	prosecute	 them.	 	 If	developed	countries	
are	 confined	 to	 only	 pursuing	 anticompetitive	 conduct	 that	 takes	 place	within	 their	 own	
borders,	this	trend	will	continue.		The	presence	or	possibility	of	extraterritoriality	may	mean	
that	international	cartels	are	less	incentivised	to	set	themselves	up	in	a	developing	country.		
While	this	may	not	wholly	prevent	the	spread	of	cartels,	it	may	contribute	to	a	reduction	in	
its	numbers.	
	
However,	extraterritorial	application	of	any	laws,	not	 just	competition	laws,	 is	not	without	
its	 inherent	 difficulties.	 	 The	 main	 issue	 regarding	 extraterritoriality	 is	 the	 concept	 of	
territorial	 sovereignty	 in	 international	 law.	 	 International	 law	 prevents	 nations	 from	
unilaterally	exercising	its	jurisdiction	on	a	global	scale	and	places	limitations	in	the	form	of	
internationally	 recognised	 customs	 and	 practices.	 	 The	 rules	 of	 jurisdiction	 do,	 however,	
allow	nations	to	enforce	their	laws	territorially	–	that	is,	the	principle	of	territoriality	enables	
countries	the	right	to	govern	the	actions	of	all	persons	within	its	territory.146		International	
laws	limit	the	circumstances	in	which	a	country	can	enforce	its	own	laws	beyond	its	borders;	
however,	 there	 are	 ways	 around	 this.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 nationality	 principle	 allows	
countries	to	apply	their	laws	extraterritorially	in	the	event	that	a	person	is	a	national	of	that	
country,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 conduct	 occurred	 in	 a	 foreign	 jurisdiction	 or	 not.147		
Customary	international	 law	also	contains	provisions	for	universal	 jurisdiction,	but	only	for	
exceptional	 circumstances,	most	 notably	 piracy.	 	 Other	 circumstances	 in	which	 a	 country	
                                                
146	Jennings,	Robert	and	Watts,	Arthur	(eds.),	Oppenheim’s	International	Law,	(1996),	Oxford	University	Press	
at	456-488.	
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may	exercise	its	 jurisdiction	extraterritorially	remain	controversial	and	may	not	be	entirely	
accepted	by	the	foreign	nation.	
	
Furthermore,	 by	 applying	 domestic	 competition	 laws	 extraterritorially	 to	 international	
problems,	 such	as	 international	 cartels,	 the	emphasis	will	most	 likely	be	on	domestic,	not	
global,	welfare.	 	 It	has	been	stated	 in	 the	previous	chapter	 that	a	global	welfare	standard	
should	be	the	most	appropriate	welfare	standard	to	adopt	when	considering	the	application	
global	 reform	 options.	 	 A	 national	 competition	 law	 authority	 is	 primarily	 involved	 in	
correcting	the	losses	suffered	by	domestic	consumers	as	a	result	of	an	international	cartel	
and	is	thus	not	likely	to	be	concerned	with	the	effects	that	cartel	has	on	foreign	consumers.		
If	 one	 were	 to	 reach	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 international	 cartel	 enforcement,	 given	 its	
propensity	 towards	a	domestic	welfare	standard,	extraterritorial	enforcement	of	domestic	
competition	 laws	may	not	maximise	 total	welfare	as	effectively	as	 if	one	were	 to	adopt	a	
global	standard.	 	For	 instance,	a	national	competition	 law	authority	may	block	a	proposed	
merger	or	joint	venture	on	the	basis	that	it	will	result	in	domestic	welfare	losses,	when,	in	
the	global	market,	those	welfare	losses	can	be	externalised	to	foreigners.148			
	
Another	problem	with	extraterritorial	application	of	competition	law	in	international	cartel	
cases	is	its	effectiveness.		While	an	international	cartel	may	be	asked	to	cease	its	operations	
in	 other	 jurisdictions	 following	 the	 successful	 outcome	 of	 a	 case	 in	 which	 a	 country	 has	
extraterritorially	applied	its	domestic	laws,	it	 is	 in	no	way	obligated	to	do	so.		Therefore,	a	
developing	 country	 that	 relies	on	another	 country	 to	 step	 in	 to	apply	 their	own	domestic	
laws	 extraterritorially	 is	 not	 absolutely	 guaranteed	 that	 the	 international	 target	 will	 stop	
targeting	their	market.	
	
Extraterritorial	application	of	domestic	 laws	can	also	create	conflicts	between	the	country	
applying	its	laws	and	the	target	country.		The	most	controversial	instances	of	extraterritorial	
application	of	 competition	 laws	have	occurred	 in	 cases	where	anti-competitive	 conduct	 is	
considered	unlawful	by	the	country	wishing	to	exercise	its	laws	but	is	not	prohibited	in	the	
country	in	which	it	occurred.	 	This	 jurisdictional	conflict	can	have	serious	repercussions	on	
                                                
148	Sykes,	Alan	O.,	‘Externalities	in	Open	Economy	Antitrust	and	their	Implications	for	International	
Competition	Policy,’	(1999)	Harvard	Journal	of	Law	and	Public	Policy,	Vol.	23,	at	92-93.	
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the	relationships	between	trading	partners,	as	described	by	the	Daishowa149	case	regarding	
export	cartels	in	Chapter	Two.		In	addition	to	the	potential	for	disagreements	between	the	
policies	 or	 laws	 that	 are	 being	 applied	 extraterritorially,	 there	 may	 also	 be	 difficulties	
related	 to	 conflicts	over	procedure.150	 	 In	any	 case	 involving	extraterritorial	 application	of	
laws,	even	where	the	target	nation	 is	amenable	to	the	 idea	of	another	country	coming	 in,	
conflicts	over	perceptions	of	sovereignty	and	extraterritoriality	are	likely	to	arise.			
	
In	 cases	 where	 the	 target	 state	 disagrees	 with	 the	 law	 that	 is	 being	 applied	 or	 the	
procedural	aspects	of	 the	case,	 they	can	retaliate	by	exacerbating	the	 inherent	challenges	
countries	 face	 when	 applying	 their	 laws	 in	 another	 country.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 problems	
associated	with	gathering	evidence	in	a	foreign	country	can	be	made	even	more	difficult	if	
the	target	country	chooses	to	apply	evidence-blocking	laws.151		While	the	Hague	Convention	
on	 the	 Service	 Abroad	 of	 Judicial	 and	 Extra-Judicial	 Documents	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Hague	
Convention	on	the	Taking	of	Evidence	Abroad	have	both	contributed	somewhat	to	lessening	
this	problem	between	signatory	jurisdictions,	it	is	still	a	very	real	problem	when	dealing	with	
non-signatory	 states.152	 	 Many	 jurisdictions,	 such	 as	 the	 United	 States	 have	 therefore	
recognised	 that	 in	 order	 for	 extraterritorial	 application	 domestic	 laws	 to	 be	 effective	 in	
cases	involving	international	cartels,	the	target	state	must	be	willing	to	cooperate	with	the	
applying	state.		As	a	result,	most	jurisdictions	have	signed	bilateral	cooperation	agreements	
with	one	another	in	order	to	facilitate	cooperation	in	evidence	sharing,	as	discussed	earlier	
in	this	chapter.		
	
While	 bilateral	 cooperation	 agreements	 can	 encourage	 countries	 to	 share	 evidence	 in	
international	 cartel	 cases,	 many	 countries	 are	 still	 suspicious	 of	 countries	 request	 this	
information	 in	 the	course	of	applying	 their	 laws	extraterritorially.	 	Requests	 in	 this	 regard	
are	often	perceived	to	be	‘fishing	expeditions’	by	the	foreign	nation	and	are	therefore	not	
                                                
149	Daishowa	International	v.	North	Coast	Export	Co.	Ltd.,	1982-2	Trade	Cases	(CCH)	§64,	774	(ND	Cal,	1982).	
150	Gerber,	David,	‘Is	Reconciliation	Possible?	The	U.S.-European	Conflict	Over	the	Globalization	of	Antitrust	
Law:	A	Legal	Experience	Perspective,’	(1999)	New	England	Law	Review,	Vol.	34	at	125.	
151	See	for	instance,	the	French	blocking	statute,	Law	no.	80538,	16	July	1980,	which	imposes	criminal	
sanctions	on	parties	who	communicate	to	foreign	public	authorities	documents	or	other	information,	or	
respond	to	discovery	requests.	
152	The	Hague	Convention	on	the	Service	Abroad	of	Judicial	and	Extra-Judicial	Documents	in	Civil	and	
Commercial	Matters,	(1969)	20	UST	361,	15	November	1969;	The	Hague	Convention	on	the	Taking	of	Evidence	
Abroad	in	Civil	and	Commercial	Matters,	(1970)	23	UST	2555,	27	July	1970.	
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favourably	 received.153	 	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 response	 to	 attempts	 by	 the	 U.S.	 to	
extraterritorially	 apply	 their	 laws	 in	 the	 Uranium	 litigation,	 which	 triggered	 the	 rise	 of	
‘blocking’	legislation.	
	
Westinghouse	 Electric	 Corporation	 of	 the	 United	 States	 was	 sued	 by	 twenty-seven	
electricity	utilities	for	breach	of	contract	after	failing	to	honour	its	fixed	term	contracts	with	
regards	to	the	supplying	various	nuclear	power	stations	with	uranium.154		Commentators	on	
the	case	at	the	time	noted	that	the	potential	damages	 in	the	suit	were,	 ‘the	highest	price	
package	of	private	 lawsuits	 in	U.S.	history,’	 and	 if	 successful,	would	 render	Westinghouse	
insolvent.155		
	
In	response,	and	desperate	to	avoid	insolvency,	Westinghouse	brought	charges	before	the	
U.S.	 District	 Court,	 accusing	 twenty-nine	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 uranium	 producers	 of	
violating	U.S.	antitrust	laws	through	the	formation	of	an	international	cartel.		Westinghouse	
claimed	the	cartel’s	activities	 led	 to	a	shortage	of	uranium	and	a	sharp	 increase	 in	prices,	
rendering	it	commercially	incapable	of	fulfilling	its	contractual	obligations.156		Foreign	cartel	
members	 included	 uranium	 producers	 from	 Australia,	 the	 UK,	 South	 Africa,	 and	 Canada.		
Simultaneously,	the	DOJ	also	initiated	its	own	criminal	investigation	into	the	alleged	cartel.	
	
The	 issue	 of	 extraterritoriality	 arose	 when	 Westinghouse,	 with	 assistance	 from	 the	 U.S.	
courts,	initiated	widespread	discovery	procedures	in	the	foreign	jurisdictions.		The	extent	of	
the	 jurisdiction	requested	by	the	U.S.	alarmed	the	governments	of	Australia,	South	Africa,	
the	 UK,	 and	 Canada,	 who	 saw	 it	 as	 a	 ‘fishing	 expedition.’157	 	 Each	 nation	 subsequently	
passed	 legislation	 that	 effectively	 blocked	 the	 extraterritorial	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 United	
                                                
153	See	Caylor,	Marissa	L.P.	‘Modernizing	the	Hague	Evidence	Convention:	A	Proposed	Solution	to	Cross-Border	
Discovery	Conflicts	During	Civil	and	Commercial	Litigation,’	(2010)	Boston	University	International	Law	Journal,	
Vol.	28.	
154	Re	Westinghouse	Electric	Corporation	Uranium	Contracts	Litigation,	405	F	Supp	316	(Judicial	Panel	on	
Multidistrict	Legislation	1974);	see	also	Eagan,	William,	‘The	Westinghouse	Uranium	Contracts:	Commercial	
Impractibility	and	Related	Matters,’	(1980)	American	Business	Law	Journal,	Vol.	18	at	281.	
155	Joscow,	Paul	L.,	‘Commercial	Impossibility,	the	Uranium	Market	and	the	Westinghouse	Case,’	(1977)	The	
Journal	of	Legal	Studies,	Vol.	6,	No.	1	at	119-76.	
156	Re	Westinghouse	Electric	Corporation		
157	Taylor	at	57.	
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States.158		Since	the	Westinghouse	litigation	incident,	more	countries	have	adopted	blocking	
statutes	 such	as	New	Zealand,	 the	Netherlands,	Denmark,	 Finland,	 France,	 India,	Norway,	
and	 Sweden.	 	 There	 are	 normally	 two	 types	 of	 blocking	 statute,	 although	 both	 can	 be	
merged	into	one	whole	statute.		Discovery	blocking	statutes,	such	as	those	adopted	in	the	
Westinghouse	incident,	limit	the	extent	to	which	foreign	claimants	can	obtain	evidence	and	
can	also	restrict	the	parameters	of	requests	for	commercial	documents	to	be	used	in	foreign	
cases.		Judgment	blocking	statutes	block	the	enforcement	of	foreign	judgments,	in	whole	or	
in	part,	 that	the	national	authority	deems	to	be	detrimental	to	national	welfare.	 	Blocking	
legislation	has	proven	useful	in	cases	of	extraterritorial	application	of	laws.		For	instance,	an	
Australian	Parliamentary	Committee	 specifically	 created	 in	1983	 to	 review	 the	benefits	of	
the	Australian	blocking	statute	in	relation	to	the	extraterritorial	application	of	U.S.	antitrust	
laws	during	the	Westinghouse	litigation	noted:159	
	
Despite	 firm	 Australian	 representations	 to	 the	 U.S.	 administration	
opposing	 U.S.	 attempts	 to	 regulate	 the	 legitimate	 interests	 of	
Australian	 companies,	 the	U.S.	 administration	 and	 courts	 showed	 no	
serious	concern	for	Australia’s	expressed	interests.		It	was	not	until	the	
Foreign	 Antitrust	 Judgements	 (Restriction	 of	 Enforcement)	 Act	 was	
enacted	in	1979	that	the	Westinghouse	case	was	settled	out	of	court,	
even	 then	 involving	 U.S.	 $11	 million	 payable	 by	 the	 Australian	
defendants	(together	with	extremely	high	legal	costs).	
	
It	is	important	to	note	here	that	while	the	foreign	defendants	of	the	uranium	international	
cartel	were	considered	to	have	violated	U.S.	antitrust	law,	the	cartel	was	originally	formed	
as	 a	 response	 to	 the	United	 States	 Atomic	 Energy	 Commission’s	 trade	 boycott	 to	 foreign	
uranium	producers.		Given	that	the	U.S.	market	at	the	time	held	approximately	70	percent	
of	 the	 world	 market	 for	 uranium,	 the	 closure	 of	 the	 U.S.	 domestic	 market	 to	 foreign	
producers	caused	 them	serious	economic	hardship.	 	The	 international	uranium	cartel	was	
                                                
158	Price,	R.	Edward,	‘Foreign	Blocking	Statutes	and	the	GATT:	States	Sovereignty	and	the	Enforcement	of	US	
Economic	Law	Abroad,’	(1995)	George	Washington	Journal	International	Law	&	Economics,	Vol.	28.	
159	See	Joint	Committee	on	Foreign	Affairs	and	Defence,	‘Australian-United	States	Relations:	the	Extraterritorial	
Application	of	United	States	Laws,’	(1993)	Australian	Government,	Canberra,	ch.	3.	
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therefore	 initially	 formed	as	 a	 defence	 to	 the	boycott	 and	was	 established	with	blessings	
from	the	Australian,	British,	South	African,	and	Canadian	governments.160	
	
By	 subsequently	 attempting	 to	 apply	 their	 laws	 extraterritorially,	 the	 United	 States	 was	
perceived	to	be	infringing	on	the	sovereign	rights	of	the	governments	of	Australia,	the	UK,	
South	Africa,	and	Canada	to	govern	their	own	domestic	policies.161	
	
As	can	be	seen,	United	States	has	been	among	 the	most	prolific	 in	bringing	cases	of	anti-
competitive	conduct	extraterritorially,	to	the	chagrin	of	many	nations.		Its	current	stance	is	
outlined	in	the	Antitrust	Enforcement	Guidelines	for	International	Operations	1995	issued	by	
the	United	States	Department	of	Justice	and	the	Federal	Trade	Commission.		The	guidelines	
contain	provisions	allowing	 for	 the	exercise	of	antitrust	 laws	extraterritorially	 in	 instances	
where:162	
	
• The	conduct	is	considered	a	violation	of	American	antitrust	laws;	
• The	 conduct	 has	 a	 direct,	 substantial,	 and	 reasonably	 foreseeable	 effect	 on	
American	 domestic	 or	 import	 commerce,	 or	 export	 commerce	 by	 domestic	
firms;	and	
• The	 U.S.	 courts	 have	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 foreign	 firms	 participating	 in	 such	
conduct.	 	 This	 last	 instance	 also	 involves	 an	 analysis	 of	 any	 agreements	 the	
United	States	may	have	with	the	foreign	nation.	
	
Extraterritorial	 application	 of	 competition	 and	 antitrust	 laws	 is	 not	 solely	 limited	 to	 the	
United	States.		The	EU	has	also	adopted	a	similar	approach	in	terms	of	its	effects	doctrine,	
as	 best	 illustrated	 through	 the	 Dyestuffs	 and	Wood	 Pulp	 cases.	 	 In	 1985,	 the	 European	
Commission	 fined	 a	 number	 of	 foreign	 producers	 of	 wood	 pulp,	 including	 those	 from	
Canada,	 Finland,	 and	 the	 U.S.,	 for	 engaging	 in	 cartel	 behaviour	 that	 was	 held	 to	 be	 in	
                                                
160	Utton,	Michael	A.,	International	Competition	Policy:	Maintaining	Open	Markets	in	the	Global	Economy,	
(2006)	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	at	127.	
161	Taylor	at	58.	
162	U.S.	Department	of	Justice,	‘Antitrust	Enforcement	Guidelines	for	International	Operations,’	(1995)	at	3.12.	
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violation	of	 the	then	EEC’s	competition	 laws.163	 	The	defendants	appealed	on	the	grounds	
that	the	EEC	did	not	have	 jurisdiction.	 	The	American	producers	also	attempted	to	rely	on	
the	 exemptions	 granted	 to	 export	 cartels	 under	 the	 Webb-Pomerene	 Act.164	 	 The	 ECJ	
rejected	 these	 arguments	 on	 the	 basis	 that	while	 the	 cartel	 agreements	were	 concluded	
outside	of	 the	EEC,	Article	85	would	still	apply	 if	 their	 implementation	occurred	within	 its	
territory.		The	Webb-Pomerene	Act	therefore	did	not	grant	immunity	from	prosecution	in	a	
foreign	jurisdiction.	
	
On	the	other	hand,	other	countries	have	a	much	more	circumscribed	approach	to	the	issue	
of	extraterritoriality.	 	For	example,	 in	contrast	to	the	approaches	adopted	by	the	U.S.	and	
the	 EU,	 Australia	 does	 not	 apply	 its	 laws	 extraterritorially	 unless	 the	 person	 or	 firm	 in	
question	is	incorporated,	conducts	business,	or	has	assets	in	Australia.165	
	
Anti-competitive	 behaviour	 such	 as	 hard-core	 international	 cartels,	 in	 which	 the	 relevant	
conduct	 is	 unquestionably	 illegal	 in	 a	 number	 of	 jurisdictions,	 may	 be	 less	 controversial	
when	it	comes	to	extraterritorial	application	of	competition	laws.		However,	it	is	important	
to	reiterate	that	countries	only	apply	their	laws	extraterritorially	in	order	to	serve	their	own	
national	 interests.	 	 It	 is	 highly	 unlikely	 that	 a	 country	 would	 instigate	 a	 case	 against	 an	
international	 cartel	 on	 behalf	 of	 another,	 even	 if	 that	 other	 country	 were	 a	 developing	
country.	 	 Additionally,	 full	 extraterritoriality	 is	 commonly	 only	 exercised	 by	 the	 most	
developed	economies	and	remains	the	exception,	rather	than	the	rule.166			
	
Chapter	 Three	 also	 highlighted	 the	 difficulties	 foreign	 plaintiffs,	 particularly	 those	 from	
developing	countries,	face	when	attempting	to	use	foreign	courts,	such	as	the	United	States.		
Indeed,	 as	 reiterated	 above,	 developed	 jurisdictions	 are	 often	 not	 at	 all	motivated	when	
faced	with	the	option	of	prosecuting	anti-competitive	behaviour	whose	negative	effects	are	
largely	 felt	elsewhere.	 	However,	many	of	 these	countries	do	not	 recognise	 the	 inevitable	
effects	 harms	 on	 foreign	 welfare	 can	 have	 on	 global	 welfare	 in	 a	 global	 market	 that	 is	
                                                
163	European	Commission,	‘Commission	Decision	of	19	December	1984	relating	to	a	Proceeding	under	Article	
85	of	the	EEC	Treaty,’	(1985)	(IV/29.725-Wood	Pulp)	OJ	L	85/1	(Wood	Pulp).	
164	Webb-Pomerene	Act,	1918,	15	U.S.C.	ss	61-66	(2005).	
165	Australian	Law	Reform	Commission,	‘Legal	Risk	in	International	Transactions,’	(1996)	at	6.3.	
166	Taylor,	Martyn	D.	at	65.	
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becoming	 increasingly	more	 interdependent.	 	 Developed	 countries	 with	 the	 resources	 to	
identify	 and	 prosecute	 international	 cartels	 and	 protect	 their	 domestic	 consumers,	
particularly	 competition	 and	 antitrust	 law	 powerhouses	 such	 as	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 United	
States,	 are	 typically	 blind	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 consumers	 in	 developing	 countries	 who	
continue	to	suffer	from	the	effects	of	global	competition	law	offences.	
	
Extraterritoriality	has	been	criticised	by	a	number	of	developing	countries.		This	opposition	
can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 official	 statement	 of	 China,	 and	 the	 Group	 of	 77,	 a	 United	 Nations	
coalition	 of	 developing	 countries,	 at	UNCTAD’s	 Sao	 Paolo	 Conference.167	 	 The	 conference	
report	summarised	their	opinion:168	
	
The	Group	of	77	and	China	expressed	 its	deep	concern	at	 the	 increased	
application	 of	 coercive	 economic	 measures	 and	 unilateral	 sanctions	
against	 developing	 countries,	 including	 the	 new	 attempts	 at	
extraterritorial	application	of	domestic	law,	which	constituted	a	violation	
of	 the	United	Nations	 Charter,	 the	 principles	 of	 the	multilateral	 trading	
system	and	the	WTO	rules.		The	Group	of	77	and	China	firmly	rejected	the	
imposition	 of	 laws	 and	 regulations	 that	 entailed	 extraterritorial	
consequences	 and	 all	 other	 forms	 of	 coercive	 economic	 measures,	
including	 unilateral	 measures	 against	 developing	 countries,	 and	
reiterated	the	urgent	need	for	their	immediate	repeal.	
	
Although	this	statement	was	made	in	relation	to	unilateral	trade	sanctions,169	however,	it	is	
entirely	possible	that	this	same	attitude	can	be	applied	to	competition	law	as	well.		It	is	more	
common	 for	 developed	 countries,	 which	 have	 the	 resources	 and	 the	 strength	 of	 their	
established	 competition	 law	 systems	 to	 fall	 back	 on,	 to	 apply	 their	 domestic	 competition	
laws	than	it	is	for	developing	countries,	which	lack	these	resources,	to	do	so.		Thus,	it	is	not	
                                                
167	UNCTAD,	‘Communication	from	the	Group	of	77	and	China	regarding	the	application	of	coercive	economic	
measures	and	unilateral	sanctions	against	developing	countries,’	UNCTAD,	Doc	TD/411	(6	August	2004).	
168	UNCTAD,	‘Report	of	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	on	its	Eleventh	Session,	
UNCTAD,	Doc	TD/412	(20	August	2004)	at	39.	
169	See	also	Group	of	77	and	China,	‘Declaration	by	the	Group	of	77	and	China	on	the	Fifth	WTO	Ministerial	
Conference,’	Cancun,	10-14	September	2003.	
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surprising	 that	 developing	 countries	 would	 protest	 in	 this	 regard,	 especially	 in	 instances	
where	developed	countries	have	applied	their	laws	against	them.	
	
For	developing	countries	seeking	to	apply	their	competition	laws	extraterritorially,	not	only	
must	they	already	possess	a	strong	legal	system,	but	they	must	also	obtain	the	approval	of	
foreign	governments.	 	 Indeed,	many	 jurisdictions,	 including	 the	United	States	and	 the	EU,	
acknowledge	 that	 in	 order	 to	 effectively	 apply	 laws	 extraterritorially,	 the	 foreign	
government	must	agree	to	fully	cooperate	with	the	domestic	government,	especially	when	
collecting	evidence.170	 	 Thus,	 the	process	of	 applying	 competition	 laws	extraterritorially	 is	
not	unlike	 forming	a	bilateral	or	 regional	agreement,	along	with	 its	associated	difficulties.		
As	 a	 result,	 it	 may	 be	 more	 beneficial	 to	 begin	 the	 discussion	 on	 reform	 with	 some	
suggestions	 on	 how	 to	 support	 developing	 countries	 in	 not	 only	 establishing	 but	 also	
building	on	whatever	competition	policy	regimes	they	may	already	have.			
	
Which	Reform	Measure	to	adopt	then?	
	
The	 reform	methods	proposed	 in	 this	 thesis	 have	been	 categorised	 as	 ‘Domestic	 Reform’	
and	 ‘Global	 Reform.’	 	 To	 that	 end,	 as	 stated	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 chapter,	 domestic	
reform	strategies	should	be	adopted	in	conjunction	with	each	other.		That	is,	reform	options	
under	the	‘Domestic	Reform’	heading	should	be	adopted	alongside	those	under	the	‘Global	
Reform’	 heading.	 	 This	 section	 will	 therefore	 evaluate	 which	 reform	 options	 under	 each	
specific	heading	is	the	most	achievable,	effective,	and	realistic.	
Domestic	Reform	
	
Before	any	of	the	global	reform	options	can	take	place,	developing	countries	must	establish	
and	strengthen	their	own	competition	law	systems.		To	that	end,	they	can	make	use	of	both	
the	 OECD’s	 programmes	 on	 peer	 review	 as	 well	 as	 UNCTAD’s	 programmes	 on	 technical	
cooperation.	 	 In	 doing	 so,	 a	 developing	 country	 can	 use	 UNCTAD’s	 Model	 Law	 on	
Competition	as	well	as	their	training	activities	in	order	to	obtain	a	better	understanding	of	
                                                
170	Griffin,	Joseph	P.,	‘EC	and	U.S.	Extraterritoriality:	Activism	and	Cooperation,’	(1993)	Fordham	International	
Law	Journal,	Vol.	17,	No.	2	at	358.	
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competition	 law	 issues	 and	 how	 to	 effectively	 address	 them.	 	 Once	 a	 competition	 law	
system	is	established,	using	the	Model	Law	as	a	starting	point,	and	the	training	activities	as	
guidelines,	a	developing	country	can	use	the	peer	review	system	in	order	to	obtain	feedback	
and	advice	on	how	to	better	improve	their	enforcement	mechanisms.			
	
Developing	 countries	 can	 also	 take	 advantage	 of	 foreign	 direct	 investors	 in	 order	 to	
encourage	the	development	of	healthy	competition	in	the	market.	 	 Increasing	the	amount	
of	FDI	in	the	country	however,	should	only	take	place	after	the	country	has	strengthened	its	
own	competition	 law	system	by	making	use	of	 the	 technical	cooperation	and	peer	 review	
programmes.	 	 This	 is	 because	 FDI	 can	 come	with	 risks,	 such	 as	 the	 foreign	 firms	 unduly	
infringing	on	domestic	firms’	rights	to	participate	fully	in	the	market.		In	these	instances,	a	
strong	 competition	 law	 system	 can	 help	 to	 dissuade	 foreign	 firms	 from	 taking	 an	 unfair	
advantage	in	the	domestic	market	they	are	investing	in.		
Global	Reform	
	
Once	 a	 developing	 country	 has	 addressed	 their	 domestic	 competition	 law	 issues,	we	 can	
begin	 fighting	 international	 cartels	 on	 the	 global	 front.	 	Out	of	 the	 reform	 strategies	 that	
have	been	discussed	under	the	‘Global	Reform’	heading,	establishing	a	global,	harmonised	
competition	 law	 agreement	 specifically	 designed	 to	 target	 international	 cartels,	would	 be	
the	most	ideal.		However,	as	discussed	above,	there	have	been	many	attempts	to	establish	
such	an	agreement,	and	each	was	unsuccessful.		Therefore,	while	a	harmonised	competition	
law	 agreement	 is	 the	 most	 desirable	 outcome,	 it	 is	 likely	 not	 the	 most	 feasible	 when	
considering	the	other	global	reform	strategies	discussed	in	this	thesis.	
	
Rather	than	enacting	one	binding	international	agreement,	it	would	be	more	practical,	and	
therefore	 effective,	 to	 encourage	 developed	 countries	 to	 negotiate	 more	 bilateral	 or	
regional	 agreements	 with	 developing	 countries	 that	 contain	 provisions	 addressing	
international	competition	law	concerns,	such	as	international	cartels.		However,	in	order	to	
do	so,	the	parties	must	ensure	that	they	possess,	or	else,	comparable	bargaining	powers.		At	
the	moment,	many	developing	countries,	which	 lack	functioning	competition	 law	systems,	
are	 in	much	weaker	positions	 than	 their	developed	counterparts,	which	make	negotiating	
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bilateral	 or	 multilateral	 agreements	 a	 one-sided	 affair.	 	 This	 is	 the	 main	 reason	 why	
developing	countries	must	 first	address	 their	own	competition	 law	 issues	before	engaging	
with	the	global	community.	
	
Additionally,	a	global	competition	law	framework	may	also	be	more	likely	than	establishing	
an	 international	 competition	 law	 agreement,	 particularly	 if	 more	 countries	 are	 willing	 to	
negotiate	multilateral	agreements	between	themselves.		The	ICN	has	made	great	strides	in	
establishing	 a	 global	 competition	 law	 network	 between	 both	 developed	 and	 developing	
jurisdictions	alike.	 	However,	 it	 is	argued	here	that	these	developments	are	not	enough	to	
fully	 address	 the	 problem	 of	 international	 cartels.	 	 For	 instance,	 like	 many	 developing	
countries,	China’s	competition	law	system	is	based	upon	the	EU	model.		Nevertheless,	while	
their	system	may	be	based	on	another’s,	it	is	very	likely	that	the	two	systems	have	matured	
and	 developed	 independently	 and	 are	 applied	 differently	 according	 to	 each	 jurisdiction’s	
individual	 needs.	 	 However,	 China	 itself	 is	 not	 a	 member	 of	 the	 ICN	 or	 the	 OECD.	 	 The	
voluntary	nature	of	membership	of	these	organisations	can	be	an	impediment	to	effective	
discussions	 on	 global	 competition	 law	 issues	 because	 some	 views	 may	 not	 be	 entirely	
represented.	 	A	global	 competition	 law	 framework	would	 serve	 to	address	 some	of	 these	
inadequacies.		On	the	other	hand,	as	outlined	above,	establishing	such	a	framework	can	be	
a	difficult	task	and	it	unlikely	that	it	will	be	accomplished	in	the	next	few	years.	
	
Conclusion	
	
While	 the	 effects	 of	 international	 cartels	 are	 a	 global	 problem	 and	 not	 solely	 felt	 by	
developing	countries,	they	are	usually	the	ones	to	suffer	the	most	greatly.		As	such,	reforms	
strategies	 designed	 to	 curb	 the	 scourge	 of	 international	 cartels	 should	 initially	 focus	 on	
implementing	 strategies	 designed	 to	 help	 developing	 countries	 protect	 themselves.	 	 As	
stated	in	the	previous	chapter,	domestic	reform	measures	such	as	the	strategies	designed	to	
help	developing	countries	implement	their	own	competition	law	systems,	should	be	applied	
with	 a	 domestic	welfare	 standard	 in	mind.	 	 In	 doing	 so,	 developing	 countries	 can	 ensure	
their	 own	 specific	 needs	 and	 goals	 are	 met	 first	 before	 the	 global	 issues	 surrounding	
international	cartels	are	addressed.			
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As	previously	stated	in	Chapter	Four,	developing	countries	often	face	great	difficulties	when	
attempting	to	implement	and	enforce	a	competition	law	system	on	their	own	due	to	a	lack	
of	 resources	 and	 expertise.	 	 Consequently,	 while	 this	 thesis	 separates	 proposed	 reform	
measures	into	‘domestic’	reform,	meant	to	aid	developing	countries	specifically,	and	‘global’	
reform,	 which	 addresses	 international	 cartels	 on	 a	 global	 scale,	 the	 domestic	 reform	
measures	 proposed	 in	 this	 thesis	 contain	 provisions	 designed	 to	 encourage	 developed	
countries	to	take	an	active	role	 in	helping	developing	countries	help	themselves.	 	Some	of	
these	proposals,	such	as	those	pertaining	to	foreign	investment,	may	not	directly	contribute	
to	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 establishing	 effective	 competition	 law	 systems	 for	 developing	
countries	but	they	do	contribute	to	improving	their	abilities	and	motivations	to	do	so.		Other	
proposals	 such	 as	 the	 OECD	 peer	 review	 scheme	 and	 UNCTAD’s	 technical	 cooperation	
programmes	 have	 a	 more	 active	 role	 in	 assisting	 developing	 countries	 improve	 the	
competition	 laws	 in	 their	 respective	 jurisdictions.	 	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	proposals	 should	be	
read	and	considered	in	sequence;	only	by	first	implementing	strategies	to	enable	developing	
countries	gain	the	motivations	and	resources	to	establish	their	competition	law	systems	can	
those	systems	then	be	improved	upon	and	effectively	enforced	against	international	cartels.	
	
With	 regards	 to	 the	 proposals	 concerning	 global	 reform,	 these	 clearly	 require	 a	 more	
concerted	 effort	 between	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 to	 address	 the	worldwide	
issues	 pertaining	 to	 international	 cartels.	 	 While	 a	 global,	 harmonised	 competition	 law	
agreement	specifically	designed	to	target	international	cartels	would	be	the	most	effective	
method	 of	 addressing	 the	 effects	 of	 these	 cartels,	 it	 is	 also	 one	 of	 the	 most	 difficult	 to	
successfully	 implement.	 	 Negotiating	 a	 binding	 agreement	 between	 many	 different	
countries,	each	having	their	own	goals	and	agendas,	is	notoriously	difficult.		Implementing	a	
global	 competition	 law	agreement	 in	which	both	developed	and	developing	countries	can	
agree	to	the	terms,	let	alone	be	persuaded	to	sign	is	likely	to	be	nothing	more	than	a	pipe	
dream.	 	 There	 have	 been	 many	 attempts	 in	 the	 past	 to	 establish	 a	 binding	 global	
competition	law	agreement	and	all	of	them	have	failed.		A	less	ambitious,	but	more	feasible	
approach	 would	 be	 to	 encourage	 more	 bilateral	 or	 multilateral	 cooperation	 between	
developed	 and	 developing	 countries.	 	 While	 there	 may	 still	 be	 issues	 regarding	 the	
imbalance	in	bargaining	power	between	parties,	there	is	already	evidence	that	bilateral	and	
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multilateral	 trade	 agreements	 with	 competition	 law	 provisions	 can	 be	 useful	 when	
investigating	and	sanctioning	international	cartels.	
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Final	Conclusions	
	
This	 thesis	 dealt	with	 the	question	of	what	 effects	 international	 cartels	 have	on	both	 the	
global	 market	 and	 developing	 countries	 in	 particular.	 	 It	 also	 provided	 some	 solutions	
developing	countries	and	the	international	competition	community	as	a	whole	can	employ	
in	order	to	rectify	the	 issues	surrounding	these	cartels.	 	While	combating	cartels	has	been	
one	 of	 the	 pillars	 of	 both	 domestic	 and	 international	 competition	 law	 policy,	 developing	
countries	 continue	 to	 suffer	 the	 brunt	 of	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 international	 cartels.		
Because	most	developing	countries	have	little	to	no	functioning	competition	law	policy,	they	
are	often	the	most	likely	targets	of	international	cartels	and	therefore	the	most	in	need	of	
assistance.	 	 Developed	 countries	 have	 the	 resources	 and	mechanisms	 in	 place	 to	 detect,	
investigate,	and	prosecute	international	cartels	targeting	their	domestic	markets;	however,	
developing	countries	rarely	have	such	opportunities.	 	This	can	be	especially	problematic	in	
instances	where	cartels	such	as	export	cartels,	are	located	in	one	jurisdiction	but	only	target	
foreign	 jurisdictions.	 	 Without	 the	 financial	 or	 human	 resources	 to	 obtain	 the	 evidence	
needed	 to	 challenge	 these	 cartels,	 developing	 countries	 often	 find	 themselves	 in	 the	
hopeless	situation	of	being	subjected	to	the	whims	of	the	cartel	but	unable	to	do	anything	
about	them.	
	
International	cartels	can	have	far-reaching	effects	on	developing	countries	that	go	beyond	
the	 economic	 sector.	 	 These	 effects	 can	 extend	 beyond	 simply	 raised	 prices	 to	 include	
qualitative	 effects	 such	 as	 consumer	 poverty.	 	 Easing	 these	 burdens	 by	 combating	 the	
external	problems	is	therefore	vitally	important	as	is	establishing	strategies	in	order	to	help	
developing	countries	implement	their	own	competition	law	systems.			
	
This	thesis	set	out	to	determine	the	extent	of	the	damage	suffered	by	developing	countries	
from	 international	 cartels.	 	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 first	 substantive	 chapter	 drew	 on	 previous	
studies	conducted	by	notable	academics	and	economists	on	particularly	egregious	cartels.		
By	 analysing	 both	 the	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 effects	 international	 cartels,	 including	
export	cartels,	have	on	both	developed	and	developing	countries,	 I	determined	that	while	
some	effects,	such	as	allowances	for	small	and	medium	sized	firms	to	form	export	cartels	in	
order	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 the	 global	market,	 can	 be	 beneficial	 to	 the	 domestic	market,	 the	
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majority	 of	 the	 most	 serious	 negative	 effects	 were	 felt	 in	 the	 foreign	 market,	 especially	
when	the	activities	of	these	cartels	were	directed	at	developing	countries.	
	
After	establishing	the	fact	that	developing	countries	are	the	most	 likely	to	suffer	from	the	
anticompetitive	effects	 international	cartels	can	have	on	the	global	market,	Chapter	Three	
moved	on	to	discuss	the	current	legislation	different	jurisdictions	have	put	in	place	in	order	
to	sanction	international	cartels.		This	analysis	included	legislation	from	both	developing	and	
developed	 countries	 and	 also	 detailed	 the	 types	 of	 export	 cartel	 exemptions	 that	 are	
employed	by	the	latter.		It	is	clear	from	the	analysis	that	there	is	a	dichotomy	between	the	
effectiveness	of	the	competition	 laws	from	developed	countries	and	developing	countries.		
We	can	see	that	many	developing	countries	have	not	established	any	competition	policies	
or	laws	of	their	own	and	those	that	have,	few	of	them	are	effective	in	enforcing	their	laws	in	
relation	 to	 anticompetitive	 behaviour	 that	 takes	 place	 beyond	 their	 borders.	 	 Some	
countries,	 such	 as	 Brazil,	 have	 been	 relatively	 successful	 when	 compared	 to	 other	
developing	 countries	 when	 investigating	 and	 sanctioning	 international	 cartels.	 	 However,	
the	large	majority	of	developing	countries	either	lack	the	resources	necessary	to	effectively	
enforce	their	competition	laws	in	trans-border	cases	or	they	lack	a	competition	law	system	
of	 their	 own	entirely.	 	 Therefore,	 having	 come	 to	 these	 conclusions,	 it	was	 clear	 that	 the	
situation	was	in	need	for	reform.	
	
Chapter	Four	discussed	the	 issues	developing	countries	generally	face	when	implementing	
and	enforcing	their	own	competition	law	systems.		These	difficulties	arise	from	the	specific	
characteristics	 all	 developing	 countries	 share,	 namely	 a	 lack	 of	 financial	 and	 human	
resources,	 a	 lack	 of	 expertise,	 and	 often	 governmental	 instability.	 	 The	 chapter	 ended	by	
making	some	suggestions	for	reform	on	how	developing	countries	can	rectify	some	of	these	
issues.	
	
Chapter	Five	discussed	what	the	suitable	welfare	benchmark	should	be	when	determining	
and	applying	the	options	for	reform.		It	also	set	out	the	current	framework	for	competition	
law	regulation	as	well	as	some	general	goals	for	reform.		It	was	established	that	whichever	
welfare	 benchmark	 is	 decided	 upon	 and	 subsequently	 applied	 to	 the	 reform	 options	 in	
Chapter	Six	will	 have	a	direct	effect	on	 its	outcomes.	 	 For	 instance,	while	many	countries	
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eschew	 the	 direct	 application	 of	 consumer	 welfare	 in	 their	 competition	 law	 systems,	
however,	in	a	report	conducted	by	the	ICN,	it	was	found	that	many	competition	law	systems	
employ	a	 consumer	welfare	 standard,	 some	alongside	other	 standards	of	welfare,	even	 if	
they	do	not	necessarily	refer	to	it	as	such.	 	 In	Chapter	Six,	the	reform	measures	that	were	
discussed	were	separated	into	two	paths.			
	
The	 first	 path	 of	 reform	 deals	 with	 reform	 on	 a	 domestic	 level,	 for	 example	 the	
development	of	 strategies	 to	help	developing	countries	 implement	 their	own	competition	
law	systems.		Here,	discussion	was	made	as	to	whether	a	consumer	welfare	or	total	welfare	
standard	would	be	most	appropriate.		While	there	are	differing	opinions	on	the	definitions	
of	 consumer	and	 total	welfare,	 it	was	 suggested	 that	a	 consumer	welfare	 standard,	while	
favoured	 by	 developed	 countries,	 may	 not	 be	 suitable	 for	 developing	 countries	 and	
therefore	a	total	welfare	standard	may	be	more	appropriate.		Questions	were	also	raised	as	
to	 whether	 public	 policy	 considerations	 could	 also	 be	 included	 in	 the	 domestic	 reform	
process.	 Some	 countries,	 like	 Kenya	 and	 Swaziland,	 have	 incorporated	 public	 policy	
considerations	into	their	competition	laws	in	order	to	better	serve	their	specific	social	needs	
and	goals.		The	second	stage	of	reform	deals	with	reform	on	a	global	scale,	for	example	the	
possibility	 of	 developing	 an	 international	 harmonised	 competition	 law	 agreement.	 	 Here,	
the	proposed	welfare	benchmark	discussed	was	the	suitability	of	adopting	a	global	welfare	
standard.	
	
After	establishing	 the	appropriate	welfare	benchmark	 in	both	domestic	and	global	 reform	
proposals,	 Chapter	 Six	 suggested	 some	 solutions	 for	 reforming	 the	 situation	 on	 both	 a	
domestic	 and	 global	 level.	 	 One	 of	 these	 domestic	 reform	 options	 that	 were	 discussed	
related	 to	developing	 strategies	 in	order	 to	help	weaker	economies	 implement	 their	own	
competition	 law	 systems	 if	 they	have	not	 yet	 already	done	 so.	 	 These	 strategies	 included	
encouraging	 more	 cooperation	 between	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 in	
international	cartel	cases	as	well	as	making	use	of	services,	like	peer	reviews	and	technical	
cooperation,	provided	by	 international	organisations	 like	 the	OECD	and	UNCTAD	designed	
to	support	developing	countries’	competition	law	systems.			
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After	 implementing	 the	 proposed	 domestic	 reform	 strategies,	 the	 chapter	 moved	 on	 to	
discussing	the	possibilities	for	global	reform.		The	most	ambitious	global	reform	strategy	is	
undoubtedly	 the	 idea	 of	 negotiating	 an	 international	 harmonised	 competition	 law	
agreement.	 	 There	 have	 been	 many	 unsuccessful	 attempts	 in	 the	 past	 and	 it	 cannot	 be	
stressed	enough	 that	 this	 strategy	 comes	with	many,	possibly	 insurmountable	 challenges.		
Therefore,	a	more	realistic	global	reform	strategy	is	to	foster	greater	cooperation	between	
nations.		There	are	several	ways	cooperation	between	developed	and	developing	countries	
can	 be	 attained.	 	 The	 final	 chapter	 discussed	 the	merits	 of	 encouraging	 the	 formation	 of	
bilateral	 or	 regional	 cooperation	 agreements	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 developed	
countries	 could	 apply	 their	 competition	 laws	 extraterritorially	 to	 international	 cartels	
outside	 of	 their	 jurisdictions.	 	 Finally,	 as	 a	 compromise	 between	 implementing	 an	
international	competition	law	agreement	and	negotiating	hundreds	of	bilateral	cooperation	
agreements,	it	was	also	suggested	that	a	global	framework	of	competition	law	designed	to	
combat	international	cartels	could	also	be	established.		Negotiating	a	global	framework	may	
be	 less	 laborious	 than	 attempting	 to	 draft	 a	 binding	 international	 competition	 law	
agreement	most	 countries	 will	 agree	 to	 sign.	 	 A	 global	 competition	 framework	may	 also	
establish	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 system	 of	 competition	 policies	 in	 the	 international	
community	 than	 simply	 considering	 a	 series	 of	 bilateral	 or	 multilateral	 cooperation	
agreements.	Furthermore,	no	bilateral	agreement	dealing	exclusively	with	competition	law	
issues	 has	 been	 signed	 to	 date.	 	 A	 global	 competition	 framework	 could	 therefore	 be	
specifically	 tailored	 to	 address	 the	 most	 serious	 international	 competition	 offences,	 like	
international	cartels.	
	
It	is,	however,	important	to	note	that,	while	these	strategies	discussed	in	this	thesis	to	help	
developing	countries	better	combat	international	cartels	and	are	thus	designed	in	order	to	
account	 for	 the	unique	challenges	present	 in	developing	 countries,	 they	are	by	no	means	
the	final	solution.	 	Many	developing	countries	face	both	political	and	economic	difficulties	
and	as	 such,	 an	effective	 competition	 law	 system	 is	 often	not	one	of	 their	 first	 priorities.		
Nevertheless,	it	has	been	discussed	in	this	thesis	that	a	working	competition	law	system	can	
help	 relieve	 some	 of	 these	 problems.	 	 This	 thesis	 has	 therefore	 also	 emphasised	 the	
importance	 of	 competition	 advocacy	 in	 order	 to	 encourage	 positive	 attitudes	 towards	
healthy	competition	in	the	market.			
 236 
 
	
This	 final	 conclusion	will	 discuss	 the	 theoretical	 and	policy	 implications	of	 this	 thesis	 as	 a	
whole	and	how	it	can	be	developed	in	future	research	projects.		
	
Theoretical	and	Policy	Implications	of	Research	
	
The	theoretical	and	policy	implications	of	research	into	international	cartels	and	developing	
countries	 can	 reach	 beyond	 merely	 aiding	 individual	 countries	 implement	 their	 own	
competition	 law	 systems.	 	 While	 developing	 countries	 are	 the	 most	 likely	 targets	 when	
considering	 international	cartel	behaviour,	developed	countries	also	often	find	themselves	
subject	 to	 the	 activities	 of	 international	 anti-competitive	 behaviour.	 	 While	 some	 of	 the	
solutions,	 particularly	 the	 strategies	 that	 are	 employed	 on	 a	 domestic	 level	 such	 as	
competition	 advocacy	 and	 reallocating	 of	 resources,	 may	 not	 be	 wholly	 applicable,	
governments	 of	 developed	 countries	 should	 nevertheless	 take	 note	 of	 the	 global	
suggestions	for	reform.		Because	international	cartels	often	target	markets	foreign	to	their	
own,	 cooperation	 is	 often	 crucial	 when	 dealing	 with	 these	 types	 of	 cartels.	 	 Developed	
countries	 can	 also	 face	 the	 same	difficulties	 developing	 countries	 do	when	 attempting	 to	
collect	evidence	in	a	foreign	jurisdiction,	especially	if	there	is	no	existing	agreement	in	place.		
As	 such,	 most	 developed	 countries	 already	 have	 agreements	 allowing	 for	 the	 sharing	 of	
information	in	such	cases.		Some	of	these	agreements	have	been	discussed	in	the	previous	
chapter.	
	
The	2001	Nobel	Prize	Winner	for	Economic	Sciences,	Joseph	Stiglitz	said	it	most	succinctly,	
‘[A]	strong	competition	policy	is	not	just	a	luxury	to	be	enjoyed	by	rich	countries,	but	a	real	
necessity	 for	 those	 striving	 to	 create	 democratic	 market	 economies.’1	 	 A	 successful	
competition	 law	 system	 will	 not	 only	 better	 regulate	 prices	 within	 the	 market,	 but	 also	
should	 also	 aim	 to	 support	 the	 countries	 around	 it.	 	 Therefore,	 it	 should	 not	 be	 too	
controversial	to	state	in	this	age	of	globalisation,	we	should	abandon	this	notion	of	‘laissez-
faire’	and	.		Given	that	international	cartels	are	a	global	problem	and	are	not	solely	limited	
to	 developing	 countries,	 a	 global	 approach,	 in	 which	 every	 country,	 both	 developed	 and	
                                                
1	 Stiglitz,	 Joseph	 E.	 ‘Competing	 over	 competition	 policy,’	 (2001)	 Project	 Syndicate,	 available	 at	
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz.	
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developing,	 band	 together	 and	 cooperate	 with	 one	 another	 would	 be	 the	 most	 ideal	
solution.		However,	in	light	of	the	United	Kingdom’s	decision	to	leave	the	European	Union,	it	
would	appear	we	are	moving	away	from	globalisation	rather	than	towards	it.	
	
Implications	for	Future	Research	
	
While	this	thesis	focused	broadly	on	reforms	for	investigating	and	prosecuting	international	
cartels,	some	of	the	global	reform	strategies	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	can	also	be	
adapted	for	other	international	competition	policy	issues,	such	as	merger	regulation.		This	is	
especially	 relevant	 now	 as	 the	 future	 of	 international	 competition	 policy	 becomes	
increasingly	uncertain.		Following	the	United	Kingdom’s	decision	to	separate	from	the	EU,	or	
‘Brexit’,	competition	policy	between	these	two	jurisdictions	will	become	more	complicated	
in	the	future.		At	the	time	of	writing,	it	is	difficult	to	predict	how	these	policies	will	change.			
	
At	the	moment,	Regulation	1/2003	governs	merger	regulation	for	Member	States	in	the	EU.		
This	confers	a	number	of	benefits,	the	most	important	being	what	is	known	as	the	‘one-stop	
shop’	for	merger	regulation.		Companies	from	Member	States	wishing	to	merge	need	only	
apply	to	the	European	Commission	once	in	order	to	obtain	approval.		Once	the	UK	triggers	
Article	50	of	the	TFEU	and	withdraws	its	membership,	this	option	will	no	longer	be	available	
to	 merger	 agreements	 with	 both	 a	 UK	 and	 EU	 dimension.	 	 Merging	 companies	 in	 these	
jurisdictions	would	need	to	apply	to	the	UK’s	Competition	and	Markets	Authority	as	well	as	
the	European	Commission.	 	This	will	greatly	affect	 the	relationships	and	conduct	between	
businesses	 in	 either	 jurisdiction.	 	 For	 instance,	 applying	 to	 two	 separate	 competition	 law	
enforcement	agencies	may	result	in	increased	delays	in	the	decision-making	process	as	well	
as	inconsistencies	in	the	decisions	themselves.		For	now,	the	CMA	is	bound	by	the	decisions	
made	by	the	European	Commission.		After	‘Brexit,’	this	will	change.		UK	and	EU	companies	
merging	with	one	another	may	eventually	find	themselves	in	the	awkward	situation	where	
one	authority	has	allowed	a	merger	while	the	other	has	not.	
	
It	 can	 thus	 be	 seen	 that	 international	 competition	 law	 cooperation	 is	 vital	 for	 both	
international	 cartel	 and	 merger	 regulation.	 	 Strategies	 discussed	 in	 this	 thesis	 such	 as	
fostering	 cooperation	 between	 different	 jurisdictions	 and	 potentially	 developing	
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harmonised	 provisions	 designed	 specifically	 for	 mergers.	 	 Drafting	 transnational	 merger	
regulations	 can	 incorporate	 similar	 provisions	 as	 international	 cartel	 regulation.	 	 Because	
companies	 in	 developed	 countries	 are	 often	 incentivised	 to	 merge	 with	 companies	 in	
developing	countries	through	the	encouragement	of	foreign	investment,	more	emphasis	is	
needed	 on	 formulating	 strategies	 to	 protect	 them.	 	 Considerations	 such	 as	 merging	
companies’	combined	market	power	and	turnover	along	with	what	effect	it	will	have	on	the	
developing	countries	market	must	be	accounted	for.	 	 	 If	not,	developing	countries	run	the	
risk	of	seeing	their	local	enterprises	overtaken	by	larger,	foreign	firms.		This	can	be	seen	in	
the	 concerns	 consumers	 in	 China	 had	 regarding	 the	 announcement	 of	 large,	 Western	
corporations	 merging	 with	 beloved	 Chinese	 companies.	 	 Indeed,	 along	 with	 cartel	
regulation,	 merger	 control	 should	 be	 one	 of	 the	 provisions	 discussed	 in	 any	 newly	
established	 competition	 policy.	 	 The	 characteristics	 that	 define	 and	 give	 developing	
countries	 their	 status	also	makes	 them	highly	 susceptible	 to	abuse	of	dominance	conduct	
and	monopolies.	 	A	domestic	and	international	merger	control	policy	would	go	a	long	way	
towards	resolving	many	of	these	issues.		
	
Other	 future	 research	 projects	 that	 could	 encompass	 this	 thesis	 include	 revisiting	 the	
inclusion	of	more	 competition	 law	provisions	 in	 the	WTO.	 	Although	 this	 thesis	 discussed	
and	 subsequently	 discounted	 the	 possibility	 of	 establishing	 a	 comprehensive	 competition	
law	 agreement	 under	 the	 WTO,	 it	 is	 true	 that	 international	 trade	 law	 and	 international	
competition	law	share	many	characteristics.		Indeed,	the	WTO	has	recognised	the	existence	
of	these	overlaps	and	has	thus	incorporated	the	use	of	some	competition	law	provisions	in	
its	 Agreements.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Trade-Related	 Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	
Property	Rights	(TRIPS	Agreement)	contains	some	competition	law	provisions	in	relation	to	
intellectual	property	 law.	 	The	main	provisions	 in	 the	TRIPS	Agreement	 that	deal	with	 the	
application	 of	 competition	 are	 Article	 40,	 which	 deals	 with	 anticompetitive	 licensing	
practices,	and	Article	31,	which	deals	with	the	use	of	a	patent	without	authorisation	from	
the	 patent	 holder.	 	 Article	 31(k)	 in	 particular	 makes	 specific	 reference	 to	 the	 fact	 that	
members	are	not	required	the	conditions	needed	to	grant	a	compulsory	license	as	laid	out	
in	the	Article	in	order	to	remedy	a	practice	that	was	previously	held	to	be	anticompetitive.		
These	are	only	a	few	of	the	references	to	competition	law	that	the	TRIPS	Agreement	makes	
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and	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	many	of	 these	provision	only	make	 references	 to	general	
principles	of	competition	policy	and	not	substantive	rules	on	governing	competition.	
	
The	inclusion	of	general	competition	law	policies	into	the	TRIPS	Agreement	was	advocated	
for	 particularly	 strongly	 by	 developing	 countries.	 	 From	 this,	 we	 can	 deduce	 that	 while	
developing	countries	until	now	have	been	 resistant	 to	 the	 idea	of	 incorporating	a	general	
set	of	competition	law	rules	into	the	WTO,	they	do	recognise	its	importance	in	other	areas	
of	law.	
	
This	 thesis	 has	 already	 discussed	 how	 developing	 countries	 banded	 together	 during	 the	
Cancun	negotiations	 to	block	 the	adoption	of	even	a	minimal	 competition	 law	agreement	
against	 the	 express	 wishes	 of	 many	 developed	 countries,	 particularly	 the	 EU.	 	 Should	
discussions	or	further	research	into	the	incorporation	of	competition	law	into	the	WTO	ever	
take	place,	these	negotiations	must	take	greater	account	of	the	specific	needs	of	developing	
countries	and	tailor	any	provisions	that	are	discussed	to	suit	them	accordingly.	
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